Reuters World News - Gen Z gender divide and the reshaping of democracy

Episode Date: May 31, 2025

From South Korea to Germany to the United States, young men are increasingly turning to right-wing politics while their female peers lean left. On this special episode of Reuters World News,  Global Managing Editor, Politics, Economics and World News Mark Bendeich joins us to look at the economic reality facing Gen Z men and women around the world - and the different futures they are voting for at the ballot box. Sign up for the Reuters Econ World newsletter here. Listen to the Reuters Econ World podcast here. Visit the Thomson Reuters Privacy Statement for information on our privacy and data protection practices. You may also visit megaphone.fm/adchoices to opt out of targeted advertising. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In democracies worldwide, a political gender war is intensifying among Gen Z voters. From Germany to South Korea to the US and UK, young men are increasingly drawn to right-wing politics while their female peers lean left. And as they've reached voting age, it's having an increasing impact in elections. So what's driving this chasm in the youth vote? in this special episode of Reuters World News. We investigate economic anxieties and online echo chambers and the starkly different futures young men and women are now voting for,

as well as the potentially profound impact the divide could have on democracy. I'm your host, Tara Oaks, in Liverpool. Li Zhongmin is a first-time voter. Getting ready to cast his ballot in South Korea's presidential elections on June 3rd. Young women are expected to lead a broad political backlash against the main conservative party, punishing it for months of chaos. Lee won't be joining them.

Like angry, frustrated men in their 20 years around the world, Lee is turning to the right. He says he'll vote for the right-wing reform party's candidate, Li Jund Suk. The Reform Party has vowed to shut down the Minister of Gender Equality, an appealing issue for Lee, who says he particularly resents that only men have to do military service. The data is striking. In South Korea, almost 30% of young men aged 18 to 29 plan to back the Reform Party,

compared with just 3% of young women. That's according to a Gallup, Korea poll in May. The divergent shrinks for older age groups. So what's happening? Su-Huan Li is a political economist at King's College London. I believe Korean young men are angry and frustrated, and there are a few factors at play.

But probably the most important thing is the economic insecurity they are experiencing. Good jobs are hard to find, and the competition for a good job is ever so fierce. And young men are increasingly believing that the economic insecurity is blocking them, preventing them from leading a normal life involving family formation and possibly having children. She was speaking to a global managing editor for politics, economics and world news, Mark Bendai. Hi, Mark. Hi, Tara. So, Mark, we started off this episode in South Korea, where younger men, like first-time voter Lee, are being being.

drawn to right-wing parties. Well, polling shows that almost half the women of his age want the left-wing Democratic Party candidate to win. But before we go elsewhere in the world, South Korea, like anywhere else, has its own particularities, right? Indeed. I think South Korea is easier but a day for this trend, but it does have one particularity in particular, which is South Korea doesn't have a lot of immigration. It's negligible. So when young men, are looking for scapegoats for what, in some respects, is a real, and they feel that as a real reversal of fortunes, especially compared to their fathers, they're blaming women. Many of them are buying into a narrative that women are basically being preference for jobs,

for instance, which is one of the first steps in terms of meeting kind of the traditional expectations of a South Korean man, which is to not only get married and raise a family, but importantly, buy a home and get a decent job. And those expectations, though, even though, even though South Korea has its own issues, those resonate around the world with young men, right? Young men and women are polarising politically around the world. What first drew your attention to this pattern? And why did you decide to explore it now?

Well, we noticed it in Germany in February. That's the number that really stood out all of a sudden. I think, you know, it's well known that among Gen Z, there's a gender divide in terms of views, social views. But what we're really starting to see now, and particularly since the pandemic, is that this is playing out at the ballot box. And it was Germany that first kind of rang the bell. And so we decided, OK, let's have a look at elections and just see if this is a common thread that is being weave throughout democracies worldwide. And the answer is, although it's a little qualified, is yes. Yeah, it was definitely Germany's elections this year when it really hit me.

I remember hearing a lot about how young people were behind the anti-immigrant alternative for Germany or AFD party winning, a record percentage of the boat. But when you see the data broken down, the gender polarisation is really stark. 27% of men, aged 18 to 24, voted for the AFD, while young women went to the other side of the political spectrum. voting 35% for the far-left D'Linka party. 18-year-old Molly Lynch was one of them. The topics that I'm interested in, I think that need to be addressed, things like climate change and just like general economic inequality.

