Plain English with Derek Thompson - The Meltdown at The Washington Post—and the Crisis in News
Episode Date: February 11, 2026Hello! I’m back from paternity leave just in time to talk about the biggest media earthquake of the year (so far): the Washington Post meltdown. For decades, the Post was a journalistic gem with sup...erior coverage of politics. Last week, billionaire owner Jeff Bezos decided to gut roughly a third of the staff after the paper lost hundreds of millions of dollars in the last few years. Today’s guest is Jim VandeHei, the cofounder of Politico and Axios and a former Post reporter. We talk about the decades-long rise and fall of the Post before zooming out to talk about the most important changes in news media over the past 20 years, the secret of 21st-century media success, and the coming storm of AI. To read more about Derek’s opening comments on how the future of the news industry is going back to past, check out his Atlantic article on the subject here: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/post-advertising-future-media/578917/ Subscribe to our YouTube channel here: https://www.youtube.com/@PlainEnglishwithDerekThompson If you have questions, observations, or ideas for future episodes, email us at PlainEnglish@Spotify.com. Host: Derek Thompson Guest: Jim VandeHei Producer: Devon Baroldi Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Transcript
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Hello, and welcome to plain English.
So several weeks ago, we recorded an episode of this show called Everything is Television,
where I pointed out that everything, social media, AI, podcasts, was evolving toward video.
And as I said on that show, I didn't expect that I would be able to resist the tide of history.
So here we are, in a new chapter of this show, as this is our first video podcast.
If you're listening to us without video, there is no need to do any.
anything different, you can carry on.
I myself am mostly an audio-only kind of guy.
But if you're watching us on Spotify or YouTube,
welcome and thanks for joining us in this next phase of plain English.
This is a big show for me for a second reason,
which is that it's my first show back from two months out on paternity leave.
Mom and Baby Girl are doing great.
And rather than start us off on something dense and complicated like AI
or some scientific breakthrough,
I thought I'd get back into the groove of podcasting with a subject that is extremely close to home,
the state of journalism, and the fate of the Washington Post.
Growing up in McLean, Virginia, I fell in love with journalism by falling in love with the Washington Post,
whose sports section, movie reviews, and op-eds were my introduction to what journalism could be.
So it's been more than a little galling to see what's happened to the Post in the last few years.
and in particular in the last few weeks.
After years of posting losses close to $100 million,
the Washington Post announced last week
that it was laying off one-third of its staff.
Later reports estimate that the paper
actually gutted half of its unionized newsroom.
It is exceedingly rare for a newspaper to lay off half of its staff.
In fact, in research for this episode,
I found no previous instance
where a newspaper of this size had a little
layoff of this magnitude. What compounds the frustration or the fury of many people is that the
Washington Post is owned by Jeff Bezos, the Amazon and Blue Origin founder whose net worth exceeds
$200 billion. We have a situation here where perhaps the richest newspaper owner in modern
history is overseeing the largest American newspaper layoff in modern history.
One goal of this episode is to trace the downfall of the post under Bezos.
In the first Trump years, subscriptions were booming and Pulitzer's were raining down from the heavens.
In the second Trump administration, however, Bezos has clearly shifted strategy.
In 2024, he killed off an endorsement of Kamala Harris, a decision that cost the post
tens of millions of dollars in lost subscription revenue.
Since then, almost every left-of-center columnist has left the paper.
His hand-picked CEO, Will Lewis, suffered through a feckless tenure
before announcing his own resignation,
shortly after skipping out on the Zoom call announcing the layoffs,
and then being caught on camera wandering around a Super Bowl party.
The Washington Post saga is one pillar of today's show.
My ambition, however, is to go one level deeper
and to put the Post's story in a broader context.
The news media has undergone several shifts
in the last 20 years, and I thought the best person to explain those shifts might be Jim Vandahai,
the former Washington Post employee who left the newspaper 20 years ago to start Politico
and then left Politico to start Axios.
Jim is going to tell the story of the Post and the state of news media from his perspective,
but first I wanted to share my own view, which is that I think the future of the news business
will more than anything resemble the distant past.
If you go back to the 1800s, before the internet, before the modern age of national advertising,
there was what historians call the party press era of news in the 19th century.
Newspapers of the time often relied on political organizations who handed out printing contracts
to their favorite editors or directly paid writers to publish vicious attacks against rivals.
That era's journalism was not fair or balanced.
It was unfair, unbalanced, heavily biased, highly political.
Thousands of newspapers competed for market share, and they used sensationalism
and often outright lies to grab readers' attention.
As Gerald Baldasty, a professor at the University of Washington once said to me,
quote, these newspapers didn't just want to inform readers.
They wanted to politically galvanize readers, end quote.
And readers were galvanized.
voting rates of the 19th century
were the highest in American history.
But when national advertising emerged in the 20th century,
the party press era went away.
Department stores and other marketers
wanted their ads placed next to neutral, objective,
you could even say boring, or milk toast reporting.
And so this age of advertising
led to a neutered, detached style of journalism,
the so-called view from nowhere
to avoid offending companies.
In the 21st century, we are back to the past.
Google and social media companies like Facebook and TikTok have gobbled up advertising revenue,
and that has forced newspapers to go back to the 1800s,
to shift their business models from advertising back to subscriptions.
For example, consider the New York Times.
In the late 1900s and early 2000s,
the New York Times advertising revenue exceeded $1 billion every year.
That's advertising.
Today, its annual ad revenue is closer to 500 million.
On its own, that might seem like a calamity, a 50% decline, except today's subscription revenue
has surpassed $2 billion.
20 years ago, the Times was two-thirds advertising.
Today, the Times is two-thirds subscriptions.
The business of newspapers underwent a total shift in the 1900s, and in the 2000s, it's
changed again.
This is not just a statistical change.
It's an identity shift.
Mid-century newspapers were as broad and unobjectable as the department stores that advertised in their pages.
But the most successful news organizations of the 21st century are very different.
Sharp elbowed, cantankerous, ideological, personality-driven.
They have perspective.
They have an identity.
In many cases, they feel like individuals because, in the case of Joe Rogan, Bill Simmons, Tucker Carlson, they are individuals.
If you ask me, the Washington Post didn't just lose revenue in the last five years.
Most importantly, what it lost is what 21st century news organizations most need, an identity.
Every once in a while, somebody asked me whether we'll ever go back to the media norms of the 1950s,
that mythological era where we all allegedly agreed on a single set of facts,
when we could count the number of TV channels on one hand,
when newspapers owned local monopolies,
and when the words of Walter Cronkite
held a special, avuncular power.
The answer is no.
We're never going back to that time.
We're never going back to a world when news was scarce.
The future of news is abundant for better and for worse.
The messy jungle of the 19th century is here to stay.
