Pod Save the World - Middle East Peace

Episode Date: November 1, 2017

Tommy talks with former Senator Majority Leader and US Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell and Alon Sachar about their book A Path to Peace, which details the history of the Middle East peace process and their efforts to forge an agreement during the Obama administration.

Welcome back to Pod Save the World. Thank you guys for tuning in. This is Tommy Vitor. Hey, Elijah, has anyone else on the Crooked Media team had a Presidential Medal of Freedom Award winner in the office? No, you say? That's right. Just Pod Save the World. This week, my guests are Senator George Mitchell, who was the Senate Majority Leader for several years. He negotiated the Good Friday Agreement and he was most relevant to today. President Obama's U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. He and a man named Alone Shakar, who wrote a book called A Path to Peace about their experience trying to negotiate peace between the Israelis and Palestinians and the history of all the failed efforts to forge a peace agreement. It is a hell of a good book.

It's a great primer on a very complicated subject. And it was a thrill to have them in studio to talk about their personal experience, the history of the conflict, and ultimately why they're optimistic, despite the Arab Spring and all the changes in the Middle East and all the tumult and scary things. things you see on the news, why they still think peace is possible. So check it out. And if you want to see a cool photo of me with Senator Mitchell after BB Netanyahu scolded President Obama in the UOFLOFL office, go to the Pod Save the World Facebook page. It's up there. It's a photo of a photo. I know I can do better. I'll work with Elijah to get you guys a better version. Joining me today on Pod Save the World are two incredible guests. The first is Alone Sakar,

served as an advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to Israel and my good friend, who we all need to move back to the United States pretty soon. Dan Shapiro. Alone was also an advisor to Senator Mitchell and David Hale during their time as special envoy to Middle East peace. And before that, a thankless job. He worked at the State Department's Bureau for Middle East Affairs. Senator George Mitchell served as the Democratic Senator from Maine from 1980 to 1995, including six years as Senate Majority Leader.

He was the primary architect of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement for Peace in Northern Ireland. He was the author of the Mitchell Report on the use of performance-enhancing drugs in baseball and perhaps most relevant to today's conversation. President Obama's U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. Oh, yeah, and he received the Presidential Medal of Freedom. No big deal. Thank you both for being here. You wrote a book called A Path to Peace,

A Brief History of the Israeli-Palestine Negotiations and a way forward in the Middle East, which is a fantastic primer on a decades-long. brutally complicated series of negotiations that you guys explain in a concise way, easily to understand. You are brutally honest about where we made mistakes as the United States as a partner, as the Obama administration. So thank you both for being here. So, Senator, you're tapped by President Obama to be his envoy for Middle East peace alone.

You begin this monumental task as part of this team. That's not really a job description. It's a goal that has eluded every U.S. president for decades. Where do you begin? How do you start to tackle something as complicated as this? Well, the first objective I had was to take stock of the situation there in light of the then-existing circumstances. I had been in Israel many times. As Senate Majority Leader had met every Israeli prime minister.

I had met Prime Minister Arafat and most of the Palestinian leadership. But there have been a series of what are called conflicts or minor wars between Israel and Hamas along the Gaza border. And the most recent one at that time had ended just four days before President Obama took office. So when I went there just a few days after he took office, emotions were very high. An estimated 15 or 1,600 Palestinians had been killed. very widespread destruction had occurred of housing, commercial, transportation, and all other activities in Gaza. And my purpose was to get a sense of what the status was, how people were thinking.

It also was the case that Israel was in the closing weeks of a general election, a very hotly contested general election. So I knew before I got on the plane to fly there for the first time that the situation was not ripe to try to call a peace conference at that time. Emotions were very high on both sides. There had been an ongoing for about the last two years of the Bush administration negotiation negotiation between the Prime Minister of Israel and the president of the Palestinian Authority under the supervision of then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. and it had been a serious discussion, but it had not reached agreement. And the candidates for Prime Minister of Israel denounced the discussions and the ultimate winner of that election, Prime Minister Netanyahu, was absolutely clear that the positions taken by his predecessor

were, as he described, them dangerous and invalid, and that there would be. be no continuation of negotiations on that basis at all. So what a warm welcome. Well, it was warm in the sense that it was intense, but it was pretty clear that there had to be first a period of time of cooling off period, and there had to be actions taken by all sides to try to bring down the temperature and take sort of baby steps for trying to create a more conducive atmosphere. I mean, one of the great things you guys do in the book is detail all the missed opportunities.

