PBS News Hour - Full Show - In Munich, NATO leaders assess America's reliability as an ally

Episode Date: February 14, 2026

The Munich Security Conference is one of the world's key diplomatic gatherings. This year, a serious and almost shocking question hangs over the event: Is the United States still a reliable ally? Compass Points moderator Nick Schifrin is in Munich and spoke with three leaders: NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand. PBS News is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy

President Trump, demolition man. From here in Munich, an influential report accuses America's commander-in-chief of damaging the global order and establishing an era of wrecking ball politics or sweeping destruction is the order of the day. We speak to European and Canadian leaders about their relationship with the president and the United States. Tonight on a special edition of Compass Points. Hello and welcome to a very special edition of Compass Points from the Munich Security Conference,

one of the world's annual diplomatic gatherings. There is a serious, almost shocking question being asked across Europe today. Is the United States a reliable ally? The answer to that question is being fiercely debated here, and I spoke to three key NATO leaders who are helping chart new futures for their countries and institutions. NATO Secretary General Mark Ruta, Finland's president, Alexander Stubb, but we begin with my conversation with Canada's Foreign Minister, Anita Anand. Madam Foreign Minister, thanks very much.

Good, see you. I want to start with an excerpt from the Munich Security conference report that was released ahead of the conference beginning. Quote, the world has entered a period of wrecking ball politics. The U.S.-led post-1945 international order is now under destruction, and the most powerful of those who take the axe to existing rules and institutions is U.S. President Donald Trump. Is that a fair characterization? The speech that Prime Minister Carnegie gave in Devils represents Canadian foreign policy,

and that... ...led a rupture. Exactly, not a transition, a rupture. And middle powers need to work together in order to ensure that we are advancing our own sovereign interests, but also our collective interests. And that's exactly what Canada is doing, whether you look at Ukraine, whether you look at Arctic security and sovereignty, and numerous other examples. We work with other countries and we ensure that the interests of the Canadian public, from economic resilience to domestic defense and security, are always front and center.

Is the source of the rupture, though, a lack of faith in the United States, whether on a leader-to-leader level or among the public? I mean, a new Politico poll out this week says 57 percent of Canadians do not see the U.S. is reliable out. We are looking to double non-U.S. trade over the next 10 years. The United States is making decisions that are in its sovereign interests and capacity to do so. And we as a country need to do the same, advancing our economic interests by signing 12 trade agreements over the last six months across four continents. That's the type of leadership that the Kearney government is exemplifying.

I mean, what's fascinating about your answer is you're looking beyond the United States. and I keep asking about the United States, which of course is, you know, historically Canada's most important ally, let alone neighbor, the prime minister's speech, right? You know, he said, we're in the midst of a rupture, not a transition. The middle powers must act together. If we're not at the table, we're on the menu. After that speech, President Trump said this. Canada lives because of the United States, remember that mark the next time you make your statements, a remarkably personal statement by the President of the United States. There's been a lot said since, but given now that we have pressure over a bridge between Canada and Michigan. What is the state of U.S. Canada?

The Prime Minister and the President spoke and are working to resolve the issues that have been raised. But I want to go back to your point that the United States and Canada have been integral trading and defense and security partners for decades upon decades upon decades. And we will continue to work closely with them. I just returned from Newk Greenland. where we opened a Canadian consulate. And I will say that the United States work in terms of defense and security with Canada and with other Arctic allies is extremely important.

We have to work together to confront the actual threat emerging on the other side of the Arctic Circle as Russian infrastructure moves further and further north. That's values-based realism. That's middle-power cooperation that Canada's continue. to do with other Arctic allies.

On the bridge, I mentioned the Gordi Howe International Bridge that connects Canada and Michigan. Named after a hockey player. Absolutely. The president and the Prime Minister, as you said, spoke about that. Did the President indicate that he understood that the bridge will be co-owned by Canada and Michigan and that Canada actually paid for the construction despite the president's claims, false claims, otherwise? I know that the Prime Minister was clarifying some of the points you mentioned, but let's take a step back and think of the broader relationship from an economic standpoint. We are looking

forward to review of the USMCA, which is the Free Trade Agreement. There was a report that President Trump had already decided to pull out. Have you been told that at all? I have not. And certainly, we are looking to cooperate with the United States on a number of fronts. The point that I am making is that domestic economic resilience will be advanced, not only through negotiations with the United States, but by doubling non-U.S. trade over the next 10 years, by seeking free trade agreements.