The question now for the Washington Post
and for everybody else in my business
is not how to escape the jungle,
but how to survive in the jungle
by doing good work
that also happens to be good business.
I'm Derek Thompson.
This is plain English.
Jim Vanda, hi, welcome with the show.
Great to be here, big fan.
Thank you. I want to do something a little bit ambitious,
maybe too ambitious, considering that you are my first pancake.
This is my first video podcast.
I want to tell a 20-year history of the Washington Post
that doubles as a 20-year history of changes
to the media and political landscape
that I know you've reflected on in recent essays
since this is the 20-year anniversary of you
leaving the Washington Post and starting Politico.
And let's start with the news of the moment.
One-third to one-half of the staff of the Washington Post
has been laid off.
The CEO has resigned.
The owner, Jeff Bezos, is nowhere to be seen.
I mean, I really looked hard at what is a larger layoff
in modern American newspaper history, right?
One third and one half of the Washington Post.
Very difficult to find,
which means you're in this moment
where one of the richest newspaper owners
in American history
is overseeing one of the largest newspaper layoffs
in modern American history.
I mean, how calamitous does this seem to you?
I mean, it's an American tragedy.
And I don't mean to put,
to be hyperbolic about it,
but it is a tragedy.
And I know a lot of conservatives,
are like, oh, the Washington Post doesn't matter. It's liberal. You've got to step back. It is an
institution that is central to this country and certainly central to the country's history, at least
going back to the early 70s. It has been literally a central player in some of the biggest
dramas and some of the most important reporting on some of the most important topics in, by the
way, the most powerful city in the world at probably its peak in power. So it is a tragedy. And
What makes it more a tragedy, it was a foreseen and foreseeable tragedy.
Like, that is what breaks my heart.
And I worked at the Washington Post 20 years ago.
I used to read all the president's men or watch all the president's men like Joe
Thaisman would watch Rocky before a Super Bowl.
Like, it gets my blood pumping.
Like, it's one of the reasons that I'm a journalist.
It's one of the reasons I have such a romantic attachment to the profession.
So it just, it sucks.
Let's go back to 2006, 20 years ago.
You're a national political reporter at the Washington Post,
and you have this idea.
You have this idea that there's an unfed need
among the American news consumer
and the American political news consumer in particular.
What did you want to build
that you thought the Post wasn't prepared
to offer news readers at the time?
Yeah, a couple things.
At that time, this sounds nuts,
but I felt like there was a bigger appetite for more political content that was even deeper
and kind of more about the political drama and the interworking of government than
even the Washington Post was producing.
And I felt like, you know, having been starting to do TV and starting to look at what was
taking off on the Internet, I didn't think the Post was as good as the Post thought it was.
I thought there were several reporters who were awesome, but I really believed that you were starting
to see that if you could put a collection of really good reporters together in one place,
you no longer needed a massive army.
And if you could hook those reporters up to the internet and get them on cable TV or get them
on network TV, that you could almost instantly have an impact.
And that was it.
That was the observation.
At that time, I had just been named to a beat where I could write about anything.
The White House Congress lobbying is kind of the dream beat.
I loved the Washington Post.
I didn't, there's nothing I didn't like about it.
It was more, we had this idea.
The idea was really intoxicating.
It took on a life of its own, and we quit to start Politico.
And that all happened in about a six-month period.
So you leave the Washington Post.
Mike Allen leaves time.
You get Maggie Haberman.
You get Ben Smith.
You pull them on board.
Just this incredible collection of star journalists.
You've written that one of the consequences of Politico and its success is the rise of political porn.
Yeah.
This by the hour, by the minute, obsession with political coverage.
And I'm quoting from you here.
We helped create a monster.
Politics as entertainment and the dominant weapon in a never-ending cultural war.
This wasn't the intent, but we can't deny the outcome.
End quote.
Before we continue with the history of the Washington Post and the changes in the
media political landscape, I'd love you to reflect on this, the idea that you helped
to create a monster.
That sounds pretty bad.
It was.
I mean, I don't know if it's bad, but at that point in time,
people weren't obsessing about politics all day.
You didn't really have a mechanism to obsess about politics all day.
So then that was the void that we filled.
And suddenly we're writing, our mentor was,
when the morning, we were trying to produce more content before 8 a.m.
than most reporters would produce by the time they woke up and ended their day.
And so we created a new velocity to political journalism.
We added more voice to political journalism.
We wrote about the people and the power and what was animating it.
And it nailed it, right?
It nailed a market need.
And it took off like a rocket.
Within four months, we're on stage co-moderating a presidential debate.
It was like storybook level stuff.
But what happened was after everybody was a naysayer and said it won't work, then it started
to work.
Then little by little, people started to pay more attention to their traffic.
People realized, oh, my goodness, the topic that drives most traffic is politics.
then everybody started mass-producing politics.
It metastasized.
And then suddenly everybody was consuming politics all day.
And the term I used to use is like, it's okay.
Like Doritos are nice.
Like I like a Dorito.
Like if you have a Dorito once in a while, that's fine.
If you just gorge on them all day every day, you're going to be fat, lazy, and useless.
And that's what I worry happened to the general population.
And we contributed to that.
There's no doubt.
Do you think the success of Letico has something to do with the fact that you sort of, you co-evolved with several technologies?
Yep.
You launched 2007, so does the iPhone.
Yep.
You launched 2007, Twitter is just around the corner from taking off.
Social media is about to take off.
Have you reflected on the possibility that you didn't just have a good idea?
You had an idea whose timing turned out to be technologically perfect.
I think it's a brilliant observation.
I do think that everything changed.
If you go back, I think that that year, 2007, is a massive year because you start
to have massive, you have the iPhone, you start a phone use, you start to have all
these different social platforms start to take off.
And we didn't anticipate that.
That was never really part of our business plan.
Our business plan was coverage.
It was a newspaper at the time, and it was a digital platform.
But because you had those two things happening simultaneously, you have this whole new way
of consuming content all day, every day, and that it was based on an attention economy.
It was based on an algorithm that would respond to what you were responding to.
You suddenly had all this political content being mass produced thrown at an audience that now
had a mechanism to mass consume it.
Those two things collide.
It really fundamentally changed the nature of information consumption, and it changed the nature,
I think, of our politics and our culture, by the way, because you can draw lines with all of this
in terms of polarization, toxicity, kind of information as combat.
I want to put a pin in this idea, this relatively abstract idea,
that the kinds of news media that tend to succeed in a certain period
tend to be a reflection of the technology that is taking off in that period.
You could say this of maybe early printing technology,
of radio technology, of television technology,
the middle of the 20th century, the smartphone in the 2000s,
and were at the cusp, potentially, of a new industrial revolution and technology with artificial intelligence.
So we'll return to that.
I want to make sure that we put a pin in it.