And just reading it, I was getting frustrated because there are all these deals. You sort of referenced a few of them, Oslo, other instances where there were summits and, you know, the parties were brought together that were rejected by one party or the other for some reason. And that deal then becomes the foundation of a future discussion that everyone seems to agree on. This was obvious in real time. You talked about how in 2001 you met with Yasser Arafat, then head of the PLO, controversial head of the PLO, and told him that he should have, you know, taken a deal earlier. You had the same conversation with Prime Minister Abbas. You had the same conversation with BB Netanyahu, who even today says things like, I want a two-state solution, but the time is not right.

You make the point in the book, both of you, that when has the time been right? So my question is, what makes this so hard? Is it awful luck in timing like when Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated? Are the politics too hard? Are the leaders weak? Is it something all of the above? What's your sense? It's all of the above and more.

Okay. First off, I'm asked all the time, well, how come you got an agreement in Northern Ireland? Right. And you couldn't get one in the Middle East. While all of these conflicts share some similarities, they involve religion, territorial disagreement, national identity, each has a highly unique history. You can't transfer one set of negotiations to another place. Each one requires a unique situation, and it requires the coming together of a lot of factors that can't be predicted and can't be controlled. In Northern Ireland, there had been

several prior negotiations, all of which failed. And I spent five years there. I chaired three separate sets of negotiations. We finally prevailed, but we came within an inch of not succeeding. We were very lucky in the end that a whole series of events aligned that made it possible, and most of it was, I will say, the courage and vision of the political leaders of Northern Ireland, who rose to the occasion. The Middle East is much more complicated than North Island was. I spoke last year to a group of Irish Americans in Queens, New York City, and I said to them, I'm going to say something.

I never thought I'd say, I never thought I'd believe. And that is, because it took me five years of Northern Ireland, it was very tough. But I said, once I got to the Middle East, began dealing with Israelis and Arabs. Well, the Irish seemed like a bunch of Patsis, people that were easy to deal with. It is a long, deep, bitter history. And I'll describe just one anecdote. At the request of then President Perez, I spoke at a large conference in Israel. And there was a Q&A period after it, and I was asked about Northern Ireland,

and I made the comment that the peace agreement in Northern Ireland came 800 years after the British domination of Ireland began. When I finished, I walked off the stage, and as often happens, people gathered around and wanted a picture and autograph, but wanted to ask a question. And an elderly, Israelis, said to me, did you say 800 years? I said, yes, 800 years.

Ah, he said he kind of waved his arm in a dismissive. No wonder you settled it. It's such a recent argument. So in the Middle East, 800 years is considered a recent argument. And in fact, they do bring up 5,000 years ago. They make claims of who lived where, 3,000 years ago, who was discovered in this cave and what documents were found over here to both to justify their position, both sides, and to delegitimize the other side's position.

Yeah. Do you have thought? Yeah, I think it's also important to keep in mind that whatever deal is reached is going to shape both states in their entirety. This isn't like some minor deal on a tangential issue. And both Israelis and Palestinians, their internal societies are incredibly divided themselves. And these are robust dialogues going on internally within Israel, internally within the Palestinians, about what kind of state they want, what kind of future they want. And that gets tied into negotiations on a peace process because getting to an agreement is one thing. Implementing an agreement is infinitely times harder.

And with successive changes in government, as we've seen here in the United States, you can agree to something last year and this year you could just walk it back very easily. And that happens a lot. Let me tell me, Alon has said something very important. Let me illustrate it by saying something that is an opinion on my part. But it's based upon dozens and dozens of meetings over many years with Prime Minister Netanyahu on the Israeli side. and with both then-Chairman Arafat and subsequently President Abbas. I believe one of the principal reasons why they're not able to get together a region agreement is that, as alone said, the societies are deeply divided.

