Pod Save the World - Will Biden Bomb Iran?

Episode Date: January 31, 2024

Tommy and Ben talk about the drone strike by an Iranian-backed group on a US base in Jordan that killed three US service members, the pressure on Biden to retaliate against Iran directly, and the muddled politics of war. They also cover allegations that UN employees in Gaza participated in the October 7th Hamas attack, the International Court of Justice’s ruling about genocide charges against Israel, and Nancy Pelosi’s odd criticism of activists calling for a ceasefire. They also discuss NATO member fears about Russia, Trump floating major tariffs on China, a Kenyan court blocking the deployment of police to Haiti, and French farmers laying siege to Paris. Then, Tommy speaks with Ali Vaez, Iran Project Director at the International Crisis Group, about Iranian proxy groups, why Iran funds them, and the US conventional wisdom that Iran can only be deterred through military action. For a closed-captioned version of this episode, click here. For a transcript of this episode, please email [e-mail] and include the name of the podcast.

Welcome to Pod Save the World. I'm Tommy Vitor. I'm Ben Rhodes. Ben, is Obama still writing the NFL script before the season starts or did he kick that to Michelle? She was a better seller. Whoever wrote this Taylor Swift, Travis Kelsey storyline? Yeah. Yeah. Well, like it's in the storyline of the backlash is also a good part of the twist. Have you seen the conspiracy theories about this? Oh, I had to say I had one of those nights who I was awake from like 3.30 to 5.30 to last night. I was actually just telling Fabri. Like I started with my predictable like 30 minutes on Gaza and I was like, I got to stop doing this.

So then I basically spent an hour plumbing the depths of the Travis Kelsey Taylor Swift conspiracy theory and trying to figure out like what it is. Yeah. And I still don't quite understand it. There's a whole narrative that the NFL is rigged to begin with and that the NFL wants the Chiefs in the Super Bowl because there will be more eyeballs. I can understand that. I'm sure the NFL is very happy about this outcome. But the idea that they script the games ahead of the season is kind of hilarious to me. Well, and also, like, the Chiefs are in the Super Bowl, like, almost every year.

They're really good at football. Irrespective of Taylor Swift. And, again, as coming from, like, a massive, monstrous, in a good sense, Swifty household, you know, I've been very attuned to this, right? Because I do, you know, my daughters will now, like, pay attention to football, you know. And that's great. And the thing is, part of you wants to be like, oh, at some point I'm getting tired of this,

but then it's like so lovely and charming, you know, like. That's great. Travis Kelsey's going to pull down 11 catches in the AFC championship and make out with Taylor on the field after. It felt like the most, like, you know, it felt like the end of like a heartwarming sports movie. It sounds like a Taylor Swift song. And if there's one thing Americans like,

it's like a good heartwarming sports movie. Probably not the best thing to attack. God damn right. Also, I just got even email of a screener for a new Apple Plus TV series called The Dynasty New England Patriots. Ten parts. I'm going to savor that.

Now you have to watch it in like, you know, documentary form. Just like I still watch documentaries about the 1986 Mets. Because they're the last team I liked that won the championship. It's going to be like black and white. I mean telling my kids about back in the day. Anyway, this is the sports talk at the top. You'll get no more of that after. That's Taylor Talk.

If you don't like a Taylor Swift talk. Today we are going to cover this horrible drone attack in Jordan. They killed three U.S. service members and how Joe Biden might respond. We're also going to talk about the politics of war, why D.C. seems to incentivize more conflict, but there's this kind of new Tucker Carlson element out there that's changing the calculus a little bit. We're also going to cover allegations that U.N. stabbers in Gaza participated in the October 7th Hamas attack, the U.S. decision to suspend aid to that relief organization and what the impact will be on citizens in Gaza. We also have updates on efforts to get to a ceasefire in Gaza, a ruling by the International Court of Justice about charges of genocide against Israel. Lots of NATO news. Trump trade in China, U.S. military training in Africa and a couple more quick hitters. And then you're going to hear my interview with Ali Vez from the crisis group. We dive deeper into these Iranian proxy groups in the Middle East that are causing all these problems, what it means to deter Iran, if that's even possible, if we're even thinking about it right,

what Biden should do next. So great conversation. Yeah, I mean, one of the smartest analysts out there on Iran. And actually, you know, the international crisis group, were those who want to do. want to go deep, like that website is like a treasure trove. Like even when I was in government and had access to the U.S. intelligence community, I would read the International Crisis Group reports because they had guys on the ground who knew what the fuck was going. They're really like deep dive summaries into what's happening and what you need to know. And they're usually pretty readable. So, big plug for ICHA. Well done. Also, Ben, I was listening

to the fourth episode of Dissident at the Doorstep came out over the weekend on the POTS of the World feed. It had an interview with our old friend, Danny Russell, who we worked with at the White House, who is a top Asia hand in the administration. And just hilarious. That's why I'm so, so funny. I just can't recommend the show enough if you want to hear, like, real unvarnished accounts of what it's like to be in a White House situation room meeting where you're debating U.S. interests when it comes to a country like China, when you're balancing, like,

human rights with economic and military priorities. How do you find off-ramps, diplomatic off-ramps in a crisis? How do you manage disagreements, sometimes very contentious ones, between. the State Department and the White House and when people are mad at each other and not getting along, it's really well done. I got called into a meeting on that one day. It was like one of those days you're like going up and down

the hallway in the West Wing. Someone's like, hey, you've got to get in this meeting the situation room. And I had no idea what the fuck was going on. And so I come into this meeting and I'm trying to, with there's a blind dissident in the embassy and the what. And people are like shouting each other.

Like I think Danny and Kurt Campbell maybe. And I literally was like, you know what, guys? You guys got this? I'm just, I'm out of this one. I think you, I was like,

Tommy can handle the press on this one. Like, I'm just, I'm out of this. There was like a police chase with an embassy car in Beijing. It was a crazy story. It's all in this series.

Yeah, my personal memory of that story is I remember I was dating someone long distance. I was going to visit her that weekend. When I was at the airport about to take off, everything was resolved. When I landed for my layover,

everything had blown up. I was like, I hate this job. Anyway, I check out dissident at the doorstep. It's literally sitting in the POTS of the World feed. And if you don't listen to it, Ben and I will know, and we will judge you harshly. Yeah.

That's all I got out of the thing. Okay. So over the weekend, there was a dark turn there. Dark turn. Yeah, yeah. It's always really hard to make turns on this show. It's like the Today Show. So over the weekend, there was this horrible drone attack on a U.S. base in Jordan.

It killed three U.S. service members and wounded dozens more. The U.S. believes the drone was launched from Iraq by a Shia militia group linked to Iran. U.S. officials told the Wall Street Journal that the U.S. has no evidence that Iran directed the attack, but they know that Iran provides weapons, training, and funding to these groups, so they blame Iran. Iran denies data role in the incident, but a telegram channel linked with Iranian-backed militia groups say the attack was retaliation for a recent U.S. strike in Baghdad against an Iranian-backed militia group called K. This is very confusing, but I remember KH threats against the U.S. embassy when we were in government. So this drone was apparently able to. to evade air defenses at this base by approaching right as a U.S. drone was preparing to land,

which confused the air defense systems. It hit a barracks where U.S. service members were all sleeping and had devastating consequences. There have been at least 165 attacks against U.S. service members in Iraq and Syria since mid-October. 80 service members had been injured before this incident over the weekend. So the question now is, how does the U.S. respond? President Biden said, we shall respond. So it's clear they're going to do something. The Wall Street Journal says the response options could include sanctions, attacking Iran's personnel in Syria, Iraq or Yemen, attacking Iranian ships in the Red Sea, a massive response against just these Iranian-backed militia groups wherever they're operating or a kind of combination of those options. The journal says a response strike within Iran itself is less likely, which is a relief to read, but we'll see. President Biden is under immense pressure from Congress to respond. We'll get to that in a minute.

But Ben, let's like try to take listeners kind of inside the situation room meetings and debates about what to do here. What do you think that conversation is like? And did those options outlined by the Wall Street Journal sound like what you'd expect would be presented to the president in this situation? And do you have a guess for what kind of approach he'll take? Yeah. And look, first of all, it was, it's obviously tragic when you lose service members like that. But, you know, these are all reservists too. and you just feel so bad for people.

