Prof G Markets - Why the U.S. is on the Precipice of a Recession — ft. Mark Zandi

Episode Date: August 29, 2025

Ed Elson is joined by Mark Zandi, Chief Economist of Moody's Analytics, who returns to the show to discuss his U.S. outlook and how he thinks the economy is actually doing. He shares his insights on what is causing heightened recession risk, how tariffs will impact inflation, and a potential September rate cut. Plus, he gives his main concerns for America right now and shares what he thinks might trigger a bond market meltdown.  Subscribe to the Prof G Markets newsletter  Order "The Algebra of Wealth" out now Subscribe to No Mercy / No Malice Follow Prof G Markets on Instagram Follow Scott on Instagram Follow Ed on Instagram and X Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Support for the show comes from public.com. The investing platform that lets you access industry leading yields, including a 4.1% APY. You can earn on your cash with no fees or minimum. Go to public.com slash prop G to fund your account in five minutes. That's public.com slash prop G. paid for by public investing. All investing involves the risk of loss, including loss of principle. Brokered services for U.S. listed registered securities, options, and bonds in a self-directed account are offered by Public Investing Inc. member FINRA, SIPC, complete disclosures available at public.com slash disclosures. When you're with Annex Platinum, you get access to exclusive dining experiences and an annual travel credit. So the best tapas in town might be in a new town altogether. That's the powerful backing. of Amex.

Terms and conditions apply. Learn more at amex.ca.ca slash yamex. Wendy's most important deal of the day has a fresh lineup. Pick any two breakfast items for $4. New four-piece French toast sticks, bacon or sausage wrap, biscuit or English muffin sandwiches, small hot coffee, and more. Limited time only at participating Wendy's taxes extra. Today's number, 100,000.

That is the average number of hairs on the human head. according to scientists, hair is important for regulating your body temperature and also perceiving sensations. Put another way, we now know why Scott Galloway is so cold and unfeeling. Listen to me. Markets are bigger than I. What you have here is a structure or change in the world distribution. Cash is trash. Stocks look pretty attractive.

Something's going to break. Forget about it. All right. Welcome to Profugee Markets. It is our final day of Scott Free August. We're going to be taking a break on Labor Day, but then we will be back to our regular scheduled programming. Until then, today we are speaking with our friend Mark Zandi,

who is the chief economist of Moody's Analytics. We're going to discuss a lot on this episode, including your outlook for America, which you recently published, Mark. We're very happy to have you on the show. Thank you for joining us. 100,000 hairs? 100,000. I may have 5,000 hairs.

I shaved all mine off. Well, it's good to have you on the show. Thank you. I want to jump right into it because we read your U.S. Outlook, which you published recently. There was a lot in there, a lot that I found very interesting and a lot that I found very concerning, to be honest. And I'm just going to start, I've collected a few quotes from your report. I'm going to start with the opening quote, which I think really says.

sums it up. You said, quote, this is actually how you opened the report. This is what you said, quote, the economy is on the precipice of a recession. While our baseline most likely outlook does not feature a downturn, the economy is struggling, and it wouldn't take much to push the economy over. Really getting right to the point there. Give us, give us the headline. I like that now that I hear it again. I like that's first line. Well done, Mark. But not very good news. Let's hear, let's hear your summary, and then we'll get into some of the more fine details, but your summary of that outlook. Yeah, I mean, the economy is struggling. You pick your statistic. GDP, that's the value of all the things we produce. That grew just over

1% in the first half of the year. That's pretty punk. It's consumer spending. If you add up all the spending done by everybody, after inflation, it's gone nowhere this year. In fact, is down a little bit from where it was at the end of last year. Construction spending is falling, and that's despite the boom and construction related to data centers. Everything else is falling. Manufacturing activity would be consistent with recession and manufacturing. And most importantly, obviously, is jobs. The job market has really kind of hit a wall. Job growth in the last few months has come to a standstill. Hiring is really, it's almost like we have a hiring freeze across the country. Layoffs are low and that's good and that's the kind of the firewall

between the struggling economy and a recession era when businesses aren't lying off, so no recession yet. But when the economy is struggling like this, when it's having a hard time growing, it's when it's vulnerable to anything that might go off script. And goodness knows, there's a lot of things could go off script. And yet, if you look at the stock market, if you would look at the NASDAQ or the S&P, we're at record highs. That's telling quite a different story now. Yeah, that's hard to square that circle. I mean, there's a couple things to keep in mind. One is the stock market is being driven to a significant degree by the stocks of a few tech companies, Magnificent 7, AI-driven. They run on their own dynamic. They're independent

of what's going on with regard to the business cycle. So, you know, you've got to abstract from that. Of course, the big, beautiful bill has some pretty significant tax cuts for businesses, corporations. So just by definition, the, that's going to lift stock prices after tax earnings are now going to be higher. It's also important to realize that, you know, a lot of the companies, the big companies that are publicly traded that certainly are in the S&P 500, which is the index

that most people look at, they get a lot. a lot of their revenues from overseas. It has nothing to do with the U.S. Right. So it's a broader measure of things. But having said that, and if you take out all those kind of caveats, I'd say the stock market is basically,

