Pod Save the World - Election 2024: Ukraine, Russia, and Whether the War Will End

Episode Date: October 12, 2024

In this special episode of Pod Save the World, Ben looks at how the war in Ukraine will be impacted by a Harris or Trump victory. Speaking to guests from Ukraine, Russia, and Europe, we hear different perspectives on American leadership, the future of the war, and the stakes for Ukrainians, Russians and NATO. Ben is joined by Senator Chris Murphy, Ukrainian journalist Illia Ponomarenko, Nina Krushcheva, Professor of International International Affairs at the New School, and Célia Belin, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. For a closed-captioned version of this episode, click here. For a transcript of this episode, please email [e-mail] and include the name of the podcast.

Welcome to POTS at the world. I'm Ben Rhodes. And this is another special episode in the lead-up to November's election, where we're looking at what the stakes are for foreign policy and for the world as a whole in the Harris and Trump matchup. Last episode, we focused on the battle over global democracy. And today, we'll look at a conflict which is at the center of that broader struggle, Russia's war in Ukraine. It's now been two and a half years since Russia invaded Ukraine. And since Vladimir Putin underestimated the resolve of Ukrainians to to fight for their country. What he thought would be a short conquest has now become a grinding war of attrition between Russia and Ukraine, the Kremlin, and the West, with Europe and America pouring hundreds of billions of dollars

with the military support and other aid into Ukraine. Now, the costs are most staggering for those fighting the war. Roughly one million Russians and Ukrainians have been killed or wounded. Ukrainians are exhausted, battling not only for their lives and their sovereignty, but also for the attention in support of the war. world. As conflict in the Middle East sucks up attention, and Western electorates are focused on

rising costs at home. Russia has drifted further into totalitarianism, as any dissent or criticism of the war is harshly punished. And a propaganda machine works nonstop to convince the Russian people that their government is on the right side. It's also become a major political debate here at home. That is a war that's dying to be settled. I will get it settled before even become president. If I win when I'm president-elect, and what I'll do is I'll speak to one, I'll speak to the other, I'll get them together, that war would have never happened. Ukraine stands as an independent and free country. If Donald Trump were president, Putin would be sitting in Kiev right now. And understand what that would mean,

because Putin's agenda is not just about Ukraine. Understand why the European allies and our NATO allies are so thankful that you are no longer president and that we understand the importance of the greatest military alliance the world has ever known, which is NATO, and what we have done to preserve the ability of Zelensky and the Ukrainians to fight for their independence. Otherwise, Putin would be sitting in Kiev with his eyes on the rest of Europe. In this episode, you'll hear my conversations with Ukrainian war journalist, Ilya Panamarenko, the Russian academic, Nina Khrushcheva, who is professor of international affairs at the new school, and Celia Baylon, from the European Council on Farm Relations. Then, we'll hear a bit more from my conversation with Senator Chris Murphy.

We'll look at how the war is reshaping Ukraine, Russia, and the global order, and try to answer the question of whether and how it can come to an end. Above all, we'll discuss how the American election will impact the war and its broader consequences. The first person you'll hear from is Ilya Panamarenko. He's the Ukrainian journalist who has been one of the most prominent voices covering the conflict. And he now has a new book out called, I Will Show You How It Was, the Story of Wartime Keev. I started the conversation by asking Ilya to tell us how he and other Ukrainians have adapted to life in a war zone. Well, life goes on. The most common description is that life goes on in all of its complexity, in all of its joys and problems.

and grief in anticipation of what's going to happen with the normalization, sort of normalization of things like missile attacks, drone attacks, very often, lack of electricity also too. But in general, if you go to a place that is far beyond the front lines, such as Kiev or the place where I live, such as Boucher, just outside Kiev, you would barely notice any signs of wartime at all. Other than, you know, slight moments, details that come to your mind and come to your eyes, such as the presence of military cars and the streets.

