School of War - Ep 106: John McManus on the U.S. Army’s Pacific War

Episode Date: January 16, 2024

John McManus, author of To the End of the Earth: The US Army and the Downfall of Japan, 1945 and host of the We Have Ways of Making You Talk in the USA podcast, joins the show to talk about why the U.S. Army’s war in the Pacific during WWII merit deeper study and recognition. ▪️ Times      •   02:12 Introduction      •   03:57 Lessons to be learned     •   05:32 The Army from Pearl to Tokyo      •   08:50 Winds of change     •   14:07 Europe first      •   21:16 Taiwan or the Philippines?      •   27:55 Battleground Manila      •   30:48 Bleeding the Americans     •   34:56 Failures in China     •   40:33 Chiang Kai-shek     •   45:07 Okinawa     •   48:06 Operation Downfall     •   52:24 Revisionist and reductionist history      •   55:19 Required reading Follow along  on Instagram Find a transcript of today’s episode on our School of War Substack  

John McManus joins the show again today. He joined School of War early in the podcast's life to discuss his ongoing multi-volume history of the U.S. Army's war in the Pacific in World War II, and he's now finished that project and is back to discuss. It's remarkable that something on the scale of his subject, the Army bore the brunt of the fighting in the Pacific, fighting in massive campaigns in places like the Philippines

that were essentially wars unto themselves. And yet compared to the Navy and much smaller Marine Corps, gets relatively little attention for it. That's a problem, McManus argues. Kind of intriguingly, in my view. The Army's war, he says, points at the real Pacific War, which was much more about China

and terrain closer to the main Asian coastline than it was about the smaller islands made famous by marine actions. And of course, where the Army fought in the 1940s, America may well soon find itself fighting again. Let's get into it. It is a prescription for war, this Iraqi invasion of Hawaii.

1941, a date which will live in infamous. The bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stay-on. We continue to face a grave situation in Iran. The people are not seen... We shall fight on the beaches. We shall fight on the landing grounds. We shall fight in the fields and in the streets. We shall never surrender.

For maps, videos, and images, follow us on Instagram, and also feel free to follow me on Twitter at Aaron B. MacLean. Hi, I'm Erin McLean. Thanks for joining School of War. I'm delighted to welcome back to the show today, John McManus, who is Professor of Military History at the Missouri University of Science and Technology. He is the author of numerous books and publications, most recently, to the end of the Earth, which is the third of a three-volume history of the U.S. Army in the Pacific in World War II. John, I want to start by congratulating you on your achievement. really is a remarkable document that you've produced. So thanks very much for coming on the show to talk about it. Well, thanks so much, Aaron. It's really a pleasure to be here, and I appreciate you saying that. Thank you so much. Before we get into the substance of the thing, just how long is this, how long is this project taking you? I'd say the better part of a decade or so, you know, because really the majority of it in research, I guess, the research and travel for same.

And then the writing, you know, that took a number of years as it stretched out because these are, not short volumes, as you know, and that, you know, that can take a while to produce. So I wanted something that would really just kind of take us on an odyssey from the beginning to the end for the U.S. Army and that maybe gives us a sense of some of the lessons we learn and some of the harbingers that war contained. Yeah. And we'll get into this during the course of our conversation, of course, but you pointed out way back in the very first volume when you were writing about December 41 and everything that was to come,

that, you know, the American military history of the rest of the 20th century is in many ways an Asian military history and a Pacific military history. And so, you know, what we can learn from those warriors in the early 40s clarifies what's to come. And then, of course, we're all sitting here in 2024. By the way, I should point out, I realized as we were sitting down to record, it is January the 9th, which if I'm not, is it Esté? Is that the, is that the code name for the invasion of Luzon? So this is the end of history. of one of the great amphibious operations of all time, which you talk about your book, the invasion of the Philippines and of Luzon in particular.

But that military history not only clarifies the Cold War, but sitting here in 2024, we're all anticipating, you know, that there is a strong possibility of another war in the Western Pacific that everyone is talking about. And so we might pull some lessons, you suggest. Having completed the project, you stand by that assertion? Oh, I absolutely do. I just think there's so many lessons to be learned. I mean, for one thing, the nature and ferocity of the combat, the sort of give no quarter, ask no quarter, take no quarter kind of approach that you see in the war between the U.S. and Japan is really more typical ever since that our enemies really kind of fight that way.