Whether folks love Politico or they blame it for the rise of political porn and the demise of democracy, it has objectively been a success.
Why did the Post let you walk out the front door?
Do you think there was, was there an arrogance that the Post had, that they're the institution and how dare you leave?
There was this very famous moment where, like, at first I thought, they thought we were joking.
They didn't think we would do it.
At that point in time, people did not leave the Washington Post.
They did not leave the New York Times.
And so the fact that, like, well, here's Jim.
He's only been here three or four years and like, whatever.
He's kind of a lone wolf.
And then Harris, John Harris, who was a creature of the institution, had been an intern at the Washington Post.
They took it more seriously because he was involved.
I think they thought we wouldn't do it.
So they at first said, no.
But then they did mobilize.
Like people have criticized Don Graham for not trying harder to keep us.
To his credit, at the end, he made a very aggressive and ambitious bid to keep us there.
But by that point, we really wanted to do it on our own.
And we just had this intuitive sense that doing this within an institution won't be as fun and probably won't be successful.
And so they were pissed by the time we left because when we left, Don Graham had this very famous meeting with us.
And he's like, he looked at us and he's like, I have never said this to anyone.
You are making a catastrophic mistake.
And everybody thought we were making a catastrophic mistake.
There were many days back then I thought I was making a catastrophic mistake.
It turned out to be the best thing I ever did.
It turned us into entrepreneurs and helped us build Politico and now build axios.
And even though, like, we could argue the pros and cons of having more political coverage,
I'm very proud of what we created.
I think Politico to this day does a lot of great vital journalism, and it is a durable, scalable model, and the world needs more of those.
But I think we just have to reckon with the good and bad of all the things that get created.
Can we just hold on that?
I'd actually love to hear what you think about the downsides of overlauding the news environment with, say, too much political news.
Like, what is the strongest argument you can muster that we are overserved?
that not just Politico itself,
but the cultural moment that it helped to create,
leads to a kind of political coverage that is bad for us,
that is, in fact, that super-sized box of Doritos
that we shouldn't be consuming.
Yeah, it's just not that important.
In the scheme of things, it's just not that important.
It is important, like how we're governed,
like how people run and win campaigns,
It's important, but it's not 80% of your life important.
Is it more important than artificial intelligence or technology or how businesses are created
and run or how we as people interact with each other or build functioning societies or
communities?
There's no way that it's that much more important than everything else.
It's just that it's something everyone pays attention to.
It's with characters.
Everybody knows the characters in the plot.
And it has a good team and a bad team.
It has constant tension.
And then it has a cast of characters who came up, by the way, with us during that 20-year period and learned to be creatures of these platforms and be characters who kind of care more about the performative art of politics and governments than actual governance.
Government's not supposed to be sexy.
It was built.
It was constructed to be slow, plotting, thoughtful, thinking about a 50 states and a governing structure for all that.
nothing about that is supposed to be getting you all hopped up all day every day while,
you know, scrolling through your phone.
It's just, it's not healthy.
It's one of the reasons that when we left political, we started Axios, the whole idea is like,
how can we help people pay more attention to other topics other than just politics?
And we still do a lot of politics, but we do a lot of other topics.
And so I think, you know, I think the only way that you fix that, like I worry, everybody
thinks that some hero is going to come in and save the day, whether it's not.
on AI or government or politics or social media feeds.
There's only one hero right now.
It's you.
You, the consumer.
You have to realize that what's getting pumped into your brain is not necessarily under your control.
It's usually what's coming through the algorithm.
And that you have to make the conscious decision to read and watch and listen to healthy content
that's getting you smarter across more topics than just doom scrolling or getting seduced
by essentially political porn.
And I do think people are coming to that realization.
I think, like, you put it nicely, this symmetry between like the rise of political and the rise of technology.
One of my theories and one of my fears about AI is that we as a species, we weren't built for change at this level of velocity.
We're just not.
Most people are not capable of change.
And by the way, from the creation of man through now, we never had to deal with change at high, high velocity.
And once you had the phone, it was just too much, it was too much of a change.
It was too much stuff coming at you, too much discernment that would be required to use it
in a healthy way.
Well, now we've had books written, research, education.
People are starting to understand the consequences of it.
I think we're finally, really as a society coming to grips with it.
And at the very moment we're finally coming to grips with it, a new technology is going
to take over, which we can get to.
Just to weave this back into the history of the Post.
So you leave in 2006, you start Politico, 2007.
on to found Axios about a decade later. The Post later brings in Ezra Klein. He starts
Wonk blog. He leaves to start Vox and his enormous podcast. Do you see a kind of parallel timeline
for the Washington Post where it owns big stakes in the stars that it helped to create and nurture?
that it's this kind of conglomerate or, you know, landing zone for Politico and Axios and the Ezra Klein product.
Is that a plausible sort of Earth-2 second timeline?
Or do you think that it's, to a certain extent, the nature of entrepreneurs to leave the places where they get their start?
I think it's a little bit of both.
Like, listen, it's hard for big old institutions to realize they're not as big and impressive as they think they are.
Right? Like once upon a time, I'm sure IBM thought nobody would leave IBM, right? Or even Apple thought nobody would leave Apple. Like it just, it happens. In the Washington Post, I think, thought it was bigger than its individual parts. And what the Internet did is it made the individual parts much more valuable than the institutions realized and sometimes much more valuable than the institution themselves. And so, yes, there is an alternative universe where they realize that and they utilize the brand prestige of the Washington Post to entitial.
those people to stay, financially incentivize them to stay, and basically do what the New York Times did.
That is essentially what the New York Times did. The New York Times is a good counterpoint to the
post. It knew what it was. We are going to be the newspaper of kind of rich, like city dwelling,
educated, left America. And we're going to dominate that. And then we're going to try to find
different stars, whether it's on podcast or whether it says columnist.
or now on video, we're going to try to lock them in, and we're going to use that and then
offer the things that people in that category care about food, health, buying gadgets,
and we're going to focus solely on subscriptions.
A genius, whether you like the New York Times or not, a beautifully, meticulously run strategy
in company knew exactly what it is, knows exactly what it is, and did it.
The Post could have done a version of that.
and instead they've now, for the better part of a decade,
done everything you shouldn't do
if you want to build a great media company in this era.
And before we get to what the Post should not have done,
I think it's actually worth slowing down in the 2010s
to remember a kind of golden age for the Washington Post,
the boom years, really.
I mean, Marty Barron comes over from the Boston Globe,
and whatever mistakes the Post might have made in earlier years,
there's really no debating that under the First Shop Administration,
it is a real commercial success.
Digital subscriptions go from just under 500,000
to nearly 3 million.
The paper wins 11 Pulitzer's under Marty Barron.
Was this period of success?
I really am trying to connect all the dots
from 20 years ago to now.