here it is, punk, flat. It's gone, it's not down. That would be consistent with recession, but it's, it's gone nowhere fast, and that's consistent with the economy that we're experiencing, one that's kind of going sideways here. So, you know, not great, but not bad. Now, I will say, I mentioned layoffs as being a firewall between

the punk economy and a recession. Another is the stock prices. If stock prices were to correct, if we did see, say, the S&P 500 down, so let's say 10%, and it stayed down for a month, two, or three, that would be one of those things that would push us into recession, because that's off script, and consumers, particularly high-end consumers, the well-to-do, are very focused on their stock portfolios. And if stocks go down and they feel less wealthy, many of them are older in retirement or close to retirement, they'll pull back on their spending. Consumer spending, instead of going flat here, will go down, and that's recession. Yeah, it's striking that, And you point this out in the report that basically all of the gains that we're seeing this year, because the S&P is up, we can't, you know, we can't dispute that. We're up 7%. Basically all of the gains are because of AI. I mean, that is essentially what is juicing the entire market right now. And we're seeing that both in the increases that we've seen this year, but also just the concentration. I mean, we discussed this on our episode last week, but the fact that Nvidia is at nearly 10% of,

of the entire S&P, that's a completely different story from all of those things that you have described. I mean, Nvidia has only so many employees at the company. Meanwhile, you've got nearly 400 million people living in America. Those are two very different stories. Yet, Nvidia and the tech stocks and the AI stocks, they have this massively outsized impact on the way we perceive how the economy is doing. And the extent to which we are dependent on the tech stocks and the AI stocks, I think that is the scary part of this, which is why I think your recession risk model is so important. I mean, last week, we saw this study out of MIT, which said that basically a lot of companies aren't seeing returns on their gen AI investments. And suddenly we saw the markets,

you know, not freak out, but certainly there was a wobble there, which emphasizes this point that you're also making, which is AI is the story here. But if we were to see something even worse if we would see a correction that really took that leg out of the stool when it comes to AI, then we're running into trouble. And I just want to read you your quote from the report here. You said, quote, our machine learning based leading recession indicator puts the probability of a downturn beginning in the next 12 months at 49%. Since 1960, the indicator has accurately predicted an ensuing recession whenever it has risen to more than 50%, and there have been no false positives when the indicator has breached the 50% threshold and a recession has not ensued.

So what you're basically describing is you have this model. Every time it's hit 50% or higher, recession has happened. We're at 49%. I'm not making that up. That's the result. And, you know, I don't want to overstate my confidence in, you know, models are good. They're useful, but, you know, there are all kinds of. problems issues with models. But it's pretty telling. And if we're not at 49% we're pretty

dark close, it feels like we're in a pretty precarious position. And I should say you can go look at all the tried and true kind of leading indicators of recession. And they're all kind of saying the same thing. You know, if you look at the, say, the conference board leading economic indicator, which has been around for decades, that's been falling consistently over the last couple, three years. In the past six months, it's fallen very sharply consistent with the recession. The yield curve is inverted. Consumer confidence is weak. One kind of esoteric leading indicator that I find useful is that if you go look at the Bureau of Labor Statistics jobs report for businesses, the employment survey, the payroll survey, there's 400 roughly

industries that BLS canvases when they construct the employment estimate. Every time the percent of those 400 industries that are reducing payrolls is more than 50%. So more than 50% of industries are reducing payrolls. We go into recession, and we're over 50%, or 53%. So it's almost like you pick any leading indicator you want. My machine learning recession indicators is a new indicator based on these new statistical techniques. If we go take a look at all the kind of tried and true ones that we've been using over the

years over the decades. They're all saying that roughly the same thing. They're saying this economy is really, I use the word precipice on the precipice of recession. My lazy response to that when I think about what is what is the cause of it, why are we in this position? My lazy, but I think probably accurate response is tariffs. I mean, if I were to think about what are the big shocks that we sort of sent into our economy in the past six, seven months, it's that we put up near 20% tariffs on everyone around the world. Is that it? Is that what's causing this? When you look at what's causing these issues and these heightened recession risk, what do you think is the cause? I think what else the economy

is pretty clear, it's policy, economic policy. You mentioned the tariffs and trade. That's kind of at the top of the list. The effective tariff right now is 10% up from two at the start of the year. It feels like it's headed to 15 to 20. You said 20, but some in that kind of directionally in that ballpark. That's where we're headed. And that's going to pass through. That's starting to pass through in the form of higher prices, higher inflation. And that's going to be very clear of what's happening over the next six, 12 months. And as that happens, it's going to undermine going back to the consumer, people's purchasing power and spending. And that's the fodder for a downturn. Of course, immigration policy, highly restrictive, is having an impact.

It's really done a number on the labor force. If you go back a year ago, the foreign-born labor force was growing four or five percent year over year. Now it's falling. This began last year when Biden put in the executive, had an executive order constraining or limiting asylum seekers coming into the country. And of course, President Trump has double-tripled down on that. But with no labor force growth, the labor force growing nowhere, that's putting real significant pressure on the economy as well.