Within Israel, there's a substantial body of opinion, including many people in the cabinet, in the government, who are adamantly opposed to their ever being a Palestinian society. state on the West Bank, are publicly opposed to it, and their position is that Israel should annex the whole West Bank. There are others, probably a slim majority in Israel, who still favor a two-state solution, an Israeli state and a Palestinian state. There is a similar division on the Palestinian side. The Palestinian Authority has renounced violence, has recognized Israel, has said it will accept prior agreements. Hamas has done not.

of those things. And so both societies are divided it. And I believe, and this is where I'm giving an opinion, that Prime Minister Netanyahu does not think that President of Baas has the personal or the political strength to reach an agreement or to implement one. And therefore, he does not want to risk the wrath of that half of his society that's opposed to there being in West Bank by seeming to make any concessions in a process that he doesn't think can succeed. For his part, President of Baas does not believe that Prime Minister Netanyahu is serious about there being a two-state solution. He repeatedly cites the fact that Prime Minister Netanyahu has been against the two-state

solution for a two-state solution, then against the two-state solution, then for a two-state solution, and now he says he's for it, but the time isn't right, as though there. There is a right time somewhere around the corner. So Abbas doesn't want to risk. His support is declining for a whole bunch of reasons, including that, doesn't want to take a risk. So until you get leaders who believe that there is a reasonable prospect for success in getting a two-state solution, I don't think you're going to get very far. And I want to add to that, and I'm jumping ahead now.

But the principal reason that Alon and I wrote this book is to preserve some. support for a two-state solution. That support is declining in Israel, among Palestinians, and in the United States. President Trump was asked about it, and he said it could be a one state or a two-state, whatever the parties agree on. And personally, I don't believe that a one-state solution is possible. That's a major part of the book. Alone drafted that section of the book, and we are doing this in part to try to make the case that although it's been very difficult, it has not been attained, we should still aspire to a two-state solution because that is the only realistic way this conflict can be brought to an end. Yeah, I thought those are a very compelling argument you make about how, in fact, a one-state solution,

a so-called sort of, what's it called Isrestine or some? Isretine? Isretine? It will actually is a de facto two-state solution because ultimately there will be a partition. Luckily, though, President Trump has put someone with vast experience in the Middle East in charge of the peace process, his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who I believe is in his early 30s. Has this team reached out to you at all to try to get some background on sticking points that have emerged to try to learn from that process? No, I've had no contact with anyone in the administration. That's disappointing.

But, you know, Tommy, it may be that the solution. lies in the circumstances in the region less than in who is representing the United States in the effort. There's been no sign of any movement or progress. We don't know what will come of the Palestinian effort at reconciliation. But what will bring them, in my judgment, to a conclusion, a successful conclusion of a two-state solution, is when the leaders and the people become convinced that their best interests are served by an agreement. Right. That the alternatives are worse.

Prime Minister Nehiyahou said to me many times that there would be a risk to Israel in creating a two-state solution because a Palestinian, the Palestinian Authority, might fail, and Hamas would take over a West Bank, thereby posing a serious threat to Israel. And my response is that is a risk. But there is a greater risk in the absence of an agreement that the Palestinian Authority will fail and that Hamas will take over. And then you face that same circumstance. Right. I mean, I think, you know, alone, you made the point that these are existential questions for both parties.

Israel views. The territory they receive is existential for their ability to secure their territory. The Palestinians are literally talking about the amount of territory they get. So I think that's a really important point. Senator Mitchell, you are far more charitable to both parties and the challenges they have of their internal politics than I would expect you to be after spending two years dealing with both sides and what could be a frustrating process. But I want to admit some of my own bias here, which was as frustrating as I thought a boss could be and his refusal to actually engage in talks with Netanyahu during a freeze in settlement. construction that he had demanded was infuriating. But I've always found Bibi Netanyahu to be more frustrating because I didn't feel like the Palestinians really had as much leverage. They barely

control 40% of the West Bank. Hamas controls Gaza. The U.S. gives Israel billions of dollars in security assistance every year. As you know, better than has even been made public, Netanyahu was offered incentives to engage meaningfully in a peace process, including billions of dollars in weaponry and assistance and other things. But BB dragged his feet frequently. He wouldn't discuss real issues when they got together with Abbas and the other parties. Am I wrong? Am I not being charitable or sympathetic enough to the political challenges Netanyahu faced?

Do you think he ever really wanted peace? Well, as I noted earlier, he has been both for and against a two-state solution for a long time. I think both sides want peace. I think both leaders want peace. The problem is finding a definition of peace that is politically acceptable within both societies. That is the terms and conditions of any agreement. It is complicated by the fact that there is a huge disproportion in strength between the parties. Palestinians, you rightly note, have very little leverage.

They are militarily occupied by Israel. Israel. Israel controls access and anybody coming in or out, subject to control by Israel. And in economic terms, why, of course, there's simply no comparison. At the same time, it seems to me that both sides have exhibited reluctance to get into negotiations in a way or to take actions that I think should have been helpful. Let me cite what I think are mistakes on both sides. President Abbas takes the position now. He cannot negotiate in the absence of a full settlement freeze.

