Pod Save the World - Iranian revolution

Episode Date: January 5, 2018

Tommy talks with former top Obama foreign policy advisor Ben Rhodes about the protests sweeping across Iran, Trump’s response, how today compares with the 2009 Green Revolution and Obama’s response, and what it could mean for the Iran deal. Then they vent about how terrible the discussion about Iran is in DC / on Twitter. 

Welcome back to PodTAPA world. My conversation this week is with someone you all know well by now, a former Deputy National Security Advisor, Ben Rhodes. He was a top aide in the Obama administration, and he was a key part of Obama's effort to forge a nuclear agreement with Iran. We talked about the protests that are happening in Iran right now, how they are or are not different from protests that followed a presidential election in June of 2009 when Obama was still in office. And we talked about, you know, sort of what Washington can and should be doing to support protesters like those on the street today and what Obama did versus what Trump's doing today and how they differ. We also talked about why, unfortunately, the conversation about Iran that you find in D.C. circles

can be so broken and so partisan and so deeply frustrating. So I think that it's very hard to know what's happening in Iran right now. I think it's going to take us a long time to see. how these protests unfold. But I think this is absolutely critical context for understanding it, understanding Washington and the United States reaction, and how we should address these types of protest movements as a nation. So check it out. I think you'll enjoy it. Joining me today on Pods Day of the World is Ben, it's great to have you on. Could it be with you, Tommy?

All right, man, I wanted to talk today about the ongoing protests in Iran because there are the events that are happening on the ground, there are the sort of looks back to the protest in June of 2009 when you and I were both sitting in the White House. There's a policy debate around the Iran deal. And then there's the general sort of insanity that infects Washington, D.C., whenever the word Iran is uttered. So I figured you were the perfect guy to talk through this with. So first, on the protests themselves, I want to try to outline what it is we know with the caveat that I'm not in Iran, you're not in Iran. Neither of us have been to Iran, the likelihood that with this many protesters on the streets, there's a variety of reasons why people are there and doing what they

do. So huge caveat, huge dose of humility here about the efficacy of diagnosing foreign political upheaval from the U.S. But according to news reports, there are protests in dozens of cities. Reportedly 21 protesters have been killed. That number is probably greater than what's reported. Unlike the protests in Iran in 2009 that were focused with middle class or urban. areas. These have been largely young people in rural areas that tend to be more conservative and strong backers of the Islamic regimes. That's notable. According to the New York Times, and a great reporter there named Thomas Erbrink, the catalyst for this anger is reportedly a leaked budget document that showed the military and elite religious institutions are getting a whole

bunch of money, billions of dollars while subsidies to the poor are getting cut and fuel prices are increasing. So that sparked a sort of understandable outrage. I atoll, how many has blamed the protests on outside enemies. President Rahani has appealed for calm while saying that the protester should be heard. Am I leaving anything out here? And is the mere fact that people are taken to the streets in these numbers significant? Or is it just too soon to know really anything definitive about what's happening? Well, you know, speaking with the humility of having, you know, live through many protests in that part of the world, I think we always have to be careful about both diagnosing the cause of protests and also predicting where they may leave.

I do think what is clear is there is pent up frustration in Iran about the economic circumstances and the corruption inside of Iran. There is a sense, what I'd add to your summary, Tommy, is, you know, I think Iranians have seen that they've been spending a lot of money in places like Lebanon and Syria, places outside of Iran. And in that budget document, it basically demonstrates that both the military and the clerical institutions, you know, are getting a big cut of the budgetary pie at a time when things are getting worse for, you know, kind of the working poor. And in some ways, it's inequality. It's a basic frustration and inequality and corruption that we've seen in many countries around the world. So it's familiar in that regard. Yeah. You're right.

What's different is 2009 was largely middle class pro-tebrose. in response to an election that was seen to be flawed, and it was flawed, frankly. And here, this is more organic and less leadership. In 2009, you had the Green Movement and you had identifiable leaders of the Green Movement, politicians. Here, it really is kind of an outburst of anger and frustration from more of the working poor and people in different Iranian cities, not just in Tehran. Yeah. Interesting makeup of protesters, obviously ongoing. going, but everyone is watching. The world is watching, including President Trump, who is doing what he does, and he has been tweeting. Here's one example. Quote,

the people of Iran are finally acting against the brutal and corrupt Iranian regime. All of the money that President Obama so foolishly gave them went into terrorism and into their pockets. The people of little food, big inflation and no human rights, the U.S. is watching. Rouhani responded to some of those tweets saying Trump has no right to criticize Iran since he's called them terrorists and is locked them out of the country and is constantly trying to sanction them. How do you think tweets like that comments from the United States will be received in Iran? Helpful, unhelpful. What's your take from afar? Yeah. And, you know, there's a lot to unpack there, but we'll get to the Iran deal later. You know, frankly, I don't think that they matter much. You know, we tend to make all of these events about ourselves. Trump always makes every event about himself. You know, frankly, I think if there was one thing that most people in Iran would agree with, it's that they, you know, don't care much.

for Donald Trump, and they don't think that Donald Trump should, you know, be interfering in their politics. And the risk, of course, is that if he tries to make the protesters in Iran look like an extension of, you know, the Trump administration or the Trump administration's agenda, that, you know, undermines their legitimacy in a way because what is powerful about this is it's Iranians who are saying that they're fed up. They're not acting on behalf of a foreign power. they're not acting even on behalf of, you know, a political agenda that could be set by the United States.

