PBS News Hour - Full Show - How long the U.S. and Arab allies can afford to sustain the war on Iran

Episode Date: March 7, 2026

The U.S. and Israel unleashed the region's largest conflict in more than two decades. As the Iran war expands, there are questions about how long the U.S. can sustain the war and what Trump's endgame could be. Compass Points moderator Nick Schifrin discusses what's at stake with Firas Maksad, Danielle Pletka, Wendy Sherman and Ray Takeyh. PBS News is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy

The risks and rewards of war in the Middle East. The U.S. and Israel unleashed the region's largest conflict in one in two decades. President Trump indicates it could last four to five weeks or, quote, forever. And as the war expands, anxious Arab allies need American protection that the U.S. could struggle to provide. How long will the U.S. sustain the war and what is President Trump's endgame? Coming up on Compass Points. Hello and welcome to Compass Points. It has been more than 20 years since the United States launched this large,

military operation in the Middle East. And that buildup fueled nearly 20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, it's a war alongside Israel on Iran. The Pentagon says it is not Iraq. It is not endless. And the specific military goals are to destroy Iran's missile and military infrastructure and the Navy. But U.S. and Israeli officials also envision changing the Islamic Republic's regime. And it is the second time just this year. The U.S. has helped remove the head of a country's government. Here tonight to help us understand how we got here, what's at stake, and what's to come are Faras Maksad, the managing director for Middle East and North Africa at the Eurasia Group. Danielle Pletka, a distinguished senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Ambassador

Wendy Sherman, former Deputy Secretary of State, and Ray Take, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Thank you all very much. Such a pleasure to have you here. Let me start with just the big question. And let me start with you, Ambassador Wendy Sherman. Was it in U.S. interests to launch this war on Iran with Israel? I think good to be with you and with everyone today, Nick. I think everybody here would agree that this regime is terrible, that it suppressed its people, that it's slaughtered its own citizens who protested against the government,

that they have ambitions to really control the Middle East. They have proxies. They had tried to get an ability to head to a nuclear weapon, which I think we stopped, but we can talk about that more later. So there's a lot of odious, repressive, oppressive parts of this regime. But it's been that way for quite some time. And there was no imminent threat, in my view, to the United States. And so this is a war of choice.

I would say it's also a war of chaos and confusion. And we don't know what the objective is, what the exit plan is, how much it's going to cost the American taxpayer, ostensibly a billion dollars a day right now. And Americans care about their own pocketbooks right now and wondering what the heck we're doing. Danielle Parker. So I agree with Wendy, shockingly.

I just not expect that, to be honest. We often agree, Danielle. We often agree. We often agree. I agree that it's hard to make the case that there was an imminent threat. You know, I don't think that, and I don't think if you press President Trump, he would say, tomorrow X was going to happen.

I think that the challenge that he saw, and one that I do agree with, is that Iran was proving itself entirely unwilling to moderate its nuclear weapons program, its missile program, its support for Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, the Hashdashabee and Iraq, all the bad guys. that as they were increasing their capabilities on the missile and the drone front, and we see this now, of course, in what they're doing, that they were beginning to pose a threat that couldn't be countered. And that I do agree with. Couldn't be countered diplomatically, you're saying?

Couldn't be countered diplomatically, but also, frankly, militarily. You know, we need to be realistic in understanding that the capabilities of a country like Iran, while their military, there's no relationship to our military, they can inflict a lot of damage. They are. They can kill a lot of innocent people,

and of course that's their strategy. They don't aim, they're not aiming for bases. They like killing people. And this is what they do. They kill their own. They kill the foreigners. So I understand that if you come to that conclusion and the president came to that conclusion

after some pretty serious efforts at coming to a compromise, and I think some fair offers to them on things that could reassure them, he came to the conclusion that they're not going to do a deal. And this is too big a danger to tolerate. Right. Taki, this is really hard to ask.

But what has been the Iranian response to this war? We did see some videos early on celebrating the death as Supreme Leader. We have since seen the regime throw people into the streets for their own rallies. Do we know how Iran is responding to this war? It is hard to assess public opinion. It's hard to assess public opinion in this country, much less public opinion in a country where you don't have access and you kind of make generalization about what 90 million people think. I suspect that there isn't that much mourning for Ali Khamenei.