But I think the left, yeah, for me, addresses those issues more. So, Mark, in your reporting, did you find any common threads that begin to explain this gender divide across different cultures? Yes, I mean, I'm obviously not Gen Z, but so it surprised me, actually. I've grown up my whole life as a white male being in a fairly privileged position. You know, just if you look at the numbers in terms of the gender pay gap, for instance, it's been very clear. What surprised me as actually men aged from about 18 to their late 20s, they are very clearly

in some countries going backwards. And let's leave aside the narrative in the blame game, but just look at the numbers. So if you look at the UK, men are more likely to be neither in employment nor education. University enrolments, women are outpacing men. That's pretty clear in the United States and many other countries. So these are numbers that you wouldn't associate with my age group. Like I'm 60, right? This is not something that I'm used to seeing.

So when you get to the narrative, though, that's when it gets messy, because particularly in the West are white men who have had that privilege. These young men are not seeing life in the same way that their fathers and father's fathers have seen it. That's very interesting to me. But of course, we're talking about relative outcomes for young men relative to their father's day. It's still the case, of course, when you look more broadly, that the gender pay gap is still well in favour of men.

It's just within this age group, it's starting to look a little. different. Yeah, I don't know if you're exposing your generation when you say Gen Z rather than Gen Z or if that's a regional variation. I think that's an Australian thing maybe rather than a generational thing. A generational thing. But let's stick and talk about men a bit. How true is it then that what does a data show about Gen Z men around the world faring worse than previous generations economically? You talk about their fathers or what's been their grievance in, say, South Korea where they say, They're fearing worse than their present female peers. Well, Gen Z men feel left behind, and the data shows that in some respects, particularly

relative to their father's generation, they are indeed going backwards. As Darrell Bricker and Ipsos executive based in Toronto told me, there are some real numbers which show that young men are just not making this up. There are actually numbers which explain why there is such anger amongst this age group of young men. Men are not doing particularly well in the Western world these days. If you look at their ability to get started in life, they're much less likely to complete basic education, they must not much less likely to complete post-secondary education than women are. They, on terms of wages are not doing as well as women are at the same stage of their lives.

In South Korea, young men, for example, if you look at the gender pay gap, which is a good proxy for a lot of things, then young men, I think, are still doing better than young women. But if you look more broadly, say in France, I think Belgium in particular, young women are doing better. Their average hourly earnings are more than young men in that 20-something age group. But certainly in other parts of the world as well, you'll see this, particularly young men from, say, non-urban, sort of rural areas, those traditional manufacturing areas that, as we all know have been in decline in the West. Now, that's where young men are going backwards,

relatively speaking, compared to their fathers. So I've got to keep saying that, not compared to young women in broad, but they are also buying into this narrative that its immigration is to blame. Diversity programs are to blame. That's why you're not going to, you're not, you're not being able to get a decent job. There are real facts on the ground in terms of the data, which show that young men are in place going back relative to their fathers, and in some cases, but a few cases, are actually at a disadvantage relative to their female peers. What are right-wing political parties promising young men that they seem to be finding appealing, and what's not winning over young women?

Look at Donald Trump. I mean, that's pretty clear. He's not only promised, but he's executing that promise to dismantle diversity programs. That does, looking at the polling numbers, appeal to you. young men. Perception is reality in politics. So it is an issue. It needs to be dealt with. You're starting to see a divide that will trouble or challenge democracies for years to come. So are we seeing this uniformly across all communities of men, including men of color? Actually, it's a great question, and the answer is no. So if you look at the United States,

it's one of the few that will break it down by community, including community of color, you see white men and Hispanics, they, more and more of them, have voted for Donald Trump at the last election in November. But if you look at black men and black women in that young age group, they both overwhelmingly voted for Kamala Harris. Now, I think it's a reasonable interpretation from the data that essentially young black men haven't felt this position of privilege that perhaps young white men, both in the United States and in other parts of the West, have felt. So I think that's very interesting that you're seeing it particularly among young men who have, for generations perhaps, felt this relative privilege over young women.

And you say perception is reality in politics, and we heard from voter Molly in Berlin, who attributes right-wing success among young men to what she calls propaganda. A lot of young men are sort of falling for sort of more like sort of right-wing propaganda as well because they feel upset and I think they feel upset about the fact that they're like losing power. They have the feeling that they're losing power, but it's actually only losing power over women. So how much of the appeal for young men is about rhetoric and messaging? And where are they getting this language from? when you get into the social media, the kind of what's called the manosphere, that's when it starts to get a little bit murky. The blame game starts and the figures don't necessarily support the blame game. Darrell Bricker, I've made a good point at one point. It's that, you know, these young men are investing huge amounts of time in social media and podcasts.

