Pints With Aquinas - Does the Kalam Argument Work? w/ Dr. William Lane Craig & Jimmy Akin

Episode Date: August 3, 2021

In this episode, I talk with Dr. William Lane Craig and Jimmy Akin, two Christian apologists, about the philosophical version of the Kalam argument. Also in this episode: - A detailed explanation of what the philosophical Kalam argument is - Whether or not the argument works - Using sound arguments to answer the questions of those outside the Church - Dr. William Lane Craig & Jimmy Akin discuss the pros and cons of the argument   Sign up for my free course on St. Augustine's "Confessions"!   SPONSORS Hallow: http://hallow.app/mattfradd STRIVE: https://www.strive21.com/   GIVING Patreon or Directly: https://pintswithaquinas.com/support/  This show (and all the plans we have in store) wouldn't be possible without you. I can't thank those of you who support me enough. Seriously! Thanks for essentially being a co-producer co-producer of the show.   LINKS Merch: https://teespring.com/stores/matt-fradd FREE 21 Day Detox From Porn Course: https://www.strive21.com/   SOCIAL Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/mattfradd Twitter: https://twitter.com/mattfradd Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/mattfradd Gab: https://gab.com/mattfradd Rumble: https://rumble.com/c/pintswithaquinas   MY BOOKS Get my NEW book "How To Be Happy: Saint Thomas' Secret To A Good Life," out now! Does God Exist: https://www.amazon.com/Does-God-Exist-Socratic-Dialogue-ebook/dp/B081ZGYJW3/ref=sr_1_9?dchild=1&keywords=fradd&qid=1586377974&sr=8-9 Marian Consecration With Aquinas: https://www.amazon.com/Marian-Consecration-Aquinas-Growing-Closer-ebook/dp/B083XRQMTF/ref=sr_1_4?dchild=1&keywords=fradd&qid=1586379026&sr=8-4 The Porn Myth: https://www.ignatius.com/The-Porn-Myth-P1985.aspx   CONTACT Book me to speak: https://www.mattfradd.com/speakerrequestform

G'day, g'day, g'day, and welcome to Pints with Aquinas. My name is Matt Fradd, and on today's show, we have two Christian apologists who will be discussing the philosophical version of the Kalam cosmological argument. And these two Christian apologists have been really instrumental in my own life in helping me understand the intellectual aspect of the faith and to grow in my relationship with Jesus Christ. So personally, tremendous honor to have them both on. We have Dr. Bill Craig and Mr. Jimmy Akin. Now, let me just set the stage before I introduce the guests. The Kalam argument, for those not familiar

with it, runs as follows. Everything that begins to exist has a cause. The universe began to exist. Therefore, the universe has a cause. Now, the philosophical version of the argument, which we'll be discussing today does not rely on Big Bang cosmology or astrophysics, but instead seeks to show that the universe had to have a beginning by reason alone. The point of this discussion is to see whether or not the argument works. Bill thinks it does, Jimmy thinks it doesn't. This is not a Catholic vs Protestant thing. In the Catholic Church, for example, there have been people like St. Bonaventure, a doctor of the church, arguing for the Kalam argument, and people like St. Thomas Aquinas, another doctor of the church, saying that

it most certainly does not work, that it's not a good argument for God. As Christians trying to lead non-believers into a relationship with Jesus Christ, it's important that we not only use arguments that they find convincing, but which actually succeed in terms of logic. St. Thomas Aquinas said of certain versions of the Kalam cosmological argument that, quote, they are so weak that their very weakness leads probability to the opposing view. But others think that they have versions of the argument that are very strong. So does the Kalam argument prove the existence of God or not? Let's get into it. Welcome, Dr. Craig and Mr. Akin. It's great to have you both on the show today. Is there anything you would like to add or correct to what I've just said there? Well, I would like to add that for Aquinas, in order to be a successful argument in natural theology, an argument had to be a demonstration so that he had an extremely high bar set for what constitutes a successful argument. He did think that some of the arguments

for the finitude of the past were good probability arguments. And so by today's standards, I think many people would say that he would accept them as good probability arguments for the finitude of the past, even if they fall short of strict demonstrations. Okay, thank you. And thanks for being on the show. I would agree. Obviously, Aquinas, when he's talking about arguments, is thinking not of probabilistic arguments, but of ones that are conclusive proofs. And we don't always use that standard today. I think that the Kalam argument is interesting, and I just wanted to mention that I'm going to be taking Aquinas' position, which is that I don't think the philosophical version of the Kalam argument succeeds,

but actually Bill and I have a lot in common. We're both Christian apologists. We're both trying to bring people closer to Christ. This is really a question of method, of how is best to go about that. And even on the Kalam argument, we agree on a lot of things. I agree that it is a very appealing argument. It's very simple and easy to understand, at least the basic structure of it is. I also agree it's logically valid. It uses correct logical form. And I agree it's sound, meaning that it has true premises. It's true that whatever begins has a cause, and it's true that the universe has a beginning. There's just a question of how do we go about showing that. And we're

fortunate enough to live in the 21st century, so we have intellectual tools that Aquinas and Bonaventure did not have. We have modern science, and the findings of modern science do support the idea that the universe had a beginning, and so we can appeal to that. And I think that the scientific version of the Kalam argument is actually quite successful. And I use it myself. I recently published a small book called The Words of Eternal Life, where I use a scientifically supported version. It's really only on the philosophical end of things that I think the argument has weaknesses.

