Ottoman History Podcast - States of Emergency in the Late Ottoman Empire

Episode Date: February 28, 2018

Episode 349 with Noémi Lévy-Aksu hosted by Taylan Güngör and Michael Talbot Download the podcast Feed | iTunes | GooglePlay | SoundCloud Idare-i örfiyye (or örfi idare), loosely translated as a “state of emergency or siege,” was a neologism introduced in the first Ottoman constitution in 1876 to allow the suspension of ordinary legal order in Ottoman localities in case of actual or potential uprisings. While the term clearly referred to the Ottoman legal tradition, the idare-i örfiyye was also inspired by contemporary definitions of regimes of exception in France and other countries. This conversation offers an insight into the genesis of this legal notion and seeks to understand the political, geographic and social impact of the widespread implementation of idare-i örfiyye in the Ottoman provinces during Abdülhamid II reign and the early Young Turk period. « Click for More »

Hello and welcome to another episode of the Ottoman History Podcast. State of emergency in the late Ottoman Empire. Michael Tolbert and I, Thailand Genghis, will be discussing the introduction of the Idari Urfiyah during the first constitutional period, 1876-1878, with Dr Noemi Levi-Aksu, British Academy Newton International Fellow of Birkbeck College School of Law and also a former member of Boazici University History Department. Noemi, if I can start off by asking what is the Idari Urfieh and where does it come from and what does it mean? The Idari Urfieh is a kind of state of emergency but I tend to refrain from translating it because it has its specific dynamics. So I think we'll use the term Idariyyeviyen. It's a notion which was introduced in the first Ottoman constitution in 1876.

And as every kind of state of emergency or state of siege, another notion which was used in this period, it allows a suspension of the normal legal order in exceptional circumstances in a specific place. So this is basically the definition you can find in the Article 113 in the Ottoman Constitution of 1876. Could you perhaps tell us about the ways in which the Ottoman state had dealt with these sorts of situations prior to the first constitution? The idea of he is actually both new and old in the sense that this is a notion which makes sense in the context of a constitutional

state that is allowing for suspension of the constitutional or legal order. And within this constitutional framework, this is the tension which is inherent to all kinds of state of siege or state of emergency established in Europe in this period. But of course, the Ottoman state had already faced exceptional dangers in its history and many of them. expeditions, appointment of military governors, something which was actually very frequent, especially if you look at the border regions, especially in the Balkan area. So there were already many ways to deal with specific challenges, especially rebels, rebellions, and wars. As you kind of mentioned, this isn't the first period of conflict that the Ottoman Empire has suffered in its history. But what's particular about the threats that it faces in this later part of the 19th century that require this new kind of legal regime?

invention of the notion is connected to two aspects of Ottoman history in this time. And the first one, as I said before, is constitutionalism. So the emergence of a new legal political order, which requires a further definition of policies, which may be contrary to this order. This is the first thing. And the second thing which you mentioned is, of course, threats. And there were actually many threats in this long 19th century, foreign threats or threats from foreign powers and internal threats, both being often connected, the rise of national movements, especially in the Balkan area in this period. So if you look at the very period when the state of emergency was invented and codified,

it coincided with the rising tensions in the Balkan area, especially rising tensions with Russia. especially rising tensions with Russia. And actually the first implementation of the state of emergency was during the Russian-Ottoman War in 1877. So I think it's important to take into account this context and this first implementation as well in order to understand the political and social meaning of the notions, especially in this region, this specific region, the Balkan. We've framed this time as a start of constitutionism. There's the new political order.

It's a long 19th century. We have the rise of national movements and it's coincided with rising tensions. Specifically, you're looking at Balkans, and you've mentioned the key events of the Russian-Ottoman war in 1877. So these are all the milieu where Idariyurfi emerges from. But is there a specific trigger that requires or a specific impetus from the Ottoman government to come up with something that is relatively new in terms of their legal understanding of implementation of military rule, or however you want to translate idar-irfiya. What is the triggering? Or is there a single triggering point for introducing this? It's difficult to say, actually. And as you know, the first constitutional period remained relatively little studied compared to the second one or other periods.