Like they're just plucked out of their lives doing their reserve duty and Jordan and I mean caught up in a war that, you know, they didn't think was probably happening when they got called. I mean, it's just, it's a horrible situation. I've been in meetings about this particular issue, right? It was never as widespread a kind of regional war

as it is now. But, you know, we dealt, for instance, with circumstances where Iran and back militias in Baghdad attacked U.S. troops, in some cases, killed U.S. troops before the pullout from Iraq in 2011. Obviously, throughout the kind of counter ISIS campaign, even though Iran was, you know, against ISIS too, like U.S. troops were kind of in the vicinity of Iranian-backed groups that sometimes, you know, you'd have clashes with. And basically what happens is the Pentagon usually has kind of a list of potential targets, you know.

you know, hear the different types of responses. And, you know, they can be, the dial can be turned up. And so, you know, we could either strike at, you know, some of these camps or areas where we know these militia groups kind of are headquartered or operate. We could strike at kind of supply nodes, right, where the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the RDC is kind of handing off material weapons to these types of groups. And actually the Israelis frequently strike targets like that in Lebanon and Syria and Iraq. Or, you know, here are some strikes into Iran if you really want to escalate.

And I imagine they're looking at things like sanctions, which I think are useless at this point, because, I mean, how many sanctions can you put on, you know, these groups? cyber actions. But the kind of discussion that you're having is, well, like, what would this do? What would the, you're trying to game out what the response would be from the Iranians or from some of these other groups. You're, you know, hearing the views represent, not just on television, but here's what Congress is saying. And you're kind of weighing what might be the point of engaging in this military activity versus what might the cost some potential escalation be, and you're kind of trying to refine, you know, what the option is that the president's

going to choose. And then at some point, you know, you go through multiple levels of that same meeting and then you meet with the president and have probably a couple rounds of, you know, here are some three, it's usually three options, you know. Well, Goldilocks. Yeah, well, it's usually like the third one's crazy and the first one is minimalist. It's too high. It's often kind of teed up that way. And I'm not saying that's the best. way to do these things, by the way. And so I think they've been going to that exercise. Now,

what's different in this case than when I was in the situation room is the wars in Gaza. And this is we don't hold all these cards. You know, not only do we not know exactly what they're thinking in Tehran or how much control the Iranians have over these groups. And I'm quite dubious. And I'm sure Allie gets into this. I think to that a lot. I don't think that the Iranians are sitting there like, you know, ordering attacks in these U.S. forces. But put that aside, we don't control what the main theater of this war is. You know, we don't, you know, obviously, Bibi Nanyahu is controlling the Israeli military operation there. And, and so that, that's part of the challenge and the problem with this whole dynamic, is that we can't control for escalation and de-escalation in kind

of the main theater, or we can, I guess, if we, you know, used our leverage on Israel to try to really de-escalate. And so it feels, is something about the whole exercise feels off to me. Like, what are we doing here? You know, like, what is this all about? What strategies is connected to? There's this kind of a Washington drama of like, well, they did something, so now we have to really do something. And I question the premise of what is achieved by these military options, because they're not deterring these groups. And I would actually argue, I think these groups want us to, like, you know, do things, say, in Iraq and ways it calls the Iraqi government to say, get out of here. So this whole thing just feels very tenuous to me. Yeah, Ali and I get into the

different motivations for some of these different groups, how much Iran controls them, the fiction of deterring Iran that gets talked about constantly in Washington. Here's a clip of white out spokesman John Kirby talking about the need to respond. We're going to take this seriously as well. We've got to do what we have to do to protect our troops and our facilities. What the options are available to the president, we're still working through that. He's still working his way through that. And I don't want to close down any decision space on it on his behalf that said uh we certainly know iran's back in these groups uh we know that they are resourcing their supplying in some cases they're providing information that allows these groups uh to do this we're taking that very seriously we don't want a wider

war with uh with iran we don't want a wider war in the in the region uh but we got to do what we have to do there was another quote out there from tony blinkin who said uh this is an incredibly volatile time in the middle east i would argue that we've not seen a situation as dangerous as the one we're facing now across the region since at least 1973 and arguably even before that. There's also reports been that the U.S. is debating whether to fully pull U.S. troops out of Iraq in Syria. I imagine this incident in Jordan will lead a lot of people to wonder, why are U.S. troops in Jordan? Why are U.S. troops in Syria?

The Pentagon will likely say they're there to prevent a resurgence of ISIS. We saw what happened when the U.S. pulled out of Iraq and we had to go back in. but I do think that that's a conversation that probably needs to happen. Yeah, there's a lot there that I find concerning. I mean, if you listen to Kirby's, you know, I think accurate description of their policy, I think that is there's a contradiction at the heart of it, which is we don't want a wider war, but we are engaged in wider war, you know. And that's where I think they need to stop just reacting to events and step back and be like,

what is actually in what's the right thing to do here, what's in our interest, you know, because, you know, there's a quicksand feeling to what's happening where they're getting drawn into a conflict by all these various groups that are, again, you know, playing off of what's happening in Gaza to take on what they see as the U.S. and Israel and the region. And I think they need to step back and consider, you know, whether this is working, kind of going back and forth like that with these groups and thinking you're controlling the escalation because the escalation is just ticking up and up and up. I think on the troops in Syria point, we shouldn't have these troops in Syria.

And I think that they were debating that for years inside the administration and it's always hard to pull them out. And this is why it's hard to pull them out because, you know, you have these troops in a pretty vulnerable place. You know, like you were talking about 500 or 1,000 U.S. service members. And, you know, the counter-Isis mission, it's not a lot. like there's no remnant of ISIS anywhere, but I don't think you need those troops anymore. I don't think you've needed them for a few years, you know. And you, when you don't pull them out

because, you know, you're kind of delaying a hard decision or you might get criticized, and then this happens. But then you're like, well, we can't possibly pull them out now because then the Iranians or their groups will declare victory. And that's such a bad reason to put people at risk, you know. they're not serving a function other than potentially being a target for these groups. And then what are they doing there? So I think they have to step back and think about like what kind of footprint do we want in this region? How much do we going to get drawn into these conflicts? And I'd say we should be narrowly protecting, you know, okay, if you want to protect ships that are going through the Red Sea, just do it there.

You don't need to be attacking the Houthi so you're not going to deter. You obviously need to protect U.S. military installations, but think carefully about where they need to be. and don't let these groups, you know, control your own policies. In other words, like, don't, it's like, don't get drawn into a fight that, you know, is not worth it to have. We can get into the politics of this, too, because I actually think the politics run counter to what people probably think it is. Yeah, let's talk about the politics. I mean, I think there's about 900 U.S. troops in Syria. There's another couple thousand in Iraq.

It sounds like the U.S. in Iraq are going to negotiate on the future of that force presence. But, again, this idea that you can deter an Iraq. Iranian-backed militia based in Iraq, whose primary mission seems to be driving the U.S. out of Iraq seems to be logically wrong to me. But, you know, we talk more about that with Ali. But, Ben, you know, to your point about Washington, there's, there is the bipartisan blob pressure on Biden to respond military. I'll tick through some of that.

So on the Democratic side, he gets Senator Ben Cardin, the Democratic chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said, I support President Biden in a deliberate and proportionate response. Senator Jack Reed, who is in charge of the Armed Services Committee, use similar language. Nick Christoff, a liberal New York Times columnist, tweeted, quote, I hope Biden's response this time is much tougher striking either Iranian territory or its naval assets. Iran can be deterred if it feels sufficient pain. I didn't realize that Brett Stevens has stolen his pen.

The Republican comments were more overtly bloodthirsty. You got Lindsey Graham tweeting, hit Iran now, hit them hard. Tom Cotton called for a, quote, devastating military retaliation, both in Iran and across the Middle East. Anything less will confirm Joe Biden as a coward, end quote. Nikki Haley called Biden weak. She demanded a retaliation, so lots of pressure to escalate the war. There's some notable exceptions I did want to flag. Congressman Seth Moulton of Massachusetts served in Iraq, did four tours, said, quote,

to the chicken hawks who are calling for war with Iran, you're playing into the enemy's hands, and I'd like to see you send your sons and daughters to fight. Moulton said, we must have an effective strategic response on our terms and on our timeline. Grateful for voices like that and crazy times like this. Tucker Carlson called Lindsey Graham and John Cornyn, Senator from Texas, quote, fucking lunatics for demanding Biden strike Iran. Shout out Tucker. Stop clock is right. You know, twice a day. Trump called Biden weak. He said this wouldn't have happened if Trump was president, which is what he always says. But I don't think he is outlined what he specifically wants to see as a response.

So the political challenges are basically like one consideration, right, it's like people say you got to look tough, you got to look strong, whatever the hell that means in D.C. Strength is usually defined by like schlubby columnists who's, you know, closest they've gotten to war is playing call the duty with their friends or whatever. Biden's going to face some pressure from the left from anti-war progressives. We love them for that effort. but I don't know that those voices will be the loudest in the White House right now. But the interesting wrinkle to me is this Tucker Carlson message, which is that striking around itself is crazy.