Sometimes, you know, it's the sound of air battles over cities. Sometimes it's the rattle of power generators that keep a lot of businesses a lot. and keep the life applaud, economic life and stuff like that. So it's one of those things that we learned about ourselves in a war and in general about the human beings in war. It's that people, no matter what happens, no matter how bad it is,

people try to have it as normal as possible, as close to normal as possible. So this is what's happening here in Ukraine. So looking back, because this episode, we're kind of looking at the, election, but we want to understand the past as well as the future. With respect to the Biden administration, you know, you've, on the one end, obviously the support provided by the United States as well as other coalition countries, NATO countries, is helping Ukraine continue to fight off

Russian advances. And yet there's been frustration at times that there's been a slowness to certain weapons deliveries, a reticence to, a reluctance to allow Ukraine to, you know, hit targets deeper into Russia. How do you look at the record of Joe Biden and his support for Ukraine? What's the balance between appreciating the support that has come with some of the frustration over some of the slowness? It's a very complicated issue because it's really hard to stay within the margin of this balance between obviously our need to ask for things from the United States and also trying to appreciate this contribution,

try to be respectful in due manner, and also thinking about a lot of problems on the American side and also on our side. It's true that without US assistance, particularly the United States assistance, as the biggest contributor, there would be no Ukraine at all. At the same time, I personally, as we talk to American officials,

as we talk to ourselves, within our discussion about the American rule and the Biden administration in this, I personally try to be less super demanding about this, but to talk more from the perspective of the American, quite understandable American need to carefully spend their resources, particularly when it comes to Ukraine, and be always sure about the fact that all this efforts, all this investment that American made into this whole deal,

they will lead us to something. There will be a positive result, rather than wastage of resources from American taxpayers' money. And in this regard, just what we're saying is that, you know, you guys invest in billions and billions into this. It's true that, you know, partly that money stays within the United States economy, on weapons production, on substitution on weapons. But at the same time, we do not see a plan for the future a clear objective of how that works. So on that point, you know, there's, in terms of what the objective is, you know, there's

increasing discussion of negotiations. And let's assume a Harris victory in this case, because I'll get to Trump. What should be the objective in terms of, you know, a lot of people, Ukraine obviously wants all of its territory back to include, you know, Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Putin obviously would not be coming into negotiation wanting to give up any territory of Russia controls. Where do you see the kind of Ukrainian negotiating position going next year? What objective should the U.S. be pushing for in terms of not just the military assistance provides, but also the kind of diplomatic approaches it takes. You know, and you see the invasion into Kursk and Russia, you know, that feels to me like a

smart way of gaining something to trade in negotiation, but how are you looking at that end-state objective that might enter in a negotiation? The problem is that, you know, the United States clearly have some sort of a loosely formulated objective, which is the survival of the Ukrainian state, no victory for Russia, no defeat for Ukraine, stuff like this. The problem is that this extremely careful approach, this in many ways, passive approach, this a lot of lack of leadership, lack of resolve in terms of getting Ukraine instruments towards this very objective. It really undermines the efficacy of this effort in many ways. The simplest example is the ongoing discussion regarding the Ukrainian

ability to strike Russian military targets deep within Russian territory. And our question to this is that what are you guys trying to achieve by giving this this comfortable safe space for Russian bombers, for Russian missiles in attacking our military infrastructure, in killing our cities? I mean, what's the catch on this? What's the goal in this? We often communicate with American officials. We talk to them, we try to explain this.

And from our perspective, from my perspective, they are reserving this leverage in a bit to, you know, push Putin to sort of a reason to de-escalate, to come to terms, to stop, or else we provide Ukraine with ability to strike your bombers and strike your air bases. But the problem is that, you know, it's been so many instances of that, not that very logic, not working. The only possible

way to coerce Russia into essentially giving us what we can realistically expect and what Americans can realistically expect is to effectively disable Russia's very ability to wage the

war at this scale by pushing back its air bases, bombers, missile launch sites. This is the only possible way out of this war, is to make Russia stop by disabling its ability to fight this war. Yeah, no, that makes sense. So, you know, you want to see a Kamala Harris from Ukrainian perspective, loosen up some of those restrictions, try to get some more leverage on Russia by striking

against its capabilities in Russia. Well, the other alternative is a Trump presidency. And, you know, you've got, you know, Trump has suggested somehow he'd end this war on his first day in office. J.D. Vance has been one of the biggest critics of assistance. Ukraine. How concerned are Ukrainians about what happens in the case of a Trump victory? What we try to do, and I think it's a wise policy, is not to take sides in the election. It's tried to be working with both sides. And it's true that, you know, I would even tell you this, that within the Ukrainian public discourse, there are some percentage of people and even decision makers who think that this lack of resolve demonstrated by the Biden's administration,