They're just people saying, we want more control of our lives. We want more resources, more opportunity, less corruption, you know, frankly, a more democratic society and that, you know, the government reflects their needs. And so, you know, I think you can overread, you know, how much impact it has. It certainly doesn't have a positive impact because I don't think the protesters are looking to Donald Trump's Twitter feed for inspiration here. And again, the risk is we know the play that the a itole will run. He'll say that these are agents of the foreign power, their agency in the United States. There's no reason to kind of give them that ammunition. But, you know, frankly, I think Donald Trump is not very relevant to the current internal politics of Iran. And, you know, is making the mistake of presuming that this is somehow about him and not just about the frustrations of the Iranian people. Yeah.

You spent a lot of time in the situation room in the Oval Office. thinking about talking about policy options that the U.S. could take during protests like this, comments the president or the administration could make, and even, you know, covert actions that the CIA or, you know, the intel agencies could do. Do you think, when you think back on that time and those debates and discussions and what you guys did or didn't do, is there an action, is there a policy that the administration could take that would be helpful to the protesters? Or is it, it just not about the U.S.? I think that generally speaking,

most Iranians want more engagement with the West and more engagement even with the United States. The United States, in public opinion surveys, has generally been more well thought of in Iran than in some of the neighboring Arab countries, which is interesting. I'm not sure if

that holds up under Trump. So I think that, you know, the points I would make are one, I do think it's right to speak out in support of the protest, but I think it's important to frame it as we support universal rights. We support the right to freedom of assembly, to right to freedom of speech, the right to have a government that is not corrupt, so that it doesn't feel like we are trying to control regime change in Iran to our own needs, but rather we're taking a position

that is principled on behalf of universal values. Frankly, the more you can try to be consistent in the application of those principles, the better. So I think Trump is further under cut by the full embrace he's given to C.C. in Egypt and to the Saudi Arabians who also have authoritarian systems and don't allow for freedom of assembly and large-scale protest. So I think, you know, anybody looking at Trump's words in the region are going to tune them out because they're going to think that this isn't really about democracy. This is about, you know, how the United States feels about the Iranian regime. So first point is, you know, couch support for the protesters in support of their fundamental human rights and aspirations

and try to apply that as consistently as you can, recognizing that American foreign policy, you know, perfect consistency is elusive. Second, though, is taking steps to show that there is a pathway towards more engagement with the West and the United States. And so Trump's travel ban is exactly the wrong message to send. I mean, it doesn't send a message to Iranians that as they reform and that we want to be a part of that process. We want them to come to the United States. We want them to study at American universities where they obviously will be exposed to different points of view. So, you know,

I'd be looking at a menu of options to get rid of that travel ban and, frankly, to increase, you know, that students from Iran who could come to the United States so that, again, they're exposed to life on our university campuses or the potential for, to show that if Iran evolves in a different direction, there will be incentives for that evolution. The other thing is, the other thing, is information. So we wrestle with how do we try to provide access to information inside of Iran. Are there ways to unblock the internet? Are there ways to, you know, try to empower people through technology? And the U.S. government has a variety of ways to try to do that, to try to protect some open space in areas where the regime may be trying to crack down on the free flow of information.

So that's another practical thing that you can do. And frankly, at a, at a, at a, at a, at a, a certain point, you know, dialogue, you know, we don't know these people protesting and finding some way to engage the Iranian people more broadly. We tried to set up, for instance, in the Obama administration, a virtual embassy. We absolutely don't have an embassy, but a platform that could at least have some form of online engagement with the Iranian people to tell them about American values, what we believe in, the future we prefer to have with Iran. So, you know, I think it's a mixture of criticism of the regime, support for universal. rights that we want for all people, including Iranians, and then finding ways to engage the type of

people, the young people in particular, who are driving this protest movement. Yeah. I noticed that Bibi Nanyahu also did a video wishing the Iranian people success in their noble quest for freedom. I would probably put that in the maybe not helpful category. I don't know about you. I think the bottom line is everybody, you know, if you talk to people about Iran and we'll get to the diversity of views, Iranians.

Iranians are very proud and they're very sovereignty conscious. Yes. A lot of their, if you talk to Iranians, not just the people who support the regime, but, you know, the people that you and I would know, middle class educated people who, you know, come to the United States. They always bring up in 1954 when the CIA sponsored a, you know, a coup in Iran that reinstalled the Shah. They're very neurologic to external powers, particularly the United States, seeking to dictate their regime. And the point is that we should want the Iranian people to make these decisions, not the supreme leader and not a foreign power. And they're the ones who are driving this process.

