Rev Left Radio - Iran Will Not Bend The Knee: National Cohesion, The Axis of Resistance, and Decolonizing West Asia

Episode Date: May 25, 2026

Historian David Yaghoubian joins Rev Left Radio to discuss the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, the genocide in Gaza, the assault on Lebanon, and the broader imperial-Zionist project to dominate West Asia. Drawing from his 2014 monograph Ethnicity, Identity, and the Development of Nationalism in Iran, Yaghoubian explains why Washington and Tel Aviv have repeatedly misunderstood Iranian society, underestimated Iranian national cohesion, and fantasized that sanctions, bombing, covert operations, or minority pressure could fracture the country from within. Together, Breht and David explore Iran's history of resisting foreign domination, the reactionary nature of the Iranian diaspora in the United States, the ethno-religious complexity of Iranian society, Iranian national cohesion, the strategic significance of the Strait of Hormuz, the relationship between Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, and the ideological inversion through which the U.S. and Israel present themselves as defenders of "stability" while unleashing coups, sanctions, assassinations, occupations, and genocide across the region. They also discuss how anti-imperialists should defend Iran against U.S.-Zionist aggression without flattening Iranian society or denying its internal contradictions. This is a conversation about nationalism, sovereignty, resistance, and the failure of empire to understand the peoples it seeks to dominate. Dr. David N. Yaghoubian is Professor of Modern West Asian and Islamic History at California State University-San Bernardino and author of "Ethnicity, Identity, and the Development of Nationalism in Iran" (Syracuse, 2014) and co-editor of "Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East" (3rd edition forthcoming). ----------------------------------------- Check out a great new resource for revolutionary education, Unlearning Capitalism: https://unlearn.capital/ Support Rev Left and get access to bonus episodes: www.patreon.com/revleftradio   Make a one-time donation to Rev Left at BuyMeACoffee.com/revleftradio Follow, Subscribe, & Learn more about Rev Left Radio https://revleftradio.com/

Hello everybody. Welcome back to Rev Left Radio. On today's episode, we genuinely have what I would argue. You can be the judge of this, but I think this is one of the best discussions that I've ever heard on Iran. And that's not because of me. That is because of this wonderful guest, Professor David Yagubian, who is really focused scholarly and in an academic sense, has done a lot of work on internal Iranian nationalism, the ethnic and religious divisions within Iranian society. and they're coming together through social cohesion via civic nationalism

and sort of the construction of Iranian nationalism that is not exclusively Persian or Islamic. So we start the conversation talking about ethnic and religious subgroupings within Iranian society, the historical processes by which they've come to be united under a civic nationalism, the hope on behalf of the U.S. and Israel that sanctions and then a full-on war of aggression, would spark sectarianism along ethnic and religious lines. And the fact that that has failed has been core to the ongoing, really, victory of Iran in this ongoing war of aggression on behalf of Israel and the U.S. against Iran. They've stood firm.

And part of the reason they've been able to stand firm is precisely because the U.S. and Israel have not been able to create the sort of second. tearing in religious divides they were hoping to create that would that would topple and ultimately Balkanize Iranian society as we've seen in other instances. It's a very similar playbook they've played in many countries most recently in Syria to varying degrees of success. But it hasn't worked in Iran and the civic nationalism tying these various ethnicities and religious orientations together as proud Iranians is I would argue and I think you know Professor Yagubian argues is a core reason why that has not happened. So it's a, and then we get in, of course, to current events.

And the Iranian diaspora, his position within it, you know, if you think as we talk about in the episode, the Cuban diaspora in Miami, this reactionary core that, you know, fled after the revolution and were often plantation owners and beneficiaries of, in various ways of the brutal, disgusting puppet dictatorship of Batista. You have a very similar situation with the Iranian diaspora in L.L. where Professor Yagoubian comes from. So he talks about from first-person experience what that's like, the brainwashing in childhood,

and then his pursuing the truth through scholarly academic work, coming to realize the truth about Iranian society, flipping his politics through that political awakening, and then now being at odds with his family, his friends, his community in and around L.A. in the Iranian diaspora. So that's just one aspect of the conversation. It goes much deeper. about the current state of war, the leverage of Hormuz, the role that Iran's allies

regionally and internationally have played here. We talk about what an Iranian society and the consolidation of cohesion after a victory might look like with regards to domestic Iranian politics. And just so much more that I can't even summarize right now is touched on here. So truly, if you listen to this episode, you will have a better understanding of internal Iranian society. and its perseverance in the face of this sanction and war machine, then 99.9% certainly of Westerners in the world, certainly of Americans who know absolutely nothing about this stuff.

But it will deeply deepen your understanding of Iranian society. And if you put this in conversation with our recent interview with Professor Matina Skari on the history of Iran-U.S. relations, which I'll link to in the show notes here, you can listen to them in any order, of course. But if you take those two together, your understanding of domestic, internal, contemporary Iranian society, how it came to be through historical processes, et cetera, will be truly top tier. As far as podcasts can do, you know, political education, I think we've succeeded here. So I'm very, very excited to introduce you to Professor Yagubian, if you're unaware of who he is, and then to this conversation more broadly, which is, again, just essential for understanding Iranian society, which is fascinating. which is multifaceted, which is beautiful, historically, and culturally diverse in so many amazing ways.

And the social cohesion in the face of this aggression, where people inside of Iranian politics might be on opposite sides of certain contentious domestic issues coming together to defend their government as it attempts to defend them in the face of disgusting war of aggression by the fascist Trump regime and the settler colonial genocidal and sane rogue state of Israel. It's just fascinating to walk through. This is a moving, insightful, educational episode, and I guarantee you you'll walk away a more informed human being after having listened to it. And as always, if you like what we do here at Rev.

Left Radio, we are obviously 100% listener-funded, true independent DIY media. Episodes like this will never have corporate sponsors. We'll never be put out on big channels. We'll never have big money backing it. We've always been like that. We always will be like that. I will never put an ad in front of you whatsoever.

and the supporters of the show is exactly what makes that possible. And I give back. So if you do become a supporter of the show, $5 a month on Patreon, the cost of a cup of coffee for a whole month. And you do get bonus material, community Zoom calls and meetings, early releases, access to our meditation group, and so much more. I truly try to give back.

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All right, without further ado, here is our fascinating, wide-ranging, deeply insightful conversation with Professor David Yagubian on Iranian ethnic, religious, civil, Nationalist and domestic internal political situation as well as broader history and contemporary analysis of Iranian society in the face of Israeli and U.S. aggression and so much more. Enjoy. Greetings, everyone. It's great to be with you. I'm David Yagubian, a professor at California State University San Bernardino since 2003. My area of specialization is technically, as per my diploma, the modern Middle East and Islamic Islam. We've sort of changed terminology, so I'd now say West Asian and Islamic history. And I received my Ph.D. from UC Berkeley in 2000.

I began my study at Berkeley in 1990 and spent the 10 years there getting my MA and PhD. And then it was very sort of happenstance, kind of fortuitous, that I was able to adjunct teach modern Middle Eastern history at Berkeley from 2000 to 2003, which of course spanned. September 11th and so there was a huge interest among students at Berkeley for my classes and they grew that that term, you know, fall 2001 from 80 students to 280 students. And so sort of an intense period in which to cut my teeth in, you know, transitioning from a grad student to a lecture or so. It was in 2003 that I got my job at Cal State, Samernadino and I've been there ever since. My area of research specialization is modern Iran, Iran-U.S. relations and the development of

nationalism generally as a global phenomenon, but specifically in Iran. And in terms of my written work, I have my monograph, which is based on my dissertation, which focuses on the development of Iranian nationalism. And as well, I've worked with my mentor from my undergraduate. years at UC Santa Cruz, Edmund Burke, on a book titled Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East, which is a compilation of social biographies of what we would refer to as ordinary individuals from modern Middle Eastern history. And that's been a relatively popular volume. And thankfully, we're working on a third edition right now. So I'll just say, additionally, one of my teaching interests over the past few decades,

has been Palestine and what in at least on the syllabus we refer to as the Arab-Israeli conflict. And so I've pretty much been deep in the trenches, especially since September 11th, teaching students about Middle Eastern history, U.S. foreign policy, Zionism, the occupation, especially, you know, neoconservative ideology and the, the, the continual, I guess, wouldn't necessarily say development, but progression of, U.S. foreign policy within the context of PNAC and, you know, conservative ideology. So I think that probably should suffice as a basic introduction. And it's just great to be with you today, Brett. Absolutely. It's a pleasure. It's a genuine honor. And I'm so excited to get into this with you.

You mentioned a lot of your academic work is about the development of nationalism within Iran and the sort of examination and research of the different. ethnicities and, you know, cultures within this state that we call Iran, something that is almost never talked about in the West, never referenced, never thought about as a particularly important thing. So can you kind of talk a little bit about your overall work on that, why you're interested in that topic in particular? And also your personal history, because I believe, if I'm correct, the information is that you were born in Tehran and that you even hold dual citizenship with U.S. and Iran? Yes, yes, certainly. And I'll try to

not to be long-winded here, because this is basically my life story that led to my decision to pursue the subject of Iranian nationalism as a grad student. But just in a nutshell, having been born in Iran at the height of the Iran-U.S. relationship in 1967, this is the year that the Shah coronated himself as the king of kings of Iran. And really, the peak of the relationship, it would continue to develop with the Nixon doctrine and an increasing flow of arms. But the United States and Iran were essentially BFFs at this time. And so when I was a year old, though, my family moved to Los Angeles, California. And my mom, who is an American, my dad met her at University of Illinois, my parents essentially raised my sister and myself as, you know, American kids in the San Fernando

Valley, you know, a suburb of Los Angeles, without Armenian language in the home, without Farsi in the home. And so basically as a child, I became kind of confused about my identity, even though this wasn't something that was really conscious until junior high when the Iranian revolution hit and all of the sudden being born in Iran was something that got your ass kicked, whereas, you know, formerly it was just sort of, oh, interesting, or where is that? Or, oh, Persian, Persian carpets, cats. So it was the process of essentially the bullying in junior high. And my confusion about my identity that led me to ask my dad one night, dad, are we American,

are we Iranian or are we Armenian? And his response was basically affirmative, yes, you're all of those things. And that was just even more confusing to me, basically. Also just mentioned, because I think it's relevant, I grew up in the San Fernando Valley in a community that was probably majority Jewish. at least Sherman Oaks in Encino, California. And so all of my friends growing up at, you know, Sherman Oaks Elementary were Jews and went to their bar mitzvahs. We didn't have burrito line at our elementary.