this reluctance and this drive towards a simpler solution of making sort of a deal, a good deal with Russians, is not as good as the perspective of another Trump presidency and his unpredictability. I'm not saying they are 100% right from my perspective, but they say that. that other than this so bleeding out that is insured by Biden administration, maybe this next guy who is so hard to predict, who is so hard to forecast in terms of his reaction and his policy, maybe who could be a better alternative other than the slow bleeding out amid the talk about the escalation management and expressions of concerns

that we have. But at the same time, the Trump team is saying because in many ways, what they say is something that we call election talk, electorate base. He says to those conservatives who can support Ukraine, he says that Russians are not going to win

and some stuff like that, that he'll make a deal, he'll force Russians into deal. To those who are skeptical towards Ukraine, he says that Ukraine is, what Ukraine does is the threat of World War III, So I don't think that we can talk about real things as we talk about, you know, election promises and, you know, election hot air and talk. So, yeah, no, that's interesting.

So one last question on this, which is that, look, you know, whether it's you want Kamala Harris to kind of do more move off of a de-escalation mindset or whether it's Donald Trump selected and, you know, Ukrainians have to convince him to, you know, not. walk away. Where would you make the argument from, you know, to the American politicians and voters, hey, here's why you guys should remain invested, get more invested. What's the argument from Ukraine about why Americans should continue to provide more support going forward? Because we definitely do understand what the Kremlin is about, what Russia is about, and what the today's regime of Putin is about. So they need war. It's one of the biggest and the most successful instruments of holding on to power.

After Ukraine, there will be something else because they are mechanically incapable of holding onto power except for getting back to the isolation of the Cold War, finding an external enemy, which is the West, particularly the United States, which is the mobilization of population regarding this idea of Russia being surrounded by... the enemies. You guys have a unique opportunity, which is truly unique in terms of human history, to prevent, to curtail, curtail and large European war that would entail a lot of Western nations. So we talk about a win-win deal. You get rid of this war, you curtail this crazy dictator that depends, organically depends on war as such in Europe. And we got

our country saved, we got our way of life saved. And it's a win-win deal. This is what we're talking about. We're preventing something really ugly. Okay, so I hope you can see why it is so important to get the Ukrainian perspective on these things, both because it communicates the stakes for them but for the entire world, including the United States, but also because their view of the issue is complicated. They're grateful for the support that they've gotten.

from a Democratic administration, but not entirely satisfied. They're worried about Trump, but they might see some ways in which he might not be as bad as some of us, including me, have been saying. So it's important for us to continue to hear these perspectives from Ukraine as we prepare for the election and hopefully for a Kamala Harris presidency. Next, we're going to hear a Russian perspective, not to defend the war, not a Putin perspective, but to give us insight into the cultural and political mindset of the country. If Trump or Harris truly wants to find a negotiated or military end of the conflict, they need to understand what motivates the Russian leadership and the Russian public. So we spoke with Nina Khrushcheva.

She's a historian and professor of international affairs at the new school and the great-granddaughter of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who she's just written a new book about. We started off the conversation talking about what the political and media narrative within Russia is like about the U.S. election. Well, Vladimir Putin said that he supports Kamala Harris because Joe Biden said that he, we should support Kamala Harris. And so he said, we're going to follow the order and we're going to support Kamala Harris because she seems like a happy person. She loves all the time. And like a happy person, she may not have problems. And therefore, she may not further sanction Russia as Donald Trump did. during his administration.

So it was a little bit of a tongue and cheek, a little bit of trolling inside. And I sort of recognize the old KGB, clandestine recruiter who kind of says, is he serious? Does he mean it? Does he really support Kamala Harris? Because normally what we hear in the West,

and sometimes in Russia, although I'm not sure in Russia that much anymore, that of course the Russians should be following Donald Trump and loving Donald Trump, since he promises to end the war with Ukraine in just 24 hours. But mostly, I think, generally in Russia and certainly coming from the Kremlin, they really do not expect the relationship between Russia and the United States to improve anytime soon. Well, that's what I was going to ask. I mean, you know, the public posturing is very much like Putin, right? You know, keep people guessing, troll a little bit.