I suspect because of everything we've seen, there is substantial opposition to the regime. And I suspect that those who support the regime are fortified in their support for the regime, given everything that has happened. The question that I don't know the answer to is at which point does, the majority of the Iranian public continue their opposition, continue their doubts about the regime while also becoming disenchanted with foreigners who are bombing them. I mean, presumably, you can have two ideas at the same time. These are being bombs in densely populated urban areas and there's possibility of collateral

damage and so forth. We already seen that. So I don't know what that breaking point is without being able to assess public opinion in a detail way. And for us, Maxid, let's zoom out. just at the beginning here, because Iran's responses have been, what the U.S. military says, over 1,000 missiles, drones at the entire region. So let's talk about that. For as far as you can tell, how has the Arab states in the region, especially the Gulf, responded to the war, but also

responded to how Iran has responded to the war. Yeah, well, first, Nick, it's very clear that the Iranian response function here is to expand the war. This started as a three-way shootout, between Israel and the US on one hand and Iran and the other. Today, we're talking by last count, some 14 countries impacted by this. As far as Sri Lanka, where an Iranian Navy ship was sunk, and then drones striking at Cyprus where there are British bases there,

ballistic missile headed towards Turkey that was intercepted. So this is having a big impact on the entire region. And Iran intends to share the pain with the neighbor. Second, what the Iranians are clearly doing, through targeting of energy, but also civilians, is to try primarily through these Arab countries, which you mentioned, the Arab Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and others,

to get them to feel the pain, but also to get them to pile the pressure on Washington, D.C., to bring this war to a close. I don't think that this is a winning strategy. These Gulf countries have nowhere to go. It's not like there's another security partner for them waiting in China or in Russia. They are tethered to the U.S.

And instead, what we're seeing, and these are early days today, I think, is day six is the first week. What we're seeing is that they're closing ranks with the United States. And in fact, they might allow the United States some access to basing and airspace that they haven't allowed. They were very careful in the onset not to align themselves completely with the U.S. They, in fact, blocked the U.S. from using their territory offensively, and that is changing. Absolutely. So that gets us to the U.S. goals. So let us listen to Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, laying out what he called,

the relatively short-term military goals, but also the longer-term political vision. The objectives of this operation are to destroy their ballistic missile capability and make sure they can't rebuild it, and make sure that they can't hide behind that to have a nuclear program. That's the objective of the mission. That said, abundantly clear, we would love for there to be in Iran that's not governed by radical Shia clerics. Daniel Pucker, can you have simultaneously a relatively limited military mission and a long-term? term idea for regime change? Well, I think if you're Donald Trump, you can.

Look, you know, this is a really important and interesting distinction to me. If you're a nerd, I'm going to bring Ray into this one. She means that in the nicest way possible. Like, I do. I am a nerd. I'm not. You are super cool. For me. I'll just speak for myself.

If you're a nerd, you think about these things. You ask that kind of hard question, right? How do I calibrate? How do I get a good regime, but also one that supports America, that doesn't repress people? You think about who? Who could be there? You think about what kind of elections they could have. If you're a neo-conservative like me, you do all those things.

Donald Trump is no neo-conservative. He's just not. And so I think, and obviously he doesn't call and confide in me. But everything I understand from talking to people who are close to the president is, His thinking is, no, I'm going to deal with that problem, as Rubio said. I'm going to deal with that other problem, as Rubio said. I'm going to give the Iranian people the latitude to do what they need to do. And I'm going to have a veto over whoever they're going to choose to cough up if I don't like them.

And if the government isn't one to Danny Pletka's liking, Wendy Sherman's liking, I don't give a damn. And I don't even need to decide right now. Right. And if you have that attitude, and you can call it a Trump doctrine if you want, then as long as Iran doesn't become a threat again, as long as Iran doesn't enter into an insurgency, as long as, you know, there are a lot of caveats, then, okay, mission accomplished. So, Danny, I would say... As a non-Trump voter, I do think that's the president's approach to life. But one of the many objectives that he and Secretary Rubio, Secretary Hegsteth, and others have played out, President has said Venezuela is his template.

Well, if Venezuela... Venezuela, just to make sure everybody understand. So the idea of removing the head of the regime but leaving everyone now intact and conducting gunboat diplomacy to achieve your objectives. Exactly. Get oil, get gold, get whatever you can. Very transactional, as you pointed out. If that is true in Iran, A, and the Iranian experts know better than I, that's not likely to happen here.

And secondly, it leaves the Iranian people as an afterthought. And when the president began all of this, he began it by saying after so many people were slaughtered in those protests, I'm going to have your back. We're going to have your back. Well, if it's a Venezuela template, their back is not going to be held. their lives are going to be had. Ray, I mean, you and I have heard lots of Iranians say that there was a moral clarity from the White House, that they felt like they did not receive the backing that they expected, and that they're worried, fast forward today, of the U.S. actually seeing this through.