And I think there is still a lot to do about the genesis of this constitution. There are a few important works by Aileen Cochignon and others about the discussions which actually led to the first constitution. And I think this gives an insight into how D.A. Daré, as well as many actually other notions or other articles of the constitution, were born. And in many cases included D.A. Daré, D.A. Daré, I think we have to deal with both inspirations from the West, to put it in this way, and other constitutional and legal frameworks. And at the same time, a desire to root the constitutional idea and the new constitutional text into the Ottoman political legal tradition. And I guess this is exactly what happened with the Idari-Offier. On the one hand, being inspired by other frameworks, especially the French one. And actually, if you look at the article of the Constitution, which I mentioned before, 113, it has many similarities with the 1848 articles in the French cases. And I guess this is one of the main factor

with this contemporary elaboration of the state of siege or state of emergency in other countries. But on the other hand, the very terminology that was adopted for the state of emergency in the Ottoman context, that is this term Idariye ofie, brings not to local customs in this case, but rather to what we could define as the Lex Principis, or the power of the sovereign to make law. And I think it was also very important for the commission that drafted the first constitution to root such a notion in a longer Ottoman tradition, political and legal tradition. And that's where we can locate Diyafi Deri as this product of both internal and external influences.

I'd like to pick up on what you mentioned about this being a time of inspiration from the West. Obviously, this is the period of constitutionalism, the first constitutional era, and how Western templates were being applied in the Ottoman Empire. Is it fair to say that urfidari, or state of emergency emergency is an extension of constitutionalism? Is it a logical outcome of having a constitution in a polity like the Ottoman Empire? Yes and no. I mean, yes, in the sense that both in legal and political studies,

legal and political studies, as you know, the state of emergencies and similar versions of what we could call in a broad sense states of exception have been tightly connected to this constitutional order as a tension within constitutionalism, as a tension within sometimes democracies or democratic states, and without which actually these states cannot be taught. So there is this very tight link which we can observe in various countries. And indeed, I mean, if you look at the constitutional states of the time, all of them, to my knowledge, had this kind of provisions which that enabled the constitutional state to suspend the constitutional, to suspend fundamental rights within the constitution. And this is, I guess, important in the Ottoman case. And this is what makes the Al-Faeda be a new notion in this context.

the Al-Fidari may be a new notion in this context. But on the other side, I would argue and I argue in my work that the Al-Fidari, because it's also kind of continual political and legal tradition that had a longer history in the Ottoman case, that had a longer history in the Ottoman case, it should also be conceived beyond this constitutional framework. And in this respect, I guess one of the most interesting periods to study is the period after the suspension of the constitution in 1878. That is when de facto, if not de jure, the constitution is suspended, the parliament is also suspended, but the Alfi Idaray continued to be implemented, either

extended or also we can talk of new implementations in various localities. And I think it leads us on another aspect of the Ophidare, which is not essential to constitutionalism, and which actually can be parallel to other cases than non-constitutional states such as Russia. And that's why the comparative framework in which we can study the Ophiidae, in my opinion, should include not only the Western constitutional states, but also a broader array of countries, especially Russia, in which we can observe these dynamics. Not only the constitutional states take seriously this possibility to suspend legal order or to use exceptional measures and to put them in the law.

In your work, you've looked at specific examples, particularly around the areas of the Balkans under Ottoman control. What would the daily experiences of locals living under the Urf-i Daray be? Could you give us any illustrations, perhaps? First of all, it should be said that the experience of the Urf-i Daray depended on who you were. I mean, and I guess there were many factors such as social, ethnic affiliations that made the Orfidarei vary according to the subjects. Basically, what the Orfidarei implied when the Orfidarei was imposed, curfew was established,

publications, associations, rites of gatherings were suspended, weapons were to be collected, and in order to do so, the military forces had the right to search private houses day and night. So there were this kind of specific measures that could impact the daily life of the inhabitants. But one of the major aspects of the Ophidare and one that materialized the exceptional order that was imposed on them was the creation of court martial in order to try the suspects of disorders in this context. And this court martial had the power to sentence without any possibility of appeal, the ones who were considered as guilty of any political disorders or infringements of