Okay. Well, here's what I'd love to do. I'd love to kind of step out of the way and just let the two of you discuss this, since you've both given it a lot of thought. So how do we proceed from here? Since I suppose Dr. Craig's argument is pretty well known, maybe Mr. Akin, you could go for it and respond, unless Dr. Craig, you'd like to put it forth again. And then I'd like to just maybe just, as I say, step out of the way and let you two discuss. Yes, I think that for the sake of our listeners, we should review the arguments, lest we presume that they know too much. I present two philosophical arguments for the finitude of the past. The first is based on the impossibility of the existence of an actually infinite number of things, and the second is based upon the impossibility of enumerating an actually infinite number of things by exist, but an infinite

regress of past events implies an actually infinite number of things, therefore an infinite regress of past events cannot exist. So if that argument is sound, it shows that the regress of past events is finite, and therefore had a beginning, and since the universe is not different from the regress of past events, it follows that the universe began to exist, which is the premise of the main argument. Jimmy, do you want to just respond there? I didn't know if Dr. Craig wanted to present his second argument as well. Well, let's do one at a time, I think, Jimmy, lest it become too confusing.

Sure. So the way I approach this question as a Christian is in terms of what can God do? God is the creator of the world, and for me the question is, can God create a world with an infinite past if he chooses? Now, we know from Scripture that he didn't, but can we show it by reason alone that he could not create a world with an infinite past? And that gets us into the question of God's omnipotence. And I'm a classical theist, I understand God's omnipotence to mean that God can do anything as long as it doesn't involve a logical contradiction. So God can make unicorns, God can make aliens, but he can't make married bachelors or four-sided triangles, because a married bachelor is a contradiction in terms,

so is a four-sided triangle. So as a Christian, I want to say, well, since God can do anything, as long as it doesn't involve a logical contradiction, if I'm going to say God can do anything, as long as it doesn't involve a logical contradiction, if I'm going to say God can't make a universe with an infinite past, then I'm going to need to see a logical contradiction in that concept. There needs to be something about the idea of an infinite history that has a contradiction of some sort on the fundamental logical level. It's not enough for something to seem improbable or weird, because God can make lots of improbable and weird things, but he still does that. In fact, he does lots of things that people would regard as improbable and weird, allowing innocent children to suffer,

allowing innocent people to be harmed by others, creating a universe where matter is mostly empty space, and even atoms are mostly empty space, or God becoming man, or God dying on a cross, or God dying for our sins. To a lot of people those sound like absurd claims when they first encounter them. So one thing we know about God is that he does things that are, from a human perspective, absurd, or at least seem that way when we first encounter them. So for me, it's not enough to say, well, something leads to surprising or counterintuitive conclusions, like the concept of infinity does in mathematics, I need to see an actual logical contradiction. And that's the basic way that I approach it. Now, in regard to your first argument, I am aware of your books, how you flesh that out using examples like Hilbert's Hotel,

and you find very surprising things about Hilbert's Hotel, which you've said are absurd. But for me, I really want to see a logical contradiction, and I'm not aware that you've claimed that one exists in the concept of an infinite history. Well, this is really an interesting response to the argument, because what you've offered, Jimmy, is not a philosophical critique, but a theological critique, a critique from the standpoint of biblical theism. But of course the argument as it's presented is not an argument for biblical theism. It's meant to be presented to a secularist or a naturalist to prove the existence of a personal creator of the universe, and it doesn't aspire to prove God's omnipotence. So to object to the argument theologically

at this point seems to me to be premature. All that would prove is that Christians shouldn't use this argument, but I don't see that it exposes any flaw in the argument. but I don't see that it exposes any flaw in the argument. The argument doesn't even try to prove that God is omnipotent, so if it proves the existence of a personal creator of the universe who's not omnipotent, that may be theologically objectionable, but it doesn't do anything to undermine the argument. Now more to the point, I think that your concept of omnipotence is far too strong, because there are metaphysical impossibilities that do not involve strict logical contradictions. There is this notion of broadly logical impossibility, stemming from the work of

Saul Kripke and others, that show that it's far too narrow to think in terms of involving a contradiction. So let me give some examples. That something should come into existence without a cause is not logically contradictory, but nevertheless I think it's metaphysically impossible. That an event should precede itself is not logically contradictory, but I would say metaphysically impossible. That gold should have a different atomic number than it does is not strictly logically contradictory, but I think it's metaphysically impossible. That this desk that I'm sitting at, this very desk, that it could have been made of ice, I think is metaphysically impossible, but it doesn't involve a strict logical contradiction. Alvin Plantinga gave one example that is my favorite. He says that the prime minister is a prime number is not strictly logically