We should get our troops out of Iraq and Syria. Trump seems to be in mostly in the Tucker camp. He's calling Biden weak, but he's not detailing a response. Like, I don't know. What do you think the political incentives are here for Biden? Because it's getting a little muddled. I'd say three things, Tommy. I thought about this a lot.

First of all, you know, Lindsay Graham and Tom Cotton, there hasn't been a problem in the last decade that their answer to that problem wasn't to call Democrat Week and say that we should bomb her on. This is a comic book. Like John Bolton. Same thing. And like, so I just block those people out. They're not serious people. This is what they do. It's like one trick pony bullshit, right?

And that leads to the second most important point, which is that my experience in eight years in the White House is that the best policy. politics in foreign policy are actually the outcome, not the posturing. And the outcome of getting into a war with Iran is a terrible political outcome. Americans would fucking hate that. By the way, Lindsey Graham and Tom Cotton probably know that. You know, they're goading Biden to do something to be politically devastating but in line with their ideology. And so this is where the politics of national screen in Washington is so profoundly out of touch with actual American voters. because in Washington they think that like what Lindsey Graham is saying about you

actually matters to your politics. It doesn't fucking matter. Like no, there's not voter. Lindsay Graham ran for president and got like. But Ben, he was on Face the Nation. He was on like the JV.

Remember those JV debates? He never even got on like the main debate in 2016. He spoke at Brookings. Yeah, well that's the thing. And everybody thinks this is a big political problem because he's on like Sunday shows that like barely anybody watches anymore.

And he like is quoted in some legacy media that, you know, 90% of people like don't read anymore. Don't talk about the Atlantic that way. Well, look, I write for the Atlantic and I'm on MSNBC. So like, I, you know, I get it. But like, I don't think that that's not where, like, Democrats don't like wars. I totally agree with you. Republicans don't either.

Yes, the Tucker Carlson is much closer to the base of the Republican Party than Lindsey Graham is. And so it's such a mistake to even consider those viewpoints as political pressure. The political pressure is to not end up in a war that you, don't want to be fighting, you know? And to be, again, I think the Biden people's options are to not do this and to do, look, politically the best outcome for where this thing could be is that there's a ceasefire in Gaza, the hostages come back, you're getting aid into Gaza, so like things are getting better for the people there. For sure. And we're not in a war, right? So that's

both the best substantive outcome and the best political outcome. And just because that doesn't track the DC playbook of like we got to support BB and we hug him and we got to like that's that's the wrong political outlook. But you know in the back of their minds they're thinking, okay, we said we shall respond. Obama did the red line. He got destroyed for not bombing Syria. So that's the one thing floating around here, right? The second thing floating around the back of their heads is the Afghanistan withdrawal. So they know it's time to get troops out of places like Iraq in Syria, but they're obviously and understandably scarred by what happened in Afghanistan. And then three is kind of like the A-PAC politics of Israel traditional thing, right? So, like, those I imagine are like looming

super large in the heads of decision makers right now. I'm not saying that's the right thing to be thinking about, but I think that's what I think they're probably talking about. And I'm saying I think they need to get that out of their heads. I mean, the red line thing made it, you know, like hugely controversial in elite circles. But like, did that hurt Barack Obama's political standing? No. And so we don't have to, this is not to debate that whether that was right or wrong. It's just to make the point that, like, it was never the political cost on Barack Obama that, like, national security elites, like, thought it was because they were so divorced from public opinion didn't want to be in war in Syria, you know? Then the APAC stuff is profoundly insane because, because BB Nanyahu does not want Joe Biden to get elected. We've covered all this. But it bears repeating that, like, that should literally not enter into the head of Democrats. APAC is an organization that, like, is endorsing. insurrectionists and the prime minister of Israel is clearly in favor of Donald Trump in this next election. So why would you let them dictate your political or national security strategy, you know?

And then Afghanistan, look, the biggest problem in Afghanistan was just how that went, you know. It's just a different situation. It's apples to oranges. And when you're trying to kind of, shape your current decisions to kind of make up for something you did in the past, I think that, you know, taking 500 troops out of Syria is a different kind of enterprise than what we saw in Afghanistan. I do think on Trump, the problem with Trump, and he's too dumb to know it, is, yes, he didn't, like, start a, didn't bomb Iran, but he killed Qasem Soleimani. Yeah. He assassinated the commander, the revered commander of the IRGC. And a lot of what we're seeing now is a lot of groups have been waiting to kind of get their revenge on the U.S.

And this Gaza war has, like, been the opening for that. And so he's part of this, too, because, like, he literally did a major escalation to the I. G.C. that escalated this regional war in ways that we're still seeing, I think. And it's worth pointing out that Republicans say, and the press repeats it as an article of fact, that killing Qasem Soleimani restored U.S. deterrence and it quieted the Iranian proxy groups. This is absolutely not true. Attacks increased in the calendar year after the Soleimani strike above the one before it. Don't trust me. The quote here is from General Frank McKenzie, the commander of U.S. Central Command. He said, we have had more indirect fire attacks around and against our bases in the first half of this year than we did in the first half of last year.

So pretty clear there. Remember, in September of 2020, Mike Pompeo threatened to close the U.S. embassy in Iraq because their threats were so high. In December of 2020, December 23rd, 2020, there was the largest rocket attack on the U.S. embassy in Iraq in a decade. So, in fact, like all these proxy groups, increased their activities, increased their attacks on U.S. forces after the Soleimani. assassination. They didn't chill them out at all. Yeah. And that, and that, what drives me crazy is that line of argument, you know, we need to restore deterrence. We need to punish Iran for its malign activities in the region. We need to apply maximum pressure. It's never really scrutinized. Never questioned. It's never questioned because it's like, it's quote unquote tough, even though it

brings about the opposite outcomes, right? That approach leads to a more advanced Iranian nuclear program, more hostile Iranian proxy groups. It doesn't work. work. And so, so like, like the, the efficacy and the results should matter here. And it should guide whether or not the administration kind of lets those people write its playbook or whether they are able to find a pathway to de-escalate this thing. Yeah. A couple quick things just to close this out. So one argument you can make against U.S. involvement in Middle East is that the buildup there of U.S. military assets has already cost $1.6 billion. I don't think people like that kind of spending. In a sign that foreign policy is complicated, Ben, the Wall

Street Journal reported that the U.S. warned Iran in advance of that January 3rd ISIS attack that killed 80 Iranians that coincided with the death of Qasem Soleimani's assassination. This might surprise listeners, but the U.S. intelligence community works under a directive called the duty to warn that requires them to warn Americans and non-Americans if they're going to be the target of a terrorist attack. So maybe some more diplomacy like that could get us in a better place. It's just an interesting side note. And then as long as we're talking about, you know, the Senate and congressional committees. I do hope the Senate will get moving on some of their nominations.

There's great folks sitting out there like Derek Chalet to be a top Pentagon official. He's just waiting for a confirmation hearing. You've got state and DOD jobs just sitting vacant. So let's get moving here. Let's get rid of Bob Menendez and get moving on some nominations. Yeah, I mean, you're talking about like an incredibly volatile international environment and you've got like, yeah, Derek is up to be the lead policy person in the Pentagon. You've got diplomats.

Like Democrats can push this through the Senate. and they need to do it. I mean, now it's not a good time to have like, you know, a bunch of vacancies and, you know, acting in different places. Give Joe Biden his team. Yeah. Okay, so let's turn to Gaza because the latest crisis facing Gazans is the status of funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine or UNRah. Israel says that at least 12 UNRWA employees crossed into Israel on October 7th and participated in the Hamas terrorist attack. Israeli intelligence also claims that 10% of UNRWA's Gaza-based staff are Hamas members. This latter claim, the more expansive claim, is reportedly based on cross-referencing an UNRWA staff list with a directory of Hamas members that the

idea found on some computer in Gaza. I think we need to see a lot more evidence to back up this 10% figure. But the specific allegations against these 12 individuals are very serious and very troubling. It includes allegations that an unreal worker kidnapped a woman and that another participated in a massacre. It is Israeli kabbal. on October 7th. Nine of these 12 employees have been fired. One is dead. Two are being investigated.