Was this period of success,
do you think the result of excellent journalistic
and business choices made,
or to a certain extent
was the first Trump administration
a kind of rising tide
for resistance journalism
that lifted so many boats that if you just put your yacht anywhere close to that rising tide,
you were inevitably going to benefit.
I think it's both, right?
I think that in retrospect, if you look across the media, everybody benefited tremendously
from Trump being a celebrity and this sort of outsider and somebody that people were just
captivated by through love or hate, everyone benefited from that.
At the same time, Marty Barron was the real deal.
Like they were doing real investigative work, and people were responding to that.
And they were smart enough to exploit that for subscription sales.
So that probably that was the high watermark of kind of the modern last 20 years Washington Post.
The problem is, is that, and now it's like somebody who started companies but runs them, you got to live paranoid.
You got to always make sure you're not responding to a false indicator, either positive or negative.
And there was a sense that, oh, my God, like, we can just keep growing like this forever because we're the Washington Post as opposed to, wait, take a deep breath.
Everybody seems to be growing.
Viewership and TV seems to be growing.
Website traffic's going through the roof for everybody.
Is this a moment or is this the post?
And at that point is when they start to make all these investments in overseas and let's have a bureau in South Korea and London and losing it.
Really? But is that what the post-consumer wants? Is that what somebody in Korea wants? Like,
that's where you started to probably see a divorce between kind of their success and the reality around them.
It's interesting. This question isn't written down, but the way you were describing this era of media reminded me of what so many different companies said about the pandemic years, that it was this blip of acceleration that seemed to pull these companies into the future that got them investing so much in certain kinds of digital technology.
in particular, but that turned out to be an overinvestment. And then you saw TV companies push,
pullback and movie companies pull back and tech companies pull back. I'd never quite thought of
the Trump year's being for left of center media, what the pandemic was for the digital
economy, this sort of like false impression of, oh, a period of nonstop boom. And ironically,
like, both led to like a little mini bubble happening that required a correction. I never quite
thought about that. But that's interesting.
Yeah. In 2021, Marty Barron steps down and Fred Ryan replaces him with Sally Busby, formerly of the AP. The paper goes on a hiring spree. While subscriptions are flatlining to slightly falling, the Post loses a reported $80 million in 2023, $100 million in 2024, close to $100 million I've read in 2025, which means just pausing there that the Post lost more money in the last three years than Jeff Bezos paid for it in,
2013, which is just no matter what you think about the journalism being done at the Washington Post,
like that is a business strategy disaster. We can talk about like the higher purpose of journalism
and investigative reporting, I guess, in a bit. But like, if you're a newspaper losing a hundred
million dollars a year, you've clearly done something extremely wrong. So like, why do you think
the Post flailed so badly in the Biden years, even before we get to the decisions that Bezos
infamously made in the last six months.
Yeah, I mean, I think there's a couple of things.
I think it didn't know what it was.
Like, that's what I'm always looking for in companies, is like, do you have a sense of
who you are?
Do you know what you need to do every day?
The term I always use with our staff jokingly is like, we got to know every day who's
asked.
We got to kick, right?
We got to know exactly how we win.
And the post seemed to lose its sense of self, right?
Is it a technology company because we have Bezos backing us?
Are we a Washington company because we're in Washington?
Are we now an international?
brand because we've started to expand overseas.
That's happening.
And then they don't fully appreciate the value of talent.
And they lost a lot of talent.
If you went back three or four years ago and wrote down the top 50 people that you
and I have to read, maybe 49 of them left.
And they didn't have, they don't have enough talent to back that up.
And these are talent businesses.
And if you're not breaking news, if you're not telling people things they don't know,
if you don't have that big investigation, if you don't give people a reason to read,
they don't care what your name is.
They don't care that you are draped in glory.
Are you utility to them?
Are you vital to them today?
If you're not, you start to fade.
And I think they had that happening.
They, for whatever reason had what I would describe as cultural rot in that there was, there
always just seems to be infighting.
There's us against them.
Part of it is because they're a highly unionized shop.
A part of it is because people, you know, at different times didn't like Fred or don't
like Will.
like there's just like this, this tension, which is just, it's odious.
Like, I can't imagine operating a company like that.
I just wouldn't do it.
Like, it would be miserable.
Like, I bless that, like, I've got a great relationship with the people who work for us and we
try to take care of them.
We enjoy each other.
Like, to not have that is very contagious.
So then you spend all of this time infighting, gossiping, trying to position, as opposed
to doing great journalism in a really competitive environment when the economics are almost
impossible and the margin of error is almost zero, right?
So they're doing everything wrong throughout that entire period.
And that's where you end up with losing $100 million.
And more than that, like losing a lot of readership and really just like losing cachet in this town.
And then feeling driftless, right?
That's how I would describe.
I don't know if someone said describe, I just listened to Matt Murray's podcast where he talked about this episode of Will leaving.
And I still, after it, I don't understand like what is the Washington Post.
Like, how can I, Jim, who worked at the Washington Post, who loves the Washington Post, who lives in the D.C. area, consumes a stupid amount of media.
How can I not know what you stand for? That's awful. That's sad.
I think you finally have to bring Jeff Bezos into this, because, I mean, you look at what was said about Bezos between, say, 2013 and 2020.
And it seemed like the journalists respected the fact that he was plowing a lot of money into the institution while also keeping a hands-off approach, which is what every journalist and editor wants from their...
billionaire benefactor, it's give us all the money and then leave us alone. You compare that
with what's happened in the last year, year and a half, with him pulling the common endorsement,
turning the business section, excuse me, the op-ed section, essentially into a kind of
makeshift economist where all of the left of center voice has been pushed out and it's sort of
a place for libertarians to be libertarians. What do you make of Bezos's, at least it seems
to me like utter lack of focus here. This is someone who clearly is a brilliant person who,
when he pays attention to companies, the companies tend to thrive. What do you make of his involvement
in the post over the last decade? I don't know. I'm baffled by it. Listen, I think we have a tendency
to think because somebody has domain brilliance in one area that therefore they are structurally,
wholly brilliant. It's possible he's the smartest person ever to get you to figure out how to buy
shoes and buy product at the lowest possible price with the best possible delivery, but terrible at
actually managing a media company, a totally different space. I don't think I'd be very good
at operating a company that's trying to get you to buy that pair of shoes at the lowest
possible price. I don't have any domain expertise, nor do I have any passion, do I give a crap about it?
And so I think he got into a space that's hard. I think he thought you could just like magically
sprinkle some technology dust on it and it would solve problems. It doesn't. And then I think he got into
like living life on a yacht and in dating and getting buff and all the stuff that that you see
him do. And he didn't pay any attention to the operation of the company. He doesn't have to.