Well, in sectors that really need immigrants, agriculture, construction, transportation, distribution, leisure hospitality, retailing, health care, elder care, child. All these industries really depend on those immigrants. And if you can't find those folks, we see disruptions in higher prices and weaker growth. And so that's also contributing. And obviously, the Doge cuts, the Department of Government Efficiency, those cuts have had an impact that will become even clear in coming months as many of those government work. who lost their jobs, got deferrals or severance packages, and as those things come to an end, they'll show up in the data as a job loss. And so it's the policy writ large. That's the issue. But I agree with you. I think tariffs are at the top of the list. You outlined this in the

report, and I have this other quote I want to read you here in regards to tariffs, quote, based on a counterfactual simulation of our global macroeconomic model, assuming that none of these economic policies had been implemented, U.S. real GDP would have been 1.1 percentage points higher by the end of 2025. Our baseline forecast with the policies in place puts real GDP growth at a meager 1.1% on a year-over-year basis. Without the policies, growth would have been 2.2%, which is consistent with its potential. So again, you put the policies in place, growth gets cut in half. get rid of the policies, you're back up to more than 2% GDP growth. Tell us what went into that.

I assume tariffs are a big piece of it, perhaps the immigration policy as well. Perhaps the Doge cuts, though, I'm sort of hesitant about that because I feel like Doge didn't really do that much in the end in terms of the overall economy. But what's going into that model there? Number one is the tariffs. You know, good rule of thumb is that for every percentage point increase in the effect of tariff rate, that reduces real GDP by seven, eight basis points in the subsequent year. So if we went from two, let's say to say we go to 15, let's just say 15, that's a 13 percentage point increase.

You do the arithmetic, that's a percentage point off of growth, GDP growth. That's the bulk of what's going on in that simulation. The effects of immigration also weigh, but those become much more significant as we move towards the latter part of 26 going into 27 and 28. And I don't know that I push back too hard on your comments about Doge. That's just more about jobs. It has had an impact. If you go look at, if you look across the country and look at which regions of the country

is struggling the most, at the top of the list of recessionary economies is the broad D.C. area. D.C., deep recession, around Maryland, Virginia, very, very slow economic growth. And that's consistent with the idea that the Doge is having an impact. And those job impacts will, they're already evident in the data. It's one reason why job growth has slowed quite sharply so far this year. But that'll become much clearer as all those severance and deferrals wind down and start showing up in the data. And that will be second half of this year going into next. Just in terms of inflation itself. So we're at, I think our last

reading was 2.7%, which isn't, I mean, it's not great. The Fed target is 2%. But it's not horrible. And of course, we just had this Jackson Hull speech from Jerome Powell. It appears that he's probably going to cut rates at the next meeting in September. At least, that's what traders are betting on. But you point out, and I think this is really important, and I'd like to hear again, what went into this, you point out that if we had not implemented these policies, these very inflationary policies that are tariffs, you say that we would be at 2% by Q2, 2026, and the prediction in your model is that at that point, we're going to be at 3.4% inflation. Right. And that, to me, I mean, we'll see. And as you say, we never know with these predictions, you never know with these

models. But to me, that that basically summarizes what I've been saying for the longest time, which is, of course, these tariffs are going to raise prices. And the reality is it's going to take a while. They're not going to suddenly flip and go to 3% overnight. It's going to take months and months and months. And your model is projecting out to Q2, 2026, 3.4%. So take us through those predictions as well. Yeah. I mean, there's been a lot of debate about how much of the tariffs will be passed through to consumers because some of it will be eaten by U.S. businesses in the form of lower profitability. They just won't pass it all the way through. They'll just lower their margin. And some of it will be borne by foreign producers. The poster child of that so far has been Japanese automakers. They have a 15% tariff, but they haven't passed that through yet. My sense is that by this time now, year, when inflation peaks, the bulk of the price increases will have been passed through, the two-thirds, three-quarters of the path would be passed through to consumers. It's just taking

a little bit of time, in part because the tariffs, the stated tariffs are all over the map. You know, they're up, they're down, they're all around. So if you're a foreign producers looking at that, you're concerned that if I raise prices now and the tariff goes away, then I'll be wrong-footed. I could lose market share, and I don't want to do that. So I'll just eat a little bit of this for a while, see where their tariffs kind of land. Once they settle down, I know where they are, then I'll pass through the tariff increases. And I think that's the kind of in the minds of most CEOs that are trading with the U.S. globally. You know, there's also, you know, this is harder to prove, but I suspect that companies, particularly

bigger publicly traded companies, really don't want to get into the political spotlight around price increases, you know, it's that, that's a pretty uncomfortable place for a CEO to be. And so I think they're just taking their time. And, you know, eventually those price increases will happen. It just won't happen. It'll happen more on the radar screen, not, you know, not publicly so they don't, they don't get called out. The other thing I point I make, that, that forecast I just, you just articulated with regard to inflation and growth, that does assume we don't go into recession, right? I mean, that we are on the precipice, but we never actually go over.