In response, though, the U.S., and now about a dozen countries, suspended funding for UNRWA. That is an enormous decision because 80% of Gazans have been displaced by the war, and now the U.N. is providing shelter to about 1.4 million people in 150,000 locations, and they're also providing general assistance to about 400,000 more. The U.N. says their funding could run out by the end of February. if the U.S. and other donors don't reverse course. The U.S. in Germany provide about half of U.S. 1.2 billion dollar budget in 2022. So before the war started, UNRWA employed about 13,000 employees in Gaza. Most of them were teachers and about 30,000 in the broader Middle East.

We reached out to Shana Lowe, the communications advisor for Norwegian Refugee Council in Palestine to ask about the impact of the U.S. and other countries suspending aid. Here's a clip. Suspending UNRWA funding will have a catastrophic impact on the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Already around 1.7 million out of Gaza's 2.3 million people have been internally displaced. The majority of them, around a million, are seeking shelter in and around UNRWA facilities and are reliant on UNRWA to provide them with everything from shelter to water to food to toilet. UNRWA is also playing a huge role in the distribution of aid throughout Gaza. Around 80% of aid that's being distributed right now is being distributed through UNRWA.

On top of that, UNRWA provides support to other NGOs, including the Norwegian Refugee Council. Unurwa collects our goods when they cross through the Rafa crossing and deliver them to NRC's warehouse in Ruffa. They also provide NRC and all the other humanitarian agencies operating in Gaza with fuel that's needed to power our vehicles to distribute the goods that we're receiving. We've also, as the Norwegian Refugee Council, relied on UNRWA to help deliver some of our aid to areas that we're unable to reach, either because we don't have access due to ongoing hostility. or because we don't have staff available. Just to give an idea for scale, the Norwegian Refugee Council has around 50 staff in Gaza right now. Not all of them are operational.

Unrua in Gaza has a staff of 13,000 people with 3,000 people operational. To cut off funding to UNRWA, particularly at a time where there is so much desperate need, is just punishing a civilian population that has already been suffering So, Ben, Israel's concerns about ties between UNRWA and Hamas or other militant groups are not new at all. This new evidence is obviously very troubling. But there's got to be a better way to deal with, you know, these bad actors than to fully cut off support to 2 million people in Gaza when it is so clearly desperately needed, right? I mean, there's got to be some space here between cutting them off and nothing. Yeah.

No, look, these people did what they did, you know, it's horrific. I do think you have, you know, this isn't like a finite, small, you know, UN team, like you said, before the war was 13,000 people. Basically, it's kind of like the public school system, say, of Gaza. And so like the capacity to kind of vet and monitor 13,000 people, yes, they need to investigate it, you know, yes, they obviously should not have any role in this kind of violence. I just think this response is callous and crazy. I mean, in the sense of like, okay, you know, this is kind of like instinctive idea, like,

oh, we have to cut this off. Well, now the U.S. position is simultaneously we want there to be more aid into Gaza, but we're going to defund basically the overweight. overwhelmingly only delivery vehicle for that aid. I mean, you're talking as you're over a million people are like literally living in unretent. Where will they live? How will they eat?

What are we doing here? If our policy is to get more assistance to people in Gaza are suffering, how can we do that if we're cutting off all the funding for the. Now, I think there is a bit of a lag here in the sense of like the U.S. money that's, you know, the next tranches and for, you know, there's some time. So I think there's a capacity to kind of figure this out. But the problem is if you accept the political premise that we have to cut this off, then what's going to turn it back on, you know, the completion of investigation, like what is the,

because if you can't find a way to turn it back on, how are you going to get assistance, you know, save the children in the region refugee council, they joined a whole group of very established aid organizations, right? These are not like radical, saying essentially, we can't do it. We can't take the place of UNRWA because they have all the infrastructure. So again, I think it doesn't make sense. And the other thing I'd say even politically, because, you know, that must have been a sense that there's some political pressure here. I just wish that the political imperative of showing voters who care about what's happening in Gaza that you're trying to help those people. that that was taken into account in the same way that like,

oh, someone's going to criticize us for continuing to provide funding to UNRWA. The people that are going to be mad at you for continuing to provide that assistance are probably not big Biden voters anyway. So I just, I don't know, like this whole thing kind of bugs me, you know.

And it's not to justify anything about fucking what happened with these people that work there. It's just a question of like, we're in a situation now where like how else we're going to get assistance in? By the way, I'd also say about this policy, leveling Gaza is probably not doing a lot to like de-radicalize exactly like that 13,000 number

there are probably more people and is not to impugn them I'm just saying that like how are you going to be living under these bombs and be derecical? Bibi says he's de-radicalizing the population no he's not he's doing the opposite. The absolute opposite is true. Yeah I think you should find the individuals

who are involved on the seventh prosecute them and then keep investigating if you could find others. You shouldn't cut off eight to the entire organization. By the way, in 2018, Trump defunded UNRWA in an effort to pressure the Palestinian authority into talks with Israel. That effort completely failed. So this has been tried before, and it's just stupid. Last thing on this, did you see this report today that Reuters had about Israeli commandos disguised as medical workers, like bursting into a hospital in the West Bank? They kill three Palestinian militants, including one who's apparently paralyzed. I don't have

much to say about it beyond the fact that, like, it seems like the kind of thing that could lead to an eruption in the West Bank. So just something to watch. Yeah. I mean, it was, they were dressed as doctors and veiled women and they killed these guys with silencers. Now, these were Hamas and Islamic jihad guys. Yeah, Islamic jihad guys. But the kind of, there's a sense that there's no norms anymore, you know.

I mean, busting in a hospital and assassinating people is like, even if they are on your, like, Hamas list is just, you know, people say, and I hear this, you know, from Israelis sometimes, well, you guys didn't, you know, when you fire bombed Dresden, like, you know, you didn't think twice about what you needed to do. And it's like, well, yeah, but after World War II, everybody got together and was like, this is why there need to be some rules, you know. And that, to me, is like there's a sense of a breakdown of any rules or constraints or norms. There's zero interest in the optics of any of these operations anywhere. A couple more quick thing. So a couple weeks ago, I interviewed ONA Hathaway, the director of the Center for Global Legal Challenges at Yale Law School.

We talked about the case before the International Court of Justice accusing Israel of genocide. That was a really helpful interview and primer, if you want to go deeper on this issue. But then last Friday, the ICJ issued a ruling that ordered Israel to do all it can to prevent death, destruction, and acts of genocide in Gaza. But it stopped short of ordering Israel to end its military offensive. the response to the ruling was a bit confusing. Both sides seemed to be claiming victory in a sense. So we check back in with ONA to get her reaction and try to understand what it all means. The very fact of this decision itself has an impact.

And I expect it will have an impact in that, first of all, it makes clear that the claims that had been made by South Africa are not completely off the wall. That a court has looked at this carefully. that pronouncement of the fact that 15 judges on the court out of 17 found that there is a plausible case, that there's a violation of the genocide convention, activates the obligations of every state that's partyed to the genocide convention. Because the genocide convention requires that every state that is party to the convention, not aid and assist genocide. And also that they take active measures to prevent genocide. So it should be causing substantial conversations in the states that are providing assistance, Israel and its military.

So very interesting. I mean, basically it says the allegation that Israel violated the genocide convention are plausible, but it will take years to rule if it actually took place. But in the meantime, it could create real legal risk for the U.S. if we continue to provide Israel with military assistance that's used in Gaza. And Ona also makes the point that if the U.S. disregards what the ICJ says in this instance, it really undercuts our arguments at other international forum about Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Yeah, I think what this underscores is, you know, just how much this is a more long-term issue that's going to play out. You know, there's a lot of drama and question about whether they would call for a ceasefire. First of all, even if they did that, there's no enforcement mechanism to go with it. I think what this indicates is that there are going to be years of varieties of cases being brought,

not just under the genocide convention, but under other war crimes. And the U.S. is potentially going to get drawn into those as a supplier of arms to Israel. Yeah. So last gossip, Ben, so over the weekend, officials from the U.S. Israel, Qatar and Egypt met in Paris to try to hammer out a ceasefire proposal. On Tuesday, a top official from Hamas said they were reviewing this proposal. for a six-week ceasefire. That would allow for a phase prisoner withdrawal, starting with older hostages and then women and children. The plan still needs to be relayed to Hamas' military leadership in Gaza, who are likely, I don't know, in some tunnel, like 100 feet under the ground.

So it could take a while to hear back from them, but, you know, fingers crossed that the two sides can come to an agreement on a ceasefire agreement and a hostage release deal, as the death toll now exceeds 26,000 people. These peace talks were not helped when a recording of Netanyahu criticizing Qatar's leadership leaked to the press. Axios also reported that officials from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority had a secret meeting in Riyadh nearly two weeks ago to coordinate on a plan for Gaza's reconstruction, which I think is probably positive. But another Axios report said that 12 Israeli ministers, including members of Netanyahu's Lakud Party, participated in a conference about rebuilding settlements. in Gaza and displacing Palestinians so clearly Israel and the rest of the world are very far apart on the question of what Gaza looks like after the war. Former Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, had a surprising take on calls for a ceasefire in Gaza that are happening in the U.S.