We had bagel line, actually, in the 1970s. So this was also another element of the confusion. I even asked my dad at one point, you know, when's my bar mitzvah? He's like, you're not going to have one. And well, why? Because we're not Jewish. What's that? So just to advance, it was basically through my study.

of West Asian, you know, modern Middle Eastern history at UC Santa Cruz with Edmund Burke, that I finally learned about the dynamics and, you know, of course, the history of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and was also pretty stunned that the history that I was learning did not necessarily accord with the narratives that I was hearing from my family members who had decided to leave Iran immediately before or during the revolution. So, this was just very revelatory for me, and this is what really then drove me to specialize in modern Iranian history. And it was really just my interest in understanding how not only, of course, in the United States, where we have a civic nationalism, one can maintain hyphenated identities, if you will. So being an Armenian-American or Iranian-American or even Iranian-American is, is, is, is,

acceptable within the American, say, political and social framework because of the civic nationalism that the United States maintains. Iran similarly maintains a civic nationalism. And this was something that, of course, in my study of the history of the development of Iranian nationalism, I came to understand and then within my book to illustrate how this development of a civic nationalism in the post-World War II period is and remains one of the greatest strengths of the Iranian nation. And this would be both under the Pahlavi regime, which lasted up until 1979, and then of course, subsequently. under the Islamic Republic. Again, I don't want to take too much time in this initial response, but I'll just say briefly in terms of this maintenance of a civic nationalism in Iran.

This was not born out of any sort of like altruism on behalf of the Pahlavi government in the post-World War II era, but rather by necessity, because as I'm sure many of your, listeners are aware, Iran is incredibly diverse linguistically and ethnically. And so Persians only constitute about 55 to 60 percent of the population, especially in the periphery regions. There are Osri Turkish speakers. There are Arabic speakers. We have the Baloch. We have the Turkmen. You know, I could go on. And so in the aftermath of the Second World War, the first crisis of the Cold War, 1946-47, is known as the Azerbaijan crisis, in which Azeri Turks in the northwest of the country, as well as Kurds, sought to establish independent

states, and they sought Soviet assistance in the establishment of their independent states. This effort to create independent states was really born out of the 1930s when the father of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, Reza Shah tried to basically dropkick the country through forced modernization as well as exclusive linguistic nationalism. And his model was out of Turks, Turkey. So in the 1930s, the Iranian government tried to purge all of the minority languages, you know, Arabic, Turkish, Armenian, Hebrew, any foreign language they were called. And to just require, a linguistic conformity. Long story short, that completely failed.

Reza Shah was ousted by the British and the Soviets in 1941. And his son, at 22 years old, was essentially put on the throne by the allied powers. And of course, as you covered in your excellent interview with Dr. Afshin Matine-Askari, of course, the, Shaw's weakness eventually led to the gathering strength

of the Majlis and the nationalization movement, at which point he was placed in 1953 firmly in power as dictator, but there was this 12-year period between 41 and 53

when he was relatively much weaker. It is this period that is the crucible of Iran's civic nationalism because in the wake of the Azerbaijan, Rajan crisis, the Iranian government basically did a complete 180 in terms of this issue of

exclusive linguistic nationalism. And it turned from, you're all Persian, you know, you Armenians, you're just Christian Iranians. And so you need to start speaking Persian. It turned into, by necessity, again, not by altruism, but an embracing of the diversity of the, you know, the united colors of Iranian Benetan, if you will, you know, Kurdish Iranians, Arab-Iranians, Turkish Iranians, Armenia. We love, love, love them. The, the, the, the, the, the, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, happy Iranian diverse family. And so in that context, um, uh, hyphenated identities, uh, became essentially standard in Iran. And so, uh, sorry for the very long introductory answer, but, but, uh, but it is my, my, uh,

understanding of this transition from an exclusive ethnic nationalism to a civic nationalism and the, say, unity that such a framework of nationalism can provide that ultimately led me to, I'd say, the primary conclusions of my book on Iranian nationalism, which is that essentially the ongoing efforts by the American government under the Bush administration, the Obama administration, which is where my book was published in 2014, to utilize ethnic or religious minorities as a way to break up the state, to balkanize the state, that this would essentially result in failure. We didn't until the most recent war, not even really in the 12-day war, but in, if you will, the Ramadan War, the 40-day war, see this put to the test because, and, you know,

Trump was just talking about it in China or in interviews around the China visit, but that, you know, how upset he was with the Kurds that despite the arms that they were sent that, you know, they didn't proceed to dismantle and balkanize the Islamic Republic of Iran. I would argue that they would never have had the capacity either internally as a separatist group, or externally some sort of iridentism, simply because of the strength of Iran's civic nationalism and I'd say the buy-in of a vast majority of the population. Now, we could talk subsequently about challenges to national unity.

And, you know, I'd just say it's sort of, it's the economy stupid, obviously. And so that is going to put the hurt on the unity, if you will, under maximum pressure sanctions and challenge, I'd say, many Iranians sort of sense of loyalty, unfortunately. And this is a complex issue. But when people cannot see a future for their kids, irrespective of where that economic pressure is coming from, they rethink oftentimes their life trajectory and choices. And so things are very difficult. But I just say in some, the conclusions of my study on Iranian nationalism have clearly been borne out, especially in relation

to the linguistic minorities. I mean, and I'll just close in this response, there was a video from Baluch tribesmen in the southeast of the country, you know, proclaiming their loyalty to the Islamic Republic, their recognition and a concern for the leader, Moshaba, Chahmani, and, you know, standing there with their rifles, their statement that they would defend the Islamic Republic until the end.

There is a slightly performative, dialogic element involved in these displays that we could maybe discuss, but they are genuine. And in their genuineness, if you will, they illustrate, the continual strength of Iran's civic nationalism. Beautifully and expertly stated, I love that summation of the core of your work.

And it really cuts to a lot of the core of the conflict we're talking about now. You're talking about Bush era, basically predictions that if there was ever overt aggression against Iran, they would attempt, as they have in so many other places, including most recently Syria, to divide the country up along the lines of religious and ethnic, NIC sectarian divisions, play on those divisions, exaggerate those divisions in order to undermine basically civic nationalism and even civil society more broadly in some places those have worked. You have to think of the history of colonization in the global south, Sykes Pico, the carving up by colonial European powers and the imposition of borders on lands that the Europeans didn't

understand or even really care to understand, which would then give rise to the possibility of ethnic and religious sectarianism inside ostensible nation states. But as you said, during the Bush era, you said that civic nationalism was strong enough to hold these groups together and that that plan wouldn't work. The sanctions regime imposed on Iran for years and years and years is certainly an attempt to create that uncertainty about people's futures and the futures of their children that you were referencing, that then in times of economic, dire straits might be enough, might be sufficient for people to turn inward toward their own

ethnicity or religious sectarianism as an attempt to try to solve the problem of economic depravity. That has not worked. And then the ultimate move beyond the sanctions was, of course, under pressure of a war of aggression, that that might be enough to inflame these divisions and create the breakdown of civil society that would result in the overthrow of the government or just the collapse of the entire society. That was clearly, and in some degrees perhaps still is, clearly the goal of the U.S. and Israel with regards to Iran. But I want to ask another question about that a little bit. You've mentioned some of the ethnicities and some of the languages involved. Can you give us a rough breakdown, an ethnic breakdown of Iranian society? You mentioned

Persians 50 to 60 percent. Can you give us a rough estimate of the other major ethnicities? And then I'm also interested in whether or not they form geographic enclaves, right, or whether they are more or less mixed into the broader Iranian society and don't necessarily have that enclave effect that you see in some other countries. Great, great question, man. And honestly, I don't have the exact statistics off the top of my head, but I can give a pretty informed guesstimate. It's roughly for the larger linguistic minorities, that would be Azari Turkish speakers, Kurdish speakers, and Arabic speakers. I would say those are roughly at about

8 to 10 percent each roughly speaking and in general parity on the western border of Iran. Baluch maybe another 5, 6 percent. And then you have maybe one to 2 percent that would include Assyrians, Armenians, Hebrew speakers, and then some of the Turkic dialects that have still persisted amongst tribal communities. So those are the largest linguistic groups, of course, in terms of the, if you will, potential threat to the unity of the Islamic Republic or of Iran, of modern Iran generally under any.

any government. It is along the periphery, the borders in the west and the east, that we have these larger blocks of linguistic minorities that, of course, then spill over across the border. Therefore, these would be the regions that would be of concern for the government in Tehran, of course, again, based on very clear historical precedent of the Azerbaijan crisis. The fact is that the government being aware of the potential separatist interests of even potentially a very small minority in these regions has led the government to shape development geographically within the country, towards the center of the country, towards the heartland, you know, the sort of strip from Tehran down through Rome to Isfahan and over Shiraz centrally. Central Iran is where most of the heavy industry and also out east in Mashhad. But for example, you know, you go to Sanandaj in Kurdistan and I have a dear friend who's a professor there who was taking me around and he took me to a high spot in the city, a beautiful

vista point. And I was, you know, just in awe of how beautiful it was. And he asked me, he's like, what don't you see? And that sort of trick question I'm looking and I'm like, I don't know. Come on, what don't you see? looking and he's like, you don't see any industry, you don't see any smokestacks. You know, there's not much, not much industrial or in terms of, not necessarily business, but production. And so it is, the production facilities, industrial facilities are not near the border.