But, you know, substantively, it would seem like there's a real, you know, investment for the Putin government in particular to see Trump win, given what he said about support for Ukraine. I mean, do you think, I mean, you're suggesting people, they kind of assume things won't really change no matter what. Do you think, what do you think the view is of whether or not a Trump presidency would be kind of materially different than Kamala Harris on support for Ukraine? I think that for the Russians, Trump is more interesting as somebody who can meddle in American life, more interesting somebody who can unsettle the American life. So the worse than America does, the more ridiculous America looks, the better it is for the Russians. And the reason I'm saying that, that they're not necessarily expecting much change. I mean, they may hope a little bit, but I think they already kind of burned their hopes the first time around in 2016,

because then, I'm sure you, I don't know if you remember those news, but they were shocking news. They were drinking champagne in the Russian parliament saying, congratulations to us, Trump won, it's going to change. Well, nothing happened. And yes, it is a kind of Trump line that he sanctioned Russians more than ever. It is the Russian line, but it is also to some degree true. This is the gas pipes, the North Stream 1 and North Stream 2. So Trump sanction those. So in this sense, I think they're being calm about it.

So for them, the interest in Trump is that with Trump, America is going to do worse. Trump will do insane things. It may work out for the Russians. It may not work out for the Russians because I don't think that anybody in the Kremlin really thinks that things are about to change. And as long as Putin's staying in power, as long as he's alive, which I think he's going to stay in power for as long as he's alive. As long as he's alive, actually, the worst the relationship is, the better it is for him. Yeah. Yeah.

So that's really interesting. So there's more benefit from the Russian perspective, the Putin perspective, to kind of divided in chaotic America that's weakened at home and kind of embarrassed globally kind of undermining this U.S.-led order. That makes a lot of sense. The other thing that people speculate on in terms of a Trump presidency is that the U.S. would be less invested in NATO, less invested in. obviously Ukraine, and that that might invite kind of further aggression by Putin either into

like a Georgia, the Moldova, and former Soviet space, or potentially even into the Baltic states. I mean, do you see, as just an analyst of this, do you see Putin acting differently in a Trump presidency as a Harris presidency? Do you see him, do you, you know, sign on to this notion that he might be more belligerent if he feels like the U.S. is less committed to NATO under Trump? A lot of Trump doing is a lot of Trump speaking. I mean, you know, how much he has really done. He wanted NATO, his whole thing about NATO is that he wanted them to contribute.

Well, they contribute. I mean, they now contribute much more than, in fact, he wanted, than the 2%. So we still don't know whether Trump is indeed going to be uncommitted to NATO if NATO pays its dues. And as a thing, actually, I also agree when Trump says that Putin may not have invaded Ukraine if Trump were president. Because I think Joe Biden really did with withdrawing from Afghanistan, with calling Putin names, with trying to have predictable relationship, but actually meaning that he means Putin wants predictable, needs to be predictable rather than Biden. I think it kind of insulted Putin more. It doesn't justify his actions, but it certainly explains. why he has become so belligerent with Biden.

And so with Trump, if Trump is not insulting him, and in fact, we know Trump likes dictators. It's not just Putin. I mean, I think America is concentrated very much on how much Trump loves Putin, but Putin, I mean, Trump loves Erdogan more than he loves Putin. He loves CZP. He talks about their greatness.

So that is flattering. To a dictator, that is quite flattering. And also, another thing that analysts unfortunately miss, because we're so driven by the excitement of the story, is that Putin has shown us that he doesn't want the war with NATO. He's been very careful. And if you look at Kursk, the Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk territory, Putin reacted to this very calmly.

Why? Because he fights that war with Ukraine. He doesn't want to make it bigger. He just wants to push out Ukrainians. It doesn't matter how long it takes. He doesn't want a larger war with NATO. So I am not of a school of thought, and I'm probably very few of us, that Putin wants to invade Europe. He wants to invade Poland.

He wants to invade the Baltics. He may meddle with Georgia. He may meddle with the parts of Moldova that wants to be part of Russia. But so far, he hasn't. It doesn't mean that, you know, five years from now, he may change his mind. But for now, he wants that war to be on his terms. And he's not looking into having more wars at this time. And so on Ukraine, what do you see, you know, because I think even if Kamala Harris is elected,

there's very likely to be some push for negotiation in the next year or so. What do you see is the end state that is acceptable to Putin, to the way he's presented the war to the Russian people? Is there a certain territorial end state? Is there a certain commitment in terms of NATO membership being off the table for Ukraine? What is the formulation you think that would be acceptable to Putin to end the war? Well, he already actually, he said it. I mean, he was also quite consistent in this. He said we want whatever it is we have, we're going to take, and there's no NATO,

and we can consider European membership for Ukraine if they behave. But there is no NATO membership, and whatever territory we take, we've taken, it's going to be ours. And that's what he has been saying for quite some time. He was like, like, we're here. Are you hearing this now? No, you're not hearing us. So we're going further.