Here's a clip from an interview she did on CNN over the weekend. For them to call for a ceasefire is Mr. Putin's message. Mr. Putin's message. Make no mistake. This is directly connected to what he was. would like to see. Same thing with Ukraine. It's about Putin's message. I think some of these, some of these protesters are spontaneous and organic and sincere. Some I think are connected to Russia. And I say that, having looked at this for a long time now, as you know, it's not.

You think some of these protests are Russian plants? I don't think they're plants. I think some financing should be investigated. So I guess I would not be surprised, Ben, if Russia is like fanning the flames here, like promoting the Genocide Joe hashtag on social media, right? I think the idea that Putin wants us to get to a ceasefire, I don't know. I don't know that that's right. Like he may very well want us bogged down in Gaza along with Israelis for a long time. But I do think most importantly, it's not a great idea to suggest that I think very sincere concerns about a horrific war in Gaza, the death toll are some sort of Russian disinformation play, even if the Russians are like, you know, promoting.

these hashtags or whatever. I don't know. We'll find out someday. Like, come on. Yeah, again, like, I'm sure that the Russians, every time there's something that's divisive in American society, every time they can draw wedges in the Democratic coalition or whatever, sure, they did turbocharge their kind of like online information campaigns.

Probably attacking Travis Kelsey and Taylor Swift. But that's my point. That does not mean that they're responsible for the protest or the political views of people that are upset about what's happening in Gaza. And, like, there's two major problems that. Like, one is when everything becomes about, like, Russia and Putin, it kind of undermines the stuff that really is concerning that they do, you know? Like, I still believe that they, you know, met a lot in 2016. I think they'll probably do it this time around. And, like, it may reach a level that is really concerning. But when everything becomes about, like,

a Putin's the hand behind that and this and that, like, it kind of is a cried wolf piece of it. But then more profoundly, it connects to what I was saying. saying earlier about Unra is that there's this kind of an ability to see, you know, I remember Tommy, like I used to, with the Jewish community actually, I had like, you know, I often had to engage an outreach of the Jewish community and somebody who helped us with that effort, you know, once had a good formulation to me because he said, you know, everybody in Washington tends to think about APEC, but I think about our door knockers, right? And by door knockers, right? And by door knockers, he means the people that got out and organized and knocked on doors, who were super

left wing on a bunch of stuff or who were, you know, not even left wing, just being progressive, yeah. Progressive, cared about the Palestinians. And the fact that, that Speaker Pelosi and President Biden, they're just not seeing these door knockers. And that, that's politics as much as, you know, APEC and the person who calls you in and, you know, and I just, I'm almost astonished by the inability of the Democratic Party's leadership to realize that this is a big political problem. Yeah, I'm sure it's annoying when she has like Code Pink going to her house in San Francisco and screaming at her. Like, I would not like that easier. You know, you react on the human level sometimes. But I think that the motivations behind people who want the war to end are

profound and sincere and should be listened to and we'd all be better off. Okay, we're going to take a quick break. But two quick things. First, if you want help finding volunteer opportunities near you, go to vote saveamerica.com. help you find causes you care about, high impact ways to get involved in so much more. Again, vote saveamerica.com. Also, you're going to like this, Ben. If you want to deep dive into the most recent exit polls, how they work, everything else, check out Polarcoaster by Dan Pfeiffer. It's available for members of Crooked's friends of the pod community. You can join by going to crooked.com slash friends. You will also get access to ad-free listening,

exclusive Pod Save the World Q&As that we do twice a month and much, much more. So cricket.com slash friends. All right, we got lots of NATO news. Last week, Turkey's parliament voted to allow Sweden to join NATO, something that Erdogan said he agreed to last year, and that leaves Hungary as the last holdout for Sweden's bid. Finland joined NATO last year, putting the NATO alliance right on Russia's doorstep, which is exactly what Putin has been afraid of all these years and reportedly didn't want, which

is why a lot of people think he invaded Ukraine, so a big self-owned there. The U.S. has been a big supporter of Sweden's bid, and now the Turkey's parliament voted in favor, the State Department announced a $23 billion sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, which is a major part of the negotiations with Turkey that dragged out for a while were over these fighter jets. Remember, the U.S. got very pissed off. When was that a year or two ago, when the Turks agreed to buy Russian air defense systems, it's a big dust up. Anyway, this comes as NATO countries are getting increasingly vocal about fears that Russia's invasion will not stop at Ukraine and will go to a NATO country.

You got military leaders in the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, all voicing concerns about Russian aggression. And there was a military commander in Estonia who said it's not a question of if but when Russia will try to invade them. Obviously, this is all tied up with Ukraine's future. The Washington Post reported that U.S. officials are pivoting to a new strategy for Ukraine, one that focuses on fending off Russian advances, strengthening Ukraine's military for the long term, but not retaking territory. so no counter surge like we saw last summer. The Post says the administration hopes to release a 10-year plan this spring, but obviously that's dependent on Congress passing Biden's supplemental funding request for Ukraine.

And then obviously there's the U.S. election. Here's a recent clip of Donald Trump talking about NATO at a rally in Las Vegas. Ukraine's an interesting case. People always want to know my feeling. Number one, we're in for 200 billion plus. and the European nations are in for 20 billion, and it's more important for them, and don't you think they should equalize?

Nobody asks them, it's like I did with NATO. I said, we're spending, we're paying for NATO, and we don't get so much out of it. And, you know, I hate to tell you this about NATO. If we haven't needed their help, let's say we were attacked, I don't believe they'd be there. I don't believe. I know the people.

I know them. I can tell you country by country who would be there but I don't believe that be there. For the record, literally the opposite of what he just said is true. NATO has invoked Article 5, its collective defense principle only once in its history, and that was after the September

11th attacks on behalf of the United States. But that never stops Trump from repeating the same bullshit, the same, you know, whining about NATO spending. He's right about some of it, but he's very annoying. Ben, how do you think you're feeling about the future of NATO at this moment in time? Look, a few things. the turkey thing is interesting

because there's such a predictable cycle to this it's happened like 15 times there to everyone now where like there's some NATO decision has to be made and Erdogan says I'm not sure I want to do that and maybe I'm going to buy something from Russia and the blob

like freaks out like oh my God like you know when all it is is a normal like you know shakedown that Erdogan needs like he wants some F-16 and so it's the same pattern I think what is more interesting here is like Orban's, like, you know, growing willingness to just be a... Because he's not even like Erdogan.

He's not trying to, like, shake you down for something. He's just trying to show what a right-wing asshole he is, you know? And that's going to be a problem. You know, like the skunk at the Garden Party. I think on this Russian invasion fears, look, I mean, the Estonians, you know, we dealt with this in the Obama years. Some of the Baltic countries, and all three of them, Estonia, Lafay, Lithuania, you know, they have these Russian-speaking populations that, you know, what they've feared is a version of what started in eastern Ukraine, which is suddenly there's, quote-unquote, you know, separatists,

and I'm doing air quotes for the podcast listeners, which are essentially the Russians kind of starting some, like, seeming, like, popular movement to, and then they have to come in and protect them. And, you know, and so, look, but what all this comes down to me is the U.S. election. I mean, if Joe Biden is reelected, NATO is remain strong. And I actually don't think that the scenarios of the Baltics being invaded are, you know, particularly likely. And I think that Ukraine, though, needs to figure out, like, what is diplomacy or what, what, what is, where is a war going that you're not going to be able to take back a lot of territory? And that's like a looming question that I think we can get into in the coming weeks. But if Trump, what, what, what, what is, where is the war going?

wins, like, I mean, listen to that guy. Like, that guy is, doesn't have any commitment to NATO. He'll either pull out of NATO or he'll kind of de facto not give a shit. He's certainly not, you know, they've already killed Joe Biden funding Ukraine. I don't think Donald Trump's going to be funding Ukraine. And so there, I do think the scenarios get worse in terms of like the Russians feeling emboldened in Ukraine, maybe the Russians feeling, I'm not when these guys is like, they're going to march into, you know, Europe writ large, but like, they might these start kind of fucking around on the borders of the Baltics? Yeah. So it's understandable that these European countries are thinking about that now because, you know,

spoiler, like most of them think Trump's going to win, you know? And so they're like thinking, okay, what do we need to do here? Yeah. And I remember an episode a few months back, we walked through just how weak a lot of these European militaries are. The Germans, the British, I mean, they're just a shell of what they want to work. There's not a lot of infrastructure. So I bet they are concerned. Sticking with our presumptive Republican nominee, Ben, so the Washington Post reported that Trump is considering various ways to launch a massive new trade war with China if he gets elected. Trump has said publicly that he's considering revoking China's most favored nation status, which could lead to tariffs on Chinese imports of more than 40%.