And we can find ways to help them to give them more space, to give them more interconnectivity to people in the United States and around the world. But if we make this about us and we want this type of government to be in place in Iran, not only is that going to be rejected by the Aitola, frankly, that's not the main. message that I think that people are protesting, you know, are looking for. They're looking to control their own lives, not to have the United States or anybody else do this for them. Right. So going back in time a little bit, the Iranian Green Movement started after the disputed June 2009 presidential election. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was in power. He was

particularly brutal. He was facing a more moderate challenger in former Prime Minister Musavi, who ran a surprisingly strong campaign given that he was seen as elect. cluster campaigner. There were very significant irregularities that you referenced earlier. Musa V basically said it had been stolen and he went out and declared victory and called him his supporters to take to the streets. And then, you know, hundreds of thousands of people, if not millions, listened to him. The protest started peaceful. They quickly got violent because the regime dispatched riot police and plain-closed goons called Bastige militia members who beat protesters in the streets, shot them, murdered a young woman named Neda. We all

watched, literally watched her die from a cell phone video. We were in the White House at that time. During those first 48 hours, I think Obama greatly internalized the advice. You've been talking about about how we don't want this to be about us. We wanted it to be about the aspirations of the Iranian people. And he didn't weigh in publicly on the situation in the way that a lot of observers wanted him to. Can you talk about why? Like, what did he say in those first, that first day, of those first 48 hours that you can recall? Well, what I recall is it, yes, we did have a, you know, he did have a view that we didn't want to make the protest look like an extension of the United States.

We also wanted to see what turn it would take. So in other words, I think he wanted to hold open the possibility that the protest could lead to something more constructive, you know, like an actual dialogue and some process to look at the election. When it was clear that the protests were being met with a crackdown, he then spoke out. So in other words, I think he, you know, once we saw, you know, we saw the protest and we wanted to see how the regime was going to respond. When we saw their response, you know, he spoke out and he continued to speak out in support of what the Green Movement was trying to do. Right. Personally, frankly, I think, you know, there is nothing lost in speaking out right away

around universal values. So I don't have a, I don't take an extreme position. that, you know, we should not be heard from. I do just think we have to couch our language to make this about the Iranian people. And Trump and some of the people who are weighing in, you know, make Iran seem like some extension of American domestic politics almost. You know, they're talking about Obama and the Iran deal and, you know, Trump's tweeting out his own speeches. And, you know, that is not what this is about. So again, we wanted to give some space to see what would take place. And then Obama spoke out. I think there's no problem in speaking out right away. I do think what you say and how you say it matters. And that's where I think we would obviously be taking a different approach.

Right, right. Yeah. It's the juxtaposing Trump's statement with Obama's statement immediately makes it a domestic political statement. But you're right. By June 15th, Obama was talking about how it's up to the Iranian society who Iran's leaders will be. We talked about respect their sovereignty, didn't want to make the U.S. issue inside Iran, but said he was troubled by the violence. By June 23rd, it went much further. We were condemning. violence and unjust imprisonments. Do you think that shift in language was a response to the evolving situation in Iran? Was it an increasing political pressure back home? What do you think got him to a place where he was comfortable condemning what he saw? Was it just that the things got so brutal? I think it was a situation in Iran. It wasn't the situation in D.C. I mean, I think, like I said, we saw what the regime was doing. I remember Obama personally seeing that video of, Netta, the young woman being killed in the street. And, you know, it was clear that they were in a full crackdown mode and there was no space for dialogue. You know, they weren't going to allow some

process to look at the election results or to sit down with the Green Movement. They ultimately put the leadership of the Green Movement under house arrest. You also have to remember that, you know, this is going to play out on its own timeline, you know, that even in Iran, that protest movement, those people voted for Rahani in the next election. And Rahani was not the preferred candidate of the Supreme Leader. Every Iran analyst we had, he suggested he wasn't even probably in the top two. And, you know, they had barred Ross and Johnny, who was a leading moderate, who had some affiliation with Rahani and some connections to some of the Green Movement figures from running. and Rahani kind of came in as the reform candidate, the more moderate candidate, and he won so decisively that the Supreme Leader and the Powers of B did not repeat the play of 2009 and try to prevent the candidate who was not their preferred candidate from taking power, right?

So in other words, that protest movement didn't succeed in overturning the regime in 2009, but it did lay some groundwork for a guy who was not the preferred candidate of the Supreme Leader to get elected president of Iran. And here we are today where, according to that time story, which has the ring of truth, you know, was people associated with Rahani who leaked that budget document precisely because they were at odds with some of the more hardline factions. So we always have to remember there's politics inside of Iran. There's politics in the people in the street and there's politics within the regime itself. And how we react needs to do whatever we can to empower the more reformist elements. and the people who are more likely to lead Iran into a more democratic, less violent direction. Can you explain who pulls the levers of power in Iran? Is it the Supreme Leader? Is it the president? What's the gist of sort of who's in charge and who has real influence?