Because if we actually go over in recession, then we have weaker growth, but also weaker inflation. So there's a lot of different scenarios on how this can all play out. The scenario I just described in the piece that you're quoting from is one, that's what my baseline most likely, that we kind of squeaked through

without an outright economic downturn. Trump Powell even acknowledged that point at Jackson Hole. He said, yes, tariffs are raising prices. And, you know, to your point, it's happening slowly and kind of quietly. And a lot of companies and a lot of CEOs don't want to cause a stink about it because they know they're going to get the wrath from the king. But that is exactly what we've seen. We've seen Walmart raising their prices. We're seeing Amazon raising their prices, not making an announcement about it. The only way we find out is when a team of researchers goes in and looks at the price and says, yes, we saw a little

increase in these products here, in these products here, all of these products that are largely affected by tariffs, i.e., we import them from abroad. Given all of that, and by the way, just to be plainly honest, I completely agree with you, there's no way prices aren't going to keep rising if the tariffs remain as they are. Yeah. It's 100% in my view going to keep rising. Businesses are also strategic when they raise prices. Take the auto-made. They're going to going to wait till the changeover in the model year, because in the change over the model year, they always raise prices. But this year, they're going to wait there. They're going to raise prices, but they'll raise them more than they typically do because that's when they'll try to account

for the effects of the tariffs. So that's why, in my view, we haven't seen those price increases coming out of the automakers yet, but they will come. They're just going to come in a more strategic point in time. Totally. And also, you're not going to immediately raise your prices by 10 or 15 percent if there's a chance that the tariff's going to be revoked the next week. I mean, you need to wait until you know. It's the same thing that I've been saying about Jerome Powell. He needs to wait until he knows what the story is. No one knows what the story is yet. And yet, at that speech, Jackson Hall, he said that essentially rate cuts are on the table in September. And he pointed to the employment data. He looked at the labor market.

But I just, I wonder what your views are on that speech and on the possibility of a rate cut. If it is true, as you say, and as I would agree with you, that prices are set to rise and it's probably going to come end of this year, maybe very, very beginning of next year, in quite a big way. If we're on track for 3.4% by Q2, and here we have this dovish position coming from Jerome Powell saying, we're probably going to cut rates. What are your thoughts on that? I think it's reasonable for the Fed to cut rates at the September meeting. Now, we got one more jobs number coming out between now and then, so let's just see what that says. That'll have some impact on whether they actually cut rates or not. But I think the way I would frame it is the Fed's so-called reaction. action function is shifted. They put a weight on inflation above target. They put a weight on unemployment above full employment. Usually those weights are roughly the same, but now they're putting more of the weight on unemployment than inflation. A couple reasons. One is they kind of sort of view the inflation as more kind of one-off that you get this price increase related to

tariffs but doesn't persist, cause persistent increases in inflation going forward. That's a pretty tricky thing to get right, but okay, that's okay. But here's the other thing that matters more. They desperately, they, the Fed, and Chair Powell in particular, does not want to go into recession. Think about the political pressure that he will face if we go into a recession. He's already, as he should be, very worried about Federal Reserve independence. What's going to happen if we actually do go into recession? And the Federal Reserve is blamed. And what does that mean about Fed independence going forward. So they're, they're kind of, they put it in a much higher weight. And again, I think appropriately so on, on growth, on unemployment, on,

where unemployment is relative to full employment, then the inflation numbers, at least at this point in time. And in that context, it makes sense for them to start cutting rates at the September meeting, go slow because again, you have to be worried about inflation becoming entrenched and persistent. So maybe you cut a quarter point each quarter until you get back to something that's more consistent with, you know, policy, neither supporting or restraining economic growth, so-called the neutral rate, but still cut rates. We'll be right back after the break. If you're enjoying the show so far, be sure to give Profi markets a follow wherever you get your podcasts.

that starts with a tea. Tampa, Florida. Fly to Tampa on Porter Airlines to see why it's so terrific. On your way there, relax with free beer, wine, and snacks, free fast-streaming Wi-Fi, and no middle seats.

You've never flown to Florida like this before, so you'll land in Tampa ready to explore. Visit flyporter.com and actually, enjoy economy. We're back with Profi Markets. Just sticking on the Fed here for a second. This week, we've had some pretty shocking news. The president firing the governor of the Federal Reserve, Lisa Cook.

You know, the accusation of mortgage fraud. These are all allegations right now. nothing's been actually brought to the court. This, we haven't even seen a formal charge yet. I'm not trying to make a prediction on whether or not she's guilty, but the point is he's firing her for something that has not been proven, which is, you know, notable. Your reactions to the pressure that the Federal Reserve is receiving

from the administration right now. And one thing that I've been thinking about, which I'd like to get your reactions to, is, you know, this is a very political issue. issue. And I would imagine it's hard to model these kinds of things out as an economist. Your job is primarily to assess the data and the numbers. And here we have this very kind of, I don't know how to describe it other than political. It's sort of a soft issue. You can't really quantify what the threat to the independence of the Federal Reserve actually is. But if it truly is under threat, as many people are

concerned, then, you know, how do we quantify that? I mean, what is the hit to the markets? What is the hit to the dollar? What can we expect? Perhaps in the bond markets, perhaps in the stock market itself. I mean, how do we model all of this out and how do we quantify this? What are you thinking about as an economist? Federal Reserve independence is under a lot of pressure. President Trump has made no bones about it, he wants lower interest rates and he wants people at the Fed that have views that are consistent with that, that is in front to the principle of independence of the Federal Reserve. And I do think that the Fed independence like the independence of any central bank around the world is a cornerstone of a well-functioning economy. If you have a Fed that's