But the post says privately, he has floated the idea of a flat 60% tariff on all Chinese imports and is considering a universal baseline tariff on basically all imported goods. China accounts for nearly 12% of total U.S. trade. They're just after Canada and Mexico. What's frustrating about all this, Ben, is we know that U.S. consumers and U.S. businesses are the ones who had to pay more because of Trump's tariffs, but it still helped him politically. So Trump starts his trade war with China in 2018, farm sales to China collapse. So what does he do? He has the government, the USDA, write big checks to farmers. And I was out in Iowa. I heard him bragging about this. He gets credit for being tough on China and he gets credit for taking care of the farmers. It's like unbelievably frustrating.

So Biden has kept a lot of Trump's tariffs on China. They've also taken a number of steps to limit China's access to sensitive technologies like semiconductors. But this protectionism from Trump and his claim that he's actually tough on China and the political salience of that argument is likely to be a big focus of the campaign. Ben, what do you think the impact of a 60% across-the-board tariff on Chinese imports would be? and do you have thoughts on how we run against this nativist populist rhetoric that plays pretty goddamn well in Iowa, from my experience? I mean, first of all, on the negative side, a 60% tariff, it's just a tax on Americans. I mean, it's just that tariff will immediately get passed over into the prices that you're paying. So it's like an inflation turbocharger.

And so I think there does need to be an effort to, and by the way, like, the American populist movement, not to nerd out, but it's because I've been reading about it, like, was founded in part because farmers understood that terrorists were taxes on them and drove the prices up. So I just, I think there has to be an ability to say that this is the dumb, wrong approach and we'll hurt people. I think that the Biden people who've been, you know, quite hard-ass on China have a story to tell that, yeah, not only have they kept some of these terrorists, but like they've tried to marry their domestic agenda, right, all these investments in infrastructure and clean energy and semiconductors and chips, with their China policy, which has been restricting the inputs of technology and investment into the Chinese tech sector and the Chinese semiconductor and AI industries. And the story is basically like we are standing up for and protecting not only America's competitive edge against China, but also our capacity literally to kind of create jobs and advanced manufacturing for the future.

it's a it's a it's a as democratic narratives are it's a slightly more complicated one than six percent tariffs but i think that they have to not assume that people you know i'd really try to tell that story over the course of the year i do want to just quick the quick detour because like you know been pretty hard on the biden people the last few weeks like you the six percent tariff thing just begins and the nato thing like the trump presidency you know first of all total blank check to the far right israeli government you know oh my god yes like all bets off over there. Like, yeah, like some crazy China policy that makes no sense and that could lead God knows where. The fucking North Koreans could decide to make their move on South Korea. And we've

seen a bunch of reports to that effect. Putin could just start fucking around beyond Ukraine. I mean, this is real people, you know. And so I do think we have to realize that as, you know, things look kind of chaotic now. Like, it's not hard to see the pieces of craziness that could accompany another Trump term. Yeah, the world is chaotic no matter who's in charge, but leadership matters and Trump would be a lot worse in this scenario, in my opinion. We should also just note that things are pretty rocky for the Chinese economy right now. So there's Evergrand, which is a massive property developer in China. They were forced to liquidate after they couldn't restructure their $300 billion in debt. In 2018, Ever Grant was listed as the most valuable real estate company

in the world. So a pretty terrible turn of events there. Last year, China recorded its slowest GDP growth in decades in foreign direct investment dropped by 8%. So China still has an $18 trillion economy that accounts for about 18% of global GDP, but it is slowing down, which will have ramifications in China, but also globally. So it's just something to watch long term there. We're going a little long. So a couple stories just to track, Ben. The Washington Post reported that the Pentagon abruptly canceled plans to hold joint military exercises with Sudan, Niger and Mali and several other African countries. They had disclosed his plane to Congress.

Then I guess decided you shouldn't do. joint military plannings with military coup leaders? Not the best. Is that what happens? Not the best roster there that you want to be engaged with right now. Tough roster. Also, some bad news out of Kenya were a court blocked a plan to deploy 1,000 Kenyan police officers to Haiti who would have provided the backbone of a multinational peacekeeping force

that is backed by the United Nations. We've covered this a bunch on the show. About three years ago, the president of Haiti was assassinated since that incident. A very bad situation, security situation, has gotten. steadily worse, and millions of people are struggling to avoid gangs, kidnappers, and levels of violence that are, frankly, normally only found in war zones. The Kenyan government is appealing the ruling. The U.S. says they will pledge $200 million to support this peacekeeping effort, but I don't know, hopefully something changes, and this is overturned because it does

seem like Haiti desperately need some help here. They need some help, and Kenya made a lot of sense for a lot of reasons, you know, that we talked about. I will just say this China story is like every now and then you actually go deep on these things and you're like fuck man like this feels kind of 2008ish you know but it doesn't like collapse but this is 25% of the Chinese economy and there's clearly just not the money there to make this hole you know and so it feels to me like at some point the Chinese governments can have to get involved in a big way in like a kind of tarp bailout kind of way or else or else maybe this will be a bubble that bursts and believe me that will affect the U.S. economy a lot too.

And the other thing that struck me, and there are all these Chinese people that, like, literally paid for apartments that, like, aren't getting built because they have no money to build them. Yeah, so it added to, like, the sense that there's got to be some societal, you know, pressures in China that we can't really see

because it's not like they can go out and criticize, but, like, if there's, like, millions of people, like, imagine if you bought your first apartment and then basically it's a Ponzi scheme and you can't get it and can't get your money back, like, I got to, I'd kind of watch that space. I know there could be an Arab Spring like situation where like something random happens, right?

In Tunisia, it was like a vendor lit himself on fire and it sparked this massive upheaval. And then six months later, everyone's like, how did the intelligence community miss that? I mean, you could imagine like similar levels of outrage and frustration about the economy, about, you know, totalitarian rule in China. I guess the difference is what happens when you marry that sentiment and anger among a population with total, pervasive surveillance and a government that cracks down brutally. Yeah, but to your point, like, to people who might dismiss that, remember, that happened on zero COVID and the government changed the policy. That's true.

That's really important. Yeah. They must have been seen something we weren't because of that surveillance. And they literally did a 180. So I think you're right. I don't know, man. This feels like something to watch. That was a remarkable kind of under-discussed moment.

She-Jing-J-J-J-J-Bin, which you can do when you're- when you're Shijim-Bing. Last thing, just to watch. So pissed off farmers in France have laid siege to Paris on Monday. French farmers, they blocked roads all around Paris in an effort to choke off access to the city. Some of them are burning bales of hay and tires and shit in the road. They're parking their tractors to block traffic. These guys are pissed about cost of living increases.

They're pissed about regulations to fight climate change. They're pissed about cuts to subsidies for diesel fuel. We've seen similar protests in Belgium, Germany, Poland, Romania, and the Netherlands. I have no idea what to say about it or what's going to happen. But, man, I mean, Macron, it's got a tough challenge here. He's got the Olympics coming up this summer. So good luck, man. I was chuckling just because, Tommy, like, one of the good things, apart from seeing you every week,

about doing a podcast for, like, a few years, is, like, it's funny. The stories that just keep coming up, right? So we always say some crazy Australian thing, like some naked people taking psychedelics, like, animals. But I feel like we've done a version of, like, French people, like burning shit. Bernie all down. And so I just, I got to say, I love that part of the French political culture. It's just like, because it's been going on forever since the French Revolution, right?

But like the serious point is that like I think we've gotten enough signals from the European electorate that they're pissed. They're pissed about a lot of things and particularly cost of living. And so that's the main headline to me is just like this kind of populist discontent is clearly manifest. Oh, you know Marine Le Pen is going to be on a. tractor outside Paris burning a Macron and effigy somewhere like leading this thing in a couple days. You had something to watch. Also, if you're a listener and you know a pissed off French farmer who can speak to us in English, reach out. I'd love to interview. I'd love to know what's going on. Okay, we're going to take a quick break when you come back. You'll hear my interview with Ali Vez

about what's going on in Iran. Biden's options to respond to these proxy groups, what we know about them, what motivates them, how one can deter Iran, if at all. So stick around for that. I am so excited to welcome to the show. Ali Vez, he is the Crisis Group's Iran Project Director and Senior Advisor to the President of the Organization. Ali, thank you so much for doing the show. Great pleasure to be with you. So as we speak, the Biden administration is preparing to respond to this drone attack over the weekend on a U.S. base in Jordan that killed three U.S. service members. The White House says that the attack was conducted by an Iranian-backed militia group.