What Marco Rubio said was very important, because what he was essentially saying is that the United States will use force against Iran when there's no nuclear urgency. He was saying essentially that the new doctrine is that we will disable their conventional forces, defense fortification, air missile networks. And what he was saying actually in that sentence, that this is not the end of this. In about seven, eight, nine months, ten months when Iranians rebuild those particular fortification, as they were almost certainly do, this will be repeated. So that particular statement in terms of identification of the American objective is rather poignant.

because it's pregnant with so many different implications. And the Israelis understand that. The Israelis understand that this is pastures you have to visit and revisit. I'm not sure if the American people, the representative, and even the president understands that. But this is the new normal. And the question is, how far are the Iranian capabilities

are being degraded to delay the interval between the uses of force? What the Israelis call mowing the lawn? Correct. Exactly. Correct. Now, in terms of the Iranian people, people uprising. As I said, I don't know what the tipping point will be when they become

disenchanted with foreign intervention, if there will be a tipping point. What the idea here is, and it's a provocative idea, that if the regime is sufficiently weakened, next time there's a social protest movement, it will succeed. That's the theory of the case. Is it implausible? No. It could happen. Is it likely? Most certainly, most certainly, most likely no, because the regime that comes out of this experience is likely to be far more vicious. And what the reason why the previous uprising was repressed in such dramatic way is because the point that the regime wanted to convey to its public was that we may lose wars abroad, but we're capable of maintaining order at home.

For us, let me bring in what a U.S. official told me about this. We reject the pottery barn rule, right? This is what the senior U.S. official said, which of course was Colin Powell, Secretary of convincing President George W. Bush before he went to war in Iraq. If you break it, you own it. So this U.S. official today says, we reject that idea. Does the U.S. have a responsibility to fix something that it breaks? I think the U.S. very much does,

and that's part of the reason why so many of these countries in the region were so hesitant to lobby the president for a conflict, very much preferred a diplomatic outcome. Very much on their mind, to us it might have been very distant, but to them, not the case, is Iraq. I mean, even the closest of American partners told the United States don't go into Iraq, it's going to come apart at the seams,

it's going to be a problem for a very long time that animates events in the region. There is concern that Iran might end up being just that kind of problem because Iran is a vast country, it's multi-ethnic, it's got neighbors that have interests on designs on its territories. And so there is this concern

that the U.S. might cut loose at the end of this. But I do have to say that the view from the region is not nearly as pessimistic as some of us have described it here. There is that view that this might not be a war of choice, but it could be a war of opportunity. Iran is the weakest that it's been, perhaps since the Islamic Revolution, I should say, in 1979.

It showed signs of rejuvenating not only its ballistic missile capabilities, but it's weakened proxy network, that forward defense strategy of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Shia militias in Iraq, the Houthis, and Hamas. And so why not strike when Iran is weak? That is a thinking that animates much of the decision-making and the conversations in the region still.

Yeah. Can I usurp your role for a second? No, please. I want to ask a question that I think will be interesting to people. I mean, the reality is the pottery barn, rule hasn't obtained almost ever in reality. Including a pottery barn. Including a pottery barn.

That still exists. We went into Libya with our NATO allies and then we're like, this place stinks, bye. And, you know, and basically ignore the field. Right. Right. We, we, we, yes, I remember. We pretended to the Syrian people that we cared that they were being assaulted with chemical

weapons, made a few statements about it, and then we're like, never mind. So, you know, the idea that we have been responsible about these things. But the big question I wanted to follow up with Ray is, what gets us to that tipping point that you're talking about? Well, damn it. I'm not sure if that tipping point will be approached, will be crossed. It requires a level of analysis into public opinion with a level of access that. I realize this is an unsatisfactory answer, but I just don't have that. Meaning we just can't know. And of course, that goes...

Well, in a situation like this, having lived through 79 revolution and study it, all assumptions have to be reconsidered every day. Everybody in a situation like this has to be a watchmaker. Put themselves apart and put yourself together every day. Because what you believe in 9 a.m. may be true, but it won't be true the next day. This is an extraordinary volatile situation. Let's step back to see what happened. The United States bombed Iran twice in eight months.

It killed the supreme leader of the country, and it decapitated the leader. This is a big deal. So if you offering certainty in this particular atmosphere and environment, I think this is an occasion that requires extraordinary degree of modesty. As my father might say, the only certainty is uncertainty. Yes, and I agree. I think a lot of humility is needed by all of us in this. And to your point, yes, this is where the Gulf States,

may be today, but if drones hit more of not only civilian targets, but energy targets, they may feel differently over time. The same thing applies, I think, to everyone. And Iran, as you know, is a country of 92 million people. So even polling there, even if you could, it's a vast job to really understand dynamically what's going on in the country. And to that point, what are the risk? I would characterize perhaps where these countries are.