Part of the reach out to you, if you will, beyond the United States, of course, was to Beijing. And that's where the Prime Minister went before that speech in Davos. And Carney's, you know, almost battle cry, you know, going to the barricades for the middle powers to unite against those rupturing the global order. Isn't that the opposite of going to Beijing? which itself is trying to rupture the global order?

There is an element of pragmatism in our foreign policy. And part of the approach with Beijing was to ensure that we are resolving specific trade frictions. So you're defining that narrowly. China defines itself as a more stable, possible partner to the rest of the world. Do you think China is a more stable partner than the United States? I think that we as a country, as a middle power, as Prime Minister Kearney mentioned, in his Davos speech, will be looking to ensure that we're advancing the interests of the Canadian economy and Canadian defense and security relationships.

That means ensuring that we have existing multilateral alliances that work for Canada, but that we are also taking the time to form new relationships where that is in the interest of our country. Is there a reliability question or not? We are working very well with the United States. I'll say I have a close relationship with Secretary Rubio and the work continues to ensure cooperation around the globe. Canada is a country that is rules-based

and advances rules-based multilateralism. We are also a country that is pragmatic and principled in this ever-changing geopolitical environment. I need a non-form minister for Canada. Thank you very much. Thank you. Next up, Secretary General Mark Ruta, who perhaps more than any one person has worked with President Trump to keep the transatlantic alliance as strong as possible.

Secretary General Mark Ruta, good to see you again. Thank you very much. The written report that launched the Munich Security Conference concludes this, quote, The world has entered a period of wrecking ball politics and the most powerful of those who take the acts to existing rules and institutions is U.S. President Donald Trump. It's a sentiment I'm hearing a lot here

that even though the president's Greenland threats are off the table, there's been damage done. How much damage do you think has been done? Well, I'm much more positive. I would even say that NATO, the organization, which I'm representing here, is stronger than ever. And lastly, thanks to President Trump, I'm not sure we would ever have reached this famous 2% defense spending

in the end of last year without him. Big nations like Italy, Spain, Canada, Belgium, far below and now getting on these 2%. And then we had the summit in the Hague where we reached a 5% defense spending target, which is staggering. And we did it as NATO as a whole. And this is important because it equalizes the spending in Europe and Canada with the United States, taking away a big air attempt.

This week, the Pentagon's top policy official, Elbridge Colby visited Brussels, spoke to NATO, and laid out a kind of division between the United States and Europe. He said the U.S. would provide nuclear deterrence, and the U.S. general would be NATO's supreme Allied commander, while Europe eventually would provide its own conventional defense and the regional operational commands. Have you discussed with the U.S. the timeline on that when the U.S. wants to start drawing down the conventional forces? This will take time because what for the U.S. is crucial important is that they see the seriousness.

They see a Europe, take Germany, it is now spending over 150 billion euros in 29, twice as much as in 2021. It's an enormous amount of money. It is already today they're spending three times what they were spending in 2014. So they are seeing not only Germany but also other countries. Most of the European nations now really ramping up defense spending, taking it serious. And yes, it is true. The US wants to pivot more towards Asia, but also Brits Colby in the speech yesterday said, we know that longer term there is a threat not only in the Pacific,

but also the threat that if in the Pacific the Chinese would move against Taiwan or whatever, that Russia would keep us busy here. Although, forgive me, but Colby, at least in the release that we got, did not mention the word Russia in his speech. Well, he mentioned at least that there might be something happening here. I'm not sure that I heard Russia, but he was very clear. It might be... Is there a concern, though, that the Trump administration