Yeah, so it's a complicated system in a way. But essentially, the Supreme Leader is the final decision maker. You know, I mean, he's the ultimate authority. But underneath him, there are a variety of different sources of power. So the president, who is elected, who is now Hassan Rahani, has significant authority over certain economic policy. You know, on foreign policy, we thought he had authority, obviously, over the nuclear negotiations because he'd run on a platform of pursuing those negotiations and ultimately was able to reach an agreement. So he is one source of power with some control over elements of the Iranian government. However, then there are other hardline factions. So there is the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which is led by a guy named Qasem Soleimani, that is largely responsible for Iran's support for Hezbollah, Iran's support for Assad, Iran's actions inside of Iraq.

He's a world-class asshole. Yes. I mean, he's a world-class bad guy. And the Revolutionary Guard generally has some freedom of operation separate from Rahani. You know, they get their own budget. And that's it, you know, they have their own resources and they have this kind of freedom of action. the region. And then you have a clerical elite that is largely, you know, based in the city of GOM, that, you know, are essentially the aging Ayatollahs who run some of these religious institutes to get enormous amounts of resources and provide some of the support to the Supreme leader and have significant influence on things like the judicial system and some of the laws about, you know, alcohol and, you know, women covering themselves. So, you know, there is this multiplicity of forces within the regime itself.

And one of the things that's important, Tommy, is in the current context that, you know, haven't seen discussed a lot, is the Supreme Leader is old and, by all accounts, you know, not particularly healthy. And so most people who've watched Iran were already anticipating, well, what happens when he dies? That is going to be a huge moment inside of Iran. Right. Because any number of things could happen. You know, you could have an equally hardline Supreme Leader take his place, even some rumors

that his son could take his place. and that would obviously be a bad signal. Or you could have a more moderate figure in that role, albeit still a deeply flawed role, or more extreme, you could do away with the position of the Supreme Leader and Iran could evolve into something more like a democratic government. And so I think we all have to look at this moment and think, well, how is this going to affect what comes after this Supreme Leader?

And I think it's useful that the protesters in the streets are just like the scale of the election victory for Hani was too big for them to overturn. They are sending a message that our voices have to be heard. Right now, we're shut out. We don't know how decisions are getting made. We don't know how this budget is being crafted. We don't know who is going to replace the next Supreme Leader. And my hope is an optimistic take, I don't think you're going to have a democracy in Iran

next week. That's not how these protest movements have worked. But hopefully they provide an internal lever of pressure and accountability on the regime that leads to a more democratic evolution. One more question about Obama in that period of time and the statements. Like, there's a constant demand in Washington for the president to condemn things, right? We were constantly condemning terrorist acts. You see Trump called on to condemn, you know, acts of gun violence domestically, right?

I mean, that's just it's a thing you deal with as president. Those demands started immediately after the 09 protests. And like we discussed Obama resisted for a while. I've seen some former administration officials that we both know. well and both greatly respect, like Secretary Clinton, former NSCA named Dan Shapiro, went on to be our ambassador to Israel, say it was a mistake for Obama not to more forcefully condemn what was happening, the crackdown in Iran, or come out in support of the protesters in those early days. Do you agree with that? And I guess my broader question is, I wonder, is there any other thing

that we could have done early that might have backed those words with policy steps that might have made an impact on the ground, or is this about sort of consistency of statements and values more than it is about something we could have actually done to move the needle? I don't have any problem with those. I mean, look, I feel like we could have said things earlier. I just don't know that it would have made a significant difference. And that's my, my issue is not, you know, if someone wants to say, you know, Obama should have spoken out a couple days before he did, I think that's entirely fair. And the question, though, is, you know, would that have led to any different outcome?

And I just, I don't think so. I struggle with that, too. Yeah. So, I mean, I think it's always important to be on the right side of history if you can and be on the side of the people who are, you know, in the streets for a better future. I think it's important, again, to understand motivation. Obama was trying to help those people. So, you know, the notion that he was on the side of anybody other than the young people trying to bring democracy, anything. anybody who knows anything about Barack Obama knows that, you know, his heart and head are always

going to be with young people pressing for positive change. I do think this is a problem, though, like we, and I say this as someone who was responsible for a lot of statements, you know, statements are not action, you know, and they can fill a certain need. And yes, I think it is important for people to know where we stand. And, and I, Tommy, you and I shared an office for years, you know, I was always the guy wanting to make the statements about to Harrier Square or or what have you. But I think I also had to come to realize that, you know, a U.S. statement is not going to transform some foreign country. And particularly a country where we don't have, you know, a lot of levers to pull. Like in Egypt, we had a ton of influence, you know,