been, let's say, captured by the executive branch and is making policy based on political as opposed to economic decisions. Historically, and we've got a lot of case studies here, even here in the U.S., Nixon, Arthur Burns, it would be the best example, that that always ends up with interest rates being too low, which ultimately leads to uncomfortably high inflation. That's the result. And it never ends well. It always ends with at some point much higher interest rates in a much weaker diminished economy. So we really don't want to go down that path. I think we've learned that lesson over the decades across lots of different experiences here and abroad. So I think this is a major concern, a very significant issue. Now, I have not changed my

forecast for what the Fed will do as a result of this, at least not yet. And maybe that's why markets really haven't reacted yet. And I think the key here will be who does the president nominate to be the next Fed chair. As you know, Fed Chair J. Powell's term is up in May of 26. The President Trump has put forward a nominee here sometime before the end of the year, and a lot rides on that choice. If the choice is, you know, and I don't have any insight here, but, you know, I'm just going from press accounts. If it's Scott Bessent, the district Secretary, Kevin Hassett, the head of the National Economic Council, even Kevin Warsh, who was on the Fed under Bernanke many years ago during the crisis, you know, they would be viewed as

solid individuals with an appreciation of the need for an independent Federal Reserve. And I think we can feel reasonably confident, trust but verify, kind of confident that they're going to maintain that independent, sufficient. that my forecast won't change. Now, if it's somebody else, we'll have to see who that is and what that implies. But that probably is kind of the inflection point for when everyone kind of wakes up and says, hey, we've got a problem here. Forecasts are going to change.

It means higher inflation. It means higher long-term interest rates probably because long-term bond investors don't like inflation. That's, you know, something that's kryptonite to a bond investor. They're going to ask for a higher interest rate. It's going to mean a weaker dollar because foreign investors are going to have some real reasonable questions about the saving haven status of the U.S. and its management, how things are being managed, and there are already some questions about that.

But I think that's the key here. We'll see how this plays up. And at this point, and I've not changed my forecast. When you look at the inflation of pretty much any third world country in the world, And I'm saying this because, you know, this idea of central bank independence and capture of the central bank, this isn't like a fairy tale that we're imagining. This is a thing that regularly happens in societies, hence why people are so worried about it. And when you look at the charts of inflation in basically any third world country where you've had rampant inflation, when you look at Turkey, for example. Yeah, it's a poster challenge.

What you've found is, you know, there is a larger-than-life president, bordering on dictator, who installs a loyalist into the Federal Reserve, captures the central bank, installs the loyalist in there. And then as soon as that happens, the inflation literally skyrockets. It goes up like this. And, you know, this has happened so many times, and it's such a tried and true playbook. We see it so often in politics that it feels as though I always try to check myself and make sure that I'm not being alarmist and make sure that we're not, you know, getting too worked up over something that isn't really likely. but it feels as though this is one of those things that is like actually quite likely or actually quite probable, maybe likely is too strong. But the idea that Trump would put a loyalist in the Federal Reserve and they just do exactly what he wants in terms of interest rates, cut rates, cut rates, and then we have rampant inflation, which is already being pushed by the tariffs. I mean,

we're increasingly going away from a fairy tale scenario to something that could actually have in the very near future. And to your point, markets haven't reacted that much as of this recording. My belief is basically you can't fire her. I mean, you have to have a cause. It's not going to go through. It's going to be litigated in court. But how probable is it that we could have that sort of third world inflationary outcome? Is that us being alarmist? Is that us being, you know, and just having some level of Trump derangement syndrome, or is it like an actual possibility or how probable do you think this could be? I think low probability, that kind of scenario, you know, I think,

I don't think this is a cliff of that. And I wouldn't articulate it as such. It's not like the Fed's captured. We know what that means exactly and it affects policy and immediately you get inflation. Okay. There's a long lag here. a lot of, it's more of a corrosive, I would think. You know, it plays out over a period of years. And inflation expectations, you know, have been well anchored. So that can change quickly, but

it's so far so good. So I think it's, that's not a likely scenario, it's a likely, but I don't think it's a likely scenario. I think a more likely scenario is that, you know, you get in the next year and the economic data would say, oh, okay, the funds rate should be the federal fund rate, that's the rate the Fed control should be 3%. That's the that equilibrium rate I was talking about earlier, that rate that where policies neither supporting or restraining growth. But the Fed chair and the Fed at the time decided to push the rate even lower, say to 2% to try to keep the economy strong going into next year's election. That's not going to generate runaway inflation. It's not going to be Turkey, but it will mean higher inflation going into 2027 and 28. And you can

see how it can become a, it's a corrosive. It becomes more of a problem as you move forward. And it's, you know, maybe the case study for us would be President Nixon and Arthur Burns, who was chair of the Fed back in the 70s. Arthur Burns was, and this is all based on the Nixon tape. So we have firsthand knowledge of kind of how this all played out. The President Nixon wanted lower rates, Arthur Burns obliged leading into the 1972 election. And of course, go look at what happened in the 70s and 80s. You know, we saw very significant run up in inflation. Of course, other things were going on, oil price embargo, the Orion hostage crisis,

higher oil prices, that kind of stuff. So it wasn't. And the Fed really didn't understand the role of inflation expectations like they do today. So there's a lot of differences between now and then. But that's kind of more like what would happen. It would be more of a long running, would play out over a long running period of time, years, not months, certainly not weeks. So, you know, it's a scenario, what you've, what you articulate it as a scenario, certainly prudent to consider, but I think probably a low probability

scenario. I want to shift us to your what keeps me up at night chart, which I love, I love this chart. You basically... Yeah, don't you like it? The risk, I call it the risk matrix. I should trademark. The risk matrix, right. It's great. You basically have on one side, on the y-axis, you've got likelihood of risk on the x-axis if you've got economic severity of risk. And that's just this dot plot of all these concerning things that could happen based on how likely they are to occur. I don't describe necessarily the whole chart, but if you could rank sort of your top three or four concerns for America right now based on their likelihood and also the severity of each risk, what would they be?