contradictory, but it's surely metaphysically impossible. So the fact that the concept of the actual infinite is a logically consistent concept given the conventions and assumptions of infinite set theory, I think does nothing to suggest that this is not metaphysically impossible. And I think that the illustrations, like Hilbert's Hotel and others, do give reason to think that the existence of an actually infinite number of things is metaphysically impossible, even if it's not strictly logically contradictory. Thank you. You raised a couple of points there that I'd like to respond to. The first one is the question of, is my approach premature, because I'm using theological considerations as part of my approach? And of course, you know,

there's a long history of theologian philosophers like Bonaventure and Aquinas, who did both activities at the same time. I would actually argue that it's important as Christian apologists that we think from the beginning from a Christian perspective, and that we make sure the arguments that we're using are consistent with the faith that we're trying to bring people to. And so before I use an argument with non-Christians, I want to make sure that it checks out from the viewpoint of the Christian faith. So as a Christian, I know that God is omnipotent, and I understand what that means, and I wouldn't use an argument with a non-Christian that would fall afoul of God's omnipotence. I would view that as kind of my

duty as a Christian apologist to make sure that whatever arguments I'm using with non-Christians are ones that do work from the perspective of Christian faith. So I think it's important that we do consider whether or not a given argument actually works within a Christian framework, including the idea of God's omnipotence. With regard to God's omnipotence, now I'm using the standard version that's been used by Christian philosophers down through the ages, including St. Thomas Aquinas, God can do anything that doesn't involve a logical contradiction, and actually I think that solves the question of metaphysical possibility and impossibility. I would say that something is metaphysically possible if it's something that God can accomplish in some

possible world. And since God can accomplish anything that is logically possible, I think metaphysical impossibility is simply another approach to the same concept of logical possibility. To take an example that you used, you mentioned the prime minister cannot be a prime number as a metaphysical impossibility, because under the laws of a given country, the concept of prime minister involves a person and not a number. And so I would say if you understand the concept of what a prime minister is, it does not fit the definition of a number, and therefore it would be logically impossible to have a number be a prime minister the way the term prime minister is understood, just like it would be impossible to have a married bachelor or a prime number as a bachelor the way the term bachelor is understood.

Yeah, those aren't strict logical contradictions, though, Jimmy, and I disagree with you that omnipotence is traditionally defined in terms of strict logical possibility and impossibility. There are lots of things that are strictly logically possible that are nevertheless metaphysically impossible, as I illustrated. So at least in contemporary philosophy of religion, definitions of omnipotence are not given in terms of strict logical possibility and impossibility. I think the finest treatment of omnipotence on the contemporary scene is the one given by two philosophers at the University of Notre Dame, Alfred Trudeau and Thomas Flint, entitled Maximal Power, in which they offer a very complex analysis of omnipotence, and would argue that trying to define omnipotence simply in terms of strict logical possibility is far too narrow.

I recognize that contemporary Christian philosophers, you know, going back to the 1960s and even a little bit before that, have done a lot of valuable work in trying to rehabilitate theism from a philosophical perspective, you know, after the heavily atheistic philosophy that we had in the first part of the 20th century. Unfortunately, in a lot of their work, they actually deviate from concepts that have been established parts of classical theism, and any understanding of God's omnipotence that waters it down and says there are things that God can't do, even though they're perfectly meaningful concepts, is something that I would regard as departing from classical theism. Just to touch base once again on an example we brought up, the idea of a prime number being a bachelor is a contradiction in terms,

because by definition, a bachelor is an unmarried man, and a man is not a number. And to say an unmarried man is a number is a contradiction in terms. Well, actually, that's not strictly logically contradictory. That doesn't involve a strict logical contradiction saying A and not A. But even if you can try to say, well, a strict contradiction should be derivable from the statement using the resources of ordinary first-order logic. For many of these examples that I gave and that are in the literature of things that are broadly logically impossible, you can't derive strict logical contradictions from them, and yet it's very plausible that these things are, as I say, broadly logically impossible. So I think

any tenable definition of omnipotence is going to need to be framed in terms of this broadly logical possibility and not just trying to derive strict contradictions. Okay. Well, I think we've identified a point on which you and I would differ then, because I would say that our terms, the realm of logic, are modeled after reality, and therefore logical, if they're accurate, they're modeled after reality. They describe things in reality. And so anything that's metaphysically possible or possible in reality is going to be possible logically, and conversely, anything that's impossible in reality is going to be logically impossible. And I would say the same thing about the other examples like a desk ice

or gold having a different atomic number. I would say those also have derivable logical contradictions in them, but you and I seem to be using terminology differently on this point. Well, I mean, a strict logical contradiction is a proposition of the form A and not A, and none of these examples involve that sort of strict logical contradiction. I agree with what you said about reality, but I would say that's what philosophers mean by broadly logical possibility or metaphysical possibility. It is a possibility that is actualizable, something that could actually be the case, could be real, as you say, and that's where we get into

the question then of is it really possible that an actually infinite number of things could exist, and classical theists have disagreed about this. Aquinas himself was quite conflicted about this. Sometimes he would agree with Aristotle that you cannot have an actually infinite number of things, and so he sought to find a different way to avoid the argument. Yeah. I don't want to—I'd love to explore the idea of logical possibility and impossibility more. I'm not sure that, since time is limited that we want to go in that direction. So why don't we move to considering the actual infinity that you base your first argument on? You say it's impossible to have an actual infinity. And I would pose two