And at the same time, the U.S. then has to kind of struggle with its own concepts of the rules of war. You know, I think that that certainly is in play, but also just the relevance of amphibious operations and ground forces in general, that even though, you know, naval power and air power were, of course, crucially important in World War II and a major reason for Allied victory. In the end, I think what comes through, I hope, in these volumes, maybe even shockingly so, is just how much of the fighting was done on the ground. And I just don't know that that would change in the future. of, you know, that's been sort of the pattern of history. Things can change, of course, but I think maybe what happens with the Army in World War II can give us a sense that this could be quite possible in the future, unfortunately. Well, let's come back to this. I want to sort of revisit this issue of lessons learned at the end, but for now, let's go back in time to the

period that you're writing about. And in a minute, we'll get to 1945 in the actual period that this volume covers. But even before that, what, how did the U.S. Army change? from Pearl Harbor, you know, December 41 through to the final phase of the war against Japan in 1945. Talk a bit about what the army was like when the war started and how it ended the war. Yeah, when the war starts, the army is kind of just starting to expand beyond almost something of a glorified constabulary force in a way. This is kind of provincial, very, very kind of intimate military force that in 1939 was actually physically smaller than Romania's army. So obviously, the officer corps was small.

Many of the folks knew one another, but it was interesting that we had this professional core that is going to be so crucial to, you know, expanding the army and winning the war that they had enough professionalism, enough professionals to make that happen, but not so much that the army was driven by careerism kind of thing. So it ends up, of course, as a massive drafty army of citizen soldiers for the most part, and which probably about, you know, two-thirds were draftees. The army grows to about eight million. And in terms of what happens with the Pacific Asia, you know, there's 1.8 million army ground soldiers

who serve in the war against Japan. And that's the third largest we ever sent overseas. So when Pearl Harbor happens, you're just seeing the beginning of that kind of growth because we were already mobilizing before we got in the war. And of course, afterwards is when you see the largest growth. And so the Army ends the war as this incredibly sophisticated, diverse military machine that is capable of doing all these things that, many of which don't have a thing to do with combat in the sense of, you know, seeing danger. But, I mean, the Army, it's a massive engineering problem that they're dealing, especially in building of airfields, dealing with the conditions creating infrastructure, the transportation side of the house is just so

crucial to all of this, the medical side. The Army's medical organization and capability and apparatus by the end of the war, as I would argue, you know, had never been exceeded in history up to that point. It's really incredible. But also the civil affairs side of it. I mean, we tend to think of the Pacific War as being fought in these empty eyes. islands. And sometimes that's true, but really more often it's not. And especially the Philippines, you know, is a completely different kind of animal in the sense that you are liberating a friendly country quite similar to Europe. And this then entails a lot of different civil affairs issues.

So those are just a few examples of this kind of larger whole of a very diverse army with all these different MOSs that's doing a lot of things. And oh, by the way, fighting this existential kind of peer-to-peer war against the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy, which also has ground forces. And of course, we all know about the ferocity of that. So I think that to me is just a fascinating transition, you know, what that means for our country. And, you know, and who's part of this and why and who directs it. And, you know, I mean, it's just, it's an amazing human story, I think. How did the professionals and the draftees, this is a big and in some ways kind of impossible question, but how did they interact? How did how did the professionals sort of

come to terms with the new reality that was dawning for their organization and make this organization effective, even as everything must seem to have been changing it in some ways for the worse before their eyes? Yeah, I mean, I think it's very frustrating for the professionals. And by that, especially I allude to the officer corps. I mean, the NCO core is not very big. And it's going to have to be created to some extent, created in combat quite often, or under the the stress of working in an Army service force side of the house in a port company or something like that. I think that there's frustration with having to train these guys up and get them to do things the Army way. But I also think that when the draftees come in, the citizen soldiers, and many of them are volunteers, actually, but they're citizen soldiers serving for the duration.

I mean, they bring their own kind of innovation to things too of saying, you know, I never intended to be a soldier, but maybe I want to be a business guy. but I have some ideas about how we can do things better, about how our finance office can work better, or how our rifles squad, or whatever it happens to be. And I do think that there's a really good kind of meeting of the minds in terms of talent that you see in the war. There are social tensions, to be sure.