Before we get into that and what the response options might or might not be, I wanted to just step back and try to understand who are these groups that we're talking about and just understand where they operate, who they are, are they controlled by Iran, or do they just get some support from Iran? So can you sort of like walk us through some of the groups we're talking about whether it's H, the Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas, like whatever you think is sort of relevant here? Sure. So this is a network that Iran calls the access of resistance. It spans all the way from Yemen to Iraq to Syria, to Lebanon, and to Palestine. It's comprised of groups that are often Shia militia groups, like Hezbollah and Lebanon, Iraqi militias or Syria militias, as well as the Houthis in Yemen, who are also an offshoot of Shiism. But it also includes Sunni groups like. the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas.

It came about in the early 1980s when Iran was in the midst of war with Iraq and felt pretty isolated. And the trauma of that war pushed Iran to try to figure out a way of protecting itself better with all the shortages that it was feeling. Even today, if you look at Iran's situation, it's one of the biggest countries in the most populous countries in that part of the world. But from a conventional military perspective is weaker than a lot of other adversaries and states around it. The UAE, which is the size of a province of Iran, small province of Iran, has one of the most advanced air forces in the region that can take out Iranian Air Force in a matter of hours. Air Force dates back from the time of the Shah is basically a flying museum. And Iran is not a member of any military alliance. It doesn't have a security guarantor. It's not like Turkey, a member of NATO. It's not like Saudi Arabia can count on U.S. support.

And so it has tried to make up for this shortcoming by hiring partners and proxies that can deter an attack on Iranian soil that it believes that it believes that. it cannot protect properly. This is the concept of strategic depth, which the Iranians are pursuing here. And Tommy, they believe that it has worked for them. They believe that the reason Israel or the United States have not attacked their nuclear program in all these years of being in a nuclear standoff is not because they were afraid of Iran, but it is because they were afraid of hundreds of thousands of Hezbollah missiles targeting civilian population centers in Israel.

And I remember very well once the senior Israeli official told me, you know, for us, Iran is a thousand kilometers away. For Iran, Israel is 10 meters away from across the Lebanese border. So that's a concept that they believe has been pretty effective. Now, in order to put this network together, they picked up the Palestinian cause, which was left on the ground by the Arabs in the 1980s. After years of fighting with Israel, the Arabs had failed to advance that agenda and had left the cause on the ground. And for Iran was a real opportunity because Iran is a sweet, generous nation. And so by definition, there is a heart sealing to its ability to project power in the region as a Persian nation among Arabs and Turks or as a Shia nation among Sunnis. But the Palestinian cause allowed it to transcend all of those limitations.

And that's why there is an ideological facade here. But in practice, it is really a mechanism to try to deter and attack on Iranian soil. Do we know which one of these groups the U.S. thinks is responsible for this drone attack in Jordan and how much support Iran has or has not given them? We don't know for sure because the statement that came out taking responsibility for the attack was from an umbrella group known as the Islamic Resistance, which is comprising some of the Iraqi and Shia militia groups. I've seen speculation that this might have been Katayyip Hezbollah or Nojaba.

Both of them are very close with Iran. But one has to understand that Iran doesn't have the same relationship with groups within this network. They really fall on a spectrum. And at the one end of this spectrum, you have Hezbollah, whose relationship with Iran is akin to two NATO allies. They are really, there's absolute trust between them. There is a high degree of coordination or even delegation of responsibilities. And at the other end of the spectrum, you have the Houthis in Yemen. They are fiercely independent and they actually have a long track record of ignoring Iranian advice.

And then there are different groups that fall in between these two, different shades of gray. And both the Qatayib and Hujaba, who were probably responsible for this attack, are among the groups that are closer to Iran and coordinate quite closely with the revolutionary guards. So, you know, the big buzzword you're hearing right now is deterrence. You even hear some progressive, some liberals saying, you know, the U.S. has to restore deterrence with Iran. and the conventional wisdom in Washington seems to be that the only way you can deter Iran is through military force. Do you agree with that conventional wisdom? And if not, how do you think the U.S. or some coalition can convince Iran that it's not in their interest to support these groups that are targeting U.S. forces or commercial vessels in the Red Sea?

Well, Tommy, I think deterrence is one of the most overused words in Washington, D.C., to the extent that it has lost its meaning, really. I would argue that we've never had deterrence against Iran. When have we successfully managed to deter Iran from pursuing activities that we consider destabilizing or problematic? You know, when we had 150,000 troops on both sides of Iran's borders in Iraq and Syria, and we had proven to the Iranians that were willing to take risks,

we had just toppled their regime in Afghanistan and the regime in Iraq, the Iranians were quickly expanding their nuclear program and they were sending IEDs to Iraq to kill Americans. When the Trump administration killed General Soleimani in Baghdad in January of 2020, we were told that deterrence was restored. Two months later, there was an attack in Iraqi Kurdistan that killed two Americans and a Brit. We've never had deterrence against Iran. And at best, what we have been able to do has been to degrade some of their capabilities. Yes, General Soleimani's successor is not as effective as he was, but the threat hasn't diminished.

It has just changed its form. The network is still there. The coordination among members of this network today is at a much more advanced level than it was before. in terms of their military equipment and capabilities. The network is now at its peak of power. They are taking much more brazen risks than was the case in the past. And so at best what the U.S. has done now through attacks that we've seen, the U.S. and the U.K. has undertaken in Yemen, for instance,

has been able to degrade some of the Houthi's capabilities. But as we have seen, it has not stopped the attacks that they're conducting on shipping in the Red Sea or in Babal Manda. We have also not seen the attacks on Iranian-backed militias in Syria or in Iraq to bring those attacks to an end. In fact, they have escalated. And now they have, after 165 attacks in which, thankfully, there were no American fatalities. now we have three American service members who have been killed. And so I don't think this is a policy that is working, and it has been tried and tested multiple times in a bipartisan fashion over many years.

But I just give you another data point to consider. Between March of 2023 and October 7th, there were no attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria. Zero. Why did that happen? Because Iran and the U.S. were engaged in a mutually beneficial diplomatic negotiations, aimed at reaching a de-escalatory understanding that actually worked and delivered the release of five American hostages and also some of Iran's frozen assets. So we know diplomacy works. Deterance does it. You know, yeah, I mean, I agree with you guys of time to worry that deterrence is just sort of a nice way of saying revenge. in a lot of these in a lot of contexts. But it's interesting, I mean, you just, I think convincingly outlined for us the way Iran uses these proxy forces as a security blanket as a way to protect themselves from military attack.

But we're also seeing a situation now where actions by proxy groups that they back may have led them closer to a direct U.S. military attack than ever before. How should we reconcile those two things? I mean, is it just both sides kind of making strategic mistakes here? Well, it's a perilous game because both sides constantly calculate and calibrate the actions that they're taking, but they are on an escalatory ladder and they're each climbing it in a consistent and continuous manner. And at certain point, obviously, they would get in a difficult situation. It was predictable and predicted that if the war in Gaza, which is the proximate cause of the tensions that we're seeing in the region, continues and gets dragged on, eventually we would end up in this situation.

Now, I think there are risks of miscalculation on both sides because both the leadership in Tehran and in Washington are aware of the fact that the other side doesn't want war. doesn't want a direct confrontation. They are able to manage proxy conflict, but they don't want to end up in a direct war between Iran and the United States. And by the way, the last time we were in a direct military confrontation, it was in 1988. So it's been a long time since then,

and in that episode in an operation called Prane Mantis, the U.S. destroyed half of Iran's Navy in half a day. and destroyed some oil facilities offshore in Iran. So even that wasn't an attack on Iranian soil, which is what now some members of Congress are asking for. But, you know, one can easily draw, I think, mistaken conclusions from some of the previous experiences. Of course, after the Operation Praying Mantis,

Iran did not escalate, did not even respond. But that was when Iran was, was exhausted after eight years of war against Iraq. It did not have the capabilities it has today. It has the biggest and most sophisticated arsenal of ballistic missiles in the region. It did not have the network that it has today in terms of partners and proxies around the region. At the time, it only had Hezbollah. And Hezbollah was also in its infancy.