Are you hearing us now? I think the more important question is what Vladimir Zelensky is going to agree with. Yeah. Because so far, every time when there is a conversation about potential negotiations, potential ceasefire potential something, Vladimir Zelensky does something. that makes this impossible because he doesn't want to surrender. He doesn't want to surrender on Putin's terms. He has his own absolute terms and he's going to fight for them. The more conversation was about how,

you know, what could be potential negotiations, boom, he goes into Kursk. Why? Because he wants this war wider. He cannot win this war as Ukraine against Russia, even with all the help of the West. The West is a party to this war, but it is not an actual participant, essentially. So Zelensky wants the West, NATO, America, all these countries to be a participant in this war. And in this sense, I think a more question, a more important question for us is that when would be the time when Zelensky would say, fine, we cannot fight more, or will he convince NATO countries? countries, West European countries, to actually get involved in the war, have boots on the ground, something that Emmanuel Macron was talking about a few months back, but then stopped. So the question is how wide the war will get, because Putin is clear.

I just want to ask, like, as someone who spends a lot of time in Russia, while also looking at the politics of it, how do you see, is there, should Americans understand something about how Russia has changed? since the war began or not changed? Because we read about people, you know, lots of people leaving the country, this kind of drain of more liberal constituencies. And obviously, we also read about the propaganda instead of Russia. Do you get a sense that Russia is a different place today than it was in 2022? Absolutely.

It's an absolutely different place. Because before 22, I mean, COVID was 20, so it was. already kind of going into, it's hard to assess exactly what it was in 2021, 2021. But it was a reasonably free society. I mean, it was, now it is essentially dictatorship. But at the time, it was an autocracy with a certain amount of freedoms. There was free press. I mean, there was a great, a lot of news outlet that outlets that were oppositional to

the Kremlin and spokes. were quite outspoken. It started changing when Alexei Navalny returned from Germany in 21. And as I remember I was in Moscow. I went, I think, is one of the last protests that people went to. It was in January 21 to protest his imprisonment. And so it started changing then. And the 22 war was kind of a finally Russia openly and loudly fell off the cliff. And so yes, that's that's, Russia changed. The media outlets were closed in the space of a week. But once again, I mean, there's still, for example, ECHO masquay, very liberal, important, like NPR, radio station, now turned into something that is called Jivoy Gvoist, which is a live nail.

And it's still on YouTube. And only a month ago, the Russians started jamming YouTube. But then VPNs are everywhere. So it's not an entirely unfree society. I mean, the Kremlin does want it. But at the same time, it's almost like a boiling frog. It does it, but it also does it in batches. It doesn't close everything at once because it is afraid of a certain amount of protests.

But for now, people say, well, I have to use VP and I can do it. So I'm not entirely out of the free world. My calculation, people are very modest about it, and I'm not. So I think about two and a half million at least left since the war began. So Russia lost incredible amount. It really lost the best and the brightest and those who are capable of moving Russia forward. I travel around. I actually not only stay in Moscow and San Petersburg, but I go to different cities.

And in most cities, what I'm seeing is that they're just thinking that they can live through this. and one day it will be over, and one day they will come back to normal sea. Russians do live in despair. They live in a little bit of hope. They're frozen in fear. And they really, most of the time, they think that whatever absurd is happening, Orwell could not have made it up. Well, one last question I want to ask you then.

I mean, I try to kind of think about what it's the future of Russian politics. And, you know, Putin's not forever, but also rapid change is unlikely. I want to ask about, you know, it's tied to the book you just wrote. I mean, your great-grandfather, Khrushchev, was a kind of reforming leader right after a period of closing in some ways. And that kind of opened some doors over time to things like detente. And I mean, is there some, as you look back at the past in writing this book about Nikita Khrushchev and also kind of look to the future, there are lessons from the Khrushchev period that might be relevant? Well, it is kind of, I mean, we don't have much time, but it is a fascinating. My book has become a fascinating story and kind of a litmus test for this system,

because it was supposed to be published by sort of semi-official publisher, and they refused to publish it. I wrote it, they edited it, they censored it. They deleted Navalny, Putin, any comparison to today, everything. They did everything. And then they didn't publish it anyway. They got afraid. And then it was published by Erasmus.