Which would mean ceasing all construction in settlement areas. That's right. However, he negotiated directly with Prime Minister Omerd through the Annapolis process during Bush's term when there was no freeze. one of the toughest meetings I ever had with him. A loan helped me on it. He was blaming it on Obama, that Obama wanted to freeze. And so I asked a loan to get for me copies of press accounts.

Previously, when a buyer said he wanted to freeze. And it took about five minutes to find a stack. I'm now pointing to two or three inches high. And when we had a meeting with Secretary Clinton and I and President of Bars, I handed him in the folder. He got a little upset on me. Did you want to bang your head on the table and say, we're trying to negotiate something so big,

peace in a region that's been torn apart by war for decades, and we're arguing about a dozen construction starts in some settlement block? And Arafat negotiated when there was no settlement freeze. Now, I really think that the argument I made two of us was, look, you keep saying you want to freeze. They're not going to give a full freeze. Meanwhile, more settlements are being built. Why don't you get into a negotiation, get agreement on a border,

then they can build whatever they want in Israel, and you can build whatever you want, Palestine. But he never agreed to that. Now, on the other hand, Prime Minister Netanyahu adamantly opposed the United States negotiating with Hamas. But Israel negotiated with Hamas. He negotiated with Hamas. He negotiated at great length with Hamas

through Egyptian and German and other mediators, Hamas captured an Israeli soldier, Corporal Shalit, and it became an extremely important and emotional issue within Israel, in political and human terms. So Israel negotiated an agreement over a long period of time for Corporal Shalit's release. and it involved Israel in exchange releasing 1,000 Palestinian prisoners. Now, they constantly arrest Palestinians, so they always have 10 or 12 or 15,000 Palestinians in prison.

Some of these were people in the Israeli term with blood on their hands. I said to Netanyahu, 25 years ago, Abbas stood up in Gaza and said he opposed violence. he opposed the use of force against Israel. It's a very courageous thing for him to say and do. And he has abided by that. The Palestinian security forces and the West Bank are aggressive, something overly aggressive, in combating Hamas,

arresting them, taking away the weapons, preventing attacks on Israel. I said, so give him some prisoners. You're giving his political rival. prisoners. And the message you're sending is that violence pays. Hamas conducted a military attack. They captured an Israeli soldier, and they're getting a thousand prisoners released. Abbas opposes violence, prevents attacks on Israel, and he gets no prisoners released. And it's a devastating message to send out, not just to the Palestinians, but to the entire Arab world.

he wouldn't do it for his own internal reasons. So both sides have taken actions, made statements, not done things that have contributed to it. But at some point, alone and I believe, they will come to the recognition that that's where their best interests lie into two stations. I say one other thing, Tommy, you know in the book. We quoted at length President George W. Bush's speech in Jerusalem in January of 2008. And I would encourage, anybody listening to this broadcast to pull that up? In January of 2008, just about a year before he left office, President Bush went to Jerusalem. He spoke to a gathering of Israeli and Palestinian leaders. And what he said to them is that, basically, I'm paraphrasing now,

we quote him at length in the book, is that you Israelis have a very successful state, but you don't have security. People live in constant fear and anxiety of attack. you're not going to get that security until the Palestinians get a state. And to the Palestinians, he said, you want a state, and you're not going to get that state until the people of Israel have reasonable and sustainable security. So the way Bush put it is, you each should be vested in the other's success, because that's the only way you can get what you want. That's American policy.

At least it was under Bush and Obama. and I think it is still the correct policy, and I think it's the only policy that offers any realistic hope of bringing this conflict to a close. Alon, I want to ask you about this about the U.S. politics, because you watched this from the State Department

and from Israel when you were working with Dan. Why do you think there was such acrimony from Netanyahu's government to President Obama for, as you detail thoroughly in the book, making statements or offering positions that have been offered by, put forward by Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton. Jim Baker. George W. Bush.