challenges to that. The first one is, now, I assume we're agreed that the set of all natural numbers is actually infinite, but that then gets us into the question of what are numbers? Are they abstract objects? What's the nature of an abstract object? And we don't need to be detained by that. But whatever numbers are— Well, I think that's important for our readers to understand because we're talking here about the real existence of an actual infinite, and I would not regard numbers as things that are mind-independent realities. And so, counterexamples taken from mathematics don't faze me, because I don't think they're

part of reality. Yeah, and I'm happy to grant that for purposes of our discussion. What I'd like to use as my first challenge is this. Suppose that God knows everything, which on classical theism he does. He's got infinite mind, and as a result, God can imagine every possible natural number. God knows the set of all natural numbers, which is infinite. And God then, if he can imagine every natural number, he could imagine something very simple. Let's say a number line. Now, we can't imagine a number line that goes on indefinitely, infinitely, but God can. God can imagine the entire number line of natural numbers. Suppose

then that God, for every natural number, imagines a hydrogen atom, and an inch away from it is another hydrogen atom, and an inch away from it is another hydrogen atom, and an inch away from that is another hydrogen atom. So God can imagine a row of hydrogen atoms that stretches on infinitely. God can imagine this, and it doesn't involve a logical contradiction. Why can't God then create what he can imagine? Because by his omnipotence, God can create anything that he can conceive of. He can't imagine what a four-sided triangle is like because that's got a contradiction in it. But there doesn't seem to be a contradiction in an infinite row of hydrogen atoms. So why couldn't he make that?

We've already agreed that there isn't a strict logical contradiction in the conception of an actually infinite number of things. The question is the real existence of this. And talking about imaginary entities gets us no distance toward solving that question. In order to have an actual infinite number of things, you would have to have an actually infinite number of divine thoughts. And here, my sympathies are again with Aquinas. I don't think God has a plurality of thoughts. I think that God's knowledge of reality is a simple, undivided intuition of all reality, and it's merely we finite creatures who break up what

God knows in this seamless and simple way into separate propositions, which are then indefinite in number. But there aren't an actually infinite number of divine thoughts. And so I don't think that there's any problem posed from divine omniscience for the claim that you can't have an actually infinite number of real things. So we're agreed, both you and I and Aquinas are agreed, that God's thoughts are simple. And so there's really only one divine thought. We humans can only grasp aspects of it at a time. So for us, when we think about what God knows, we think about different thoughts. But in reality, there's only one divine thought. But that divine thought includes a multitude of things.

For example, it includes God knowing every atom in the body of William Lane Craig. So even though God only has one thought, that thought embraces a knowledge of every single atom in your body. And so God's one thought can embrace multitudes, and it can embrace an infinite multitude of hydrogen atoms. So if God can actualize every atom in the body of William Lane Craig, which is part of his thought, why can't he also actualize the part of his thought that is an infinite multitude of hydrogen atoms? Again, the ability to conceptualize an infinite multitude is something that I can do, not just God. Any mathematician can conceive of the set of all natural numbers, for example, or the set of prime

numbers, but that doesn't show that these things actually exist. It's just an idea which God has or which I have. And the reason I would say that it can't be instantiated in reality is that it leads to all of these sorts of absurd situations such as I described, or Hilbert describes, with a hotel that has an actually infinite number of rooms, that is fully occupied, has no space for any more guests, and yet it can accommodate infinitely more people, which seems to me to be metaphysically absurd. Or if guests check out of the hotel, you can have the same number of guests check out of the hotel on two different occasions, and yet in one case, the hotel is reduced to three people. In the other case, it still has

an infinite number of people in it, which seems to me, well, that is a logical contradiction. I mean, doing inverse operations like subtraction and division with infinite quantities is logically contradictory, and that's why it's mathematically prohibited. So... Well, let's actually talk about that, because I think this is a fascinating example. Now, for people who may not be aware, Hilbert's Hotel is a thought experiment about a hotel with an infinite number of rooms, and you can suppose that every room has a guest in it. But then you could have every even-numbered guest check out, and that would leave every odd numbered room with a guest still in it, and the number of guests would still be infinite because

there's an infinite number of odd numbers. On the other hand, you could have every guest above three check out, in which case you would only have three guests left in the hotel. Those are examples you've used yourself, correct, Dr. Gregg? I just did use. And yet in both cases, the same number subtracted from the same number gives different remainders. And therefore, it, as I say, would lead to mathematical contradictions. Yeah. Now, here's where I think a lot of people get into trouble when they talk about infinity, is they start thinking of infinity as if it's any other number. But in fact, infinity is not a number on the number line. It doesn't have a predecessor, so you can't count to infinity. That's not right. It's not a natural number, but in set theory and transfinite arithmetic, aleph null, which is the

arithmetic, Aleph null, which is the numeral for the least infinite number, is a number. It is a number just as much as 3 or 7 or 8 is. Correct. What I see... It's just a natural number. And there is a series of these transfinite numbers, Aleph null, Aleph 1, Aleph 2, Aleph 3, and so on to infinity. So you can do arithmetic operations with these numbers of addition and multiplication. But as I say, what you can't do with them is subtraction and division because it leads to contradictions.