And expenditures on infrastructure in bordering communities and cities is much, much less than it is within the center of the country. So I'm just explaining this as a reality. You go down to, say, Hormshar, which is the city that was utterly destroyed in the Iran-Iraq War, and you still notice that there's, you know, artillery holes in the side of buildings.

And, you know, you see machine gun strips. And I actually asked a cab driver once, like, oh, wow. So this is a long time ago. But also, did they leave this here? It's a sort of like living museum so that everyone can remember. And his point, and cab drivers are pretty honest, he was like, no, it's actually because they don't ever come down here

and spend any money on us because they're worried that we're going to, like, split off. So that's just the honest response of Takazade, my cab driver, who I'll never forget, great guy. But the, so this is just a reality. The government is aware of the interests of the Zionists, the Americans, their lapdogs in the region, extending around, you know, the littoral states of the Persian Gulf, which were all in on the Iran-Iraq War in their support for the Iraqi government, along with, of course, you know, it was 37 nations in total selling arms to Iraq. So with these external challenges that

seek to create disunity, that seek to split portions of Iran off, and they're very explain. about this. I mean, there's even maps showing the neoconservative vision for a newly gerrymandered Iran. The government, therefore, then takes sort of a dual track. It is, it is maintains concerns and policies that reflect these concerns about border security and border regions. And one could say, well, that's not exactly fair in terms of the division of wealth. But that is is one impact. But that. the tripling down on the civic nationalism. And what I mean by that is the Iranian civic nationalism is a two-way street, if you will. It is dialogic in character. And so it's one thing for the government, if you will, and I'm characterizing to just say, oh, you know, we loves us, our Kurds, you know, our Kurdish Iranians. But what's in it for the Kurdish Iranians? Why would they play this game? Why would they participate? What is in Iranian nationalism?

which at core is based on, you know, Persian-ness for the Kurds. What's in it for the Armenians? What's in it for the Arabs or for the Azeri Turks? By, if you will, engaging in the civic nationalism, by playing the game, by taking this on as one's hyphenated identity, the benefits of being included within this fabric of the Iranian nation are the security. of the state itself. And before even going on, I just want to want to talk about that in relation

to the image I just painted of Professor Amini taking me out around in Sanandage to see the beauty and, of course, the lack of industry. I actually asked, you know, so there's the potential. This was a very long time ago, by the way. This was in, I believe this was 2005 when, you know, the United States was still occupying Iraq and was potentially going to formulate an independent Kurdish state, if not just an autonomous region. And I asked, you know, so what's, what's your take on that? How do you think Iranian Kurds feel about that? And the response in a nutshell was basically this. And it was an honest response, hey, look, if there was ever an independent, strong and viable and safe Kurdish state, certainly Iranian Kurds would be interested in that.

We'd probably want to join that in some way. But the fact is, that isn't happening. That's not. going to happen. We are the safest. We are in terms of our economic and educational potentials, the ability to see a future for our families here within this country. Like, we have all of that and we are enjoying that and we would never put that at risk. And I genuinely believe that this was honest. So again, sure, if there was an independent Kurdistan, we would want to be a part of that, but we will essentially be the last of the Kurds to ever agitate for that, considering how good we have it here within Iran, which recognizes our Kurdishness, if you will. So think about Iraq with the Anfal campaign,

slaughtering hundreds of thousands of Kurds. Think about Turkey. And it's ongoing, I consider it to be a form of genocide against the Kurds of southern Turkey. Kurds in Iran, seeing the exclusive ethnic nationalism of Turkey and how it has impinged on the lives of Kurds living there, the millions of Kurds living there, the situation in Iraq. Subsequently, the situation and even through the present in Syria, I'd say all the way through the present, one can see why Iranian Kurds would engage in this dialogic relationship. And so the government can proclaim the loyalty of its Iran's Kurdish population and the Kurds can step up and embrace that inclusion within the, you know, durable fabric of the Iranian nation. And I'll just say, Brett, just one last thing. This dialogic relationship has been illustrated yet again through the most recent, you know, efforts of the United States to destroy Iran through through. both the war, but also clearly, they're open about it, their agitation and their provision of

arms and training and funds to Kurds. It didn't work. And we had, this is in, you know, Iranian news, but scores of interviews with Iranian Kurds in Kurdistan, essentially laughing at and scoffing about this idea that Iranian Kurds, you know, would ever join with such scofflaws, you know, standing in, in squares in Kurdistan, waving the flag of the Islamic Republic. This instance, this moment when a Kurdistan is waving the flag of the Islamic Republic, proclaiming its strength and its graces, in the face of, you know, aggressive imperialist warfare, this is the stuff of, you know, the crucible of Iranian civic nationalism being revived being being sort of reified and being being illustrated once again in the present to

carry forward. So same thing with the Baluch tribesmen getting out there in front of the camera with their guns and making their proclamations. This is the moment of, if you will, the illustration of that dialogic relationship. And the government is going to put that on TV and say, look, look at how unified and awesome we are. And the effort, and religious minorities are then going to benefit from that inclusion and from that trust that is generated through these dialogic interactions. Wow. I'm an Irish-German-American and you got me wanting to wave around the flag of the Islamic Republic.

No, that's fascinating. Amazing summation of so much complexity in history, cultural difference and the cohesion of the civic nationalist sort of glue that holds these people together. it's a beautiful thing and it's had as you mentioned the exact opposite effect that Israel and the U.S. wanted it to have when you see these disparate groups with sometimes genuine

conflicts, you know, come out and say that, you know, this is what we are and this is who we stand with. And of course, the ultimate goal, I mean, they even have fantasies of balkanizing China and Russia along ethnic lines and so it's very similar here in Iran. That would be the ideal situation

for Western colonial and imperialist powers. I'm interested, I mean, you're covering a lot of the stuff that I had in some of these questions, so I'm kind of bouncing around a little bit here. You talked about civic nationalism and ethnic breakdown. I'm interested in seeing how the Islamic Republic has approached religious differences in particular. You can touch on that, and then the other question attached to it is zooming outside of Iran, and you're a member of the Iranian diaspora, the Armenian diaspora. Can you talk about the dynamics of the diaspora and particular, because, you know, many times when we hear from the Iranian diaspora, we,

the Cuban diaspora, right, you see a very certain sort of counter-revolutionary politic emerge from these, these diaspora cultures. And so I'm wondering if you could speak to that as well. Sure, sure. You know, beginning with religion, as, you know, once the referendum occurred, which you talked about with, with Professor Matina Ascari, and, and, you know, and, you know, an Islamic Republic was established and a constitution for an Islamic Republic was created. Interestingly of note, one of my advisors at UC Berkeley, Hamid Algar, did the translation and spent time. There's photos of him with Ayatollah Khomeini doing the English language translation of the constitution of the Islamic Republic. But as an Islamic Republic, the recognition of the rights and, if you

will, the validity of the monotheistic, recognized monotheistic faiths, which in Iran would be Judaism, Christianity, Islam, of course, right? And as well, Zoroastrianism, the rights to pursue one's religious traditions, one's religious rituals is baked into the Islamic Republic of Iran. And I'll just say, therefore, Armenians, Jews, you want to drink, it's your holiday, go for it. That's your religion is how it's actually cast. I was in a Jewish shopkeepers store a couple decades ago. But anyway, first thing he's like, oh, you're Armenian? Dude, whips out a bottle of vodka, slams it on the table, which I actually don't drink.

So then he was chiding me for that, you're Armenian, you don't drink. But so, and he kind of looked out. He's like, dude, it's cool. Come on. You know, we're like, we're minorities. So it's like legally speaking even. and this is critically important, the leadership of the Islamic Republic. In fact, it was Saeed Ayatollah Ali Khanini himself who made the decision to break with what would be considered traditional, well, I guess Islamic tradition,

and to give religious minorities in Iran complete and full legal equality and that in terms of their blood. And here's what I mean by that. with the original establishment of the Constitution, religious freedoms and rights were provided to all recognize religious minorities. And by the way, the Baha'is were not recognized as a legitimate religious minorities. And so they do not enjoy these same rights. But for those who are deemed to be, you know, the Ahe al-Kitab, the respected peoples of the book initially and during the 1980s,

their testimony in court and as well their blood was not equal to an Iranian Muslim's blood. And this has to do with blood money if you hit somebody in the street, but also testimony in court. This became a huge issue, perhaps obviously, with the large Armenian community, with the largest Jewish community in West Asia outside of Israel, which is in the Islamic Republic of Iran. and Iatole Comini basically made a decision, and that decision was for national unity and civic nationalism over tradition. And so he issued a ruling that essentially, and I'm characterizing the ruling that essentially states that, yes, whereas it would be traditional to deny equal blood money and sort of recognition legally to religious minorities, we're, we're, doing this in the context of our state and of our nation and in the context of its, say, political and and social framework, which is more complex than simply what Islamic tradition would suggest as appropriate. And so therefore, you know, I am issuing a directive to change that law and to provide

a complete equality to all Iranians. And so this, of course, for the, for the, Armenians, the Assyrians, the Jewish community for the Zoroastrians, you know, this is everything. This is, this is huge. Now, I just want to mention, though, as well, just briefly, that irrespective of how strong the civic nationalist bond within Iran is, the economic circumstances do still greatly impinge on individuals' lives and the communal life. And basically, I guess let me just say this in another way, the civic nationalism can. can't carry it all, especially in times of need and under maximum pressure sanctions and with the inflation, things just really, really get increasingly desperate. As I mentioned, people start to rethink their sort of lives and life choices and their trajectory. And so

I'll just say, Brett, my major concern, I mean probably my darkest 48 hours, of myself, rethinking my own analyses, my, my own understanding of what I believe to be the strength of Iran's nationalism and its internal cohesion during the January riots. And I'd say the first 48 hours of those riots. And those were the Mossad and CIA trained, paid for and inspired and guided riots that led to the deaths of, it seems to be about 3,000 Iranians in total. This is, this is in January again, you know, before the 12-day, excuse me, the Ramadan war broke out on February 28th. This was the moment in which because of the epic inflation, just the twisted inflation of the Iranian Riyadh, which is just, you know, was blowing my mind. I just

jaw-gap, couldn't wrap my head around it. The, the, you know, with those economic circumstances, after years of maximum pressure sanctions and no seeming light on the horizon after what could be considered to be Iran's victory in the 12-day war. Once the shit hit the fan on the streets, Brett, I was genuinely concerned that irrespective of everything I've written about

and lectured on and waxed eloquent about that these economic circumstances might tip the balance and lead more individuals from periphery, regions, which are, as I've explained, kind of inherently, they're that much less endowed because of Iran's security concerns. And then you add on, you know, Starlink and, you know, boatloads of weapons. This was the moment where I was really genuinely concerned and sort of big question mark,

okay, what's going to happen? That Monday, this was essentially like a late Friday night when things got crazy and, you know, these Zionists and CIA stormtroopers took to the streets. Monday, when the Iranian people in squares throughout the country, cities throughout the country, and I'm talking about cities, you know, along the western border and the eastern border took to the streets with the flag of the Islamic Republic, proclaiming their loyalty and their support, I knew in that moment that essentially it was over. And what I mean by that is that this was not going to be successful. That there was no way it was going to be successful.