Jim Baker said things about the Israeli government and their unwillingness to engage meaningful in a peace process that were far more harsh than anything the Obama administration ever said. Certainly you ever said publicly, Senator. I'm curious if either of you had a sense of, why Obama received such invective for saying no settlement freeze, for example, or if it was a mistake to make settlements such a focus early on? I think when Prime Minister Netanyahu came to power, that was the second time he had become

Prime Minister. The first time he became Prime Minister in the 90s was after the Oslo Accords in which Israel withdrew from certain Palestinian areas in the West Bank. He came into power the first time, stanchly opposed to the Oslo Accords. And that was during the Clinton administration and President Clinton was very invested in that process and continuing a peace process. And he got Netanyahu, who had opposed Oslo, to actually withdraw from more territory in the West Bank. And Netanyahu was very viciously attacked from the right. He arguably had to resign because of the flack that he got from the right. So he learned that lesson. He knew when he came into power the second time that his greatest threat wasn't from the left, it was from the right. And so here

you have a new American president who wants to pursue a peace deal, which is considered a more left-wing or left-leaning agenda in Israel. And Prime Minister Netanyahu knew that, in my opinion, He knew that that's not something that he could get engaged in so publicly, so early, and settlements, which is such a big issue for primarily the right wing in Israel. There's staunch support there. And so that was an issue that he could make a big deal out of. He could gain support, not just among his own constituents, but among the right wing in Israel in general. He could hold his coalition together. and it was a very convenient issue for him to make a big deal out of.

And it's not that dissimilar from what we see in U.S. politics today, actually, where Republicans are afraid of the more right-wing elements of the Republican Party in some ways more than they are of Democrats. I don't know if Senator Mitchell agrees with any of that, But my opinion is that it was the stars were aligned for any conflict about the peace process. Let me make two points in addition to those that alone made. You are correct. President George W. Bush proposed in his roadmap for peace a full settlement freeze just a few years before Obama took office and proposed the exact same thing.

Right. There was a ferocious negative reaction to Obama by people who were silent when President George W. Bush proposed exactly the same thing. Reflecting the domestic politics in both the United States and Israel. That's a factual reality. And it's happened on all sides. But I have to say, Tommy, President Obama made a mistake. He was right and wise. to go to Cairo in May of his first year in office and make an appeal to Muslims around the world,

which included a very powerful statement that was pro-Israel in the speech. But he did not go to Israel at the same time, which he should have done. He should have gone from Cairo to Jerusalem, and he could have made the same speech there and emphasize the strength of the United States commitment to Israel's security, which through his actions he has done. No American president has provided as much financial support to Israel. Israeli defense and intelligence ministers have repeatedly said that the relationship with the United States military and intelligence services

in the Obama administration was the best it's ever been with Israel. When Israel, when the threat to Israel transformed over time from that of land-based army invasion, which is now very unlikely, to rockets. Hamas has thousands of crude rockets. Hezbollah has many thousands more and more effective rockets on Israel's northern border.

Israel initiated a craft, program to devise and deploy a missile defense system, they call it Iron Dome. President Obama approved a massive increase in American funding more than $250 million to accelerate the Iron Dome program both in its development and its deployment. Right. And before he left office, he signed with the Israelis an agreement to increase significantly the amount of financial assistance, the United States, provides. So in fact, it is incorrect when people say he was hostile to Israel, although it's now widely

believed in both Israel and in many parts of the American Jewish community. But he contributed to that by making that very widely publicized visit to Cairo without a corresponding visit to Israel at the same time. Yeah, I mean, as an NSE spokesman who spent an awful lot of time trying to defend the president's record with respect to Israel. You know, three billion a year in defense spending, the Iron Dome system on top of that, President Obama used a lot of political capital to block any number of UN Security Council resolutions that were seen as unfair towards Israel. So it was very frustrating for me to see the way that was perceived. And I think you're right,

had he gone to Israel earlier, I think that could have gone a long way in changing the perception among the Israeli people. That said, I still think that it's likely he would have had a bad relationship with Netanyahu. I think for a number of reasons, I think almost every president has had a bad relationship with Netanyahu. Yes. President Clinton had a bad relationship with him. And I believe it was unwise and inappropriate for the Speaker of the House of the United States

to invite Prime Minister Netanyahu to address a joint session of Congress. Congress for the sole and explicit purpose of attacking the President of the United States and seeking to undermine a proposal they had made. And I believe it was unwise for Prime Minister Netanyahu to accept that invitation. I was the majority leader of the Senate for six years. So I know better than anyone that the decisions are made by the Speaker of the House. But not once in my six years as Majority Leader did the then-Speaker of the House ever issue an invitation. to a foreign leader without consulting with me.