Yes. So what I actually said was that they treat infinity as if it's just like any other number. I'm aware that in set theory, transfinite numbers are a concept, but they're not numbers in the same sense that the ordinary natural numbers are. It's a qualified sense of the term number. When it comes to operations like subtraction and division, it is true that set theory does not allow them because they are insufficiently precise. You can apply addition and multiplication to transfinite numbers in a fairly straightforward way. The results you get are sometimes surprising, but you can apply those

concepts. With something like subtraction, you can't because subtraction, the way it's applied to finite numbers, does not yield sensible results with transfinite ones because of the fact it has not been specified sufficiently. But mathematicians love specifying things further and say, okay, let's make a distinction here. And I'll give you an example. Suppose that I have an infinite collection of apples. I've just got them in a big pile out back or something. What that really means is I have an unlimited number of apples. That's all the term infinite means in its root meaning is it's unlimited. And there are different ways that it can be unlimited, resulting in different kinds of infinity, like aleph null, aleph one, and so on. But suppose I have an unlimited number of apples in my backyard.

Suppose I have an unlimited number of apples in my backyard. Well, if I've numbered them, you could come over and then I could give you a gift of all of the even-numbered apples. I could take all of the even-numbered apples out of my collection and give them to you as a present, in which case I would have an odd number of them. I would have all the odd ones left. Now I've just given you an unlimited number of them, and I have an unlimited number of them left. But suppose I do something different. Suppose I don't just give you all of the even-numbered apples. I give you all of the apples above three. So I take all of the apples

above three out of my collection, and I give those to you as a gift, leaving me with only three apples. So I'm being pretty generous here. If you said to me, this is a logical contradiction because you did the same thing, I would say, no, that's not a logical contradiction because I didn't do the same thing. I used a different procedure when I took out every even numbered apple than when I took out all of the apples above three. Those are two different procedures. If you want to analogize them to subtraction, fine, but then they're two different kinds of subtraction, and both of them yield sensible but different results, even though we're working with an infinite number. Yeah, that really doesn't advance the argument. You've just substituted apples for people, that's all.

I mean, and you can cook up these sorts of illustrations very easily. And what they all show is that when you have an actual infinite number of concrete things, it leads to these sorts of crazy results. In the one case, you give away an infinite number of apples and you still have an infinite number left. In the other case, you give away an infinite number of apples and you still have an infinite number left. In the other case, you give away an infinite number of apples and you have only three left. You have subtracted an identical quantity from an identical quantity and come up with non-identical results. But I've done it in different ways. It is not the same procedure.

But I've done it in different ways. It is not the same procedure. And so if you're going to analogize it to subtraction, it's different kinds of subtraction. I may have pulled out an unlimited number of apples in both cases, but I've pulled out different apples in the two cases. There are different kinds of subtraction. You're subtracting quantities. kinds of subtraction. You're subtracting quantities. And in this case, again, the illustration shows that you can subtract identical quantities from identical quantities and come up with different results precisely by doing it in different ways, just as you said. And it seems to me that that's metaphysically absurd. It seems to me that if I had an unlimited

number of apples, I could do exactly exactly that and it's perfectly straightforward. Yes you could but that's exactly the point that that's what Hilbert was trying to illustrate. If you did have an actually infinite number of things then this is the sorts of things that you could do and yet these things seem metaphysically absurd and that's suggesting you couldn't have an actually infinite number of apples or rooms. It doesn't resolve the absurdity to say, well, if there were an actually infinite number of things, then this would happen. Of course that's the case. That's the whole point of the illustration that Hilbert gives. As we've said, what strikes people as absurd is,

number one, it's relative from person to person. A lot of people are not, who discuss the Kalam argument, aren't really persuaded by the Hilbert's Hotel type arguments, and I happen to be one of those people. Different people have different intuitions about what's absurd, but we've all, as I've already mentioned, my position is absurdity is not a good test of what God can do, because God does lots of things that strike people as absurd, and yet he does them. So we need a different test, and I would point to logical possibility. Yeah, no, not strict logical possibility, Jimmy. I think that's just untenable. There are things

that are broadly logically impossible that God can't do. I just want to jump in real quick. I wish I didn't have to because you guys are talking about apples and I'm like, I have no idea what's going on. It's like that episode in The Office where Michael says to Oscar, explain it to me like I'm five. That's kind of how I am feeling right now. So maybe just for those who are watching who are a little bit lost like I might be, Bill, would you mind maybe just sort of helping explain what's going on? And then Jimmy can respond. Maybe we can just, yeah. Yes.