And I'll just add similarly, irrespective of whether Iran has 70% of its missiles left or 50% or 120% as Iraqi said, the strength of the Islamic Republic of Iran is and remains the support of the Iranian people. And seeing millions, literally millions of Iranians on the streets daily in cities throughout the country, something that Western mainstream media is not showing, but that you can find all day long via telegram or less, less, of course, unfortunately, because of censorship, but on X, this has basically been joyous for me to behold. And I believe, you know, it's at really that point. And I'd say a few days into the Ramadan war, where once again, you know, Iranians began this ritual, which continues to this minute, like of remaining in squares on the scene, as they say, locking it down, making sure that the CIA and Mossad trained agitators cannot begin, can't even show their faces on the streets. I have no doubt that Iran is going to emerge victorious, again, irrespective of its ballistic missile supply or its potential development of nuclear weapons.

Just your second question, Brett, if I, I believe I covered the first one, perhaps more than I, with more detail than I should have. But the diaspora man, I'll just say having, as I explained a little bit of my background, you know, I, having grown up in Los Angeles and then with a multitude of relatives coming from in 1978, 79, basically since I was the, the boy and the family, I got to give up my room to two relatives as, you know, our house being a sort of way station between Tehran and their ultimate purchasing of a house in Glendale or Westwood, right? Because that's where they essentially all went. I was essentially indoctrinated as a young teen to fear and to loathe the Islamic Republic in Ayatollah Khomeini. I had a friend gave me a role of, of Ayatollah Khomeini toilet paper.

Like every sheet of the roll, you know, it's like a Scots sheet of a thousand was, we had the image of Ayatollah Khomeini. That would be quite the eBay item these days. I don't even remember what I did with it, but didn't have it for long. But of course, I had no problem with that at the time

because I didn't know anything other than that the Shah of Iran was this like wonderful provider, you know, and modernizer and industrial developer and now Iran was going back to the 7th century and to medieval times. The ass kickings that I received at Van Nuys Junior High didn't really help to endear me to what was going on in Iran and then just honestly, subsequently with the beginnings

of the Iran-Iraq War and learning that and from relatives who were leaving, you know, 80, 81, that conscription was happening and that people were dying on battlefields. This, this just, you know, as a teen, just to completely freak me out. And so, so in short, I fully like bought into what my elders and people who knew, right, these people were coming from Iran. They knew Iran. I grew up in Los Angeles, California. I was a year old when I left. I didn't remember Iran. I don't speak Farsi. So these people must know what's going on. It was, it was for those reasons that taking my college courses with Edmund Burke at UC Santa Cruz were so totally mind-blowing because it was then

for the first time that I really understood what was going on. And subsequently returning home from the university to have kebab in L.A. with family members, we started to get into it, right? Because I would start to ask questions about this or that or, gee, what were they doing such that they were able to bring millions of dollars here and go visit Las Vegas every month? And of course, that I became sort of and have remained the family black sheep for asking these these tough questions and then and then pursuing the the career that I did. But so, so anyway, Brett, I'll just say, and I can speak from from a position of knowledge of this. There is no more indoctrinated, brainwashed, bat-shit-cra that I know of. I mean, I'm not intimately familiar with the Cubans. I know it's pretty

rough in that, you know, southern Florida crowd. But, I mean, it's just, if it wasn't already bad enough, just this like Shah Pallas, this Shaw worship of, you know, a completely illegitimate regime, there is no long lineage to the Pahlavi's. Reza Shah just made the title up. He pulled it out of his ass. It comes from ancient Persian, but I'm just saying so, the the knowledge of the reality of the Pala'i regime, what the Shah did and didn't do, yes, there was industrialization but how about literacy? How about

opportunities for women irrespective of miniskirts, right? Like, or bikinis, the desperation of the diaspora in terms of, you know, they're clinging to

monarchism and to these, like, kind of crack pipe dreams of a revification of royalism and, you know, I guess a return to rapid westernization. This is just sort of broken their brains and their soul. I'm just even knowing what I know, having been dealing with these folks for many, many decades, I'm 59, so it's been a long run with them. I myself just stunned at people twerking and dancing. with the initiation of kinetic strikes on their country.

I'm dumbfounded by this. I'm disgusted by this. And I guess on a positive note, hearteningly, most of, I think most Iranians in Iran certainly completely disgusted by it, but also most human beings around the world disgusted by it and with the failure of the Zio-American Empire to destroy the Islamic Republic, as they had hoped. To say that they are kicking rocks right now would be a vast understatement.

I mean, just go suck on your gun or, you know, turn your car on in the garage. These people, this is, these are the lowest of the low. I mean, actually, it reminds me of a very intense scene from the last scene in House of Sand and Fog, which is, if you know that film, Brett, is directly relevant to the monarchist diaspora in Los Angeles. their ultimate suicide. Sorry to be so harsh, man, but I've never seen something so disgusting. And I just really, as you can tell, it's hard to find, you know, words to articulate it in its full sort of disgusting complexity. But so I'll just say this in closing. I, for a good

50-some years, have been enjoying kebab in Los Angeles with families. members and friends. And honestly, I will not be able to do that anymore because I will not be able to keep my mouth shut and I will get my ass kicked like it's 1979 all over again. And so I'm essentially done with the tradition of kebab in Los Angeles because the, they call it Tehranjulus, if you're aware of Westwood, Vestvud, as they refer to it. But it's just, you know, Westwood Boulevard, you'd think you're in Tehran. It's all all Farsi, but it's all Shiro Horshid flags. It's all lion in the sun flags and and, you know, they're, they're just hardcore royalists down there. So, so whereas I was able to go down and sort of, yeah, keep my

nose clean and not speak too loudly, I will be unable to interface with that community going forward because of the disgusting display of self-hate and support for Zionism and imperialism. Yeah, no, absolutely. I find that incredibly convincing and moving and fascinating and having to be a part of that diaspora coming up and sort of being brainwashed by it, but then following truth where it led you and then having a complete inversion, a sort of political awakening to the truth of history and the Iranian situation and then finding yourself at odds with people who are your family, your friends, your community. And for those that don't know, I mean, many of my audience will, but I think the the analog between. Cuban diaspora and Miami, the reactionary Cuban sort of base in Miami. You know, Marco Rubio comes out of, in some ways, that community. They're hell-bent on destroying Cuba. We're releasing an episode on Cuba in the next couple of days talking exactly about that in the horrific situation that Cuba finds itself in with the tightening of the embargo in particular.

The analog to Iranian diaspora in L.A. is pretty much one for one. If you understand the Cubans in Miami, that's a very similar sort of movement in L.A. around the Iranian diaspora. And so I find it fascinating to hear your personal experience navigating that. So let's go ahead and move forward. I have one more question about kind of this stuff. And then we'll get into the current war proper because I'd love to hear your analysis of what's actually going on in real time now. But, you know, in the current war, Western media keeps collapsing Iranian society into either the, the regime or, you know, the oppressed people waiting for liberation.

I think you've done a lot of work dismantling that already. And for decades, U.S. and Israeli planners, they've really treated Iran as if it were brittle, as if, you know, sanctions, assassinations, bombing campaigns, internal sabotage by Mossad agents, pressures on minority groups, as we've talked about, would eventually produce internal collapse. They have Mossad, they have the CIA, they have the capacity to attend. at least to understand Iranian society, and yet they've really doubled down on what has so far seemed to be an incorrect analysis of precisely that. So why does, in your opinion, this imperial fantasy persist? And what does it reveal about how profoundly Washington and Tel Aviv misunderstand

Iranian society, despite all the resources and the intelligence agencies they have ostensibly working on just that? Well, I think it persists. I'd have to go back to what was, you know, and you discussed this at length with Dr. Mantina Skari, the trauma for the United States, for the imperialists that came from the revolution itself, you know, the United States, quote-unquote, losing Iran as if it was, you know, the American property to lose. And as well, the hostage crisis, which, if you will, and this was sort of the terminology of the day, made this superpower feel impotent in the face of, you know, these fanatical, you know, terrorist hostage takers. And so, of course, you know, we've had now 47 years of intensive

anti-Iranian propaganda from our mainstream media, which has, you know, perpetuated this line, this idea that, you know, Iran is basically just a top-down dictatorship, right, that the mullahs run everything and dictate everything. Therefore, everyone in the country or everyone except for a tiny minority of whatever fanatical Islamist terrorists is just waiting to be liberated so that they can do only fans and wear miniskirts and have, you know, Zio-American investment. And so this. This is just the, essentially the anti-Iranian propaganda line that the mainstream media sustains decade after decade all the way through the present.