In this case, there was no consultation with the Senate leader because he then was a Democrat. There was no consultation with the President of the United States because he was a Democrat. And the Speaker, on his own, invited a foreign leader to come to the floor of the House of Representatives for the sole and publicly stated purpose of attacking the policies of the President of the United States. that, I believe, was a mistake, and it furthered the bad feelings all around. But in the end, in the end, people act out of self-interest. And I still believe that when the people of Israel and Palestinians come to the conclusion, as they will, that their best interests are served by a two-state solution,

then they will do so. I think you're right. It was viewed in the White House as political interference when Nanyahu spoke on the floor from the House. I'm sure you also remember that fun moment in May of 2011 when Netanyahu was perceived as lecturing President Obama in the Oval Office. I have a great picture of all of us hanging out in the cabinet room afterwards trying to figure out how to respond and deal with that. Yes, but Tommy, you've got to be fair again. There was also another occasion when the prime minister came and was seen to be kept waiting and not received properly. in the White House.

I guess that's what I'm trying to get at is. I'm trying to see if there were mistakes we made as an administration, as a White House, and we let personal peak maybe get it in the way of better negotiations. That might have been a moment when we all got our dander up a little too much. I think that's right. I think it was a moment. But in the end, these things may contribute to the outcome, but they're not the central cause.

and the central cause remains that the policies are simply different. And the politics are simply different. And inevitably, in democracies, you have politics. Right. It's a political process. It is internal in both societies, and it exists between nations as well. And the two are interactive. The internal policies of the United States are based in part on what happens in Israel,

and the internal politics in Israel are based in part upon what happens in the United States. Just to add to that, one of the greatest myths, I think, surrounding the conflict and the U.S. involvement in the conflict is that the U.S. can somehow dictate the outcome. And it's a myth that plenty of Americans have. It's a myth that plenty of Israelis have and that plenty of Palestinians have. The number of times I was sitting in a meeting when a Palestinian leader or an Israeli leader

looked at Senator Mitchell and said, well, you, the Israelis or the Palestinians would do X if you just force them to do it. And the truth is we can't. In the end, they have agency over themselves, and they're going to do or not do whatever it is. They want to do or not do. And we talk about in the book how some of these perceptions are actually, you know, they hurt the conflict.

They hurt the prospects for peace. There were plenty of times when Prime Minister Abbas thought there was nothing for him to do. Everything was out of his hands. He didn't have to negotiate. He didn't have to provide any concerns. sessions. And there were plenty of times when the prime minister of Israel would say make a boss do X or make a boss do Y. And the reality is, you know, we could be there to help support them when they want to engage in a peace process, but we can't necessarily force them to get to that point. And the reality is that the major breakthroughs in the Israeli-Halstanian and Israeli-Arab conflict, a lot of them started without American involvement first. like the Oslo Accords, those were negotiated first in secret. And then once there was some common ground between the parties

and they knew they needed help, were the only country that could provide that kind of backup and support. Let me just add, alone is right. It's widely believed in the Arab world. I would say as close to universal as anything can be believed by a lot of people that the United States is unfairly biased toward Israel that we are responsible for their actions because we have the authority to control their actions. It is true that the United States security guarantee to Israel is of critical importance in our relations in the Middle East.

And we do it for reasons that are in part self-interest and in part because we believe in the right of the people of Israel to have a state there and live in the world. safety and security. But it is not true, as many Arabs believe, that we can simply dictate what Israelis do. At one time, our support was very substantial. Following the Camp David, of course, for example, the glue that held it together was $5 billion a year from the United States, $3 billion to Israel and $2 billion to Egypt. But Israel has a remarkable a very successful state, a growing economy, a growing defense budget, a growing trade with other nations. And although the amount we provide them is increasing under President Obama to $3.8 billion a year, it is a steeply declining portion of their defense budget and their total budget.

They could get along without us. And they're a proud people. And they're not going to take dictation from anybody. They want to work with us. The Palestinians likewise are proud. And they have endured 70 years of what they regard is occupation and denial of their right to govern themselves. And they're not going to reverse their positions if we suddenly cut off aid. As the one said, virtually every Arab leader I met said, oh, if you just cut off aid to Israel, we'll do what you want.