You know, there absolutely are between those who are there for a career and those who are not, but that first group is pretty small. And so you have a lot of people who have found out a lot of things about themselves in terms of being good leaders, being good thinkers and planners, being courageous or, you know, or otherwise, you know, and it's everything in between. It's all these human foibles. So in terms of actual tangible operations, the challenge, I think, for many of the senior officers, and really one of the main people I cover is Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger,

who I think is the best example of a professional who's really doing great things with this human material that you're getting in a citizen army. Biggest challenge is training up actual divisions that you can send in and be ready for combat. Of course, you're never completely ready, but I think overall, when we look at the whole record, I think they do pretty well. So I think that the Eichelborgers of the world, in spite of the challenges that they had, you know, end up coming off pretty well. I think that they did a pretty solid job. Yeah, it makes me wonder, just in the spirit of thinking, projecting this all forward, if we do find ourselves in another war that, becomes protracted, which is something that, you know, we've had a number of conversations on the show about an idea we need to start getting used to.

I do wonder, you know, in the current military establishment, as you know, there's a training establishment that then supplies basically trained, but not only basically trained, actually some fairly sophisticated level of skills training in some cases, individuals to units. And then those units do their own training, but the base level at which they're beginning is much higher as a consequence of the existence of the existence of that. training establishment. And I wonder, you know, what it looks like to find ourselves in a world where all of a sudden the number of people we have to process through is so high that we look to units themselves to get themselves ready, starting from a much lower bar than we're currently used to operating, which I guess is an experience that the Army had to deal with in World War II, or was there still the sort of training establishment and then operating unit breakdowns? Oh, that's the interesting thing is before the war, like as of 1939, you probably would have received it

basic training in whatever unit you were assigned to. And of course, oh, interesting. So it's almost the other way. Okay. Got it. Yeah. So in the course of the war course and even before, then they're going to create like you mentioned there in that training establishment, which is say, you know, you're going

to go to Camp Roberts or Fort Leonard Wood or, you know, Fort Jackson, wherever to do your basic training. And then, you know, for some sort of advanced training or you're assigned to a unit, you know, whatever would be. You know, so we have that kind of major training infrastructure now. that is kind of a legacy of World War II because they'd realize we need uniformity and training.

We need everybody, no matter their MOS, to have these basic kind of soldier skills. Ideally, it should be 14 weeks of basic infantry training. Now, it isn't always that way, but when you're talking about 8 million plus people, but that's largely the pattern, I suppose. And so I think World War II is interesting to look at because you do see us transition

from that kind of old army were you was really quite intimate in a way you went to a unit and you were trained up the way that unit saw things which may or may not be good versus this sort of larger kind of centrally controlled you know let's train them up the same way sort of army that I think you know tends to work pretty well that's really interesting so you you cover a few sort of major issues or or sort of ongoing events or operations in the book and you start with MacArthur in the liberation of Luzon in the Philippines more broadly. And it makes sense for it.

And then there's China, then there's Okinawa, and then obviously the preparation for Japan itself. And we'll start with MacArthur with another big picture question. MacArthur, you sort of open with him continuing to be upset about the, excuse me, the Europe first policy of the allies. And that's another issue that has sort of echoes to today, sort of obvious echoes and obvious intersections with politics and foreign policy. Say more about that.

What does that mean that maybe just remind people what Europe first was and then how did it, how did MacArthur perceive it as affecting his interests and American interests? And then what's your own assessment? Yeah. So the Europe first or Germany first policy is something that the British and Americans agree on even before U.S. entry into the war. And the thinking behind that was sort of twofold, that Germany was the most dangerous enemy and thus needed to be dealt with first. And there was a lot to recommend that, of course. And, you know, of course, this is happening in the context of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, which if the Germans succeed there, I mean, it's going to be very difficult for the Western allies to get back on the European continent. But the second aspect

of it is that the assumption, and this is really what rankled MacArthur, that America's geostrategic interests and future really were in Europe. And that's what could be a little bit more debatable. Arthur, granted, he's a giant ego and he's the kind of person who thinks that any room he's in has to be the most important room, right? I mean, that's MacArthur. But as he saw it, it made no sense at the beginning of the war when, you know, this American and Filipino garrison in the Philippines is in crisis. It made no sense for us to be sending resources to the Soviet Union instead of our own people in that context. And as he saw it, and I think this is one insight that he had that I think he deserves some credit for, as he saw it, America's greatest geopolitical future would be in Asia and the Pacific. And I think subsequent history has has proven that to an extent.