So they, there's nothing else they can do. They don't have another narrative, unfortunately. They are incapable of changing their tune. It's thankfully, you know, alternative media like people like you and all of the other amazing alternative spaces have become a vehicle through which to, talk about historical fact and reality and complexity. But, you know, from the mainstream media, which, of course, then feeds into the understanding of our extremely dumped down and inbred, I don't know if you can even call it a diplomatic

core anymore, but, you know, are the political elites who are involved in negotiations. I mean, right now, Brett, you know, it's like Whitkoff and Kushner. And so it's just, I don't know what to call these people. But this completely, of course, informs their understanding of Iran and then therefore their agenda and their approach to trying to break it up. Of course, since they don't understand Iran, they don't know anything about Iran or Iranian nationalism. This has led to their epic failure. This is part of their epic failure.

And I'll just say, again, irrespective of the kinetic action, the fact that the fact that so many millions of Iranians are demonstrating their strong and unyielding support for the Islamic Republic at this time. So I'm just going to give a kind of quick and dirty, again, rough breakdown percentage-wise to then further illustrate the sort of the realities of what I see on the ground in Iran. And this is dynamic. This is changing right now. And that's why this is a little complex and a very cool question. But I would say, and I know other colleagues would agree, that you've got probably about 20%, and let's say 20% before the Ramadan war,

because again, things are in flux. Well, let's say 20% of Iranians who are hardcore, Jomhoea Islami, Islamic Republic supporters, like they love the leader, love the government, come out for demonstrations, four rallies. And by the way, the idea that these people are paid, my God, that's just one of the most inane talking points.

It's absurd. But anyway, just when you know Iran and you know who these people are, is just so absurd. But so they will always come out. You probably have another, I'd say, 15 to 20 percent of Iranians who are secular. They don't like religion. They want to, you know, twerk on only fans or have the allowance to.

They want to. They would love it if, you know, Iran was invested in by Israelis and Americans and, you know, just the whole sort of scope of Iran's Western, say, focus, Western gaze and Westernization. So I'd say, again, these are just very, very rough blocks. But so you've got a 20% on one side, hardcore supporters, diehards. And then another 20% 15 to 20% who are in the opposite camp. And so they're detractors. So let's take that really critical large, like middle chunk of Iranians.

There's a, there's a, it's not exactly a joke, but, but it's kind of a joke that comes from the 1953 coup era that can help illustrate the point that I need to make. During the run-up to the coup in the months before the coup, there were a multitude daily street demonstrations in support of the Shah, in support of Mossadegh, in support of the Tudai party, the socialist-slash-communist party of Iran. And so it was very common to, you know, you'd come around a corner and you'd see a gaggle of Iranians walking down the street carrying placards and they'd be saying, you know, Zendibad Shah, Zendibad Shah, which is, you know, long live the Shah, long live the Shah, long-lived the Shah, Zendibad Mosadegh, like long-lived Mossadegh, right?

So as the joke story goes, you know, someone comes around the corner and, And there's this group of minorities, let's just say, a grouping of Iranian minorities. Let's say they're Assyrians, right? Or Zoroastrians. Zendabod, Zendabod, they're chanting. Zendabod, which means long live, long live. And the person asks, Zendabod Kia, long live, who? And they say, we'll tell you tomorrow, Fardah.

Basically, the joke is their, they're fence sitting, right? they're not sure like who to proclaim long live long life to because things might change tomorrow so better to be out on the street zendibad like yes we're long live we're in support um and we'll we'll make the actual determination who we support tomorrow right so you know on if you will august 20th uh 1953 that would have been of course zendibad shah that's what we meant the whole time so so um the economic circumstances i i i interviewed for my book on Iranian nationalism, a multitude of Iranians who had lived through all of these events. And I asked, actually, it was the wife of the former Mazlis member,

Sevok Saganian. I was just asking her what she remembered about the Mossadegh period and, and, you know, how supportive she was of what Mossadegh was speaking of because, you know, it's complex. Her husband was a Mazlis member who was close with the Shah. But, but as she explained to me, as Nella Saganian did, She said, David, you know, we were all behind Mossadegh. We all wanted our oil to be under the control of Iranians. But once the British put their boycott on and, you know, after a year and a half, people started to say, and she said it in Farsiel to say it in English, but ideology is good. Meat is better.

Okay. So ideology is good. Meat is better. And what Nella was basically just reflecting was that it's the economy stupid point, right? that love you, Mossadegh, we should nationalize our oil as Iranians, yes, but the price of things is getting so out of hand that this is making me kind of rethink my, you know, ideological commitment to this movement in this moment. So I'm kind of extrapolating out from Nella's, uh, Nella's comments, comments there. So, so here's the thing, Brett. Then this is why I was so

worried in in January after the real just took a dump to like 1.2 million. When I was there before with Ednaud Hussein in December, just the month before, it was only at about 850,000 to the dollar, which is already absurd. But so I was genuinely worried that, you know, ideology is good, but meat is better was going to come into play. It's with the precedent of the Islamic Revolution, the knowledge of Iranians, that Iranians have the capacity to overthrow any government that might claim to represent them or that is in control in Tehran with this knowledge and with the situation that the economy was in, I was genuinely worried that a larger percent of this middle chunk of the 60 percent, maybe 20 percent of that 60 percent might join in with the

CIA and Mossad trade paid and armed agitators to to bring an end to this, the suffering that they are experiencing under sanctions, you know, over decades. Again, it would be my, my worst fear, and was my worst fear that that would happen. But I just have to say in a sense, I understand from my study of history and human societies and nationalism and Iran, the potential for that to have occurred. And so this is why the victory, I would say, of the Islamic Republic in this last Ramadan war, I don't know what's going to happen today or if kinetic action is going to pick up again, but has I believe been so critical to, and I don't want to overstate it here,

but in a way what I'm seeing is a revification of the 1979 revolution in 2026. Largely, well, I wouldn't necessarily largely, but a huge component is the concept of victory has a thousand fathers and defeat is an orphan. If that's 60% who in early January had to make a decision, are we going to take to the streets and join in to overthrow the government so that we can, can get some sort of relief from what's going on. That's 60% after a few days into the Ramadan war sees light at the end of the tunnel, understands the leverage that the Strait of Hormuz can provide in terms of escaping the sanctions.

All of a sudden, not only does victory have a thousand fathers, but the support of the government, which clearly demonstrated its successful planning and, you know, readying for this war, I mean, against two nuclear-armed superpowers who have been, you know, at the center of the world economy and not on maximum pressure sanctions, I believe that this has been critical to reviving a sort of new, and there's a dialogic element of this that I'll describe it in a second, but a sort of new energy within Iran for support of, of the leadership, of the Constitution, of the Islamic Republic. So not just I'm an Iranian and so I sort of support Iran and, you know, irrespective of who is governing us, but actually a support for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Whether or not that point made exact sense, let me give you an example that I think can help to kind of crystallize that verbally and maybe, maybe,

visually in people's mind's eyes. I think many of your viewers have seen the now, it's almost, they've almost become, not cliche, but there are dime a dozen, these videos of women without hijab, very Western styled and dressed, you know, with their hair flowing, standing, you know, in Engelab Square,

or, you know, somewhere in Mashad or down in San Antonio Square, waving the flag of the Islamic Republic, maybe holding a photo of, you know, Saeed Mochaba, Ahamane and then being interviewed like, hey, you know, why are you here and what are, you know, why are you here, you know, kind of making it obvious that, you know, what do you support this government? And, and this moment when an Iranian woman who looks like she's dressing for, you know, Westwood, maybe before the Ramadan war is standing there with the flag in the photo of Mojdhavahamini,

proclaiming her support for the Islamic Republic. This is a dialogic moment in the further evolution of Iranian nationalism because by participating, by showing up, and then by articulating her support for the government in this moment, without her hijab, she helps to interweave Iranian women who don't favor hijab into this fabric of the Iranian nation as it stands up to the Zio-American murderous genocidal onslaught. At this moment of dire need for the Republic, Iranians are turning out.

And these sisters, whether they choose to wear hijab or not, are Iranians just like the rest of us. There's amazing video where this woman, a hardcore hijabi, comes up right after and, like, throws her arms around this woman. And she's like, this is our sister. I love her. Like, gives her a kiss. And so that's that moment, man. And that's why I'm saying. And then just to kind of conclude here,

That 60%, if you will, again, I'm talking in, you know, really broad generalizations here, but seeing the light at the end of the tunnel, seeing that, you know, this government, which has been proclaiming its preparation, proclaiming for years what it would do, should it be attacked by Israel and Iran, it followed through. It has been, as I think the humanity has witnessed, over the last few months. It has been truthful in all of its statements and proclamations. I mean, you even have talking heads, you know, the commentary at here, even members of

government establishment, if you will, saying, well, you know, the Trump administration says one thing, let's wait to hear what Iraqi says, and then we can decipher what's actually true. And so a recognition of the genuine preparation, the decision, the genuine preparation, the genuine sort of status, unity, and abilities of the Islamic Republic. With that said, then, a much larger percentage of the population now, that percentage that wasn't extremely anti or extremely supportive, but that just wanted to buy chicken at a reasonable price, damn it, they see the light at the end of the tunnel.