public order. We observed this actually, my work was not specifically centered on the Balkan when I started, but because most of the cases that I could find from the period of Abdulhamid II and early first constitutional period belonged to the Balkan, I focused more on this, not exclusively on this. So what we see about the way the RFI was implemented, we can see it through both the Ottoman archives and also the British archives. And we see it both from the perspective of the military authorities, that is gathering troops and enabling these troops to play a major role in policing and maintaining order. And we can see it also through petitions that were sent by subjects to the diplomatic representations and also to the Ottoman states. And there what they say about the Erfi Daray is mainly the abuses committed by the military

forces, violences, searching houses without reason, and in short, abusing the authority, without reason, and in short, abusing their authority, arresting arbitrarily people who were not, according to the petition, as guilty, such as teachers, such as honest subjects, to put it in their terms. And the main complaint, and I guess the main effect of the Auf Wiedersehen was this intrusion of the military forces in the everyday life and an intrusion which that was often brutal and that disrupted this daily life, at least for some subjects, especially the non-Muslims in the Balkan case. The ability of the state to interfere in people's daily lives in this case seems to be ridiculously extensive. I mean, you spoke about curfews and getting rid of the freedom of assembly and the freedom of free speech.

What happens to these individuals who are arrested? I mean, first of all, do we have a sense of the scale? How many people are we talking dozens or hundreds or thousands? How many people fall foul of these laws? How many people are we talking dozens or hundreds or thousands? How many people fall foul of these laws? And then when they do get arrested, what kind of fate is in store for them in terms of their punishment? by this court martial. And one reason for this is that I was not able to find extensive records for this court. I could find a few records of interrogations and of trials, but very few, actually. And we can find about others in diplomatic correspondences. So they mentioned it, but of course, it does not help to make a kind of quantitative approach to this question.

What we know better is how this court-martial worked. And actually, there were court-martial, but they were not entirely military courts. They were actually mixed courts, including both civil and military staff. And their main specificity was that they acted according or they tried according to the military penal code that had been adopted in 1869 instead of the normal penal code. 1869, instead of the normal penal court. And that the procedure was very different than the one that had been established for the Nizamiye court.

And as you know, justice reform had been one of the main aspects of the Tanzimat. So in these reforms of the Tanzimat and the Nizami courts, the principle of accountability, the principle of appeal was very central to the new institution. In the case of the Ofidari and this court martial, the verdict was immediate and the application of the verdict was immediate as well. of the verdict was immediate as well. So there was not any possibility of appeal and the implementation of death penalty was much easier than it was the case in the Nizamiya courts.

Death penalty public executions were actually very closely associated to the Ofida, especially to the Aufiederer, especially in the Balkan area, with kind of public execution as a sign of restoration of public order. And interestingly, if you look at what the military staff said about the Aufiederer, especially I'm thinking of Ahmed Mouktar Pasha, who was appointed after the Russian-Ottoman war in order to reestablish order and reform the region of Monastir.

And he has a very interesting and long report, actually, on the necessity of the Ofida in this region. The justification is first social conditions and constant disorders done. But then there is another justification and other arguments develop them. And this argument is the incapacity of the legal order of the Tanzimat, of the Nizamiya courts to perform justice in a sufficiently efficient and spectacular way. And because nobody is afraid of the Nizamiya courts, because everyone knows that these courts are very slow, that they are lenient, according to Ahmed Murtabash, nobody would fear to be tried. And this does not deter anyone from committing crimes. On the other hand, on the contrary, according to Ahmed Moutabasha,

court-martial and their spectacular expeditive arbitrary justice is a strong deterrent for the potential criminals and is thinking and speaking mostly about bandits and gangs. So punishment and spectacular punishment, expeditive justice is indeed very central to both the implementation but also actually the legitimization of the Al-Fidari by the authorities and is in your hands. So we seem to be seeing this application of the idare-i urfiye after the Tanzimat, after the establishment of the Nizamiye courts

as a reaction to their inefficiency, as a reaction to the slow process, and to act as a deterrent to enable court-martials to establish authority, establish some kind of control in certain regions. You've mentioned diplomatic correspondences where we can trace complaints, where we can trace experiences of locals, of foreigners as well. And my question is something that you've touched on in your research, which is the international response to this state of emergency. It's the international curiosity, it's their reaction to the Ottoman

suspension of the normal state of affairs. Particularly, you look at the privileges, the capitulations of foreigners in Ottoman lands. Could you give us any illustrations? Could you give us any examples of sources you've seen where we see a reaction to this establishment of a state of emergency? Sure. Actually, this came out as a surprise when I started my research.