by the dilettante by those affiliates, and they publish it the way I wanted. We had it all back. All this, I mean, we still didn't put Navalny in just in case because it's extremist. But other than that, all comparisons were in. And I don't want to brag, but this is reality. It's now in the third print. Yeah. It's really, it came out on August 1st, and now it's in the third print, because it was brought out

exactly precisely because people want to know what happens when Stalin dies. And the way I was prepared for what happened, precisely because I wrote this book. So I know how people who serve Stalin, the minute he dies, they just run away and try to say, oh, like cruise ship did. Nothing to do with this. Or if I did, I was forced and so on and so forth. And one thing that I learned from writing the book, but also from looking at a lot of documents and a lot of history is that for every Stalin, there is a cruise ship. And I think that really gives us a lot of hope. So I thought that was very interesting from Nina, including the bit about her book, which indicates that even though there's not a lot of dissent in Russia,

there might be underneath the surface a lot of curiosity about what it might mean to move on from an autocratic leader. But the reality is not much is going to change inside of Russia while Putin is still in power. And he's not going anywhere. and he's probably not budging from his current terms on Ukraine, which sets up a lot of challenges for the United States and for our allies who've been supporting Ukraine. Now, America, of course, has the benefit of a lot of distance when it comes to so many of the conflicts in our world.

We've got a whole ocean between us and Europe. But our European allies, they're right there on Russia's border. Their fortunes are tied to the future of Russia and Ukraine in areas like trade and energy. Also, their physical security and their democracies themselves are much more connected to what's happening inside of Russia and Ukraine. So how are those allies looking at our election? And what do they see as the best and worst-case scenarios for the American and European relationship?

I spoke with Celia Baylon, who is a senior policy fellow and head of the Paris office for the European Council on Prime Relations. We started the conversation by talking about how European leaders are preparing for a possible second Trump term, especially as it relates to NATO and security issues. The way that Europeans are responding to the possible return of Donald Trump, which I must remind you, you know, some Europeans tried, such as President Macron to be friends with Donald Trump and others tried sort of, you know, moral opposition, a bit like Chancellor Angela Merkel. In the end, in none of the cases, it could produce anything really substantial.

And there was no... There was a real... realization that there was no influencing Donald Trump. So the perspective that he would come back as the president of the U.S. means that everybody is preoccupied by it. And so to answer your question, Europeans are, you know, sort of scraping and individually trying to push their own ideas. So typically you would have friends saying that the number one priorities build European defense industry and that that's the only way that American.

Americans are going to be taking Europeans seriously, and therefore they want every money being pulled together for that purpose at the European level. But other countries, such as the Czech Republic, for example, are signing bilateral security deals with the U.S. or buying weapons from the U.S. defense industry in order to sort of keep the U.S. close. and others such as Lithuania are, you know, drafting Indo-Pacific strategies and China strategies because they think it's one way to demonstrate their loyalty to the U.S. and that in exchange they'll get, you know, support on other fronts such as Russia.

So you have all those different strategies, and they don't necessarily produce something, strong, they might seem to work on an individual basis, but they definitely do not amount to the capacity where Europeans should be and how to really integrate the possibility of a presidential change

and how to really fundamentally prepare for it. And on Ukraine, and I guess this relates to Eastern Europe as well, You know, Trump has said, you know, he would let Putin do whatever the hell he wants with respect to NATO allies. He, his running mate, J.D. Vance, has been the most outspoken opponent of military and security assistance to Ukraine.

Setting aside even the war in Ukraine itself, one of the areas where there's like a very wide disagreement analytically in the U.S. is on the question of how we, worried to be about Putin moving into other countries, into Georgia and Moldova in the kind of former Soviet Republic space, or, you know, more dramatically, something that could move into a NATO member state in the Baltics. How seriously are Europeans taking those kinds of concerns? What scenarios are most concerning from the perspective of Paris and from Brussels and European capitals, when you're thinking about if there really is a withdrawal of support from the U.S. for both Ukraine and also kind of for the Article 5 commitment in NATO, what worries people in Europe about that scenario?