the Arab partners is that if you're going to do this, and they were very hesitant, again, preferred the diplomatic track. But if you're going to do this, do this right and stick with it, get it done with it because there is no love lost for the Iranian regime. But as those drone strikes continue, and my view is that we're going to increasingly see this shift from being perhaps an Israel-centric war where long-range ballistic missiles are at play to a drone war focus on the GCC. As that happen, you're going to start hearing a lot of Arab concerns about, well, was this war fought because Bibi Natanyahu wanted it despite us preferring the diplomatic track? And what is the United States doing to defend it? And what happens to Gaza? What happens to the Palestinians? It sort of goes

by the wayside. And it's so fascinating that we've now caught on Zelensky and Ukraine to help us figure out how to deal with the drones. And it'll be interesting. They offered, to be fair. Yes, I know they offered. But the dynamic is quite interesting, given the geopolitics. And Danielle, was this a war that Netanyahu finally found an American president who was willing to launch? You know, it's funny.

No, I don't think that's true at all. One of the things that I found frustrating about the many, many premierships of Benjamin Netanyahu is that he's always talked a really tough game. always warned about the imminence of the Iranian nuclear weapons breakout, and yet has never been willing to act. Never been willing to act. In fact, when Israel bombed Syria during the Syrian nuclear reactor, which probably belonged to the Iranians in some way as well,

there was a different prime minister in power. And so... About Netanyahu's described to me and others that October 7th has changed him, right? And look, it changed everybody. It changed everybody who cared about the region. It changed all of us who care about Israel. But again, the president made a decision to move

in the aftermath of the demonstrations, and Benjamin Nassanahu told him, I'm not ready. So the idea that somehow America is game to fight Israel's war is just a trope. And a lot of reporting I've done suggests that the timing of the war came because both Mossad and CIA had information about where the Supreme Leader was going to be

Saturday morning, and they kind of jointly decided, hey, this is, you know, to that weakness, to that vulnerability. Let me bring in one other thought here at the end, and what this says about Trump's use of the military. So this week, the Pentagon explained that it now has, or is getting total air superiority over Iran, total air control, which allows them to use certain types of weapons, right? We're referring this a little bit, that are just much more plentiful, much cheaper. And that led the president to write this on True Social. He wrote, we have a virtually unlimited supply of these weapons. Wars can be fought forever and very successfully using just these supplies.

Wars can be fought forever. Compared that to first term Donald Trump. I campaigned on ending the endless wars. We're all over the world fighting wars. Half the places, nobody even knows what they're doing over there. But really, the plan is to get out of endless wars. to bring our soldiers back home, to not be policing agents all over the world.

We will keep America out of foolish, stupid, ridiculous, foreign wars. Danielle, reconcile these Trumps for us. Well, you know, foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds. Someone said that I could never figure out what the provenance was. I think Donald Trump is not in any way troubled by what he said previously for the simple reason that he doesn't think that this is going to be be an endless war, and then we go back to the previous conversation. He's not trying to refashion Iran in the image of a Jeffersonian America.

He is trying to get rid of the bad guys, and he doesn't really care as long as they're not really bad guys afterwards. This is the Venezuela example. I don't love it, but I think that the story of Venezuela isn't closed, and I suspect when the shooting stops in Iran, the story will not be closed either. And, Ray, is there a risk to that idea in Iran specifically? I don't think that Venezuela paradigm applies here, because the Islamic Republic is not a personalized dictatorship.

It's a system, it's the ideological system, with a cadre and so forth, and it has more deep roots in this society as such. So the decapitation and having somebody else come to power that is compliant, I don't think that's the correct reading of the situation. I do think it's possible for the United States and Iran to have negotiations after this.

And I'm sure there are Iranians who are reaching out in order to just stop the bombing and have some kind of a dialogue, as was the case before. But I think this is a problem with the president has reconceptualized the idea of power and how power is used. Maybe in aftermath of Iraq, America was too hesitant, maybe now is too bold. And America always oscillates between hubris and humility. The pendulum never lands in the middle.

So we may be overreaching and then the self-correction will happen. New paradigm of power, Wendy, why don't you go last? 45 seconds. I do think there's a new paradigm. And it used to be that you always needed a credible threat of military force in a negotiation like this to be successful. But it was a last resort, not a first resort. And I think President Trump has decided that the military is his first choice, not his last choice. And I think he's done that because it means that we focus on that, not on what people in their everyday lives in America are caring about. And I think it has become very effective for him and useful for him to change the subject and to get

Nick Schifrin to lead us in this discussion. Well, thank you guys. Really appreciate it. Wendy Sherman, Vrasmachad, Ray Takke, Daniel Plekka. Thank you very much. And thank you for watching. That's all the time we have. I'm Nick Schiffren.

We'll see it here again next week on Compass Points.