because we're providing them with all this aid and we have all these relationships. And so when Obama, you know, speaking out about that, it actually carries more weight. because they kind of have to listen to what we are saying. The Iranians, they're not worried about the U.S. I mean, if anything, they want us as an antagonist, right? So if you're sitting in the Supreme Leader's office, you want more Trump tweets, you know, because you want to take those tweets

and feed them into your propaganda machine and say this proves that everybody is an agent of farm power. Now, again, that's not a reason to not say something. It's just a reason to say things a certain way. So, again, I think all, this question about when Obama spoke needs to be attached to, at least an understanding that even if you're saying, you know, I would have liked to have Obama speak out a couple of days earlier, I really, there's just nobody that I know who would suggest that if Obama had done that,

you know, the Supreme Leader would have come out with his hands up and handed the election over to, because of the power of the words of the statement that, you know, I drafted, probably. Yeah. What would be saying, you know what, we're for democracy now? I mean, it's just not how it works. Yeah, totally. I mean, that's good context and good humility from someone who is a speechwriter who was writing these words and who during the Arab Spring two years later was one of the people in situation room saying to the president, you know, I think we should. Yeah, like we should speak out sooner more forcefully in support of the protesters as, you know, a lot of the more senior aides were kind of like, let's wait and see if we can.

Mubarak will get this one out, you know. Yeah. So I'm trying to do my best to sort out. If anything that's happening Iran now is different from 2009 and if any of those factors are, you know, determinative when, you know, knowing that the real answer is everything is different. It's hard to know what the change will be. But, you know, there's no disputed election result this time. Akhmaninajad was a different leader than Rouhani is today. But there's also some technological factors. In 2009, a million Iranians had smartphones. Today that number is 48 million. That's more than half the country's population. 40 million Iranians were on telegram. which has allowed them to organize, spread news that sparked this outrage and then communicate with each other. There's also 40% unemployment among Iranians under 30. A lot of those factors feel familiar are things we discussed later in the Arab Spring in 2011. Does any of them seem particularly important to you, given that experience?

Is there a lesson from the Arab Spring that should be guiding the U.S. government response right now, but maybe isn't? Well, I think there are two lessons. One is that the information lesson is extremely important. And, you know, these protests are in some ways more damaging to the regime because, as you said at the outset, they're kind of in their base in the rural areas. You know, it's, you know, students in Tehran is one thing. Right. So it would be like West Virginia coal miners like protesting Trump. A bit, yeah. I mean, you know, it's a difference between, you know, bunch of people up west side and New York, where I'm from, protesting versus, yeah, people across the heartland. So that, that's a difference. And I think that some of that has to be information because, you know,

Information sometimes doesn't reach people in the same way if you're living in a smaller city inside of Iran than when you're in Tehran. I think the other really important thing, though, Tommy, is we always take these protests and put them in kind of a Western frame of they want our system of government. Right. And look, I do think people want democracy. But we always have to understand that a lot of these protests have a point of origin that is economic or, that is about corruption. In other words, you know, that 40% unemployment number, and then you take that coupled with seeing a document that says instead of, you know, they're cutting my subsidy to give a giveaway to this, you know, cleric who's 80 years old, and I'm just pissed

about that, right? So, you know, as in Egypt and Tunisia, the flashpoint was often, you know, this sense of frustration with corruption and lack of economic opportunity. And so the question is where does that lead in terms of what kind of government people want. Obviously, we want a more democratic government, but that can be hijacked in different directions, right? And so for the U.S., I think the goal is to understand what are the driving forces. And that's why I would say, like, you know, we want more access to information. We want more Iranians connected online. We want, frankly, more Iranian students coming here so that they can, you know, get a diversity of views and learn about diversity of ideas.

We want to show them that, I mean, look, when we were ramping up sanctions, we kept saying it doesn't have to be this way. You know, if you guys change some of your policies, you know, there's opportunity that would come from being more directed and oriented towards the West. And that's, I think, what most Iranians want. And so, and the irony is, by the way, in this kind of cacophony of debate here, like, that's kind of what we all want. Yeah.

We all want Iran to be more democratic and to not have a revolutionary guard that is sowing instability across the region and supporting terror and it doesn't have a nuclear weapon. We all want the same thing. But again, we have to understand that the Iranians have to make that choice and lead that effort and that we can also overplay our hand. Because if we turn this into a kind of foreign policy showdown with the Supreme Leader in the President of the United States, that's exactly the showdown that the Supreme Court. leader once. And then then Qasem Soleimani says, you know what, I'm going to take over because only I can safeguard the revolution and stand up to the Americans. And so things can get worse. And you always have to keep that in mind. Kassam Soleimani would be worse. That is to me one of the unfortunate lessons we learned the hard way during the Arab Spring is things can get worse. And there's a very

good chance that they will before they get better because revolutions take a very long time. Democracy is messy. We've been talking about Rouhani as a moderate. I've seen some conservatives on Twitter arguing that that's wrong, that he's done nothing to help political prisoners get out of jail or reduce some human rights abuses. And he's just as bad as Ahmadinejad and some of the others, so he shouldn't be described as more moderate. What's your take on that assessment of him in a sort of like the landscape of Iranian politicians. Well, look, I think that that's just, it's just a mistake because, look, is Hassan Rahani the person that you or I would want to be the ideal president of Iran? No.