I think when it comes to a full-fledged scenario of the U.S. fundamentally changing their relationship to NATO allies, for example, by adopting what some Republican strategists have called dormant NATO. reducing U.S. participation to European security down to just a nuclear security guarantee, but that sets, right? No more troops, no more weapon system, no more security agreements, etc. When it comes to those extreme scenario, I think all of Europe is fundamentally worried. Nobody wants this to happen, and they are worried about Putin's intentions after Ukraine.

It's taken, it's, it's taken extremely seriously. It is discussed in serious terms, not only for Moldova, who, which is probably, you know, the one country after Ukraine that is most vulnerable. Georgia and it's, you know, governing situation and the, the path that is taking at the moment is extremely worrying, but, but it's not just that. I think Baltic states, Poland even, are considering the possibility of direct incursion, confrontation of some kind, a test of some kind that the Kremlin would want to see happen to test America's resolve.

So for all of these scenarios, I think the number one priority for Europeans is really to keep the Americans committed to NATO. not only by sharing a burden of the security themselves, but also at the same time, fundamentally making the case, and I think it can resonate even with the Trump administration, that the security of Europe has some fundamental advantage for the United States, for its own security,

some advantage in the relationship with the U.S.-China rivalry, has some economic security, security advantage that NATO is the strongest alliance, military alliance around the world, and that you don't want to spoil it. This being said, I hear and I know and understand the American criticism of Europeans within NATO. So there's a lot of work to be done there. Okay, so shifting to a potential Harris presidency, just starting with Ukraine itself, assuming that if Kamleris is elected,

she'll certainly continue the kind of security systems that the U.S. has been providing Ukraine. I think a lot of people, though, are anticipating things may move into, or there may be efforts to move things into some kind of negotiation between the Ukrainians and the Russians with some support, obviously, from the United States

and European countries. What would you think the European perspective is on some of, on some potential negotiation related to Ukraine in terms of what an acceptable outcome might be in terms of how much to kind of defer to the Ukrainians versus bringing forward European positions. You know, Emmanuel Macron in the past has been, you know, very willing to kind of jump in with his own ideas before the war at different stages of the war. How do you look at the landscape for potential negotiations in 2025?

I think Europeans are anticipating that, you know, there's going to be some. kind of change coming from the US on the Ukraine file. And it's not unwelcome. I must say that even in Europe, you hear a lot of people really trying to more constructively think about exit strategies, think about the future, think about how this, which turn this war is going to take. And so, you know, whether it's one president or the other, it's important. and I think that's a priority, that they understand that European security cannot be discussed without Europeans,

meaning that a trilateral summit between Ukraine, Russia, and the U.S. is unacceptable. It's unacceptable for Ukraine, which would be, you know, lonely and weak and sort of would need the support of Europeans, but it's also unacceptable for Europeans because a lot of what would be discussed would be about not building an European security architecture

because it's too early, but at least trying to secure it and have the minimal guarantees that a ceasefire in Ukraine would not immediately mean an enormous rearmament of Russia all the way to the future even more successful deployment. Last question. you know, it's been a very tumultuous, you know, very unsettling time for democracy.

And there's a lot to be scared about. There's, you know, here we obviously have Donald Trump, you know, moving further and further to, I don't know if it's the far right, but certainly to kind of an autocratic politics. We saw the far right make gains in the European parliamentary elections and in the French elections as well. at the same time, though, we had the defeat of the far right, ultimately in that French election, obviously led to kind of an uncertain political dynamic in France. If Kamala Harris wins, do you think it kind of, that there's a momentum that could spread over to Europe in the sense that finally, it may be that the wave of kind of far-right populism has reached its high point,

And, you know, do you see the results of the U.S. election, particularly if it's a Kamala Harris victory, as, you know, helping to kind of resolve this crisis that we've had in our democracies? Honestly, I think it's more of a cultural influence than it is a political influence. I remember fondly when Barack Obama was elected in 2008. I think it was an electoral shock in Europe of how progressive and supportive. the United States could be. So it does matter in that sense that it would be an extraordinary tale

if after a surprising turn of events over the summer, you know, Kamala Harris did become the first female president. But as far as a political effect, whether or not this would reduce the power of the far right back in Europe or at least disorient them a little bit,

I don't think that's the case as much, but what is the case is that if it were to happen, it would demonstrate that the far right coming close to power has one advantage. It sheds the light on some, you know, deep-seated inequalities that sometimes have been taking hold. You remember that after 2016 and Donald Trump coming into power, there was some realization that, you know, it was not okay for entire parts of the United States to be left disindustrialized, underinvested in, not cared for when the rest of the country was doing well. And I think some of the legislation of the Biden administration directly tried to address that point.