And then maybe we want to move to the next argument since our time is half gone. We've been talking about the first argument for the finitude of the past, and this is based upon the impossibility of having an actually infinite number of things in reality. And the argument is that if the past were infinite, if the series of events just went back and back and back without beginning, then the number of events that have elapsed prior to today would be actually infinite. And so if you can't have an actually infinite number of things in reality, you couldn't have an actually infinite number of past events. And Jimmy's response is that there's no strict logical contradiction in the idea of an actually infinite number of things, and hence no strict logical

contradiction in the idea of an infinite past. This is something that falls within the purview of God's omnipotence to do. Jimmy, would you mind offering a response to that, and then let's move on to the next argument? I think that's a good summary of the state of the discussion and where we're disagreeing. Before we move on to the next argument, though, there's something I want to point out. I mentioned I had a second challenge to this argument, and it deals with the possibility of an actually infinite number of things from God's perspective. Now, in your writings, Dr. Craig, you discuss time quite a bit and the

nature of time, and you've come to a position where you view God as having a temporal existence. Now, he's not dependent on time. He would still exist even if he'd never created time. But since he's created time, he's part of it, and he has a temporal existence, and his knowledge changes as time rolls along and so forth. Since this is Pints with Aquinas, and Matt and I are both Catholics, and we have a lot of Catholic listeners, I feel

it important to just let them know that even though that's an interesting position to think about, it is actually contrary to the teaching of the Catholic Church. The Church teaches that God is absolutely outside of time. That's something, for example, that John Paul II said. And yes. I can't think of any conciliar statement that says that. The Fourth Lateran Council says that time had a beginning, but where would it affirm that God is timeless? It's when the Fourth Lateran and the First Vatican—and by the way, if you go to jimmyakin.com slash kalam, I've got some articles I wrote about this, including on this subject.

But the Fourth Lateran Council and the First Vatican Council both describe God as eternal. And of course, they're using Boethius' classic definition of what eternity is, which is the complete simultaneous possession of limitless life, and that's distinct from time. And then in his audiences, John Paul II further spells that out. So it is part of Catholic teaching. And if it's true— Yeah, that's true. I mean, if it's not defined, you can't just say, oh, well, they mean it the way Boethius means it. That's importing into it. And every Christian wants to affirm that God is eternal, but that doesn't mean that God is timeless.

And again, these are very peculiar objections to a philosophical argument to raise these sorts of theological and even Catholic objections to an argument? As a Catholic philosopher, I think from a Catholic perspective consistently in the argument, and I test them to see does this work within a Catholic frame of reference, or more broadly from a Christian frame of reference. In the case of the councils, words mean what they're used to mean at the time, and at the time Fourth Lateran and First Vatican met, that was the standard definition of the term eternity. It was Boethius's definition, and that's made clear by John Paul II's more explicit elaboration. Also, things don't have to be defined to be part of Catholic teaching.

I've written a whole book about how to read church documents and how to evaluate different levels of teaching. It's called Teaching with Authority if anybody wants to check it out. In any event, if God is outside of time— Just real quick to me. I understand you want to respond to this, and I want you to do that as well, but I understand we've got like 20 minutes left. So if you could respond to that, and then maybe we can move on to the second objection, please. Absolutely.

So if God is outside of time, then everything God does is done simultaneously, because time doesn't progress for him. And since God creates the world, including all of the different years that history contains, it creates that temporal space for us to exist in, that would mean that God in eternity is simultaneously creating 2021 and 2022 and 2023 and all of our future years. And since the years of our future history are infinite because we're never going to pass out of existence, that would mean that from God's perspective he is right now creating an actual infinity of future years, and that would show that from God's perspective an actual infinity can exist. But if an

actual infinity of future years can be created by God, then an actual infinity of prior years could be created by God. And so if he chose, God could create in front of him a world that not only has no end, but also no beginning. And that would be my second challenge to this argument. Actual infinities can exist from God's perspective. Well, this depends upon divine timelessness, which I would dispute. Moreover, on a theory of time according to which temporal becoming is real, these events that are future to us do not in any sense exist. They are not real. And so even if God knows the future and is timelessly causing the world to exist,

it's not as though these events really exist. They are pure potentiality and have not yet come into being. If you assume the view of time known as presentism, where only the present exists, then that would be true. The past and the future don't. But if you assume that God is outside of time and creating time, then it does exist from God's perspective. 2022 may not exist for me here in time yet from my perspective, but it would for God. I'm not even sure what sense that makes, Jimmy, because people like Anselm, Aquinas, and others affirmed the reality of temporal becoming. They did not think that the future exists, that it's pure potentiality. And so I don't even know what it means to say that events that do not exist are somehow real and existent to God, unless he just means that God knows them, but that's not what you want to say.