And Netanyahu said to me, if you just cut off aid, the Palestinians, they'll do what you want. I think they're both wrong. The other thing is the moral part of it. I don't think that's the way you treat friends. That's not the way you treat our lies. And we regard both of them as friends. As President Bush made clear in his speech, we favor a strong and secure Israel,

living safely behind defensible borders, and we favor the right of the Palestinian people to have a state, to govern themselves, to enjoy the dignity and self-respect that comes from deciding their own futures. One of the reasons that the United States has been so focused on brokering peace between Israel and Palestine is because it was seen as such a significant regional irritant that maybe a resolution could unlock other peace agreements in the region between Arab states and Israel, between Arab states and the United States or each other,

or at least get them to stop using the Palestinian issue as an excuse for inaction on countless other things. You talk in the book how you had committed President Obama to do two years in this role. That said as the Arab Spring began and there was just turmoil sweeping the region, it changed the context so significantly that it felt like it wasn't the moment for this peace agreement to emerge. What do you think is possible in realistic post-Arab Spring? Has it changed the context permanently or is there still hope for a plan like you guys detail in the book? It has changed the context, although the history of the region and of human society is it's never permanent. That's always changing.

And the fact is that the United States is 240 years old. I read an article that they written by someone and said, well, the Middle East is in turmoil. Well, you could pick any one of those 240 years and you could have said the Middle East is in turmoil and you would have been right. That's the nature of human societies. You could have said that about Africa. You could have said it about Europe. You could have said it about Asia. And so there isn't going to be a period when suddenly everything is calm and peaceful

and we can then just stroll on to the scene and say, okay, fellas, let's get together and shake hands. It's always going to be tough. Right now, the turmoil in the region is very intense. But it's not new. The principal divide within Islam is between Sunni and Shia. that goes back 1,400 years to the death of the Prophet Muhammad. It was not a political, a religious difference.

It was a purely political difference. The prevailing faction became the Sunni. The losing faction became the Shia. And there have been conflict ever since. And as we point out in the book, it's going to continue. It's going to intensify. Keep in mind that for 500 years, the people of that region have been governed by others. They have not been able to.

make decisions for themselves. And when they've had the chance, some of them have failed the test by having corrupt governments that are unable to meet the needs of their people. For 425 years, they were ruled by the Ottoman Turks. Now, the Turks are Muslim, but they're not Arab. And then after the First World War, the British and the French, then in their colonial mode, dictated the politics of the region, not in the interests of the people who lived in the region, but in what the British and French perceived as their national interest. That's all collapsed now. And so there is going to be a period of turmoil.

And I think Tommy is likely to be some places where there will be successes by our standards and others where they're on and will continue to be in turmoil. What we have to hope is that amidst all of those changes, there will come into alignment a series of factors that will make possible the reaching of an agreement. You can't predict exactly when, but think about this. Right now, Israel and Saudi Arabia, two countries which have long been at odds, the Saudis were very recalcitrant during the time we were there, but those two countries in the same region have the same highest foreign policy priority. That is to prevent Iran from extending its hegemony into the region and to, in the case,

of the Saudis upsetting Sunni regimes, including the Saudis, but not limited to them, and to the Israelis, to bringing destruction to Israel, which several Iranian leaders have said is coming. Right. So, but, and there's some evidence that they're talking privately, but they should be in full-blown agreement along with the other Gulf Arab states because the real threat to them doesn't come from Israel. And the leader, the Arab leaders know that Israel is there to stay. The United States is not going to permit Israel to be destroyed by its neighbors or anyone else. And the Israelis already are the dominant military force in the region as a result

with the tremendous development that they've had and American assistance. So I think they'll come around to it. But what we have to hope is that the factors come into line and create a circumstance where it's in the interest of the Israelis and the Palestinians and others in the region see it as beneficial to their interests. My final question for you, and thank you so much for the time. Reading the book, it's a great book, but it got me emotional. I was pissed off at Bebe and Abbas at times. I was angry for the Palestinians who will never get to return to their homes.

I was overwhelmingly sympathetic to the Zionist cause when you, detail the way the Jewish people have been treated just since 1880s, the fall of the Ottoman Empire, let alone World War I and two with the horrific limits on refugees as Hitler was rising to power. That's the emotion felt as a reader. I can't imagine being a participant, but you both still seem so hopeful. You outline a peace plan, you outline a two-state solution. What's the best case for the future? If either of you were hopping on a plane tomorrow with Jared or with President Trump to Israel for negotiations, what would you advocate that they do right now? Well, I would advocate the same thing I did six years ago when I was here and tell them, I think, that time and circumstances are demonstrating

the validity of my position. You mentioned Northern Ireland at the outset. I was there five years. In the main negotiation, as I said many times, we had 700 days of failure and one day of success. So some people say the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. That may be true in some cases, but the opposite is also true. You don't take the first no as the final answer. You don't take the 10th no. You don't take the 97th no. You keep trying and plugging away, adapting as necessary to circumstances.