He can do whatever he want. He bought the asset. It's capitalism. It's a free country. Do
whatever you want. It breaks my heart that that's what he chose to do because he ended up hiring an
atrocious CEO in Will Lewis. Again, foreseen foreseeable. Let it, let it like persist for far too
long, despite everybody, like, begging and pleading with him to just at least take a look at
what's happening and see if you come to the same appraisal that they were. I don't know.
I don't know. I mean, if you wanted to be conspiratorial, you'd say he's just worried about,
you know, pissing off the president of the United States. So he's trying to, you know,
go light on Republicans and doesn't really care if the post loses its mojo and he'll play
the long game. I don't know. Can I get my tone into conspiratorial waters here?
I think all that's true.
I think he lost interest.
I think he fell in love with other stuff, the yacht lifestyle.
I also think that, like, Occam's Razor is the simplest explanation for why Bezos has had this about face change in the last year and a half
is to look at the business of Blue Origin, his rocket business, his space technology business.
So when Bezos bought the post in 2013, Blue Origin was basically a fledgling company.
It had nothing more than million dollar, $10 million deals with the government.
I did some digging into contracts this morning, a sign with Blue Origin.
Before 2020, Blue Origin had only signed contracts worth barely $100 million.
In 2023, Blue Origin signed its largest federal contract for a human landing system,
for Artemis missions with NASA, $3.4 billion.
That was under the Biden administration.
2025 Blue Origin signs another contract for launch services with the U.S. Space Force.
That's $2.3 billion.
Jeff Bezos is in the business of signing,
contracts under a government and under a president that we know is vindictive that rewards people
who do things, who do favors for him, and punishes people who criticize him. And so it's,
in a way, while it's terrible for journalism, it doesn't seem to me to be very mysterious
that Bezos is essentially sacrificing a lesser asset to protect a larger asset by essentially
allowing the post to whither, reject the fact that there's a clear strategy here that could work.
When the post's identity was democracy dies in darkness, we're going to stand against
the authoritarian tendencies, the Trump administration. Its subscription sex toupled between 2017
and 2020. Clearly that strategy could work to a certain extent again. I think they're not pursuing
it because Bezos has decided that pursuing it would put at risk a business.
that is now doing $5 billion, at least with the government, at least in contracts, signed
in the last few years. It seems to me like you just can't ignore an explanation that's that
potentially obvious. Again, we have no proof that that's the motivation, but I think it's fair for you
to have that conspiratorial appraisal of it until he steps in and explains what the hell
is he doing. Like, he could sell it. Somebody would buy it. It is an important Washington institution
there are people that would go to work and try to make it work.
They would take it off of his hands and he doesn't have to deal with this.
Then he could focus on Blue Origin if that's where his emphasis is.
And everybody comes out a winner, right?
So, like, is he really get that much?
Is Trump really going to care that much if he sells the Washington Post to a group of Washington locals?
I doubt it.
You were engaged in a Twitter conversation about what you would do if someone
tapped you on the shoulder. Maybe it's Jeff himself and said, what would you do to save the post?
Do you want to walk me through some of your thoughts about what you think is possible right now to
turn around this institution that's so important to you as it is to me? Yeah, I'd start by stop
doing all the things that you're doing. Like even this crap about like, we're just going to follow the
data. Like, I don't even understand what that means. It works perfectly if you're trying to sell a pair
of shoes because you can watch what size and style people are looking for. And just be clear,
this is an illusion of the fact that I believe it was Bezos himself in an interview or maybe a
Murray, others, they all keep talking about, we're going to follow the data.
I'm sorry if you're going to follow the data, what you're going to end up is mass producing content around porn, gambling tips, weed variations, funny memes, and videos.
Yeah.
Like, that's where data is going to lead you.
If there's a 19-year-old listener or viewer right now, they're like, that actually sounds like a Washington Post that might subscribe to.
I love that Washington Post.
So, like, that doesn't seem like it.
And then I would say you are the Washington Post, right?
Like, yes, Politico did eat your lunch on politics and a lot of the policy, but there's no reason you couldn't reclaim that.
There's all these federal agencies.
There's all this money.
There's all of these contractors.
This is a rich, rich, rich area.
Make no mistake about it.
Even with the economic, like, uncertainty right now, and even with the cuts in federal government, the derivative businesses around here are massive, massive.
So if you just built it around the federal government and all the people that feed off the federal government,
and the fact that you have pretty powerful people who come into this town, do business in this town, live in this town, care about the sports teams, care about the housing prices.
It gives you a pretty clear blueprint of if you're the Washington Post, what you could own.
This idea that like, oh, we're going to be the publication for All America.
All America doesn't care about the Washington Post.
Like, what is it that the Washington Post could give me in Ashgosh, Wisconsin that I can't get from a thousand other places?
why would the Washington Post have a right to win across the country as opposed to in its own
backyard?
And by the way, these businesses aren't terribly complicated.
They're difficult.
Media is a very, very, it's a coolest business to be in and probably the hardest in terms of
making money on a year-to-year basis.
But they're not, they're easier to run today than they were five or ten years ago.
Your technology costs are lower.
You kind of understand the subscription business.
You understand the high-end subscription business.
You understand the event business.
This stuff has been figured out.
And so I just don't feel like this is rocket science.
The only reason I weighed in on X on it is like I care about the publication.
I don't think they'll do any of the things that I laid out anyways.
So if it's a competitive threat to us, like I don't really care because I don't think
they'll execute on it anyways.
And the stuff that we want to execute on, we'll execute on and probably execute better
than they would.
So I just hope that somebody takes over that publication that cares and somebody who has like
a business thesis.
because I just think it would be an American tragedy
if the Washington Post shrunk to nothing.
Maybe just one more question in the Post
before we broaden the conversation
to talk about changes to the media and political landscape
in the last 20 years.
It seems to me like the easiest, dumbest,
lowest-hanging fruit here is
the Washington Post has, for years, decades,
seen itself as being in competition with the New York Times.
The New York Times has thrived,
not only because it has high,
hired and held on to journalistic stars, but also because it has become so much more than just a
newspaper. It has become, as you said, a lifestyle brand. My guess is that most of the subscriptions
the New York Times, the last, say, five years, maybe in particular during the Biden years,
sure, maybe some of them were about the journalism, but I would guess the plurality or majority
were for cooking and for games and for the stuff that existed around the journalism. Why not just
copy the New York Times.
Like, in a way, it's almost like,
it's like if you're an NBA team
in like 2014-2015,
and the Rockets and the Warriors
are winning 60 games a year
by chucking up a bunch of threes.
Why not just at least try
to, like, get some people
on your team who can chuck up threes?
That seems to me to be sort of like
the duh equivalent of trying
to do a little bit more to hire
a chef star, hire some engineers
who build games
and build that kind of lifestyle presence around your media property?