So this is a very deep difference concerning the nature of divine eternity. Yeah, and Aquinas and Anselm and so forth were certainly correct that speaking from within the perspective of time, the future is only potential. It's not actual. However, they're speaking in that case like modern Catholic presentists from a perspective inside of time. But when I've talked with modern Catholic presentists, they'll say, oh yeah, of course from God's perspective this is real, because he's outside of time. And so from his perspective, all times have to be real, because he's creating them all simultaneously in the eternal now. Now, if you don't believe that God's outside of time,

then that argument doesn't follow. But if you do believe that God's outside of time, then I think it's inescapable. Could we— Well, again, it's a theological— and I don't think that God is timeless, subsequent to creation, so that doesn't... So it's a point of difference. I'm happy if you want to play this one out, but it might be, given our limited amount of time, it might be important to kind of move on. Oh, no, let's move on. Is that okay? I'm sorry. I know we could talk forever about this. Okay, Dr. Craig, if you'd like to. All right. Well, the second argument does not assume that it's impossible for an actually infinite number of things to exist, but it holds that it's

impossible to form an actually infinite number of things by successive addition. Sometimes this is called the impossibility of traversing the infinite, or counting to infinity. And yet, the series of past events has been formed by successive addition, one event occurring after another, one at a time, until today arrives. And so in order for the present day to arrive, you would have to have, in effect, counted down from infinity, ending at zero, which seems to be impossible. If there could be an actual infinite past, it would have to exist just or be created en bloc as a whole. But even God couldn't create an infinite past one event at a time and finally arriving at today. arriving at today. So I would agree that you can't form a past or a future or an infinite series at all by successive addition. We're agreed on that. And on the view that I just articulated about how

God is outside of time, which isn't just a Catholic thing, that's shared by lots of Protestants and Orthodox and other Christians as well. But on that view, if God is outside of time creating the world, he does not create our infinite future one step at a time. For God, it's a simultaneous act, just one act, flash, there is an infinite future for us. And in the same way, if he chose flash, there would be an infinite past to our history. So it's quite true that you don't form an infinite series by successive addition. But if God is outside of time, that's not an issue for God, because he's not doing it by successive addition. I also think there's another potential problem. Let's stop here.

Sure. Lest things get away from us. Once again, Jimmy, what we have here are not philosophical objections to the argument, but theological objections. And I don't think that appeal to that sort of thing is legitimate to refute an argument against the formation of an infinite series of past events one member at a time by going through them one member at a time. You're certainly correct that if you adopt the view that God is timeless and that all temporal reality is present to him, then God can create it all in a flash rather than sequentially. I agree with that, but I don't think that's a correct view of time or of eternity of God. So we just differ very fundamentally upon the nature of time and eternity, and that's a theological difference.

Well, I would say it's also a philosophical difference. I mean, as you know, there's not a rigid boundary between philosophy and theology, which is why people read St. Thomas Aquinas or St. Bonaventure or St. Anselm, both as theologians and as philosophers. The way that I approach things is that if I know something to be true, I'm going to incorporate that into the arguments that I use. And so let's suppose I want to entertain a philosophical argument in philosophy class that involves scientific issues. Let's say it's a philosophy of science class, and I happen to know scientifically that atoms exist. Well, since atoms exist are relevant to the philosophy of science, I'm going to bring in that piece of scientific knowledge, and I'm not going to, in philosophy of science class, pretend that atoms don't exist, other than maybe for hypothetical purposes. I'm going to use that fact that I know in my philosophy of science. In the same way,

when we're talking about philosophy of religion that deals with things like, does God exist, then I'm going to use my theological knowledge as well as part of my philosophy of religion. I'm going to make sure that the philosophy of religion arguments that I use are consistent with what I know from theology. I may, for purposes of argument, temporarily suspend that and say, okay, let's suppose Jesus never incarnated. What would the following results be? But if I'm talking about the incarnation of Christ as part of a philosophy of religion class, and as you know, the incarnation of Christ is a subject that Christian philosophers do talk about, how does

that philosophically work, then I'm going to use my knowledge about the incarnation from theology to inform my philosophy. So that's just how I approach things in general. In terms of... Let me respond to that. I like that unified field of knowledge approach very much. I think especially in doing theology, we want to have an integrative view that takes account of philosophy and science, as you've said. But then what has become obvious to me during the course's interview, Jimmy, is that our differences are not so much philosophical as they are theological, that there are certain things that for you are just out of bounds theologically that are not out of bounds for me, like for example, God's being temporal since the moment

of creation. Now we can offer philosophical arguments for and against the reality of temporal becoming, the coherence of divine eternity and timelessness and so forth, but that's a totally different debate than the Kalam cosmological argument. Our differences are not so much over this argument as they are over these theological presuppositions that we just don't share. Well, some of the ones we've discussed thus far certainly are, but let me give you a philosophical one where I won't appeal to theology at all. So one of the premises in the second argument is that you cannot form an actual infinity by successive addition, and without appealing to theology at all, and I'll grant you

presentism hypothetically. I'll say, okay, suppose hypothetically only the present exists. Totally fine for this. What do you mean when you say that this is a rhetorical question, what does it mean to say that you can't form an actual infinity by successive addition? Well, the way people would normally take that kind of statement, what does it mean to form a form a collection of things, would be to say well I start with nothing and then I add some items to my collection and that's how I form my collection. So my collection has a beginning point. Well it's true if you have a beginning point you will and you start adding to it by successive addition, you will never arrive at an actual infinity, because by definition, if something has a beginning, it can't both be

infinite and have an end point. And so if you're imagining an infinity of past years a successive, if you're imagining an infinity of past years that terminates in the present, then that sequence, by definition, must not have a beginning element. If you suppose that it has a beginning element, then you're really talking about a finite space, and thus you're committing a logical fallacy. So it must not have a beginning, as you've pointed out in your writings. But in that case, forming such a collection doesn't mean forming from nothing. It must mean forming from an already existing collection. Because if it means forming from nothing, then you're committing a fallacy. You're talking about an infinite that has a first

