PBS News Hour - Full Show - European officials on the challenges of navigating Trump's foreign policy

Episode Date: July 10, 2026

At a key summit, President Trump airs grievances against NATO allies, makes clear he's still eyeing Greenland and weighs the U.S. military presence in Europe. Compass Points moderator Nick Schifrin discusses the challenges of navigating an unpredictable American president with Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braže, Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken and Kaja Kallas, the EU's top diplomat. PBS News is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy

Confronting NATO, President Trump declares there was a lot of love in the room at a key security summit after airing grievances against key allies and making clear he's still eyeing Greenland, all while weighing America's military presence in Europe. Tonight, the challenges of navigating an unpredictable president. Coming up on Compass Points. Hello and welcome to a special edition of Compass Points from Ankara, Turkey. President Trump brought his longstanding criticisms to this NATO summit that member countries aren't spending enough on defense and not supporting the U.S. U.S. war against Iran. European leaders counter there are spending more and are helping with Iran. But in the stages of grief, Europe is now in the acceptance phase, no longer denying the U.S. will reduce its military presence in Europe, but instead trying to manage the transition,

as you will hear tonight from Belgium's defense minister, Europe's top diplomat and first, Latvia's foreign minister by Babraze. We are here at the NATO summit and we'll focus on NATO, but I have to ask about Iran first. How important is it to you, how important is it to NATO and Europe in general, that the war between the United States and Iran not restart? I think it's crucially important for all of us, not only for Europe or for the U.S., it's also for the whole of Asia. And the principle of free navigation in Hormuz Straits are crucial.

It's international waterways, so international law applies to that. So Iranian efforts to try to impose some type of control are not only illegal. it affects many people in the world. So it's just stopping. Let me turn here to NATO. You know, I talk to you a lot about this. President Trump says a lot of things in public, sees in Greenland, criticizing European allies

for not spending enough on defense, we're not supporting the US in its war against Iran. But we heard from the Secretary General Mark Gruta saying, we've never had this level of unity. How is it possible of this much unity if the president says what he says? He didn't see president's expression, so I can comment on those.

But what I can say about the summit is that it was a great show of unity. It was really a consensus in the room about the need to increase defense spending. And this message has been there from all the US administrations since the 50s, so there's nothing new about it for anyone. And then of course there are allies that respond forcefully. We have enshrined in law 5% of GDP for defense spending. Others are doing it in different ways, but it was older in the summit. Everybody was explaining what they are doing, how they are increasing defense,

both spending but also defense industry capacity. What we need is real deployability of troops and capabilities. We need also technological adaptability. When we see how Ukraine is able to defend against much larger Russian force, they do it with technological superiority, innovation, agility, That's what we all need. So there is still way ahead for NATO to adopt, but already now, NATO is able to deter against all threats.

You said in the room, this, of course, was the two-hour-plus meeting between the leaders that went long. Again, we hear certain things in public from the president. Is the mood different privately? Is there more consensus between Washington and European allies in private than we see in public? I think it's not only President Trump, I think all of us say things to the media in a particular way,

because that's media and that's public information. And of course, very often politicians also sort of try to get attention. Domestic audience, you're saying? Domestic audiences. So I come from diplomacy. My background is slightly different. But, and then when you sit at the table, when you have to actually make decisions to solve certain issues,

you look at the merits, You look at where you have to get at what time, what are the resources you have, you know, what you need to achieve, what outcomes. This is Defense Alliance. This is, you know, we as politicians have to make the right decisions so that our military is able to deter and defend, and we need to support them, so they know what to do.

And so I wonder in that sense, is there a slightly different stage of grief, if it will, in Europe, an acceptance that the US presence in Europe will go down, go down rather than a denial. And now just trying to mitigate any kind of damage as this transition to a more European NATO takes place. Every U.S. administration has a posture review. And that concerns not only Europe, also other parts of the world. They look at what their national interests are, obviously. That's why U.S. had security strategies. That's why the U.S. had the defense strategy. We all do that. And then they also look what's the best way to achieve certain results. So if we speak

about the force projections that the US needs, for example, for Middle East, for Africa, there is no better place than Europe where to still have those bases. I mean going from Europe into the middle of it. So US will always have the interest in Europe. Then all together as NATO, we do deterrence against the threats. We have two threats that we have all set. One is Russia as the most significant long-term threat for the alliance and our peoples and countries and terrorism as a most significant asymmetric threat to our people. So we need to be able to work and pull what is needed all together against both of those

threats. And as the U.S. does yet another review of its forces and its bases in Europe, is there a concern in Europe that the U.S. will leave too quickly, that it will force Europe to step up before forward ready. I don't think so. I don't think so. Because that is a task, again, of all of us working together to see, we still have the task to ensure deterrence defense against all these threats.