Rank your top three? Well, you said Y and X, that's interesting. So people know what Y and X are. It's the horizontal and vertical axes, right? So that's great. They have a very sophisticated listenership. Very sophisticated audience, yeah. Yeah, very sophisticated.

I mean, obviously you want to look at the part of the matrix where high severity, if the thing goes off the rails, it's going to do a lot of damage to the economy, in high probability. And that's kind of in the northeast part of the matrix. You can kind of visualize that. And obviously, trade war is up there as a real threat. Who knows how that's going to play out?

We think we know we're doing forecast based on what we expect, but who the heck knows how that's going to play out and whether there's at some point going to be more retaliation from U.S. trading partners. Fed independence is up there. I call it Fed Capture. matrix, but that's what I mean by what I'm using as a term for fed independence. I talk about institutional erosion more broadly, in that there's a whole slew of things that go into that.

You know, the recent decision by the government to take a stake in Intel would, in my view, could be in that bucket of institutional erosion. That raises all kinds of, you know, questions about the efficacy of that. But the one thing I would call out is a meltdown in the bond market. So while the Fed's lowering rates, obviously the Fed doesn't control long-term rates directly. And it could be the case that investors get spooked by the lack of Fed independence and the prospect prior inflation. Then you throw into the mix that are large budget deficits, which are gigantic, our deficit of 6% of GDP, our primary deficit, excluding interest payments is three percent of GDP. That's massive, particularly in the context

of an economy that's a full employment. Debt to GDP is 100 percent in rising very quickly. And given the big beautiful bill, there's nothing that's going to stop that. Interest payments on the debt as a share of GDP revenue is at or just about breaching the record high. We're spending more on our interest than we are in defense at this point. Also, who's owning treasury, the bonds is shifting. You know, we're going from the Fed. head-owning the bonds because they QE and bought all the bonds that are now QTing and letting the bonds roll off, institutional investors and banks that are less price sensitive, they don't care as much about the rate, there's parking their money there for as a safe haven.

They're exiting the market and in the void are hedge funds. Hedge funds are coming in, they're becoming very large players in the market. And these guys, you know, they're very price sensitive. I mean, they're there when times are good. They are completely out of there, on mass. They all run for the door at the same time when times are bad. So I can go on, but you know, you've got this dark brew of stuff coming together that could suggest that at some point, I don't know, and I don't know when, but could be my sense is the risk is,

and that's why it's where it is in the matrix. In the next 6, 12, 18 months, we sell, we see a sell up in the barn, which means much higher long-term interest rates. I mean, 10 your treasury yields, not 4 and a quarter. It's 5.5.5. It's 6%, you know, something like that. Think about what that means for mortgage rates, what it means for borrowing costs for businesses and consumers. That's a pretty bad situation. So it's not my baseline.

This is a risk matrix. What could keep go wrong? You know, that's less than likely, but still a possibility that we should consider. That would be kind of at the top of the list of my concerns. Stay with us. We're back with Profi Markets. I found it very interesting that the bond market meltdown, I mean, it's high up there in terms of severity of risk,

but it's also pretty high up there in terms of likelihood of risk compared to all of your other scenarios. I know you said you can't predict when, and of course, no one can. But do you have any thoughts on what might trigger that some sort of bond market meltdown? I mean, this is kind of the ultimate question that everyone's trying to wrap their head around. And, you know, we see what happens when this big, beautiful bill is passed, and we already have these insane debt to GDP levels, this insane deficit to GDP level, that we're going to explode even further.

And yet people say that. worried. I hear people talking about it. Everyone, I look around. Everyone says, yeah, we're really worried about this. But then you look at the markets, and the markets, you know, they're not unfazed by it, but they're certainly not scrambling right now. And I'm just wondering if you have any thoughts on what it might take to cause a bond market meltdown, and especially for investors to actually get legitimately concerned about our our national deficit and our debt problems in America, such that they start actually selling.

Yeah, I go back to Fed independence and who the president is going to nominate for the next Fed chair. It feels like a pretty good stress point when bond investors all over the world are going to be looking at that and saying, who's that person? And, you know, how should we think about that person in the context of an independent Federal Reserve? So if I had to pick a catalyst for that, sell-off, that would be a pretty good inflection point. You know, there's also, I think it would be good at governance issues with regard to the budget itself. We get into the next fiscal year.