And the light at the end of the tunnel is supporting the government right now in its efforts to maintain control over the Strait of Hormuz and to, if you will, lock the streets down with people on the scene so that the CIA and Mossad trained agitators can't start burning ambulances and, you know, killing unarmed policemen. And so this is, it's like, as they say,

you know, courage is contagious. And with the thousand and then a thousand and one and two, mothers and fathers of this victory, I'm seeing it. And it's amazing to behold, but sort of, you know, Islamic Republic, you know, second edition, a newly strengthened and revived civic nationalism that now can also include Iranians who formerly would have opposed the government or its policies because of things like sartorial laws, you know, dress codes, but who now are demonstrating and support. and Brett, sorry, but just one lastest anecdote. But there was another very complex interview that was given with, it was the same kind of thing, this woman long, blonde, you know,

braided hair hanging off the side. And this guy walked up to her with the camera to ask, you know, what are you doing here? And she was openly a little bit uncomfortable with his camera. And she said, hey, dude, I don't really want to be on your camera here. And so I'd say kind of her disrespectfully, you know, he put the camera down, but then he was still. recording and he then went with her question well why are you here and her her answer was was was

was not exactly straight it she she was she was clearly uh formulating her understanding of why she was there in the moment being asked and she was like you know i don't exactly know i mean and she said i was protesting before you know like like i was out in january and and uh you know i basically she was saying i was also out you could divine that it was during women life freedom. And she said, so this is really confusing, but what I see our government doing now and what I see others trying to do to us, you know, in combination, what else can I do as an Iranian, as an Iranian woman, but stand here together with my fellow Iranians in support of our nation and of our

government? So the point I'm making is you even had a woman who, very trepidacious to be on camera, very complex thoughts. She's trying to formulate it. She's saying, look, dude, I was out protesting before, right? But now, under these circumstances with what's going on, I got to support the government. Her presence in that square. And, you know, he also asked her. And so, you know, how are people treating you? She's fine. Everybody's great. You know, we're all Iranians here. Again, this is one of those amazing moments, at least in the mind's eye of a scholar of Iranian nationalism, where not only is this individual Iranian woman's nationalism taking shape,

but through the recording and the sharing, if you will, of her conundrum and her figuring it out, we're also advancing our own understanding and the character of Iranian nationalism itself. Yeah, I mean, wow, when you told the story of, you know, what could ostensibly be called like the conservative and liberal woman within Iranians, in domestic politics embracing and calling, you know, calling each other's sisters. It brought a tear to my eye just unexpectedly because it's such a beautiful moment of coming together. And it really highlights the absurdity of the Western narrative about, I mean, so much of it was not even just liberating people in the abstract, but liberating women.

And what is the first thing that the U.S. does in this war of aggression? Bombs a little girl school, killing 150, 10060, 170, little baby precious girls and their teachers, obliterating them, immediately as the first stroke of the war, obliterating the idea that there's anything liberatory for anyone, especially women in Iranian society. So to see, you know, Iranian women who might be on the opposite sides of various domestic political divisions coming together, I think it really highlights so much of the grotesque, murderous nature of this Iowa American, forces and also speaks to your social and civic cohesion in the face

of this onslaught because whatever comes after the destruction of Iranian civil society at the behest of these disgusting rogue terrorist states the U.S. and Israel are not going to be better for anybody except Israel and the U.S. and the corporate interest that they represent and of course the geopolitical interest of the greater Israel project in the entire region. So yeah, that's incredibly moving.

I always get so upset when I look at these societies that have been sanctioned by the United States. And just because I just did an episode on Cuba yesterday and similar situation, right? The sanctions are meant to decimate and make more desperate the domestic populations of these countries. It strips them of medicine, of food, of energy. It creates inflationary spirals. It just destroys people's lives, their futures. I mean, you know, if you're in Cuba, if you're in Iran, and you know, and you have, you're pregnant or you're trying to build a family and this disgusting military empire is choking off your economy so that's, you know, your people are suffering that you look forward in your own child's future. And there's nothing but a huge question mark about how are they even going to survive?

And then those people who are doing that to you and your family then come in with a war of choice and aggression and tell you they're liberating you. It's disgusting. and people see through it. And what would Iran be without having to deal with sanctions? They're at the center of global trade. They're at the center of human civilization geographically. They're at the center in a lot of ways of three separate continents. West Asia is like this civilizational crossroads and always has been.

There is no world in which absent sanctions Iran doesn't have a thriving fucking economy that can support its people. And it's so disgusting what they're doing to it. So before I move on and talk a little bit more. about the war. I'm interested in two kind of questions here. I had a Palestinian guest on recently, and I asked the Palestinian guest what the view of Iran is from the perspective of Palestinians. And he says, you know, when Iranian missiles, when the Palestinians are watching Iranian missiles hit, you know, Tel Aviv and Israel, they feel hope. They feel finally somebody is standing up for us. So I'm going to invert that. And I'm asking you, and so far as you can tell,

what is the overarching view? I mean, you know, Iranian society, as we clearly indicated, is not a monolith, but what is the overarching view of the Palestinian genocide over the last two and a half years in Iran? And what role does that play in sort of the Iranian understanding of what's happening in the entire region? Yeah, great, great question, man. You know, and I'll be drawing also from observations of colleagues of mine in Iran, who are professors there who interact with Iranian students. And over the last few years have themselves watched and been pretty amazed by the change that they've witnessed and sort of the evolution of understanding of on behalf of many of their students in light of the daily live streamed genocide in Gaza. And so just to sort of characterize it generally, whereas there were students clearly who were not only not really supportive of the government generally,

but also who would be vocal, and not just students, of course, but this is something that would be articulated at rallies, opposing, say, economic policies or, you know, in terms of protests against inflation, that, you know, why are you spending all this money on Palestine? And that doesn't mean, you know, not being concerned about Palestinians or supporting Israel, but just we're in such dire straits here economically, you know, how can we afford this? And so, you know, being, again, this is before the genocide, very critical of Iran's support for its allies in the region, you know, support for Ansar al-Assabala, support to the extent that it can for Hamas,

and the resistance in both the West Bank and Gaza, the live stream genocide, which through, you know, their devices at VPNs, Iranian students and Iranians can witness just like anyone else can, has dramatically altered the perspectives of many of these former detractors of the government as well as the government's support for Palestinians. And so this is perhaps just obvious why. I mean, Iranians as human beings and Sir, critical of their government because they have one government and the sanctions are continuing. And so it's understandable that people are going to wonder, you know, how can we get out of

this and what could the government be doing potentially better to, you know, make our circumstances a little bit easier in the face of the U.S. supported daily genocide that, you know, the U.S. supplying its air bridge to just enable this, this shocking murder of families on a daily basis that all of us watched and continue to watch. I know you know too, Brett, it's still happening. It's happening every day. Not at the same clip, but it's still happening. This has had a truly remarkable effect on those who were fence sitters and also those who for sort of more economic concerns were also critical of the government's support for its allies in the region. I would kind of then link that to the point I was just making about the success of the Islamic

Republic, the success of, if you will, the government's plan for how it would deal with Israel and the United States should they attack and the knowledgeable of the glee that this provides, if just for one split second to a. Palestinian starving and dealing with genocide in Gaza, the, again, the support for Palestine, I'd say, goes sort of hand in hand with this increased support for the government. And it's, broader plans and, you know, proposed trajectory for the region. So, so for example, let me just say specifically, and this might help us segue into what's going on now. Just over the last few days, even though I knew this was going to be part of it,

you know, basically by, I'd say March 1st or 2nd, but members of the government, guys like Arakchi, also individuals who speak very reliably for, if you will, government policies such as Saeed Muhammad Morandi, who I'm sure your listeners are familiar with, are now explicitly linking Gaza and Lebanon to the Strait of Hormoz and to any permanent cessation

of hostilities between Iran and the United States, because the United States isn't the one that just gets to say when the war is over. It takes two to kinetically exchange. And so for this to be done for in the, say, plans now for for a future West Asia, the genocide in Gaza needs to come to an end, as well as the Dahlia doctrine in Lebanon. So here's why I'm making that point. Formerly, if you came out, you know, I'm saying before the genocide, right? And this is going to be Iran's trajectory. And, you know, we're not going to make any deals.

And we're potentially even going to go to war with Israel and the United States. If they don't lay off Lebanon and Gaza, I mean, that would have been sort of just a bad joke. Like, how are you going to do that? How's the rest of the world community and the region going to react? and how are the littoral Arab states going to react and how the Russia and China are going to react? And so we're in almost a new world, if you will, in this context here in May of 2026 with Iran having survived the, you know,

all the U.S. could pour on and Trump, you know, it's obliterate everything and what was it? Not complete capitulation, but what he called for, I'm forgetting it was a total victory or something like that. Yeah, yeah, some totalizing, yeah. So I'm forgetting the word, but anyway. Yeah, yeah. But but so the, I guess just in the context of what I was just saying about this,

you know, the Iranian Revolution, 2026, it goes hand in hand with, if you will, saving the Palestinians and the Lebanese from ongoing genocide and Gahia doctrine. And so I hope that point made sense that. Whereas before the genocide or before the 12-day war, the success in early January, as well as the Ramadan war, if one had explained that, yeah, this is going to be Iran's agenda and we're not going to release the Strait of Hormoz or give up until, you know, the Zionist stopped genocide in Ghazans and or, you know, starving Gossens and, you know, with the Weiss-class diet and engaging in the Dahlia doctrine, that would have been completely unacceptable and deemed kind of like lunatic. This is the the path to to that reality is is now clear. It is it is it is there's there's a very clear potential for that reality to be manifest by way of this trajectory that the Islamic Republic is pursuing and by these demands. And by the way, most importantly, I think to all of these subpoints that I'm making getting back to it's the economy. stupid. And this has also been articulated very clearly, much more clearly in the last two to three

days, even though, again, I think very close observers and like fanatics for this have seen this since the early March. But the Strait of Hormoz and its use is going to be tied to illegal sanctions going forward. And so to the extent that countries do not maintain American illegal secondary sanctions on Iran, they will be allowed to transit the Gulf potentially for free, even if they have a trade deal with Iran, maybe for very cheap. If they do their trade in reals or yuan, it'll be pretty cheap. If they want to use dollars, but they don't maintain sanctions, might be a little more. If they maintain sanctions, maybe they'll be paying a lot more. Maybe they won't be using the Persian Gulf at all or be allowed to receive resources, any types of

resources from the Persian Gulf. So what I'm saying is that this and this being, and this being, the support of Iran's regional allies, its opposition to the Zio-American Empire, and its interest now in controlling what is legitimately Iranian territorial waterways, not international law. This is a clear path to escaping the sanctions. Therefore, let me put it together, whereas maybe before overtly supporting Palestine was a vehicle through which you weren't going to get chicken at what was not 10 times the price of 2018 before Trump pulled out of the JCPOA.