And so there is going to be inspiration. That type of inspiration of saying, well, you know, the far-right can be defeated, especially if we go ahead and address what's happening and what's going on in people's lives. And that's the beauty of democracy. So you heard from Celia a hopeful note at the end in terms of how a Kamala Harris victory could kind of speak to some of things that Europeans like about America, whereas a Trump victory kind of reinforces the kind of worst stereotypes about America, maybe being true to some extent. But I think what you also hear in that interview is, yes, there are huge issues and huge differences between Trump and Harris on questions involving NATO and Ukraine.

But also in Europe, they're focused on a lot of issues. It's not like they're sitting over there only thinking about Ukraine. They're dealing with a lot of same things we are, which is what does the economy look like after the failures of globalization? How do we deal with runaway inequality? And the reality is on all these geopolitical issues, like, like the war in Ukraine, like NATO, like the Middle East, which we'll be talking about in the next episode. It's so important that the United States and Europe are together on these things. And that's, again, not just on issues of war and peace.

It's also on issues around climate and technology and inequality. A lot to take away from that. So keep in mind, you know, Celia's point about social and economic issues being at the forefront in European politics. Well, that's familiar. and it's something that Ukraine supporters, including myself, have to take into account. Our political leaders are asking Americans to give lots and lots of taxpayer money to this war that is happening thousands of miles away. And the Harris administration will have to make the case for why that's still necessary. Here's what Senator Chris Murphy, who you also heard from in episode one, had to say about that.

Well, listen, and I agree with you that, you know, there are many Americans, probably an increasing number of Americans, who are asking those questions and who will ask more of them if we end up, you know, being in your three or four or five of the war. And it doesn't look fundamentally different than it does today. And why is that? Because every every argument that the foreign policy consensus has made to Americans over the last 30 years, but really over the past 50 years about a vital war that the United States has to win overseas in order to protect our interests have been wrong. history has judged those arguments, whether it be Vietnam or Afghanistan or Iraq, or even our half-ass involvement in Syria to be incorrect. So there's this hangover that exists in the United States where regular folks are just not willing to buy this idea that the United States has to be involved in these big, messy, costly conflicts overseas.

So I think there's a couple, you know, quick answers to your question. First, I think the Harris administration will have to supersize the efforts to try to make the parts of Ukraine that are not currently occupied, which is, of course, the majority of the country, more economically profitable, robust with real GDP growth that allows Ukraine to pick up a bigger part of the share. Remember, there's still industry, there's still commerce, there's still the ability to export and growing Ukraine's ability to pay for more of the war on their own, I think is what Americans expect as this conflict goes on. Second, I think you just need to argue that this is different than Afghanistan or Syria or

Iraq, that if you reenter a world in which big nations reset their borders by invasion, you are inviting a new era of cascading global recessions. we've seen what happens when two of the biggest agricultural suppliers in the world go to war with each other. None of us are immune from that. And if that starts to happen more often in Europe or in Asia, there's no way to insulate the United States from the shocks of big power conflict becoming the norm again. Well, one thing we can be sure of from listening to all those different perspectives, look, the near-term outcome of the war in Ukraine is likely not going to be to the satisfaction of the Ukrainians or Putin or the United States. War is always tragic. It's always messy. It's always filled with

uncertainty. But the long-term consequences of the war and how it ends will impact the world we live in for generations. And it'll also interact with all the other conflicts that are roiling the global order. Right now, the war that is consuming the most attention, and that has similar stakes for America and the world, is taking place in the Middle East. There, the United States is supplying the weapons that Israel has used to bombard Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran. How will our election interact with that multifaceted war? What are the stakes for Israelis, Palestinians, and people across the wider region? And what could the United States do differently from the Biden administration's ambivalent but blank? check of support for the Israeli government.

That's in our next episode dropping on Saturday, October 19th, on our Pod Save the World election series. Pod Save the World is a Cricket Media production. Our producer is Alona Monkowski. Our associate producer is Michael Goldsmith. Our executive producers are me, Ben Rhodes, and Tommy Vitor. The series is mixed and edited by Charlotte Landis with audio support by Kyle Sego.

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