This is not something I had thought about at all. when I started my research, this is not something I had thought about at all. I mean, I saw this more as a kind of internal affair, local or imperial, but I had not thought really about the international reactions or implication. And actually, these reactions started as soon as the Constitution was promulgated in 1876. I remember finding in the French Diplomatic Archives a draft of the Constitution was promulgated in 1876. I remember finding in the French diplomatic archives a draft of the Constitution with this Article 113 and with a kind of red ink underlining this Ida-Ré-Yaufier term and definition saying, we must be careful, this is something that may go against the capitulation.

And this idea actually continued with the first implementation of D.I. Dariye-Yofie in 1877 during the Ottoman War, as soon as D.I. Dariye-Yofie was first implemented in Istanbul. And of course, because this was the capital, this had a specific impact. And almost immediately, foreign powers, France, Great Britain and others, petitioned collectively to the port in order to protest the Idariye Ofiye. And to protest actually one aspect of the Idariei Ofiei they were displeased with, that is the possible inclusion of foreigners within the scope of the Idariei Ofiei. That actually was not explicit in the constitutional definition nor in any other text.

But the Idari of Ida is defined in the first constitution in territorial terms. That is, the Idari of Ida is to be proclaimed and implemented in a specific territory. This is the same, actually, with other versions, I mean, in other countries. I mean, the state of siege, and in many cases, actually, there is even this fiction of siege that is a part of the territory that is singled out of the whole territory as if it were besieged. You don't have the fiction, the same fiction in the Ottoman case, but you have the same idea. You are taking a part of the territory out of the normal territory and you are implementing them, their specific order.

them their specific order. Now, this idea, according to the great powers, according to the diplomatic representatives, had the potential to be contrary to the capitulations and the privilege of extraterritoriality in the sense that there was nothing saying that the foreigners would be exempted from such an implementation. in Salonika, in Monastir, in all the places where the Idareo Fie was implemented, they always got the answer that there was no exception for the foreigners. But under the pressures of these foreign powers, the Ottoman state issued a memorandum that reiterated the fact that there would not be exceptions for the foreigners, but that allowed the foreigners to go away from the specific region under the Auf Wiedersehen

within a few days. So they had the possibility to go away from this region. And if they wanted to stay, then they would be subject to the al-fidari but they could benefit from consular aid or legal aid or interpreter or this kind of legal provisions. I guess one of the things that's worth reminding our listeners is that these capitulations give European powers

extensive rights over indigenous Ottoman communities it's worth reminding our listeners is that these capitulations give European powers extensive rights over indigenous Ottoman communities, if you like, so over various non-Muslim communities. So do we then see any examples of the British or the French or the Russian ambassador, for example, trying to intercede on behalf of someone who was an Ottoman subject, but treating them as if they were a foreigner in inverted commas. Yes, it happened a lot actually in the Balkan, I mean, in the region of Salonika Monastery. And that was one of the reasons for these petitions issued by Greeks or Slavic populations that actually were claiming for protection, that were protesting against the arbitrary or the brutality of the Ottoman state, but beyond that, that were seeking an escape from the court martial.

And in some instances, I mean, I'm thinking mostly of the British consuls in Salonika Monastery, they did intervene, most often, though, for their own national, I mean, purely British national. Sometimes they did for other Ottoman subjects as well. I mean, I have in mind the case of a teacher, for example, that was arrested for nationalist propaganda because of the books he had in his house. So in these cases, we see attempt from the part of the consuls to go to the military staff or governor and try to intercede without much success, though, because as I say, I mean, we can

see this encounter between two legal factions, actually, the ones being extraterritoriality and this idea or capitulations, this idea that these people were in the Ottoman Empire but were not

subject to the law of the Ottoman Empire. And on the other hand, this other fiction, this fiction of the territory was within the Ottoman Empire, but it was kind of singled apart from the rest of the Ottoman Empire in a legal and political way. And of course, the only possible answer to such a confrontation between two incompatible legal fictions was negotiations. And interestingly, throughout the period, these negotiations went on, but at no point the question was solved in a definite way. And I think the reason was that neither the great powers nor the Ottoman Empire had actually the capacity or the power to solve it totally. So they were both trying to keep their interests on a kapaka or local basis.