So what's the most optimal way how can show that? Because it's not only what you have on the ground or right there. It's also how you reinforce, how you achieve certain effects. Let me switch to Ukraine. We have seen Ukraine get some progress, some momentum in recent months, not only seizing a little bit of their own territory, but also long-range strikes into Russia, especially against energy targets, and medium strikes, medium-range strikes against Russian supply lines that are affecting, especially southeast Ukraine, the occupied parts of Ukraine.

And yet even a senior NATO official said that, look, there is still some momentum of Russia on the battlefield. What can be done from the West's perspective to actually help Ukraine change? the strategic calculus and not just have some tactical successes. That's a very relevant question and if we knew that and had a good answer, we would have achieved that already. So for us, we have assessed that we need to increase still Ukrainian ability to defend herself. This week all Russian ballistic missiles got through. Almost all, almost all. And Ukraine shortage of air defense?

Exactly. So Ukrainian defenses, air defenses, but also also others. We need Ukraine also to be stronger in its ability to be to to hold the front. So yes they are doing that with with technological ability. There's a kill zone of drones you know you saw the reports of Russian soldiers survivability when they arrive on the front lasting 15 to minutes to half an hour. You know it's a pretty sort of tragic perspective for anybody who is there. So So Ukraine has to be able to hold it because Russia, from what we have seen, has not changed its objectives. Gaining more territories, subjugating Ukraine, having political objectives, you know, like Russian language as official language,

which would mean extinction of Ukrainian identity, basically, and so on and so forth. So strengthening Ukraine, imposing costs on Russia and affecting Russia's ability to fight the war, so warfighting capabilities. And that we do by denying Russia money. So more sanctions, especially oil, gas, other natural resources, that is more than half of Russia's federal budget, denying Russia technology. And we are not doing too well there because Russia's missiles contain quite a bit of western elements. And on that air defense question, how important is it that the U.S., the West, figure out a way to get more missiles created?

There was quite a bit of discussion around those things. Our own production, supplies to Ukraine, replacements, you know, everything around. But as I said, it's also the international sort of partnerships that need to be denied for Russia, because Russia is trying to evade sanctions, whether those are American sanctions, European sanctions, other sanctions. So working with the countries around the world, exchanging data on customs. What is going where? What are the sudden increase? you know, to be pretty transparent to everyone, because then it's possible to identify

where Russians are trying to sort of do that. Piber Razor, thank you very much. You're welcome. Next up, my conversation with Belgium's Defense Minister Theo Franken. Minister Franken, thank you very much. One of the main American messages here is that Europe must take over its own defense

and spend more on its military. And recently, American officials have shifted their language from burden sharing to burden shifting to Europe. Is the U.S. asking Europe to do too much too quickly, and does that make Europe vulnerable? I think that when we're talking about withdrawing troops and new NATO force model, that we can fill in the gaps that on the short term, on the median term, we really need to step up. And we're stepping up. We cannot build Rome in one day. We are stepping up last year with a in the NATO Defense review, the spending on 5%, everybody is increasing the budget,

and we're stepping up on production. I think that we're on a very logical pathway towards getting the security architecture of Europe in our own hands again. We will take it in our own hands again. Of course, you cannot do it like in two days. It takes some time, but we're doing it. The pathway is logical but slow, as it seems like you're acknowledging. There are capabilities to only the U.S. has.

historically provided. I'm thinking about long-range missiles, I'm talking about transport aircraft, satellite architecture. There have been announcements this week at NATO to get to some of those, but are you able, are you trying to replace backfill what only the U.S. has provided in the past? Yes, we have Ukraine, you know? That's like the biggest laboratory of defense industry and technology of the world since probably 50 years. So Ukraine is making long-range missiles. Very cheap, actually. We built with Ukraine, learned from Ukraine,

work together with Ukraine, but also work together with the United States companies. I saw the CEOs of Boeing, of Ration, they're all here, and they're very open for business. It is not that they say it stops with America. America is only producing for America. No, absolutely not. They're open for business.