He's not moderate, you know, enough for what we would want to see. But relative, you know, there are different factions inside of Iran. Hassan Rahani comes out of a political background that is much closer to people protesting and to the green movement. And he has found himself at times at odds with the Supreme Leader and with Qasem Soleimani. That doesn't mean he's like a white hat and they wear black hats. It means that on the spectrum, Rahani is more moderate than Soleimani and more moderate than the Supreme Leader. And at times, yes, he is not pushed hard enough, in my judgment, on behalf of certain human rights that he said he would in his campaign. But, again, relative to Ahmadinejad, you know, he has been a more moderate leader and has been more willing, even in the current context to at least try to signal that people have a right to protest.

So there has to be a way, and I know, you know, there has to be a way to talk about this in the United States. I know. That recognizes nuance, you know, I mean, that recognizes that we don't have to, you know, Rahani may not be Baklav Havel to be more moderate than Qasem Soleimani. And that is where the debate kind of breaks down, you know, the second that you open Twitter. In a couple weeks, Trump is going to face some deadlines about whether to reimpose sanctions that were lifted on Iran as part of the Iran deal as part of their compliance with, you know, Iran deal, which everyone recalls has drastically reduced their ability to get a nuclear weapon and prevented it in a number of very important ways. So in October, Trump told our European allies that if they didn't approve the Iran deal's terms, he's going to tear it up. It doesn't look like

Congress or the Europeans have made any progress on those demands on improving in Trump's eye the terms of the Iran deal. I don't think any of us should predict what he's going to do, but what do you think the impact of Trump throwing out the Iran? Iran deal in early January would be? Well, you know, first of all, the Iran deal is very popular among people inside of Iran who've generally wanted a more moderate direction. In other words, the Iran deal is one of the most, one of the few things that invite broad agreement inside of Iran itself because it's people who want to see some pathway to change Iran

and to have a more reasonable approach to the rest of the world. I think throwing out the Iran deal would, Tommy, you can't repeat enough. We made the Iran deal because we thought that the regime was bad and shouldn't have a nuclear weapon. Right. I mean, we did it. Period. You know, not because we liked them. We did it because we don't trust them and don't like them and don't think that Iran should be permitted to have a nuclear weapon.

And we benefit from them not having nuclear weapons. So again, you throw that out. You remove the constraints on the nuclear program. And you could end up with North Korea because the regime that is embattled could just say, say, you know what, fine. Americans just toss the Iran deal out. We're in battled at home. We're just going to dash out and get our nuclear weapon. And then, you know, we'll face the choice we've always talked about. Would you take military action to stop that or not? So I think the same dynamic holds, except it's even more acute because the regime might have an incentive to say,

we're in battle, we don't want to relinquish power. And so if the Americans cancel this agreement, we're just going to go for it. not unlike what Kim Jong-un's approach to the world is. I can't resist, Tommy, just making the point, too, that the criticism today of the Iran deal is kind of the polar opposite of what I thought it was a year ago, which was they were going to get $150 billion and be so flush with cash that the regime was going to be firmly entrenched. Well, clearly that didn't happen. Right. I know. It's so weird.

I'm watching this and I'm thinking to myself, I don't even really know how to, the illogic of the, you know, you know, the contradictions and the criticism of us. You know, it's literally that a year ago it was they were going to get $150 billion and just be flush with cash. And we said, no, no, no. Our estimates are they're going to get at most kind of a third of that. And now we see them, you know, clearly struggling still in the face of sanctions and not getting the economic benefit that they maybe even promised their own people

out of the Iran deal. And suddenly it's, you know, Obama gave them so much cash that I don't really even understand what the criticism is. But it's totally incoherent. The point is that the, you know, now is not the time to incentivize the regime and give them the excuse to just say, you know what, we have less legitimacy at home, so we're going to get it through nuke. Yeah. Yeah. So, right. I mean, I think a lot of people who are smart and don't necessarily agree with you and I ideologically have made the point that let's not rip up the Iran deal now. Let's not make, you know, sort of the thrust of Iranians political debate about the U.S. and our actions. Fine. I think that's a very smart point.