You could.
I think that's harder.
It's harder because, one, the New York Times is pretty good at being the New York Times.
I think that even in those spaces that you mentioned, there's a lot of individual companies outside of media that do it quite well.
And there's nothing about the Washington Post that tells me that they have a consumer base that's big enough that wants that,
that that's where I would put my investment dollars.
Whereas I think there's easier places.
The way you've got to look at it when you're running a media company is, okay, what are the audiences that I,
that I have the right to be able to,
uh,
to kind of lock in on a near daily basis where they,
they need me to kind of live their life,
do their job.
And then how,
based on those audiences,
what is the easiest way for me to monetize those in the most robust possible way,
in a,
in a scalable, durable way.
That's why I think like the Washington market,
there's a lot of money here, right?
Like,
like,
like, we're not a great indicator of media overall,
but like Axios has never been better and we just had our best quarters,
at our best month.
Like it's a, and why?
Because there's just a lot of people who want to reach people in positions of power.
And there's a finite number of ways to do that.
And so I don't really want the competition because not having it benefits us.
But I will say one of the market dynamics I've seen here is that the more competition you have,
it does seem to continue to lift at least our boat, if not all boats.
And so I think good, I think competition in all spaces actually sharpens the soul.
and that's why I would welcome it.
And I think that that's just a safer place for the Post to play than it would be to do kind of trying to be a knockoff of the New York Times, which has a much, much bigger base to start with.
I want to make sure that I name check the conservative critique of the Washington Post here, which is that the financial disaster of the Post in the last few years flows directly from the journalistic malpractice of the Post becoming too liberal.
When I read that critique, my view is that it misses the degree to which modern news organizations
tend to thrive when they have a discernible identity.
Sometimes that identity is a person, Bill Simmons, Joe Rogan, Candice Owens.
They all have first names.
That's how you know that they have identifiable personalities.
But you look at also organizations like Fox News, which is openly.
biased, has a very discernible identity.
My feeling about the conservative critique
is that it misses that whether or not media
should be overtly liberal or conservative or libertarian,
I think it actually helps in an abundant media environment
to be known for what you produce.
And I feel like the Post lost in identity
rather than losing purchase on a view from nowhere,
objective middle ground.
But I wonder how you feel about the conservative critique
that once too many people associated
the Washington Post with a kind of left-wing resistance politic, it hurt its ability to grow
in the post-Trump years.
Listen, I think parts of that critique are very fair.
I do think that the Post was more ideological than it led on.
I don't think that that's the reason for its demise.
I think you're right.
Like, had it doubled down on democracy dies in darkness and been more of a resistance,
like proudly resistance publication, they would probably be thriving.
And, well, Jim, you're nuts.
Well, am I?
Why is the Atlantic thriving?
Why is the New York Times thriving?
And so the actual data on people who made that choice as a business strategy shows that it can work.
I think it's that they have no identity.
I think what conservatives get wrong about media, especially in Washington, is like even if you're perceived as ideological, even if you're seen as part of like the enemy, if you are writing things that they know.
they have to reckon with and they know to be true, they continue to do business with you.
There's such a WWF kind of piece of journalism that people don't get of like Trump, I hate the media,
I hate the media.
And yet he's talking to more reporters in one day than any president I've ever met has talked to reporters in a year.
Like they're interacting with you.
Like we have days where the Trump White House hates us and loves us, but like I find them to be more
accessible by far than any administration that we've ever covered.
And like they might say they don't like us or they don't like the media.
They engage with it.
And so had the Washington Post just stuck to its identity of we are going to be the dominant publication about the interworking of power and of governance and of politics.
That's a beautiful place to be.
And there's always money to be had around there because there's always audience to be around there.
This is a company town.
That company is politics.
That company is government.
And the fact that they surrendered that
and allowed us at Politico to eat their lunch
like that's a tragedy.
They shouldn't allow that.
And Politico, Axios, Punchbowl, I mean,
it'd be one thing with the Washington Post
were like, you know, a tree and a superfund site
where it died because the ground underneath it was toxic.
It's like a dying redwood in a forest of redwoods.
Like it's being decimated in an environment
where a bunch of other news organizations are going.
And that tells me that the mistakes are more strategic
than structural when it comes to the post.
I do want to shift to the broader changes
that you've observed in the last 20 years.
You recently wrote a really interesting essay for Axios
about what you've seen since between 2006
when you left the Washington Post to 2026.
It seems to me like the single most objective observation
you could make about the difference in media today
versus 20 years ago
is that there's just more of it.
The most significant change is just a change of quantity.
I think quantity has implications
of its own. I think quantity changes the way that people see their own role in a media environment.
If you know that you're the local monopolist, you might feel like you have a responsibility to be
something for everyone. If you feel like your one voice among a million, I think you're much more
likely to be antagonistic, me against the world, and choose a specific ideology that represents
you specifically. So I wonder what you see is the most important implications or consequences of
they're just being so much more damn media in 2026 than there was 20 years ago.
It's the great paradox of the moment, which is there is more awesome, high quality,
deeply thought out, like nirvana level information available today to the 6 billion plus
that have internet connectivity around the world than at any point in the history of humanity.
sitting next to that is there's more crap, more manipulative content, more garbage, more seductive
in a bad way type content than ever before.
So like you're right.
Like the more is probably the biggest change.
There's just tons of it.
You could quantify it, right?
It's just there's just piles and piles of content.
And the consequences of that are everywhere, right?
It's why I think people are so confused.
I think it's why people are so anxious, why they're so overwhelmed.
The fact that, like, myself, even now, in a given week, will send Mike Allen or somebody
something I see and like, oh, this is really interesting.
Is it real?
Like, nobody, just pause on that for a second.
You never asked that question five years ago.
If I sent you something or you read something, you would assume it was real.
And now the smartest people with the most discerning filters don't know if what's real because you're just, there's so much stuff coming from so many directions.
And I worry about it and I talk to my kids a lot about this that I think the biggest differentiator for success over the next couple of years in addition to kind of AI proficiency and enthusiasm is being on the right side of information in a couple of.
quality. Like you, if you filter things correctly, if you know what to watch and what to read and
what to listen to and what not to read, watch and listen to, you can form a bionic brain right now.
I feel so much smarter today than I did three or four years ago. But not to kiss your ass,
like part of it is finding people like you who kind of think panoramically on topics and
provocatively on topics that I'm interested in, but that I didn't really have anywhere to get that type of
content five years ago.
And now it's everywhere.
And you follow individual people or you watch a video on YouTube.
Or you listen to the right podcast.
Like think about even us as reporters,
being like honest, like pretty wired reporters.
We could probably get almost anybody on the phone.
But it's not like I could get Elon Musk on the phone 10 times a year, right?