They're absolutely demanding for co-production in Europe, working together with European allies. So for me, there is no problem, absolutely not. You mentioned a review by the United States undergoing yet another review of its force posture, a number of troops in Europe, as well as bases in Europe. Secretary Hegseff has said that he'll consult with not only Congress in the U.S. but with allies. But he's also suggested that there might be a kind of nice and naughty list. There might be a list of allies that the U.S. likes and the list of allies that the U.S.

does not like, is that how the US do you know is approaching this review? Are they consulting with you as they do this review of troops in Europe? I think that they're working on this. We didn't have official contact on that for the moment. But of course, we know what the frustration are coming out of America. It is about defense spending, about being a free rider, and it's about like not closing airspace or closing some military bases. when we're talking about trying to fix the problems in the Middle East.

So it is pretty logic and I think it's pretty normal from an American point of view that they're really pushing on these points. So do I think that there are lists of countries who are like very collaborative and other countries where there's a lot of frustration? I think, I don't know if it's a list on paper, but the list in the heads is mentally there is a lot of lists, I think. Is the mood shift? I mean, it seems to me like when I came here last year,

European defense officials especially, we're trying to prevent this shift. We're trying to hold the U.S. back. In some ways, has the mood shifted such that European officials are now acknowledging the U.S. is going to draw down and are therefore just trying to mitigate any kind of damage that could happen as the U.S. does that. Yes, I think that there is a major concern about the security

architecture of Europe, of NATO, our alliance, the strength of our alliance. We cannot be divided. We have to show unity. United we stand, divided we fall. And that is a major concern. That remains to be the major point on the political level. And just to make sure, concern that what, that the United States will leave Europe vulnerable? No, that there's on both sides of the Atlantic.

So much miscomprehension that we're not even talking of having dialogue and that we're not listening to each other. You don't think there's dialogue and there's no listening right now? There's a lot of dialogue, but there's also a lot of frustration from both sides of the Atlantic. And I think that's what SecGen is doing trying to really keep on. Secretary General is doing a treaty talking all the time with all allies, also really trying to, capture the message coming out from Washington, I think that's the way he has to do it. And he's doing a great job when you ask me,

showing also what the capabilities are that we're creating, the innovation, the funding, the industrial cooperation, and we're rebuilding our armed forces. And that is something that we need to reassure Washington that we hear the message and that we're doing and acting and not hesitate. and like only talking but not doing anything, no, we're doing concrete stuff. Is the frustration, though, threatening the alliance cohesion already?

No, I don't think so. I think that the military is working. He's doing a great job on NATO level. American soldiers are doing so much. We have so much of them in Belgium. They're so welcome. So no, I don't want to believe that. So no, absolutely not.

We talked about a posture review that the U.S. but the U.S. has already reduced its presence in Europe from four to three brigade combat teams. Long-range strike battalion will no longer be deployed, some weapon systems left Europe to fight Iran in the Middle East. Has there already been an erosion of conventional military in Europe today? So they're withdrawing troops, but we're stepping in in the NATO force model. And when we Europeans say and hear that Americans are stopping or diminishing their conventional troops in Europe, how can we be surprised? This has been announced for so many years and we know what we need to do and we're doing it. So for me, I don't think this is the biggest concern of European leadership.

We will really mitigate this, but cannot sleep. We have to be awake. now is awake. I can't tell you that. So also, that is the main message. We are awake. We're working on it. We were sleeping for way too long. We know. But we get a message and we're working on it. Minister Theo Franklin, thank you very much. Thank you. And finally, Kayakhalas, Estonia's former prime minister, now the European Union's top diplomat. Kayakalas, thanks very much. Good to see you again. Good to be here. One year at this summit, I asked, you whether Europe believes that the U.S. will come to Europe's defense. And you said,

quote, I hope Article 5 applies to all member states. You told me you regretted using that word, but nonetheless, today, do you feel more or less confident that the U.S. will come to Europe's defense if need be? Yes, because we have been asking that question and got a reply that, yes, Article 5 is ironclad and U.S. is behind its allies. Despite any of the public statements from the President of the United States or any of his senior allies, you have that face. Well, the foreign policy is always domestic policy or politics, and it is clear that the movements that we have in different countries are also having an effect on the external relations that we have. But I think the fundamentals are there, and that's a very important also message to our adversaries, don't even think about our way because we are strong together.