But if you look at the regulations that were issued throughout the period, and there were not many actually on the earth, there is not a single word about the foreigners. So we've seen the interest of the great powers in the exterritoriality of the foreigners in Ottoman lands. You mentioned before that French diplomats had noticed Article 113 and had noted that they must be careful about this article. And we also know that the état de siège, state of emergency,

idare, euphie, is all of the similar genre, of the similar idea of constitutionalism and of the similar idea of a state of siege. First of all, did the French notice that there was some kind of similarity between their understanding of state of emergency or état de siège

and the Ottoman definition and application of état de siège? And Ottoman definition and application of état de siège. And what does that mean in terms of our translation of idare-i urfiye or urfi-i idari or any other way that they framed it? I guess that the French or the British noticed the similarities in the sense that they translated the term idarei ofie by état-siège most often. I mean, state of siege or état-siège, even in the British Occupy. So they were aware that this kind of provisions was very similar to the ones they had in their own constitution. similar to the ones they had in their own constitution. And of course, as I said before, the Ottomans were very much aware that this concept existed in other constitutions.

Actually, one of the terms they considered before opting for Fidari was muhasara ali, for Fidari was Muhassara Ali. And this is the exact translation for Etat Siege or State of Siege. And this is a term that was used, for example, in Ottoman newspapers during the French Commune. So even before the constitution and even before the term was invented in the Ottoman constitution, this notion and what it implied was known by the Ottoman statesmen and even a broader audience, I would say. The term itself and its translation, as I said before, I mean, I prefer not to translate

it. And the reason for this is first that in the Ottoman case, there is no idea of war at all. So when you have the state of siege, a notion such as the state of siege, this implies a military metaphor. that there is either a real war ongoing or something like a war, a fictional war, and that you have a territory which is just like war or just us in the circumstances of war. In the Ottoman case, you have nothing like this in the notion Idariyya or Fiyah. On the contrary, you have this rule of the earth, this rule of the sovereign that is emphasized. And this is something that is very structural, very much rooted in specific Ottoman or Islamic legal political tradition. And that's why also I tend not to use the term state of emergency for the same reason,

no military metaphor, no idea at all of emergency, either in the terminology or in the everyday application. And I think this is something which explains how the Idariyya Fiyah very soon became a kind of regular tool of governance in the Balkan and later on in other provinces as well. I mean, this has to do with legal tradition, political tradition and also tradition of governance in the Ottoman case. tradition and also tradition of governance in the Ottoman case. I mean, it's interesting, but also kind of deeply depressing that you say that this becomes the norm for the rule of governance in the region. And of course, when we look at more recent history, particularly in the history of the Republic of Turkey, we've seen a number of instances of states of emergency, of periods of martial law, including, of course, most recently after the attempted coup just last year. So how far do you see, as a historian kind of witnessing these events, how far do you see these as a legacy of the Idariyye Erfiye?

Is this a direct descendant of these kind of legal regimes that we find in the Ottoman Empire transmitted into the Turkish Republic? Or has it kind of mutated over time into something distinct? My project is also to extend my current research on the Ottoman Empire to the Republican era as well. And I do think that there are important elements of continuity between both, elements of continuity between both, starting from the legal framework. And indeed, this decree on Orphi Idar version that was preferred in the Republican period, remained used in the Republican period actually quite later on. I mean, until the 1960s. Now it's kind of forgotten by the young generations. It does not evoke anything.

But for the older generations, this is something which is very well known. Another element, both of continuity and difference, but an element that for sure should be taken into account in this evaluation of the legacy is geography. And as I said before, in the late Ottoman Empire, the Ophiida, was mostly implemented in the Balkan. And unsurprisingly, because there were both foreign and internal threats, national movements. By the 1890s onwards, it started to be used as well in Eastern Anatolia. And this was connected mostly to the Armenian movement. mostly to the Armenian movement.