And we never could, even in the heyday of our jobs.
But he's doing a podcast a week or two.
So you have access to the smartest minds across any topic available for basically free or a Spotify subscription.
And you can listen and you can learn.
And so if you could filter that correctly, it is a beautiful time to be intellectually curious.
It's just so hard if you're not kind of doing this for a living and have the time to filter out the bad stuff.
and you just get on your phone and you're stressed out
and the kids are screaming,
it's just easier to get into the bounty of crap.
Yeah, I'm glad you mentioned that sort of bifurcation
or that barbell effect where it's so difficult, I think,
to describe the state of media briefly
because we live in a period where there is so much more
insane conspiratorial bullshit.
And for our interviews with physicists
that go deep into the nature of the universe,
in ways that 1957 CBS was never going to touch.
And so you can't just say, oh, everything's getting worse, everything's getting better.
Everything's getting everything because there's so much stuff out there that it's very hard to pin it all with one brush.
I want to go back to one thing you said that just triggered a thought.
And when you were talking about you and Mike seeing a new piece of information and wondering, is this true, right?
that decline of instinctive trust in media.
On the one hand, you could argue that that's a bad sign
because it suggests that our media diets,
even when we try very hard to keep them clean,
can still be encrusted with conspiratorial nonsense.
At the same time, a part of me thinks
that decline of trust is a part of wisdom for consumers.
Like, if you go back to,
I was reading this interview that Jack Schaefer did,
for Harper's Magazine a few months ago,
Jack Schaefer, a great media critic.
He was talking about how in the 1950s, 1960s,
newspapers didn't publish the news as we understood it.
Newspapers published what the government told them.
It was only in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, he said,
when news developed a slightly more antagonistic relationship with government,
where the news wasn't just the press secretary said X.
It was the press secretary said,
said X, but that's a lie.
And there's a way in which, obviously, we don't want an implosion of trust such that
nobody believes anything that they see and we all live in this nihilistic, you know,
world of nonsense.
But there's a way in which trusting our eyes and ears a little bit less, holding on to skepticism
a little bit longer, it's not the worst way to be a modern news consumer.
I agree and I disagree.
Right. So I agree if you have the time and the capability to think deeply about what you're talking about the news and to hold it up and to think skeptically and think critically.
I think most people have a life and they're really busy and they don't have that much time to allocate to information consumption.
And I think that they're the victims of this. They really are. I think to be honest, like we're the beneficiaries of it.
And that's what makes me sad, right?
Because I want, I believe, like, so powerfully in this country, so powerfully in its capabilities.
And I think we have all these advantages that people just don't understand exist in such abundant ways.
And yet people are demoralized instead.
And they think everything's funky because of what they're seeing on their screen.
And so, yeah, I think both exist at the same time.
Like, I'm probably in your, I'm more in your camp that if I'm being honest, I have.
never been more excited to be alive.
Intellectually, like, yes, like, there's things that scare me.
I think there's, like, truly existential things that are hovering around us.
But intellectually, I have never been more on fire in terms of, like, I find AI both frightening
and the most fascinating thing I've ever used and I've ever thought of.
I think the political shifts that we're seeing here in Europe and Canada and everywhere that
all are kind of mirroring each other, I just find it fascinating.
The stuff that you read about in history books when you have.
these large societal shifts that tend to be global in nature.
Even the stuff that you and I are talking about, this transformation of how our realities
are formed.
This is a once in a hundred year shift.
And I think that, and Mike and I've written about this, I think that the root cause
would always tell people when they're like, I'm anxious, I'm anxious.
And I'm like, unless you are medicated to the point of being catatonic, you should be
anxious because you have these huge shifts taking place.
And it's a long way of saying if you have the time, if you have the capability to throw
yourself into it, it is electrifying.
I just worry that people don't and that because people aren't programmed and we're not
wired to be able to deal with change at this level of scale in this many ways, that it's just
pulling us further apart in pulling too many people.
too far away from reality.
I want to close in a topic
that I know you care a lot about.
I care a lot about it too,
which is artificial intelligence.
I think the way that I want to do this,
the way I want to get into this particular subject,
is to point out, and I'm riffing, I think, right now
on my friend Kevin Ruse's observation,
that there's an enormous disconnect
within the media, among journalists,
about whether AI is essentially just a piece of,
hallucinating, copy-catting, stochastic parrot,
auto-complete, nonsense bullshit on the one hand,
versus other people who I think are more enmeshed
in the latest offerings from frontier models
who are playing with the very latest most cutting-edge tools
and are becoming, like, extremely AI-pilled.
I count you in that category.
And so I want to give you a platform
to imagine you're speaking to an audience,
of not just journalists, but an audience of Americans, people around the world, who don't believe
that these tools can really do anything useful because at the end of the day, they're just
fancy little pieces of auto-complete. Why are they wrong? And what have you built that you
think has real value? Yeah, I think what I would say to them is, of all the things that I feel
passionately about right now, I feel there's nothing I feel more passionate about than
you're basically being told that the Internet's coming before the Internet came.
You have a heads up on a technology that is going to have a bigger effect on society than the Internet did.
And I increasingly think maybe at like an electricity level effect on society.
And for those people that are skeptical, like don't believe me, but also don't believe the one interaction you had with ChatGPT where it gave you a stupid answer or it hallucinated.
If you have $20, download the Claude app, Opus 4.5 or 4.6, it's $20 you can cancel after a month.
Spend one hour on it, not just asking it a simple question, but think about something you would like to build.
And don't just say it once and give up, like really work with it.
Like try to be very, give it context, explain what you're trying to build.
Have it ask you questions so that you could flesh it out.
And then you'll start to see the magic.
You'll start to see why people aren't sleeping in San Francisco, why every investment dollar is going into AI and AI adjacent companies, why people like you and I are up late at night building things.
And I'll give you a good example.
Like I'm being 100% sincere, like no false humility.
I am a tech dope.
I know nothing about coding.
It's been the biggest frustration in running media companies that I don't know Ruby on Rails or Python.
I can't really fact check whether somebody's good at their job or not.
And in the last, like just in the last month, especially with this explosion of Claude, I've built a half dozen different prototype apps that are high functioning in work.
I'm building one right now that basically you, if you tell me what you do, how long you've been doing it, and in what industry you're in, it's going to teach you how to code or how to prompt the machine the way that the most sophisticated people are prompting Claude or Gemini or Chat CheapT so that you can get the most.
out of it. I was able to build that in about a half an hour. As somebody who runs media companies,
had I asked my product team to do that even a year ago, it would have taken certainly three to six
people in probably three to four months to get to prototype. Me, Jim alone, working only on his
phone. I'm not even using my laptop for this. Only on my phone was able to build that and get it
into an operating state. I give you another example. I'm trying to build a, I'm a fly fisherman.