and last number in it. So it must mean not forming from nothing, but forming from a previous collection. And if that's the case, then it's false that you can't form an infinity, an actual infinity, from a previous collection. Because if the previous collection is infinite and you add one more member to it, then you have formed a new actually infinite collection from a previous actually infinite collection by adding one member to it. And so as a result, this claim that you can't form an actual infinity by successive addition either means forming from nothing, in which case it's a logical fallacy, or forming from a prior infinite collection, in which case it's just false. So I would say there's a

problem with the premise to that argument, philosophically. I do not think that the use of the word forming says anything about whether or not you are starting from nothing or starting from a prior collection. When I speak of forming an infinite collection, I mean completing an infinite collection. And the series of past events is completed in the present event. And so we can talk about two ways of completing a collection by successive addition. One would be by starting at a point and never ending. The other way would be by never starting, but ending at a point. And it seems to me that that second way is even more inconceivable than the first way. How could anyone successively enumerate all of the negative numbers consecutively ending at zero? To me that seems like an inconceivable task. And I certainly agree that if you just give someone, say, all of the negative numbers up to negative five, then he can complete the collection from negative five down to zero. But that's not the issue.

The entire series needs to be formed or completed by successive addition. And that, to me, seems inconceivable, metaphysically impossible. I keep having the suspicion that when you say completed or formed by successive addition, you're not actually focusing just on the moment of completion. Because I can easily conceive, if I'm given all the negative numbers before negative five, I can easily conceive of completing an actually infinite series from there. If you then say, well, that's somehow inconceivable, it seems to me like you're envisioning more than that, that you're envisioning forming it from nothing,

which sneaks in a beginning point. Well, no, it doesn't sneak in a beginning point, but it does require that the entire collection be formed consecutively, and so that's a fair point. Maybe another way to be put it would be to say enumerated. An infinite collection cannot be enumerated by successive addition in the way that the, as I said, you can't count down all the negative numbers ending at zero in the same way that you can't count all the natural numbers by beginning

at zero and never ending. Dr. Craig, I know that you have to leave soon, and I want to be respectful of your time. Might it be helpful for each of us, just each of you, to say, offer some closing comments? Okay, sure. Well, I would say that what our conversation today shows is that one's theological presuppositions can incline or disincline one to the sort of argument that one finds acceptable in natural theology. I don't share Jimmy's theological assumptions, and therefore am very happy to follow the argument where I think the evidence leads. And I instead would offer different conceptions, for example, of divine eternity and God's relationship with time and so forth, so that I don't find the arguments to be theologically objectionable from a Christian point of view. And I would agree. I think it's been a very interesting discussion. One thing I think is that we've covered some different ground

today than what's often covered in discussions of the Kalam argument. I recognize and respect the difference of viewpoints that Dr. Craig and I have, both philosophically and theologically. Dr. Craig and I have, both philosophically and theologically. I think it's fruitful to, you know, to talk across different viewpoints that way and explore the different aspects of things, and I do think that the Kalam Cosmological Argument does work. I think it's a valid argument. I think it's a sound argument. It's just a question of how do we prove that tricky second premise? And I think that the evidence offered by scientific considerations is more successful, certainly from my point of view, but I think from other people's point of view, than some of the more philosophical arguments, which can get rather complex and abstract, and in some cases, I think, can be actually unsuccessful. Well, why don't we, Dr. Craig, tell us where we can learn more about you. I'm sure you get told this a lot, but I'm a Catholic. I have a lot of Catholic followers. All of us are big, big fans of Dr. Craig, and we've been really blessed by your work. So I've put a link to Reasonable Faith

below, but if you have anything else you'd like to point people to. I've put a link to Reasonable Faith below, but if you have anything else you'd like to point people to. No, reasonablefaith.org is our website, and there is tons of material there, all available free of charge for people to benefit from. And Mr. Akin, fantastic to have you on the show. That was just really, I wish we could chat for five hours, but alas. I've put a link in the description to your Jimmy Akin. I need more caffeine. JimmyAkin.com slash Kalam, but is there any other place you'd like to point people to before we wrap

up? Yeah, sure. I work for Catholic Answers here in San Diego. Our website is Catholic.com. People can also go to my website, JimmyAkin.com. You do have to spell my last name correctly if you want to get there. It's so simple, just four letters, A-K-I-N, Jimmy Akin. And if you go to JimmyAkin.com slash Kalam, you'll find some articles I've written on this subject. Also, I have a very popular podcast known as Jimmy Akin's Mysterious World. So just type Jimmy Akin's Mysterious World into your Google machine and you'll find all kinds of interesting things to think about. Terrific. Okay. Well, thank you so much for being with us today. Bye. Læs merks på min kanal. សូវាប់ពីបានប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្� Kanskje vi kan ta utsida på en kål? សូវាប់ពីបានប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្រាប់ពីប្� Thank you. Bye.