does not see Russia as a long-term threat by Europe? No, no, we had the Hague Summer Declaration, where Russia was again by all allies, including American President, acknowledged to be the long-term threat to NATO. Let's go to the idea of the idea of conventional defense. As you put it yourself recently, quote, if anyone thinks that the European or Europe as a whole can defend itself without the US, keep on dreaming. You can't. So is this idea of Europe defending itself conventionally today just aspirational? No, what it means is that within NATO, where we stick together the US and Europe, that the Europeans will take more of a leadership role. That's happening as we speak. That the Europeans will take more care of their own defense happening as we speak together with the Canadian. But nobody in Europe I speak with wants to separate the US from NATO. NATO is crucial for the US itself, for your security,

because you need a secure Europe, Atlantic and Arctic, you keep the United States safe. And we need NATO here in Europe and in Canada to keep ourselves collectively safe. So there is nobody who wants to split, but people want to make sure that Europe is taking this leadership role more upon ourselves than we did in the past here in Europe. You're right. Nobody I talked to wants to split, certainly,

and Europe is taking that leadership role, but there are European officials who are telling me and telling you no doubt that they are worried about the U.S. commitment. And I had a European foreign minister today at this conference say that Europe cannot defend itself conventionally, at least not fast enough, as this person said, so that this minister is going to raise the idea of more European countries getting nuclear weapons beyond France and beyond the United Kingdom.

Is that a good idea? Well, there is, of course, crucial umbrella from the United States, the long-term guarantor. The nuclear umbrella, which is the ultimate guarantor of freedom here in Europe. And then obviously we have others also having nuclear arms like the French and the Brits, and you can have always how to splice and share that, whatever. But nobody doubts in Europe. That's great.

But the ultimate guarantor is the nuclear umbrella from the United States. It has to do with the size of that nuclear deterrent. That's not quite what I ask. Are there European officials who are acknowledging to you that they are concerned? or talking about the idea of European nuclear weapons beyond the French. But you see many discussions, you will always have discussions about everything. There is of course the non-strategic nuclear capabilities in Europe from the United States, and there is the nuclear umbrella itself.

But for me, important is that's there, but going for longer term, there will always be a strong US presence also conventional in Europe. Oh, so you have gotten guaranteed. from the United States. But there's no doubt, and the US can never, you cannot, because otherwise there is no escalation possible, you would go from nothing to nuclear. So for many, but it will be different from now. There will be more pivot towards Asia, overtime, the Europeans taking even more command

of their own security and safety. One more question on nuclear though. German Chancellor Frederick Merz said at this conference that he in French, President Manuel Macron, were having, quote, nuclear deterrence discussions. Today, France does not promise. it will use its nuclear weapons to protect all of Europe, should it? Well, again, the French are in total control of their own nuclear deterrence. And we have the Brits.

They share that within NATO. As you know, the French are outside the NATO nuclear talks and structures. And of course we have, but for me and for everybody, it's clear that if you want to defend this part of Europe against the might and power of the Russians. And by the way, the build-up of the might and power, the Chinese who will have a thousand nuclear warheads by 2030. That it's good to have these debates in Europe. But there is no alternative than to have this ultimate guarantee of our freedom,

which is this massive and mighty U.S. nuclear returns. Finally, let's switch to Ukraine. President Zelensky recently said that he had zero, zero air defense missiles and had to watch some Russian missiles hit Kiev the other night. First of all, do you know if that's accurate? And is the West fundamentally able to provide Ukraine the weapons, especially air defense, it needs? Well, again, here, the U.S. is critical. The U.S. has said, we are willing to deliver, and they are doing it. A massive stream of lethal support. No blocs, no pauses, no delays.

No pauses, no blocks, nothing. They're delivering at the tune of a billion euros a month, so that there will be about 15 billion again for this year in dollars and 12 billion euros. Critical, lethal and non-lethal, including the interceptors to take out, Russian missiles. But there aren't enough, as you've discussed, paid for by European and Canadian allies. The truth is also that the Russians have a lot of these missiles and that, of course,

the Europeans also are looking what they can do still to deliver from their own stockpiles. But are there enough? I mean, can the collective West are Ukraine enough? To be sure, we can help Ukraine to defend itself. Eugen is, by the way, also developing its own capability to produce more of this themselves. Air defense is the hardest.