There's another reconciliation package. You know, what does that look like exactly? Will that add to the deficits in debt? And if it does, to what degree, and could that be the catalyst? Or, you know, maybe we get to a place where government comes to a standstill. there's a government shutdown. The Democrats don't go along with whatever, and the Republicans can't get enough votes to keep the government open. Or there's a, you know, I don't think the Treasury debt limit's not going to be an issue for a few years because they extended that out until 27 or

28. But, you know, it could be some kind of governance issues where global investors say, hey, you know, I'm really not sure I'm going to get paid on it in a timely way. Not that the U.S. can't pay me. The U.S. is a, you know, can pay. That's not the issue. But, will they pay me and will they and will they pay me on time? That's the real issue. But I think the catalyst probably has to come from global investors, you know, saying no moss. I can't take this anymore. You're going to have to pay me. You, you, the U.S. government is going to have to pay me more to compensate for the risk that I'm not going to get paid on them. By the way, there's evidence that it's already affecting tenure treasury yields. I mean, there's, you could make, it's you got to, I don't

want to stretch this too far, but you can look at other corners of the financial system, and they're signaling saying, hey, there is a risk premium in the 10-year treasury. Go look at credit default swaps on U.S. treasuries and, you know, where they're trading, or look at the swap market prices in general. And they're saying, look, the investors are already nervous about the safe haven status of the United States. So I don't know that it would take a whole lot to trigger that bond market meltdown that, you know, we've been talking about. I want to slightly shift gears here and hear about

how you work because what I've found is that everything is getting politicized in a way that we haven't really seen before. And it's been true of, we've seen it with the Federal Reserve this week, where basically

if you want to maintain rates, then that is a political position. You are against the president. If you want to cut rates, then you are pro-Maga, you're pro-Trump. I mean, I'm simplifying it a lot, but basically what we're seeing

is that the governorship of the Federal Reserve is being split into factions, and that is certainly what Trump is trying to do. He wants to fire someone, get her out of there, and then install someone who's on his side. And we're seeing this in lots of different areas of the economy. I mean, we're seeing it even with the Bureau of Labor statistics,

where the data has become politicized. I mean, you put out a bad report or you adjusts the previous numbers, and that is a political action, or at least it is perceived to be a political action. And I find this in my own work, too. I try to balance politics as much as possible on this podcast without being distracted by it,

but what I find is that whenever we discuss the data, we discuss economics, it oftentimes is perceived to be a political conversation and that it is biased in some way. And when I look at your report and the things that you highlight that are problems in the economy right now, one, I agree with them, but two, all I can think about is some guy on the Republican side of the aisle who would say, this guy's biased, he just wants Trump to lose. And I'm wondering how you think about that today. Do you find that your work is increasingly viewed as political? Do you find that it is increasingly difficult to put work out there and to

teach about economics and to talk about economics in a way that isn't politically swayed or politically influenced? And if so, how are you dealing with that? I do my best to be apolitical. I think it's important to acknowledge that we all have a political prism that we look at the world through, you know, whether it's explicit or implicit. So I think I'm self-aware of that prism and the biases that I potentially have. But, and I apologize if I come across as being political, but it's very difficult, as you say, not to, because we're talking about economic policy is the kind of the driving force behind what's going on in the economy. So how can you not talk about policy? And when you talk about policy, how it's difficult not to be perceived as political. And I apologize to everyone if I come across that way. I try not to. I try to be apolitical. And by the way, when we talk about trade and tariffs, you know, that's the one issue where really we're debating that. I mean, that economists debate everything, reasonably so, every issue, you know, because they look at first order, second order, third order, fourth order.

effects, depending on, you know, whether you're an academic, you're a guy like me. And it's all reasonable. But on trade and tariffs, broad-based tariffs, there's no, like, there isn't a debate. I mean, that's like, if we're going to debate anything, that's a great one to debate because there's no question that that's a pretty bad idea. It's a pretty bad idea. We know this. We know this is, this is tested over the years, over the decades, over the centuries.

We know that this is a corrosive on the economy. And so if we're going to pick one issue that we're going to get, that we'll focus on, so I'm fortunate in it's trade because there's no debate here. My views are entirely consistent with the broad consensus of views of economists on either side of the aisle. Yes. So, okay, if you think I'm political, then you think there's no way to talk about this in any sense whatsoever. Now, it hasn't changed the way I approach things or the way I forecast. you know, and that's, you've got to give Moody's credit for that, you know, that I have independence.

I can think about, write about, speak about what I want. Now, I have to be careful in the context of the current environment. There's no doubt about that. But I have not said anything that I do not believe. And then my forecast has not changed as a result of, you know, any kind of pressure or anything else. So I find that, you know, very first. And I think that's critical to the work that, you know, I'm doing and that we do. We provide it a lot, our clients are all over the world, major financial institutions, governments, if non-financial corps, that use our information in lots of different ways. They rely on that and they are dependent on our being as, you know, unbiased and as true to our thinking as we possibly can. Now, we are, fortunately,

very quantitative. We're not, we're not qualitative. We're not qualitative. We've got very sophisticated, and I don't mean to oversell, but we've spent a lot of time and energy on the models that we're using to produce these forecasts. And so that provides a very significant discipline to what we're doing. At the end of the day, we have to make some assumptions. But the way I handle assumptions is I say, okay, here's what I'm, my baseline assumption, and here are the risk. And that goes to the risk matrix. Let's go different, do different scenarios. So we can think about, and it's prudent to think about, you know, what if the world is different than the assumptions are different than the ones that I've articulated there on my baseline. But