One of the challenges between the U.S. and Europe, of course, in the last year has been Greenland. It seemed that the president backed off on Greenland, but here in Ankara, he said that Greenland should be controlled by the United States, not Denmark. How can NATO, how can the Europe-U.S. relationship function when, despite everything that has been said in the last few months, it seems that the president still does not acknowledge that Greenland is part of Denmark, does not respect the sovereignty of European countries. Well, we should maybe look beyond the rhetorics because it's clear that European countries have been very strongly backing Denmark and sending very clear messages also when it was in January

that Greenland is part of Denmark because it's the choice of Greenlandic people. Europe resisted in that sense, and that was seen as a successful confrontation with the president, if you were. We don't look for confrontation. I think we have always worked better. when we are aligned. I mean, when it comes to different regions in the world, when it comes to Indo-Pacific, when it comes to also Western Balkans or other places, we are doing much better if we are working together.

Let me shift to Ukraine. We've certainly seen Ukraine seize some momentum. We've seen some long-range strikes at Russian energy facilities. We've seen some interdiction of Russian supply lines, especially into Crimea. But this week, a senior NATO official said, quote, Russia retains operational advantage momentum on the battlefield. Is that how you see it even after four plus years of war? No, we don't see it. We see Russia is in a weaker position than they have ever been before when we look at their economy but also in terms of military.

But it doesn't mean that they are not dangerous. They are still dangerous and they are not in a place where they come to the negotiation table to sit down with Ukraine who has offered. various ceasefires to negotiate, actually, to stop this war. So we need to do everything, also together with our allies, partners. We put Russia in a place where they actually come to negotiate. And you've seen no evidence of any change on Russia's negotiating stance, right? Unfortunately not.

They are still playing games. And at the same time, we see Ukraine very vulnerable. We saw multiple Russian missiles hit Kiev, and President Zelenskyy. admitting that he was basically out of air defense. Europe has struggled to bridge the gap between U.S. air defense capabilities and European. How can the West get Ukraine the missiles that it needs in order to protect itself? Well, if you look at the drone interceptor rates, they are very, very high. They're over 95 to 97 percent. But yes, ballistic missiles are a big problem because Ukraine doesn't have the air defense.

We need to really work together. I mean, Ukraine can help also countries who have been confronting the drone attacks to put up their drone defenses, but at the same time, they need really the air defense interceptors and they need these capabilities. And we are going to discuss also, you know, countries have, some countries have them in the stocks, how to make sure that they will give them now to Ukraine. and they really need to defend their civilians in Ukraine. You mentioned pressure inside Russia, especially on the economy,

and we've seen some interesting movements inside Russia. We've seen some prominent questioning of the war in Ukraine, including from think tanks, military bloggers, former officials even wrote that the elites were talking about Putin's war and not our war. How much pressure is Putin under, do you think, today? And will it change his behavior in any way? Well, it's hard to say, of course, we don't see into his mind.

But it's clear that these voices that were not there a year ago are there. Yes, because they see the impact also of the war in Moscow, in St. Petersburg. It is coming to their territory. So they clearly see also the impact that it has on the economy. Will these voices, you know, prevail, stop this war and come to the table? This is what we are trying to message also. I don't know that. There's been tension finally on Iran.

The president has criticized Europe over Iran. But I want to ask a big picture question. Iran's military, of course, has been set back. But on the other side, it is trying to exert control over the strait. We're seeing Middle Eastern countries hedge toward Iran in ways that we didn't see before the war. Bottom line, is Europe better off since this war was launched? Well, it's for the historians to do. decide. I think right now we are in the middle of it still, considering that we are in the 60 days

phase where we need to negotiate the heart part when it comes to the nuclear. The number of understanding and the final. Yes. And nuclear issues when it comes to also the opening or keeping the straightover moves toll free and the freedom of navigation respected. So there are so many elements still. We are still in the middle and we are trying to help because we have the expertise when it comes to the nuclear file, for example, and we can provide our support. I've interviewed you many times, though. You took a big sigh when I asked that question.

Is there a sentiment in Europe that Europe is less well off after that war was launched? Well, I'm not a big supporter of wars. I mean, we have too many wars in the world right now. Are people better off after these wars? Usually not. I mean, these are decided by some people to start the war. and the cost of it is spared by the others. High Representative Kayakalas, thank you very much.

Thank you. And that's it from us from Ankara. Thank you for joining us. We'll see you here again next week on Compass Points.