But this so-called pearl. initiative where the Americans deliver. The prioritization of American weapons, bought by Europe going to Ukraine. Exactly, bought by the Europeans and the Canadians. But it's crucial for Ukraine. Okay. Secretary General Mark Ruta, thank you very much. Thank you very much.

Now Finland's President Alexander Stubb, who, like Ruta, has been instrumental in Europe's efforts to communicate with President Trump. President Stub, thanks very much. Good to see you. The German Chancellor, Frederick Merck, opened this conference saying, the current world order, as we know it, is over.

And the written report that was published ahead of this conference blamed President Trump for, quote, taking the axe to the system that has ensured European security for decades. Do you agree with those statements? No, I've just written a book saying that the world order is actually in transition. So let's not throw the baby out with the bathwater. World orders change. After World War I, it lasted for two decades,

after World War II for four decades, and after the Cold War for three decades. So now we're looking for something new. And for me, it's very important that the transatlantic partnership still stands in the middle of it. There is enormous angst among some of the Europeans I speak to, and I acknowledge it's divisions within Europe, but still, enormous angst. And I had a European foreign minister at this conference tell me that Europe cannot defend itself conventionally, lack of a trust in the United States or losing trust. This minister is going to raise the idea of more European countries getting nuclear weapons beyond France and the United Kingdom.

Is that a conversation that's actually been happening? Is that a good idea? Well, first, I'd disagree with the minister in question. I mean, the full-finished defense composure with 830 miles of border with Russia is based on our capability to defend ourselves. Conventionally. Conventionally. The reason we have one million men and women who've been trade in Arctic conditions. We have 62 F-18s.

We just bought 64 F-35s. We have long-range missiles, air, land, and sea, and we have. the biggest artillery in Europe together with Poland, so I don't want to hear anyone telling me that we can't defend ourselves. Then as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, I think we still need the U.S. nuclear umbrella. NATO is based on three deterrent pillars, and nuclear is one of them. Of course, we have some nuclear weapons in the U.K., obviously in France, but the key umbrella comes from the United States, and it is in the interest of the United States to have a country like Finland, defending themselves conventionally close to Mormons, close to the Kuala Peninsula,

where Russia holds there's nuclear weapons. So I don't see that in the cars. Chancellor Mertz said today that he was speaking to Emmanuel Macron, France, the idea of France providing protection to Europe with its own nuclear weapons, something that France, decision that France has not made yet. Is that a sign, do you think, that there is some doubt in the U.S. nuclear umbrella? No, I don't think there should be any doubt in that. I think the whole nuclear posture of the world is changing in the sense that previously had two big players, Russia and the US. Now you have a third one, in other words, China with 600 nuclear warheads going to 1,500. So this sort of changes the landscape. And of course, Europe has to look at its own protection,

but at the end of the day, it is in the vested interest of the United States to give the nuclear umbrella to Europe and for Europe to accept that as well. You have a close relationship, of course, with President Trump, as many have pointed out. And some of your European counterparts, I think, have taken a lesson from the Greenland crisis and why President Trump chose to diffuse that or take the off-ramp that was offered him by the Secretary General. And that is that strength, the European strength, pushing back against President Trump, rather than giving in somehow is a better way to deal with President Trump. Is that how you see it?

Well, I mean, always in diplomacy, you can either de-escalate or then you can ask. to de-escalate. I think that it's always best to do the de-escalation publicly and the escalation privately. So when it's understood that Europe has an instrument like the ACI or that Europe holds 15% of U.S. bonds or... ACI is the ability for Europe to be able to have imposed economic pain on the United States. Well, on anyone. We've never used that instrument before. But we are a substantive player in this. Of course, we also hold about 15% of the US stock market. So my argument is that we are interdependent, and that means that we should cooperate,

not quarrel. So is that how Greenland got solved? Publicly, you reassured the president, but actually privately you said, hey, this is a little bit threatening. No, I think what we had were three scenarios, the good, bad and the ugly. So the good was to de-escalate, find an off-ramp, and focus on Arctic security. A bad one was a trade war and increase of tariffs. and the ugly one was the continued threat of a military threat.