One of my frustrations is that it's really hard when I travel to find a guide.
And so I'm trying to build like the Uber of fly fishing where I basically take and basically all I did is I said, I want you to think like you're Steve Jobs.
I want you to study Uber.
I want you to study similar marketplaces.
I want you then to help me build out an app that would match consumer with either the fishing guide or hunting guide.
And it is, it's magical.
Like even the first stab before I even started to ask it to make some changes.
It was beautiful.
It was intuitive.
It was doing and building things that I wasn't asking it to.
And if you want to really go one level deeper to see just how fascinating it is, you can
click one button and you can see how it's thinking and just watch how it thinks.
And then ask yourself, do I have a friend who could think that smartly?
I don't.
And I feel like I know a lot of smart people.
Like, it is, it is, it's coming and it's coming fast.
And when I tell our employees, what I tell my kids, you know, they're scary outcomes from it.
But what the best, the thing you can do to give yourself the best possible chance to thrive with it is to learn it.
Figure out how do I utilize this as a force multiplier of the work that I do or the passions that I hold and play with Gemini, play with ChachyPT, play with Claude, see which one works best for you.
and if you can integrate it into the work that you do and offload this work you don't want to do or the tasks in life you don't want to do,
suddenly you're going to become exponentially more productive and you're going to be fluent in the first technology that speaks gym.
It speaks English.
Like you just talk to it.
You don't need to be a fancy coder.
You don't necessarily need to be exceptionally bright.
If you are creative, you have an idea, you can offer context, have a little bit of patience, a little bit of persistence.
you're going to produce something really neat.
And so I worry like you do, I live in Washington, and I talk to people who are running
companies.
I talk to people in government, and they're divorced from it.
So it's not just you.
If you're listening to this and you're like, I'm still scared, I'm telling you lawmakers,
government, CEOs, they're scared too.
You're on equal footing with them.
If you just jump in today and you start to learn it, you're going to have a leg up over
other people.
You're going to give yourself the best possible chance to succeed.
And that doesn't mean it's going to displace you
or displace your passions or all the other things.
But I think just like using it
is the best thing you could possibly do.
I don't want to belabor the point
because this is not an AI podcast
and we do plenty of AI podcasts here.
But I do want to recircle
what I think is a really, really important point
for AI skeptics out there
who believe that this technology
simply doesn't do what some people promise it does.
In my experience, there are a lot of people
that have essentially used a model
that is two to three years old.
They use the first edition
of chat GPT, which is 3.5, we're now up to like 5.3 or something. That technology was interesting,
but incredibly flawed. It did hallucinate. It did fail to offer links. It did fail to serve as
essentially a good research partner. It was not ready for prime time. But to reject that technology
and then say that all future AI is essentially equivalent to me is like essentially trying out
a cell phone in 1989 and then deciding that the smartphone of 2026,
doesn't work. Like, these are essentially entirely different technologies, and I would just encourage
people who are skeptics, pay the $20. I think Jim is right. Pay the $20 and see what you can build.
Last question, because let me just bring AI close to, close to the topic that we've been
discussing today. I mean, if indeed, like, Politico succeeded in part because of its co-evolution
with the smartphone with social media, you know, if CBS thrived because of its co-creation with
the radio and television technology.
We can go back and do this for a lot of companies that succeed and still exist,
precisely because they struck when a certain technology was having its hockey stick moment.
What kind of a media company strikes you as being apt for the AI native world?
What is the kind of media company that you could almost say couldn't exist or couldn't thrive in a pre-AI world?
but you think could and might thrive if indeed this is something that, as you say, is the next electricity.
I don't know that it couldn't thrive without AI, but what will thrive with AI is like authentic expertise, like something that requires like true human experience, true human like history with a topic.
My ability to watch you, talk to you, get you to tell me something that you might not tell someone else or look at a verbal tick.
and be able to pick up that you meant something different
than what the words actually said.
I think that type of content is going to surge in value.
I think it's possible it's worth 10x when it is today
because everybody else is going to be operating
with basically universal general intelligence.
So they talk about AGI in terms of like the technology achieving
human-like general intelligence.
I think we're all going to have like baseline general intelligence,
just like we all basically, if we have Google,
have the same baseline recall capabilities.
We're going to have these brains that are just enormous on almost any piece of topic.
If you can sit above that with expertise, you're going to have value.
If you have trust because of either your personality, because of your knowledge, because of your humor, whatever it is, if you have trust, that's going to sit above and beyond the LLM, above and beyond AI.
And then if you have the ability to connect humans, either like through membership, events,
I think as people become more and more dependent on artificial intelligence, there's going to be an equal and opposite reaction where people need human touch, need human connectivity.
If you can provide that, those three attributes, I think will have a ton of value.
By the way, that's not most media.
If you're generic, you're general, you're not that interesting, you're not vital, you will be obliterated and it will be fast and it will be furious and there's nothing you can do about it.
So I think you have to be in those three categories.
And I think a lot of people fit, right?
I think you will thrive because you're going to be able to do more than you can do right now.
The way you research your stories, a way you distribute your content, your ability to maybe do this and run another company simultaneously because you're going to have the power of AI around you.
And so I'm bullish that if we can get things right with AI and there's some real things that scare the hell out of me because we have a government that's not paying attention.
to it, but if we can get it right and it doesn't destroy us and not to be hyperbolic,
I think there's scenarios where it could.
I think that it could be great for human intelligence.
And the last point I'll make is that for media, people in the media are interested in media,
you have to understand that we're probably at the leading edge of a substantial platform
shift that will be akin to the creation of the iPhone.
Like you never stared at your phone before 2007 to get your information.
In all likelihood, you're going to have some kind of new product in the next, say, one to three years that maybe combines some kind of screen with either a bracelet or a pendant or something where your ability to get information, have it personalized, have it tailored to your taste into your consumption patterns, I think is going to be, will be developed.
And we don't know what that looks like.
And we don't know then what the unit economics of media are as they fit into that.
One way that I think I'd synthesize that answer is that there's going to be some ways
that companies are going to succeed in the next 10 years by leaning into AI and doing more with
AI.
But there's also going to be, I think, media businesses that succeed because in ways they lean
away from it, right?
Yeah.
Like why are, why might events be so special in a world with abundant artificial intelligence?
Well, because individuals are not AI.
And so, you know, what is abundance sometimes becomes less valuable.
What is scarce sometimes becomes more valuable.
Individuals are scarce.
Humor might be scarce, like true personal connection,
both through a phone maybe through a device,
but also in the real world, that might be scarce too.
And so maybe there's companies that will thrive,
especially in this coming age because they lean away from the technology not into it.
I think that's a possibility, too.
That's smart.
Jim Van der Heai, thank you very much.
I appreciate it. Thank you.