Now we can not only support the Palestinians, who we always did in our heart, right? But we can support them full-blown and support our government in its support for the Palestinians as well as for us because we're getting the hell out of here. And that here is the hell of maximum pressure sanctions. So it's sort of a package deal here, this horizon of the future of the future. of Iran and West Asia absent maximum pressure sanctions and Zio-American imperial genocide. Yeah, no, expertly discussed and talked about and connecting all those issues. It's so fascinating.

And Iran's ability to have that sort of regional internationalism, if you will, that solidarity with Lebanon and with Palestine in particular. Their control over the strait and the leveraging of that against the global economy, which always, you know, hurts the U.S., trapping the U.S. in this sort of situation where the U.S. really is either has to capitulate to unprecedented demands, which would just be a full on defeat in any reasonable way. If Iran gets sanctions lifted, if Iran exerts its sole control over the Strait of Hormuz as it's already doing, these things are clear material victories for Iran. And there's no way that the U.S. can spin this as anything, you know,

but a complete defeat. The U.S. bases in the region have been destroyed, undermining a lot of these Gulf countries, you know, reliability and faith that the U.S. would have their back in this exact sort of instance. And the U.S. is really showing its limits, the limits of its ability to have these countries' backs, which I think is going to have long-term effects for the region. The global economy is, you know, increasingly in dire straits. There's a lag. So even if, you know, by some miracle, this war were to end today, we would still have inflationary lags throughout the supply chain and in the energy industry for months to come. And there's no by any means, any sign that this is going to end now. I'm paying now here in Nebraska, which is one of the lower costs across the

country, $4 a gallon in gas. And every time I do, it sucks, but I throw a salute eastward, because I know that this is part of Iran's ability to actually have leverage over the United States. And so my question to you is, with all of this in mind, you know, and the fact that Iran's demands themselves highlight the fact that Iran has the leverage here and is clearly currently in the superior position. Where do you think things go from here? And I'm also curious as a side question, who Iran's best allies have been in this latest phase of U.S. and Israeli aggression against them, who have actually stepped up in a meaningful way? I'm interested in that too. but the broader question is, where do things go from here? Because it seems to me that the U.S. either has to capitulate

and therefore have, you know, by any metric, a genuine defeat, or they have to escalate. And escalate here means that airstrikes are clearly not enough. So then ground troops are going to be necessary to move beyond this situation. That's kind of a question in the air right now. So I take all of that and I hand that over to you to take in any direction you want to. Excellent, man. I won't ramble too long because I know we're nearing sort of the end of our period here and it's just been great. So let me just say that I had gone on record after the 12-day war stating that I did not believe that the United States or Israel were going to attack Iran again.

I was a sort of lone voice. There were many talking heads, such as a treata Parsi who was, you know, they're going to attack in August. Oh, no, it's going to be late summer. It's got to be autumn. You know, there's a weather window. Alistair Crook. I mean, you know, Alistair Crook, I have huge respect for Alistair Crook. And Crook was like, it's going to happen. Absolutely.

I was sort of the lone wolf saying, and I believed my own interpretation that this is not going to happen. And, you know, why Dave isn't this going to happen? And my response was basically that Iran will shut down the strait of Hormoz. Iran has potentially hundreds of thousands of ballistic missiles that it will use to, you target all of the littoral, you know, et cetera. It's going to pummel Israel far worse than it did in the 12-day war. This will be unacceptable. The United States and Israel don't have a kinetic card to play here so that they're probably not going to do it. My belief was that there were some, if not adults in the room, just some more informed individuals, you know, who knows, whatever,

the Tulsi Gabbards, if you will, or somebody back there to say, like, dude, no, we're not doing this. It's not going to work. So I was wrong, Brett, and therefore, like, based on my same understanding of what would happen, should Trump decide, you know, once again, yeah, let's begin again and initiate the kinetic activity of any character trying to do a land invasion. That's just absurd. But just, you know, what the United States does best, which is essentially aerial warfare and then, you know, losing. my guess would be that no, it's not going to happen because it's only going to blow another few hundred billion dollars. It's going to bounce rubble. It's going to lead to further destruction of what remains of the 16 bases that Iran has already destroyed as well as who knows what is being destroyed in Israel because of their lockdown.

But again, logic would dictate that it's not going to happen. But who am I, David Yagubian, to say once again that this isn't going to have. happen when it could very clearly, as per our most recent example, happen again. So here's what I'd say, though, irrespective of whether the United States and Israel decide to go for one last wad and lose, which they will. It'll just be a repeat, just more expensive, and, you know, potentially just as deadly for civilians. I'm sure your listeners are familiar with the concept of agreement in capability. That is that the United States has been termed.

And I believe Sergey Lavrov came up with this, but it might have been another Russian diplomat, but I think it was Lavrov, that the United States is agreement incapable. That it, I mean, this is a no-brainer. Look at American history. It does not maintain or value its agreements. It breaks agreements all the time.

It breaks treaties at will, at whim, for its own interests, you know, flipping the bird to international law, you know, most relevant. Let's look at the JCPOA itself. Trump's out there saying, oh, they were going to build a nuclear weapon. And all of this is just such complete bullshit. Everyone knows if they're, you know,

informed about what the JCPOA actually accomplished in terms of nuclear nonproliferation, even if it didn't accomplish sanctions relief for, for Americans. So the United States is and remains agreement incapable. Therefore, as we move forward and whether or not, there is another round of kinetic exchanges. Whereas I argue against those who say, because you hear it all day, it's sort of cliche, that it's just impossible for the United States to drop its sanctions on Iran.

Like, irrespective of what Trump wants, even if he says the sanctions are going to be dropped, that that's just impossible. That will never happen because of Congress. People say that all the time, and I call bullshit on that. Because if Congress wanted to, if financial or their own political circumstances were such that they had to do that, they could do it in one day and we all know this. So this idea that the United States could never drop the sanctions. It's just bullshit. The United States could drop any.

The United States actually dropped sanctions on Iran and Russia a few days into the war. I think everyone will remember. So they did it instantaneously with some bullshit explanation that this was like judo or 5D chess or whatever. They did it. So, but anyway. I would just agree that politically, if you look at our Congress and how they vote even yesterday with the 212 to 212, like that that would be a tough road a hoe, right? But with that said, we're not just considering the agreement and capability of the pre-Romodon

war and pre, if you will, 2026 Iranian Revolution version 2.0. we're talking about, in my view, a different game board, not completely different, but with many new elements. And one of those elements is, perhaps most importantly, the control and the new regime of control that Iran is placing over the Strait of Hormoz. Based on what I just mentioned, and that is the explicit linking of Strait of Hormos transit to the maintenance of illegal American secondary sanctions, I believe that over the next really nine months to a year, we're going to see countries such as Japan are going to just have to make a decision. And that decision was before, as per the United States, you want to do business with the

United States and you won't be doing business with Iran. When Iran is basically able to say, okay, well, you can either get, you know, energy and other resources from the Gulf and drop your illegal. sanctions, illegal under international law. Okay. So we'll all be equal here, meaning, excuse me, we'll be legal here. Wonderful. If not, then I guess you can't have this and go do business with the United States. I think many nations are going to make the practical, pragmatic decision. And I think they're going to be thankful to Iran for this, actually, in the long term. Even saying the United States, hey, we'd love to maintain your illegal secondary sanctions and not do business with this incredibly

potentially profitable nation, but, you know, we just have to because we have to be able to fuel our industry and our vehicles, et cetera, and get helium and fertilizer and urea and all those other things, right? So we are going to see a pretty precipitous drop in the number of nations that are willing to humor the bullying of the United States for them to maintain illegal secondary sanctions. And therefore, I believe that we will increasingly be looking at a, an isolated United States that itself is going to, however it ends up bullshitting itself through, you know, basically a new narrative provided to the mainstream media that, hey, we're going to run with this.

I believe that the United States ultimately will itself be forced to drop the majority of its illegal secondary sanctions against Iran simply because the American economy is going to be suffering so greatly from the, shut off of access to Persian Gulf resources that Iran is going to maintain. So again, in terms of like, where is this going? It is not going to the Balkanization of Iran. It is not going to greater Israel and that project. It is certainly not going to the continued sustenance of the family regimes of the region

from Kuwait on down. Maybe something with Qatar can be worked out. But ultimately, I believe that whether or not the United States maintains its agreement in capability, it will be forced to just purely because of the digits. It will be forced to drop its illegal secondary sanctions. And then ultimately, potentially, if there's enough grumbling from the American business community, which I'll just remind viewers, in the early 1990s, was chomping at the bit to get involved back in Iran.

we might even see a lowering of American primary sanctions against its own company. So ultimately, that's where it's going. The Zionists and the American imperialists can kick rocks, whatever narratives they want to put forward, whatever new Wonderwaffe toys they want to bring to the region, the outcome is going to be the same. So that's where I see things going. And then do I have enough time to just briefly answer your second question there, Brad? Yeah, answer the question about allies, and then I'll have one final question for you. And yeah, I'm good on my end.

Okay, great. Just in terms of Iran's best allies, I'd say we need to sort of categorize them because they're not really categorizable in the same frame. Certainly, it would be answer Allah, the, the, the, the, as you know, referred to sometimes, the Houthis in Yemen. So, so the Ansarala movement, Hezbollah in Lebanon as just as key regional allies. And it's the broader footprint that having these allied relationships provides the Islamic Republic that makes them such key allies. The Ansarallah did not have to close down the Babel-Mandab straight, but they could. And that threat was always there.