So we sort of played two and three out, and now we're working on number one. And I think these kinds of off-ramps and processes are important. Again, a lot of people, for understandable reasons, get upset. But I think it's always good to be cool, calm and collected when it comes to transatlantic relations. And I say this as someone who is pro-European, pro-American, and therefore by default pro-transatlanticists.

Let's talk about Russia a little bit. Of course, as you mentioned, the longest border with Russia and NATO. Russian forces are building up or have been building up military bases on the other side of Finland, infrastructure as well. What do you think Russia is after? And how concerning have Russian moves been, in your opinion? Well, you know, again, we're not concerned. And we also accept the fact that there have always been Russian troops or Soviet troops by our border. And when the war ends, there will be more. I actually think that Russia is losing this war. I think starting the whole war with Ukraine was a strategic mistake of Putin. He wanted to Russify Ukraine.

It's becoming European. He wanted to prevent the enlargement of NATO. He got Finland and Sweden. And he wanted to keep European defense expenditure down and we're going to 5%. So I'm not excessively worried. And I don't like this rhetoric that, you know, the Nordics are next to the Baltics are next. No, no, they're not. I mean, Russia is not going to test the Arctic.

five. But does that mean that Russia is not the long-term threat? It is a long-term threat. There's no question about that because in its DNA is imperialism and expansion. It's done that throughout its history. And to be honest, it hasn't been able to cope with its own history in an honest kind of way, Soviet era or otherwise. I think what we need to do in the future is to make sure that those imperialistic threats don't move over to the Southern Caucasus or to Central Asia. Do you think Putin, do you think Russia is serious in the conversations about ending the war? I hope they are, but

some people are saying that Russia is not ending this war because they want to continue to acquire territory. I don't believe in that at all, because if you look at what happened, 12 years ago when the war started, they got 12% of territory. You're talking about Crimea when they invaded and annexed Crimea? And now in 12 years,

8%. In the past two years, 1% of territory. And Russia lost 34,000 soldiers in December, 30,000 in January. They're not able to recruit as many as they're losing. So I think Russia is not able to end this war because the social and political cause for Putin not being able to pay the soldiers when they go back is too high. So that's why I'm skeptical about Putin's intentions. And do you share your

skepticism with President Trump? I do think that President Trump and his negotiating team, Steve Whitkoff and Jared Kushner, are doing a really good job. They're trying to maximize being very practical. But I think we still need to increase. the pressure on Russia in terms of allowing them to use whatever weapons necessary and then increasing the economic pressure on Russia through sanctions, because that's the only language that Putin understands. That pressure, that sanctions is something that a lot of people have been asking the U.S. to do more of. I mean, at this point, we've got a 20-point plan.

We've got a pledge to accede to immediate ceasefire. You've got a coalition of the willing. You've got a program to send American weapons to Ukraine. There's a minerals deal. All of these steps have been taken, and yet it does seem that there isn't the pressure from the United States on Russia to actually get them to make concessions and end the war. Yeah, I think at the end of the day, it will have to come down to what are the concessions from Russia. And the only way in which you can get them to concede is to increase sanctions. That's what we saw with the Rosneft and Lukoyle.

And they had a big impact. The second thing, we need to have a maritime ban on the Russian shadow fleet, which is distributing all. all around the world at high risk. So if America puts more pressure on Russia, then we will be able to solve this. And do you see willingness for the United States to do it? I hope so. I mean, you know, again, diplomacy is sometimes a slog. You know, you work with different colleagues and try to convince them.

But remember that the United States is the most powerful nation in the world. The President of the United States does what he wants. He wants to end this war. My only humble recommendation is, if that's the case, put more pressure. the case, put more pressure in Russia. Finland, President Alex Tov, thank you very much. And that is all the time we have on Compass Points. We'll see you again here next week.