But there are events in the region, particularly what is occurring within the Islamic world. And it isn't just the divide between Sunni and Shia. There are deep internal divisions among Sunnis. There are deep internal divisions among Shia. And history tells us that there are periods of intense conflict that are frequently followed by periods of exhaustion with conflict and a period within which political progress may be possible. And my own view is that the time is coming,

and I think it may be sooner than may be. people think. And it may happen not because of anything that the United States does, but because of what the people there conclude. The politics of it don't look that way now. As alone said, describing Israeli politics, it's a very strong determination to prevent there ever being a Palestinian state. And if they think that the United States supports that position or tolerates and condones that position, that will encourage them. The Palestinian side, there are nascent signs of a possible reconciliation, which might mean a step by Hamas toward accepting some of the conditions that would make them acceptable to participate in negotiations. So you have to keep trying and hope that at some point it all comes together.

I would have any concluding thoughts on there. I would just say there's a lot of stuff going on at the grassroots, both in Israel and in the Palestinian territories, of people. who are starting to wake up about the need to get their populations politically active, people who support a peace agreement between the two. And there are, for example, on the Israeli side, there's something called commanders for Israel security. It's 200 Israeli military generals who have put forth a peace plan that outlined steps just Israel can take

without relying on Palestinians to encourage a peace agreement. And on the Palestinian side, you continue to have a majority of Palestinians still who are supporting two-state solution. So I think as each side continues down the path, and if they do start taking steps, perhaps not these governments, but future governments, if they do start taking steps towards separating from one another, I think they'll find that it's much easier to just get into a peace agreement and do it with one another rather than pay the price and do it yourself. and get nothing in return. What alone just said brings to mind something that you should be reassured by giving your earlier comments. It's a slight digression, but it's on the same theme. About a week ago, I published in the Boston Globe an op-ed article to make the point that while the American media in reporting on the Iran nuclear agreement generally describes three

positions, support within the United States by President Obama, former Secretary of State, Kerry, and others, opposition within the United States by President Trump and some of the Republican leaders in Congress, and the position of Prime Minister Netanyahu in opposition. It has created the impression among Americans, and I speak to groups all the time, and they have the impression that while the United States is divided on the issue, Israelis are unanimous in support of Prime Minister Netanyahu's position. And nothing could be further from the truth. And I published a list of statements by prominent Israeli leaders, former prime ministers, former

defense ministers, heads of their Mossad, the equivalent of the CIA, heads of their shinbet, the equivalent of the FBI, the head of their atomic energy commission. All of them strongly supporting the Iran nuclear agreement, demonstrating clearly that a a huge swath of the Israeli military, security, intelligence, establishment, and many knowledgeable people support the agreement and don't agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu. In fact, the biggest problem I had in doing the op-ed piece was I had so many such statements, I had to leave a whole lot of them out. Yet I could only get so much space in the newspaper.

So my point is that Israel is a vibrant democracy, just like the United States. there are competing in different points of view. And it seems to me that at some point, that debate is going to produce a result that reflects the best interests of the people of Israel. And that is an agreement with the Palestinians. And just think about this in closing. Israel reached an agreement with Egypt in 1979. It reached an agreement with Jordan 15 years or so later.

Those agreements have held. and a high priority for Israel is maintaining those agreements, keeping them in force. And an agreement with the Palestinians would, in my judgment, after being achieved, reach the same status. The Israelis will have a strong incentive to maintain it and to try to keep going to get the other Arab countries, the Gulf Arabs, the Saudis and the others, to recognize them, to reach agreements with them, because they all have a threat, doesn't come from each other. It's external to them. Right.

And that, to me, means that their self-interest will be vindicated in an agreement which could lead to other agreements and hopefully regional cooperation between Israel and the Arabs to their mutual benefit. The book is A Path to Peace, Alone, Senator Mitchell. Thank you so much for visiting us here at Crooked Media HQ in Los Angeles. and thank you so much. All right. Thanks for having us, Tommy.

Thank you. That is it for Pod Save the World. As always, if you like the show, please rate us in the iTunes store. Check up the Pod Save the World Facebook page. And, you know, I feel pretty good. Middle East peace has been secured thanks to this conversation.

So, you know, all the day's work. Thanks, guys.