And as we saw, an American aircraft carrier had to take the long trip around Africa rather than, you know, risk Red Sea transit because of Ansar al-A ballistic missiles. So Ansar-A-Lah and the allied relationship between it and Iran was absolutely critical to Iran's strategy. And I would even say to Iran's success in the Ramadan war due to the necessary positioning of American naval assets due to the threat coming from Yemen. as well. So absolutely critical allies, but perhaps a sort of no-brainer there and perhaps also a no-brainer, but China and Russia have dramatically increased their support for Iran since the 12-day war, but I'd say even more exponentially. And this isn't just in terms of the material support, but in sort of the verbal support, the terminological support, the narrative support for Iran since the beginning of the Ramadan War.

Let's just face it. The empire is after all three. The empire wants to break up the pivot area, right? You know, echoing McKinder, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, new regions where we can bring democracy, which means NGOs, and, you know, everybody that listens to you, knows the score there. So it was already in the interest of Russia and China to break with their really annoying and nauseating fence sitting up until the signing of the JCPOA and subsequently, because I'll remind listeners that Russia and China were whole hog on board with limiting Iran's civilian nuclear energy program and in maintaining and developing and maintaining the JCPOA.

They, of course, did that because of leverage and pressure that was placed on them via American sanctions and because of their own relative strength vis-a-vis the declining American Empire. Well, as the years have gone by, as the Ukraine war has continued, as, you know, as everyone knows, Iran and Russia signed and then have been acting within a new security agreement that enabled Iran to send drones to Russia, Russia then to send back shahead drones or geraniums, you know, with the new Russian advancements and technology. So from material support, but also, you know, support in the United Nations, this has also been absolutely critical coming from Russia and China as, you know, permanent members of the Security Council. And, I mean, again, I couldn't say.

most importantly, these things are also critical, but China's continual purchase of Iranian oil at, of course, of greatly increased rate now, not the discount prices as before February 28th, adamantly demanding its shipments from Iran via the Persian Gulf. This has only solidified the allied relationship between China and Iran and sort of made more clear the necessity of China. I mean, yes, China has diverse energy resources. They're brilliant in that. But Persian Gulf oil and other Persian Gulf resources are also critical to the continual advancement of the Chinese economy, the continual ability for China to lift even more up and out of poverty, as they have done so brilliantly. So linking these elements together, it's very clear.

China, Russia, and Iran have become, in the words and in the nightmare of Zbignia Brzynski, who in 1997 in the Grand Chess Board wrote, whatever you do, guys, in the 21st century, if you want the American Empire to remain strong, do not create an alliance of shared grievances between Iran, Russia, and China. Well, dear listeners, this is exactly what the United States of America and its proxy apartheid genocidal attack dog Israel have accomplished. in the region over the last several years. They have created a durable and powerful alliance of shared grievances between Iran,

Russia, and China, who do not share many other ideological commonalities. And that would be a great discussion to have at another time with you, Brett, in particular. But not a lot there, but their commonalities in terms of their grievances and the source of their grievances, the essences of their grievances, and their path to, ameliorating or dealing with these grievances brings the three of them together very closely. Obviously, geographically, they are very close. And their geographical closeness, if you will, happens to be the outline of the pivot area, which would be so critical to the continued maintenance of, you know,

another few centuries of offshore, maritime, West European, and potentially, you know, North American power. So, so that's where that's, that's, that's my, that's my assessment of where we're at and sort of the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, these, uh, newly enhanced and, and further strengthened allied relationships. And I'll just close by just saying, um, again, the China and, the, China and Russia had been instrumental in creating and sustaining the JCPOA, China has essentially now been unequivocal in its statements regarding, essentially the JCPOA is dead.

Biden proclaimed it dead years ago, but this is something new. China is essentially making an overt statement that, no, yeah, we're not going back to that. That's not happening and a new era. is here. So these are Iran's newly enhanced, extremely important allied relationships. Yeah, beautifully said. It's so important to understand all that. I know we're up against the end here. I have one more question for you, and then I'll let you go. You've been so generous with your time and your knowledge and your insights. I'm very interested in this question, something that I've never heard anybody really talk about in any serious way, which is, you know, what do you think, given an Iranian victory,

whatever that looks like, right? Whatever that ends up looking like, you know, based on your analysis of where this is going, let's just assume some level of serious sanctions relief, the doubling down of Iran as a genuine regional power that can't be dislodged by U.S. and Israeli aggression. At the very least, what are the implications for domestic Iranian society after that? You know, could you see, given the amount of support from people who inside of Iran might have, formed something like opposition to the government, in the wake of a victory, in the wake of economic relief and a strength in hand of the Islamic Republic overall domestically and regionally and internationally, what could be the consequences for the domestic society within

Iran? I'm thinking with regards to maybe making moves to compromise with certain elements within Iranian society, you know, like the women. March and stuff like that. Do you see anything like that possibly happening? Or do you see not much changing domestically and just a sort of doubling down of like, we have legitimacy now we can move forward? Man, what a great question. And I'll respond in the interest of our dwindling time here.

But really just so fascinating because I've been deeply pondering this. And related to previous response and explanation I gave earlier, earlier, the government right now, pardon me, is really doubling down on the, this new zeitgeist of unity and, and sort of the diverse landscape, if you will, of Iranian identity and, and sort of a style and orientation such that, you know, those videos that I was mentioning that have become, that have become so widespread and kind of popular, and that is the, you know, the, you know, the, the non-Hajab wearing supporter of the Islamic Republic being highlighted. Like, I mean, this is important.

Press TV, Iran's state-funded English language news station showing interviews with Iranian women on the street who do not wear hijab. This was something that they never did before. They would show interviews with women all the time who were not Iranian without hijab. But if it was an Iranian woman on Iranian street, she was wearing a job because, right? So the reason I'm emphasizing this is the government, if it, and follow me here, if it chooses later to go against this new zeitgeist and say, for example, because I've heard a lot of talking heads, you know, commentators speaking about, oh, yeah, after this is done, you know, they're just going to crack down again on the head job and it's going to be like whatever women like freedom in the streets again. I highly doubt this because I believe that the government, if we can generalize the political elites, are. cognizant of the power and the strength that this new version 2.0 can provide to the nation,

especially as it exits maximum pressure sanctions and embraces its true role in the region and in the world. So what I'm saying is this dialogic relationship is critically important. What does the government want? It wants people to be loyal. It does not want to be balkanized. and it wants, you know, relatively to maintain harmony and as much as possible Persian traditions and Persian culture internally. To the extent that things such as Western dress and the not wearing of hijab by women

can be seen as, and clearly here, it's not a threat to the nation, it is a strength to the nation, it is even a propaganda strength to the nation as Iran, you know, emits all of these videos of all of these women on the streets who do not wear hijab and who support the government, which then just kind of flies in the face of decades of, you know, anti-Iranian propaganda and

fetishization of Iranian women and of, you know, Iranian female dress. What I can see, and of course, this is my hope and I'll see the class, the glasses half full here, but that the government leans into this continually. And there is a new Islamic Republic of Iran under the leadership of, you know, Sayyid Muhtabakhamini, which even more than ever represents and serves the interests and, if you will, even the values of our dear, diverse Iranian people. So this is my hope, but it's not just born out of like hopium. The dialogic relationship, which, again, this is a government that more than any other government on earth knows that the people can overthrow you, dude. Like if they get pissed off enough, if, right, they, they, so, so, um, how do we keep the people,

uh, uh, supportive? How do we keep them content? Uh, it, it's, it's, it's certainly that the economy is critical, but also the interface and the relationship between the government and the diverse Iranian society. And so the diversity of the society now has in the 40, in the, the, the, the, the, the on war clearly become seen and broadcast as its strength. And this is why I have hope that the government is going to, in a very like sort of conscious way, continue on this path. And if you will, double down on it. Like, you world ain't seen nothing yet.

You didn't know Iran, get to know Iran. But that Iran that the world is going to get to know is indeed a, a, a, a, a, revived Iran, a revived Islamic Republic, the, you know, 2026 Islamic Republic, that, that, as I said before, is in the process of a further defining and, and I'd say, solidifying its national identity. Hell yeah. Hell yeah. I absolutely love that. And Iran is run, unlike the U.S., by like thoughtful, intelligent, informed people who are not living in La La Land, who are not under the auspices of one individual insane ego like Trumps or the, you know, the inc curiosity of the American right in general. These are thoughtful, often very accomplished scholarly people in many instances, and they understand

that the move after this is not to consolidate control, rather it's to consolidate cohesion and the very civic nationalism that your work has pointed towards as a core strength of Iranian civil society. I really appreciate you coming on this episode and doing this. This is honestly one of the best discussions on Iran that I've heard and that's not because of me. That is 100% because of you. I would love to have you back on any time to talk about this, especially as events continue to unfold before I let you go. Can you just let listeners know where they can find you and your work online? You know, it's sort of a bad joke that I, at times like these, I relay, but the reason I still have a job probably is because I never got on social media.

So here's where people can find me, though, actually, if interested. And even tonight, I'm going to be doing a live press TV thing with them, just sort of rolling coverage. But so if you Google, excuse me, not Google, pardon me, if you search David Yagubian in X, like, I don't know, scores of my talking head appearances will come up. And also the Ednan Hussein show, our dear friend and colleague, Dr. Adnan Hussein, his show is excellent. Many of your listeners might also be aware of his awesome show and a wonderful guest, and he's been kind to allow me to participate. So I've done a few of those as well.

And we've had some really in-depth conversations. I also had one with Benji of Resistance is Fertil. So, yeah, just search my name. There aren't too many. There is one other David Yagubian, but you'll find that our interests and, And it's clear who's who, right? So if you just search and you're interested, you could find some of my commentary. Wonderful.

Again, so grateful for you and your work and coming on the show. I hope to have you back on. Thank you so much. Thank you so much, Brett. It's been wonderful. Really appreciate it.