It didn't have drones and other cyber capabilities that it has today. So the stakes are very different right now. There are also people who draw lessons from what we experienced after killing Soleimani. You remember there was a barrage of ballistic missiles fired into U.S. bases in Iraq. And again, thankfully, and miraculously, no one was killed. No American was killed. Trump said there were only a few people who had headaches. There were more than 100 traumatic brain injuries.

Exactly. TBIs. But overall, that conflict also didn't escalate and it was contained. But in 2020, there was a very different government in place in Iran. There were people who were much more pragmatic, understood the world much better than the current decision makers. One thing that worries me is in the past few weeks in the fog of war and rising tensions, one of the things that Iran did, that even for me who's a nerd who's monitoring everything they've done for years and years was really shocking, was that they fired rockets and drones into Pakistan in nuclear weapon state. It was really shocking. And that tells me that they too are prone to miscalculations.

And I think this perception that Niderside really has the appetites for war in and of itself can give rise to mistakes and miscalculations. So back to sort of this attack in Jordan. So Biden said several times now, we shall respond. Now, the range of options seems to be sanctions, some sort of massive military response just on one of these militia groups. The next ratchet up would be strikes on IRGC targets in Iraq, Syria, or Yemen. and then the most extreme option would be including some sort of target within Iran itself.

Hopefully they don't get to that. I have to expect that unlike 1982, Iran will respond to the response, right? And there will be some incident, whether it's on U.S. forces in the region, whether it's on U.S. ships, the U.S. homeland, or maybe you could imagine Hezbollah launching some massive attack on Israel. what do you think that the response to a U.S. response could look like? Like, what is the bomb Iran crowd going to get sent back our way if we really go all in on a major attack on Iran? Well, Tommy, I think it's important to remember that every time that there's been a confrontation, the Iranians have responded. You know, with the exception of that experience in the 1980s, in recent years, they've always responded. So I give you an example. When the Trump administration imposed maximum pressure,

the Iranians started targeting shipping in the Persian Gulf and targeted ports in the port of Fajira in the UAE. They targeted oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. They shot down a U.S. drone. Of course, when the U.S. killed Soleimani, they counter-striped through firing ballistic. missiles. So every time there has been an Iranian response. And this time around, if the U.S. targets Iranian assets and not just Iranian-backed militias, there will be an Iranian response. My guess is that it would be quite similar to the summer of 2019, that they might fire, rockets, drones, or even mine the Persian Gulf to target shipping. This time, I don't think they would target the Arab Gulf states because they have much better relations with them now.

But that's the kind of counterstrike that I expect from the Iranians. It has the dual utility of not just demonstrating that they're responding to the U.S., but also So just like what the Houthis have done in the Red Sea, put pressure on the international economy. It would certainly jack up oil prices, hurting the president in an election year and so on. But there will certainly be an Iranian response. And then if there is a retaliation from the U.S., then we are continuing to climb up this escalatory ladder with the risk that at certain point it can spiral out of control. And, you know, although response, I think, is justified, I think we should be honest in the fact that this is not a solution.

There is no military solution to this crisis because eventually neither side can really afford to back off. We're in a game of chicken and neither side can afford to blink first. And the irony of it is that it is actually lose-lose for both sides. You know, the U.S. and Israel are not getting what they wanted. Hamas is not destroyed. U.S. intelligence is saying after four months of bombing them, only 20% of their forces have been killed at the cost of 30,000, almost 30,000 civilians. And of course, Hamas is still holding upwards of 100 hostages. They haven't been released. And the U.S. wanted to prevent the expansion of this conflict, but we're already in a regional war. It's still at a low simmer, but after the U.S. takes action against Iran, it would definitely be in choppier waters. And then, you know, from the Iranian perspective, too, there are two key objectives. End the war in Gaza. Hasn't happened. Israel continues its onslaught. And getting the U.S., evicting the U.S.

out of the region, hasn't happened either. And in fact, The U.S. now has a bigger military footprint in the region than it did prior to October 7. So both sides are losing. And unless they, instead of addressing the symptoms of what's happening, address the proximate cause of it, which is the war in Gaza, this situation will only go from bad to worse. Yeah, agreed. Last question for you. I mean, nowhere in the debate over Biden's options is diplomacy mentioned. Not even in our conversation.

have really talked about a diplomatic offshoot for this for this current conflict. Once upon a time, a few years ago, diplomacy was front and center. There was the JCPOA, the Iran nuclear agreement that was negotiated by Obama. Trump pulled out of the JCPOA in 2018. Looking back, what do you think the impact of that decision was in terms of not just the U.S.-Iran relationship, but how it might have impacted internal Iranian politics? Well, I think it's one of the most desire. disastrous strategic mistakes that the U.S. has committed in the Middle East in years. It rendered Iran much more aggressive in the region, much more repressive at home. And it basically killed any trust in the reliability of the United States as a negotiating partner,

not just in the case of Iranians, but in the future, you know, if there are any negotiations, but other difficult actors like North Koreans or Venezuelans or Russians, you know, we're going to face similar questions, what's going to happen in the next administration. And I'm sorry to say, but I think the Biden administration actually made matters worse. I referred to the fact that we had a detainee deal in September, as part of which six billion of Iranian assets in South Korea were released for human trade, which, as you know, is exempt from U.S. sanctions. So Iranians should have had access to that money all along.

But we basically put in a mechanism where the Treasury Department can monitor and veto every single request that the Iranians have to use this money through the Qataris to buy food and medicine and medical equipment. And yet, when October 7th happened, the Biden administration, pulled the plug on that understanding. Not officially, but it has asked the Gattari's not to give access to the Iranians. Now, this is not the Trump administration cheating on Obama's deal. This is the Biden administration cheating on its own deal, which had nothing to do with

Gaza or Hamas or anything else. It was a humanitarian deal. And I think that is going to have long-term negative consequences for the United States' ability to deal with adversaries. And another impact that it has is that it has now brought Iran, the withdrawal from the JCPOA, has basically taken Iran's nuclear program that was put in a box and under the most rigorous monitoring out there by the Obama administration. the Trump administration put it in a microwave, and Iran is now closer than ever to the verge of nuclear weapons. It can now have, in a matter of days, enough enriched uranium for a single nuclear weapon that it can then use to weaponize. In a month, it can have an arsenal worth of nuclear material for enriched the weapons grade.

And what I'm particularly worried about in the current situation of regional tensions is that if the U.S. strikes Iran on its soil, which is what the Republicans who are also advocates of exiting the JCPOA are asking for, in that situation, Tommy, we will come, Iranians, I think, will come to the conclusion that the regional deterrence hasn't worked because the U.S. has struck them on their own soil. And they will then try to replace the regional deterrence or to complement it with nuclear deterrence, which is the ultimate deterrent. Now, they weren't able to do this when they were in the JCPOA. It would take them one year to enrich enough uranium for a single nuclear weapon. They can now do it in days. And that's the achievement of Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA. Yeah, it's truly, truly disastrous. I lied.

actual final question. The Houthis say they are attacking ships because they want the war in Gaza to end. Do you think that these Iranian proxy groups will actually stop all these attacks if there is a serious fire or a permanent end to the war? Should we believe them? Or do you worry that, you know, the Houthis have realized they have this incredible tool in their arsenal now where they can basically shut down global commerce anytime they want and they might trot it out again in the future for another reason? Well, let me put it this way. There is no guarantee that they will not use this tool in the future, but there is a guarantee that they will continue to use it as long as the war in Gaza is ongoing. And we had this experiment in the one week-long ceasefire that most of these attacks by groups affiliated with Axis of Resistance came to a halt during that ceasefire. But again, it's not really a question of what they will do, but it's a question of whether the status quo is actually bringing, making Israel safer or bringing the U.S. closer to its strategic objectives. And I think the answer to both of those questions is now.

Yeah, agreed. Well, Ali, thank you so much for doing the show. I really appreciate you joining us and for all the smart and thoughtful ways you're trying to advance diplomacy all around the. world. So thank you. Thank you. Great being with you. Thanks again to Ali for joining the show. Bon chance to the French farmers. Thanks to Taitay and the Kelsey family. Yeah, you know. I really want to see Detroit. Yeah. That like, like, I, like, no offense to the Niners. No, but it's just like Detroit would have been like so good for that fan base. Goofy ass, Dan Campbell crying up there. Yeah, yeah. There's some weird Dan Campbell calls, though,

like, you know, I know, sometimes he goes for and fourth down, sometimes, sometimes, you he doesn't, but anyway, it's too bad. Tough, tough. Anyway, talk to you guys next week. If you want to get ad-free episodes, exclusive content, and more, consider joining our Friends of the Pod subscription community at crooked.com slash friends.

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