There's a flip side, like to play devil's advocate, there's an argument that says this regime is bad. This is a delicate moment for them. These protesters are sort of roiling in their base. And therefore, Trump should slap sanctions back in place, increase pressure on them as much as possible at this moment when, you know, we might bend them until they break. Do you think there's any truth to that? No, the problem with that. And I do want to take it seriously. I mean, I understand the impulse. First of all, they're still under. a lot of sanctions. I mean, they're not, this is not a normal economy. There's basically a U.S. embargo, you know, there's still all kinds of risks in doing business at Iran and getting cross-res of our sanctions. So what they are getting is very specific relief on certain

sanctions under the deal, but it's not like, you know, the whole sanctions regime is off. However, to entertain the argument, I mean, I think the problem is there are powerful interests in Iran that are not going to relinquish power without a fight. So in some of those powerful interests, as the budget itself shows, can protect their own resources in a black market economy. In other words, Qasem Soleimani and the Revolutionary Guard know how to make sure that they can fund themselves in their activities with sanctions in place. They're heavily sanctioned, and yet they can still find resources either from the government

or from illicit sources, right? So basically, if we turn up the pressure, yes, maybe there are, to be fair to that scenario, maybe that puts more pain into Iran, maybe that does lead to more protests. But frankly, I think it only incentivizes the hardliners, people like the Supreme Leader and Soleimani, to double down and crack down on those protests, and they have more guns and they have more levers of power to pull. and these are not the kind of people who are just going to

capitulate under sanctions. It took years of sanctions to get them to even make adjustments to their nuclear program. We just didn't agree in the Obama administration. I still think it rings true that there's not an amount of sanctions that is going to lead to a relinquishing of power

by the darker forces in Iran. And even if it led to some popular uprising, that could look more like, you know, Syria, then, well, there's really not an example of a popular uprising that has kind of led to a stable transition to a democracy. And so I just, I don't know what the scenario is that people are painting. So how does it work? I get it that they're under more pressure.

But how would they capitulate? How would that lead to a different government? Who is in that government? You know, it's a long way from a protest to a new government. And I think risking them getting a nuclear weapon and just, just to test a theory that we want to sanction them more is not worth the risk. It's better to have that regime prevented from having nuclear weapon inspections that verify that while we pressure them in other ways, including sanctions on other issues, including human rights.

Yeah. Last question for you. So, you know, you know about as much about Iran as anyone I know based on the access information you've had, the conversations you've had. You and I obviously agree about the Iran deal and have, you know, sort of shared thinking on a lot of these issues, but I thought we were able to play devil's advocate in a way that's at least fair-minded. The conversation about Iran that you find in Washington and on Twitter does not do that. It is particularly stupid. I imagine the response to this conversation will be stupid. It'll be like Obama lackey Tommy Vitor talks to echo chamber.

Echo chamber. It's like why is this issue so stupid do you think? Like why does it seem more driven by partisan concerns and these old grievances and policy debates than almost any other with so little discussion about like, you know, the Iranian people or humility about our ability to know what's going on in some of these faraway places. Like, what makes this so much worse? You know, it's insane. And I, you've lived it. I feel like the shady character and some drama, you know, like this kind of Twitterverse that is against Iran deal lives. I mean, I take a look at it. And I was like, you know what, I'm not, I'm sitting this one out, you know, because there's just no way,

there's no discourse. It's just just. just, it's like you open a window and just hear a scream, you know? Like I think of that painting of the, you know, Edward Monk. Edward Monk painting of the scream. It's like that is like Iran Twitter. And, you know, I think I said one thing about like, you know, the one thing is this should be about the Iranian people. And it was like, how could you say that?

And it was a fairly innocuous statement. It should be about the Iranian people. I mean, I don't, you know, there are a lot of intersecting elements here. I think part of it is there's just. a very dedicated cohort of people who, you know, have spent years invested in a view of U.S. Iran policy that, you know, that just the logic and momentum of their own experience and views leads in this direction. You know, part of it is, like, you know, very powerful U.S. allies, like, and people focus on Israel, but I'd say Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E, you know, are very

exercised about Iran and that that has an impact in our debate Saudi Arabia again arguably has had more influence on Trump than just about any other government and you know the Saudi view of Iran is that they're in a battle across the region here so you know there's just a lot of sources of gasoline on this fire but it is it's just it's just beyond I don't even know how to engage it at this point and here's why Tommy I as someone obviously engage it from government what I don't get about it is there They're in charge. Yeah.

You know, like, you and I, you know, we're just, we're just tweeting. They'll get exercised at us as if you and I are still sitting in our West Wing offices here. I should say your great sin was you were someone who worked on the Iran deal and did a very effective job, like briefing people on what was happening in real time that someone described as an echo chamber in New York Times article, which is, it would also be described as press 101, right? Like telling people who support your policy positions what you're doing. If we do a rollout on family medical leave, we have people in and brief them on that. I mean, but the thing I'd say, though, is that there is this kind of weird dynamic where they act like they, the kind of critics of the Iran deal are in opposition. Like, Trump is president. Yeah.

Like, he decertified that deal. And it sat on the hill for 60 days and Congress did nothing. Right. So it's like, I want to say to people like, you know, well, maybe I don't want to say that. But like, why are you yelling at me? Like, you know what I think. I think the Iran deal is a good deal. Like, I think we're benefiting from it.