because we are a quantitative shop, I also think that imposes a, you know, a discipline on what we're doing that makes it less likely will be political and more likely it will be apolitical. But, you know, this is all new. I've been a professional economist for 35 years. I've never been in this kind of situation. Never, never. Not wasn't even close to, you know, what we're going through. It's a real, what I call stress tests on, you know, everything, including economic analysis and forecasting. It's a huge stress test on just numbers in a way. I mean, the idea that a number could be a political statement. Right. That's sort of a new world. And I felt that way certainly after the chief of the Bureau of Labor Statistics was fired, because that to me

sort of blasted us through the door of a new situation where, you know, if we're, you know, if we can't agree that the data is real, if we can't agree that the fundamental economic data that has come from the U.S. government is true, or at least the truest thing we have, then what are we doing? You know, what am I doing with this podcast? What are you doing? Over a Moody's. Right. And I wonder what the implications of that are for the study of of economics itself. I mean, how are economists supposed to move forward? How do you move forward? I mean, another question might be like, do you trust the data? Will you trust the data when it comes out in the next six months? Say he hires someone that is perhaps another loyalist?

Will you believe the data that's coming out of the Bureau of Labor Statistics? I mean, where does this leave you if America cannot agree on whether or not the data is even real? Right now it's trust, but verify. So working really hard to come up with approaches, techniques, methodologies, other data sources to test, to make sure that we are confident in the data, the quality, the comprehenseness, the timeless of the data that we're receiving. So we're not going to simply, well, this has always been the case, But obviously, we're now on hyperdrive trying to figure out how to do this in a kind of consistent, rigorous way.

And we're thinking about and actually working on producing alternative data sources, so that, for example, on consumer prices, CPI, here's I worry about, really worried, because of the BLS cuts, the funding and staffing cuts, they are unable to canvas as many products and services for calculating the CPI, the Consumer Price Index. I think 35, I don't think I'm making this up. 35% of the prices of goods and services in the CPR are now so-called imputed. That's up from 10% at the start of the year. 35% is a lot in my mind. And so there we're starting to think about how do we scrape websites, produce our own estimates of CPI. There's some researchers that have already gone down this path to Bala at Harvard, the Billions Pieces Project. So we're piggybacking off with some of that work.

so we're hopeful that we get alternative data sources just so that we can, you know, make sure that we feel confident in the information that we're getting and that we're providing. But having said all that, it's a pretty tough spot to be in because the government is critical. There's, you know, Congress called a public good. It's a public good. There's no better example of a public good. We need government to collect this data because we're getting, we need, because of privacy issues and security issues, we need the federal government to be fully engaged here.

So we're not going to be able to completely fill the void, you know, but so hopefully the integrity of the data is maintained, you know, going forward as best as possible. But we're, you know, we're not going to stand still. We're doing the best we can to, again, verify and also construct new data sources. And there are, by the way, there are a lot of data sources out there that kind of haven't really thought about as carefully, starting to think about them more carefully because they are valuable sources of information. Like we have relationships with companies. tracking the credit performance of consumer credit cards or mortgage loans, that kind of thing, another partnership with a company to try to calculate house prices and commercial real estate values. There's a payroll processing company that does a really good ADP, which does a really good job of figuring out what's going on in the private sector in terms of jobs by industry and by region. So there are, and I can go on and on, there are a lot of data sources out there. We just now have to think about this more with greater urgency and in a more systematic way. Just to wrap up here, we've had a lot of kind of grim predictions, and we opened this show with your point that we are on the precipice of a recession, or at least that is what the model is telling you.

Is there anything that you are feeling optimistic about in the economy? Is there anything you're bullish on? Is there anything that we could end this show on more of a positive note? I mean, you know, the American economy is a marvel. I mean, it's just, you know, if you just let it have at it, you have a problem, you may allow people to make money, they figure out the problem. If we just get out of the way, if government just gets out of the way, you know, regulate, but, you know, just let the economy go, it will be just fine.

And I keep going back to, I think Churchill said this, or maybe I've got this wrong, but something to the effect, you know, Americans try everything and then ultimately do the right thing. And I just, I fundamentally believe that. We are going to, we're trying everything. But we will ultimately find the right way. And, you know, we'll land in a pretty good spot. So I, you know, I'm near-term nervous about what's going on, obviously, but I'm long-term bullish. You know, I think the American economy is just a marvelous thing. And it's going to be pretty hard to upset it in a systematic and long-term way. Mark Zandi is the chief economist of Moody's, a leading provider of economic research, data and analytical tools. He also hosts the Inside Economics podcast, and he serves on the board of directors of MGIC, the nation's largest private mortgage insurance company. Mark, this was great. It was great to have you on the show again. We really appreciate your time. Thanks. I appreciate the great questions. I've all lot to think about there. Awesome.

Take care now. Thanks, Mark. This episode was produced by Claire Miller and Alison Weiss and engineered by Benjamin Spencer. Miel Saverio is our research lead, our research associates, our Isabella Kinsel and Dan Chalan. Drew Burrows is our technical director. Catherine Dillon is our executive producer.

Thank you for listening to Profty Markets from the Vox Media Podcast Network. If you liked what you heard, give us a follow. Enjoy your Labor Day, and we will be back with a fresh take on markets, not on Monday, but on Tuesday. you have me in kind you have me in kind reunion as the waters

and the dark flies. Thank you.