Social media definitely plays an amplification rule. So people who are feeling certain things that felt like they were alone, can now find people who are like-minded and get together and create their own little echo chamber of conversation. It's an echo chamber for these kind of narratives, but it's also an accelerator or a consolidator of this kind of division because men are buying into this narrative, as I say, it's part of the blame game. They do feel left behind and they want to know why that is. So the answer readily comes in social media, oh, it's diversity programs, oh, it's immigration. And And, you know, I think another pollster mentioned that there are broader issues at play here as well, which are fundamental fiscal social welfare policies, which can be used to address some of these

young male grievances to the extent that they're justified, but that requires a kind of a consensus to deal with that. But what we're dealing with is a electorate that's polarized and a young generation that, as it matures, it doesn't look like it's going to come together necessarily. And if it continues to be polarized, that's when you're going to really struggle to deal with these divisions. And we talked a lot about young men. If we go back to Molly, she voted for the left German party called Delinker. What is it appealing for them for young women?

Are there any global themes we can see from this divergence on their end? Yeah, I think, you know, the pollsters tell me that young women have the same concerns as young men. For instance, the ability to get a decent job, not just a contract work from months to month, but a permanent job, the ability to afford housing. There are the same issues for young women as for young men. It's actually, they believe, a lot of them, believe that left-wing or left-of-center parties, they've got the policies to deal with this. And they feel, broadly, according to the polls, better off than their mothers, let's say,

but still unhappy with their lot when it comes to some of these basic economic expectations. So they believe the left of centre has the policies to fix that. The men, though, the young men, they're buying into a completely different narrative and therefore policy mix. That is crack down on immigration, get rid of diversity. That'll solve your problems. So the women and the men are touching on similar issues and grievances. It's just that they really part ways when it comes to the blame game and the political narrative. And our reporting focuses on voting age, Gen Z. But there's been a lot of focus on the

gender divide at even younger ages, right? Here in the UK, the TV drama, Adolescence was incredibly popular and depicts this toxic online world where male insecurities can warp into even violence against the opposite sex. Do we have any projections as to how this polarization might play out as the years go on, or is it just a Gen Z issue? Well, I think a Gen Z issue could become, you know, an issue for older age groups as they mature. And if the core grievances are not resolved, then you'll have new first-time voters coming in and presumably ripe for right-wing and left-wing politicians to appeal to the grievances that they may have. And it also touches on expectations in society, which,

is why South Korea is so polarized because young men still are very, very traditional expectations on them to get a job, decent job, get married, secure a home, start a family. That's objectively quite difficult now. So policies need to address that. The same applies to women, of course, but as I say, it's when the narrative, we're talking about men who relatively speaking have been able to do that in the past and women who have had a completely different role in society and now are competing, I don't know if it's, I could say equally, but more equally, as our German first-time voter pointed out for jobs. So how does it end? Well, does it end, I think, is the question.

If it doesn't, and we don't see this division being healed, then I think we're actually going to see more of these right-wing politicians and left-wing politicians appeal to these different gender voting bases. that's going to create a lot of friction continually for democracies. And even after Donald Trump leaves office at the end of his second term, we're likely to see this being playing out. It won't be the death of the far right or the far left, presumably because you've got these really fundamental forces at work. And that's one possibility. So we'll see polarised politics continue,

but more along perhaps gender than a blue-collar, white-collar. That's a point that a couple of pollsters made to me. So, yeah, if it doesn't end, it's just, we've seen polarized politics, we might be in for more of it. It's put best, I think, by Suyan Lee when she talked about the problems that this division poses for consensus and getting things done on really big issues in the future. If the future generation is ever so divided among the line of gender and then refuse to engage with each other, to build social consensus, I do not think we can successfully tackle these huge issues through big reforms and in these rich democracies in the East and the West. And remember, democracy also needs to deliver economic prosperity and social security

to certain level for people to be satisfied with democracy. Thank you so much to Mark as well as Suhion Li and Daryl Bricker for that insight. Our podcast team includes Jonah Green, Gail Issa, Sharon Reich Garson, Alex Sommer, David Spencer, Kim Vanel and Christopher Wal Jasper. Our senior producers are me, Tara Oaks, and Carmel Crimmons. Lila de Kretzer is our executive producer. Josh Summer composes all the music, heads up our sound design and engineered this episode. To never miss an episode, subscribe on your favorite podcast player. We'll be back on Monday with our daily headline show.