Of course, during the Balkan War and the First World War, this ofiidare was extensively used, both in the Balkan and then in Eastern Anatolia, and this court martial had an important role in the Armenian genocide. So this was an implementation that continued throughout the period of transition from the Ottoman Empire through the Republican era. Now, if we look at the implementation during the Republican era, we see a kind of continuity in the geography as well. Of course, many parts

of the Balkan were no more part of the Turkish Republic. But interestingly, if you look at the list of the state of emergency implemented in the Republican era, one of the regions that comes first is the region of Edirne in Thrace. So because of this border, because of the proximity with Greece. But the other main region that emerged during the Republican era for the implementation of the Ophidare is, of course, eastern and southeastern Anatolia. Within this idea of legacy, I think it's important to take into account not only the very notion of FIDAR, but also different kinds of regimes of exception that were either associated with it or implemented beyond or besides it. And I think that's what characterized the Republican era and somehow differently from the Ottoman period, that is the elaboration of a kind of, how to say, a superposition of regimes of exceptions, law of exceptions,

that could be used in various circumstances in order to face various threats. And I just give one or two examples. First, 1925, this Takriri Sukun, this law on the maintenance of order that was used after Shaysaid rebellion, and that applied to the whole Turkish territory. And there was a very interesting debate in the parliament, in the assembly at that time, on the need of such a measure while the Auf Wiedersehen was already implemented there.

And there was a kind of consensus on the idea that several regimes of exception used conjointly or alternatively was the best way to establish order and maintain order. Another example, the laws on settlement adopted in the 1930s that also were associated in many respects, in many cases with application of the state of emergency. But to put it very short, I mean, But to put it very short, I mean, during the Republican era, one of the main functions of the state of emergency and other regimes of exceptions was to deal with the Kurdish issue and was to deal with actual threats against public order or against the regime, but also to deal with what was conceived as a kind of structural enemy of the regime. And we see it maybe in the clearest terms after 1980, in the 1990s, with this oral that was applied in eastern, south-eastern Anatolia, and that opened the way to a wide range of forms of state violence and infringements on rights. We've looked at Muhassara Hali, Urfi Dariye, Sikiyon Itim, and more contemporarily, Olan Istuhal.

So we've traced this legal concept from the late Ottoman Empire all the way to the Turkish Republic and more contemporarily as well. What's next when it comes to looking at this legal concept? What else needs to be done? A lot needs to be done, actually, and little has been done. So one aspect is the legal and political meaning of these notions in their continuity, but also in their specificity and their relations to constitutionalism. What they mean, not only in terms of exceptionality, but what they mean also for the political system of the late Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey. The other aspect is related to the effects of such regimes of exceptions, the social effects, the local effect, what that means for the population that are under these

regimes. And I think it's very important, it's also not very much done, to study these notions not only from the center or from their legal or political meaning in a kind of theoretical way, which is the thing which is the most done for states of exception in various contexts, but also to try to understand the impact, the everyday life of the citizens in different ways according to the geography, the period, but also the social and ethnic

affiliation of the subjects in the Ottoman Empire but also the citizens in the case of modern Turkey. And I think that it is important even if you look at Tudez or Anus Tuhal, you cannot understand what is Oral if you don't take into account

what it means for different categories of population. I would just like to say, and I'm sure many of our listeners will appreciate this too, is that very often historians, no matter how good they are, and we've had some fantastic historians on this show, historians often find it kind of hard to justify their existence in a number of ways. Their research topics can be quite abstract. They can be in such a distant past that it's hard for people to see what they mean today. And listening to you speak now, it's clear that

your research is not only fascinating, but it's of such immediate, and one might you speak now, it's clear that your research is not only fascinating, but it's of such immediate and one might even say urgent relevance. And so I'm sure speaking, at least for myself, that we are really, really looking forward to seeing the fruits of this really important bit of thinking and historical investigation. So thank you. Thank you so much. Thank you very much. Actually, I wish it had not been so urgent, you know, relevant to the present. But yes, you are right. Indeed, it's a very topical issue. And with that, our thanks goes to Dr. Noemi Liviak, from myself and Dr. Michael Talbot.

Yes, thank you so much again. It was really brilliant. Thank you very much. If you'd like to find out more on this topic or to listen to other podcasts, you can go to our website, www.ottomanhistorypodcast.com where there is a relevant bibliography on the topic we've discussed today. Remember to also follow us on Facebook. I'm Tainan Gingur. Thanks for listening.