And yet they're screaming as if, you know, Donald Trump is president of United States. The Republican Party controls both houses of Congress. Like, I don't know why you're still shadow boxing us. That's like, you know our views and I'll continue to make them known. But I don't, that to me is almost the strangest part. It's like, but I think it has to do. The one other factor is that there's a bit of history at stake here because it somehow got tied up, I think, in the Iraq war, you know, and some of the same crowd that, you know, hates the Iran deal

supported the Iraq war. We were very critical of the Iraq war. It's kind of about whose approach to foreign policy is right. You know, we favor diplomacy over military intervention, if possible. You know, we favor an approach that tries to support, you know, kind of universal principles and be consistent and not just saying, you know, we're fine with whatever Saudi Arabia does, but, you know, we're Democrats when it comes to Iran. And it touches a bunch of nerves, I guess. But it is, it is like it is not a healthy, you know, like I, it's not a healthy discourse. Exactly. And I worry that Iran is so important, you know, to the future of American interests and the Iranian

and people's future is important to us and that this kind of funhouse mirrors where, I mean, Max Fisher said this best. Like the one thing what people say about Iran, you know, in Washington is it's about Washington, not Iran. Exactly. And I'm just, I think that that's played out. I mean, my view of this is like, you know what we think. You know what we think about the Iran deal.

Sometimes we have to repeat these arguments just so that they are not mischaracterized. And even that, the last thing I'd say at all me is even that article, like, The one thing that they said I, you know, lied about was Rahani being a moderate. Like, well, I don't lie about that. I believe he's a moderate, you know. And you can disagree relative, again, to caveat this, relative to other factions inside of Iran. And so you can disagree with that. But that's an, it's an analytical judgment.

And yet there's this kind of dogma of anything that is nuanced is capitulation when in fact, no, Iran is a nuanced place. and the world is a nuanced place. Yeah, that's exactly. Like, I don't mean to be dismissive of concerns about Iran. Obviously, there are a lot of bad actors in there. You talked a lot about Qasem Soleimani and the horrific things he does, and we should take that threat deadly seriously. That said, like, what's frustrating to me is there's your point.

The Republicans are in power. There's so little focus in this debate about outcomes. There's so little focus on policy and so much time spent on talking points and not just observations about whether or not the deal, that's in place as effective, and it's doing the things it was supposed to do, which I would agree the entire intelligence community would say it is doing. Trump's national security team apparently believes that the Iran deal. Mattis said it's a net benefit, that we're safer from it. But the debate never reflects that. It's still this partisan thing that I think you're right. It does maybe just boil down

a decade and a half of anger and harsh debates over foreign policy between Democrats and Republicans that have just, you know, it's gotten out of hand, but it's not healthy. And the last thing I can say is to try to identify the common ground is like we should agree with what our motivations are. Like you and I know someone who worked for us who was almost was badly wounded by a rocket fired by an Iranian-backed militia in Baghdad. You know, I've sat, spent playing time with Jason Resign who was imprisoned by the Iranian regime at a time when Rahani was president. I mean, we have no illusion. about this regime.

You know, and so this equation of the nuclear deal with some, like that's an expression of support for the regime. No, it's our way of keeping that regime from getting a nuclear weapon. Yeah. And so what I find to be impossible is if someone won't accept that your view is rooted in, I'm trying to have Tommy like an end of 2017 moment of serenity.

Yeah, yeah. Where I step back here, but like I can accept that they, sincerely want a Democratic government in Iran, you know, and have a different view of how to accomplish that. What's so strange and vitriolic and, you know, personal about how this debate is approached on social media and in Washington is like, is this presumption that that's not what we want, you know. We made a nuclear deal because we don't want them have nuclear weapon. You may disagree with that deal, but that's our motivation is that they don't get a nuclear weapon. You know, like we may have a different approach to how we would promote, you know, what rhetoric we would use to express support for protesters, but we all support protesters. And I hope someday our discourse gets back to a place where we can at least say, okay, here's what we agree about, you know, the ends that we want to achieve and the motivations that we have.

And here are some different tools we're getting there. The problem with Iran Twitter and Iran discourse is like this kind of assignment of malign intention. to people that makes it impossible to have any kind of reasonable discussion. Yeah. Ben, thank you so much. I think this is such a helpful snapshot of what's happening, but also the context and the politics of this and why it can be confusing for an observer to figure out why people are just screaming online about a protest movement overseas, and somehow that's about Obama and Trump when it's just absolutely not. So thank you for doing the show, man. I appreciate it, as always. No problem. And we are talking on the 10th anniversary

of one of your great accomplishments, Tommy. Oh my God, yeah. Iowa caucus, your listeners who don't know, Tommy was our Iowa press secretary in that campaign and had as much to do with that caucus victory as, well, as many other field organizers and people, and Paul Toos. Talk about a critical movement of people taking to the streets, right? Yeah, yeah. Obama won because young people took to the street.

And he got the nukes because of it, so thank you, Iowa. Got the button. Yeah, you got the button. Oh, God. That's another conversation. All right, buddy. Thanks again. Talked yet.

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