But I think it was way too dismissive of Europe's importance too. Then and, you know, and I think as we've seen now, I mean, you know, you foolish to argue Europe's not important. Of course it is. And the NATO alliance and all that. McCarthy didn't quite get that. So the way this is shaped up by January 45 when he's invading Luzon is that for the whole war up to that point, He's been basically complaining that he hasn't gotten enough resources and priority and all that. And he's convinced that people in D.C. at high levels are kind of sabotaging him deliberately and all this.

He's very paranoid. And the way I write about this, I find it almost embarrassing that he's still complaining about this in January 45 because the army he controls there is massive. And outside of Eisenhower's armies in Northern Europe, it's the largest concentration of American military force on the planet. And in fact, the invasion of Luzon involves more U.S. amphibious divisions than we contribute to the invasion of Normandy. So, you know, and then he's going to have, you know, 14 plus divisions as a follow-on force. I mean, the operations of the Philippines are enormous, probably second to lead to Normandy, you know, and maybe the Battle of the Bulge or whatever. But, you know, it's pretty, pretty high-speed kind of stuff. And yet he's still kind of complaining that he's not getting the priority.

which is a very MacArthur thing, I guess. Yeah, and of course, MacArthur is a figure of the right, and there is this political dimension to it that, that A, does map onto today in ways that we can get into, but B, obviously continues through the 40s and sort of debates within the Republican Party in the 40s as China falls to the communists and Korea looms, this notion that there is something about Roosevelt

and then Truman that is dismissive of the Pacific and that that is somehow a scandal is a live issue on the right. In fact, it's funny. I just, listeners of the show are probably wearying of my references to Herman Wokes' War and Remembrance, which I've just watched the rewatched since first time since childhood, the miniseries version of which is fantastic. And there's a scene in it where the, I forget his name, but he would have been the commander of the Pacific Fleet on Pearl Harbor. Oh, husband Kimmel. Yes, that must be right.

And obviously he's had a bad day and his career is over. And our protagonist, played by Robert Mitcham, walks into his office and they're chatting. and the fleet commander is grousing. We got caught because we weren't paying attention. Roosevelt was paying attention to the wrong war. And it's this sort of pathetic moment where he's obviously covering for whatever failures that were in Washington.

There were obviously failures in Pearl Harbor as well and in Hawaii as well. And he's covering for it with this sort of brittle political opinion. And with Herman Wilkes's work, it sort of fits this picture of, well, nothing succeeds like success. And FDR chose Europe first and it worked. and Europe was important and Hitler was terrible and it's going to be defeated him. So it must have been, they must have been right. But as you point out, there are elements, there are elements to the argument,

there are elements to the point that deserve attention. But I guess by 45, it's all, the resources, as you point out, are already sort of settled out. And McCarthur has what he needs. I mean, he definitely has what he needs. He doesn't think so, but he does in the context of a global war. And, yeah, as I try to point out in the series, the Europe first policy, certainly does work, and I wouldn't necessarily sit here and argue against it, but I think it needs to be looked at in a nuanced way that it also had consequences. And I think the biggest consequence

is our lack of prioritization of China, which we are still paying the price for today. If you look at it as a point of view of saying, okay, let's say you have greater priority to giving more resources to Shankaj Shek, more strategic priority to the China Burma India Theater, which it was always last priority and everything else. Let's say that translates to more influence for the kind of outcome you want in China. And I realize that may or may not be true, but I think the percentages are it could be. Probably what that means is the preservation of Shanghai's ex regime. And what it means, conversely, we know, is the triumph of the Communist Party and the establishment of the People's Republic of China, which I think we would all agree is a pretty important event and that we're

still kind of paying the price for today. So even though Germany first made total sense, it was like anything, your resources, you only had so much. And so even when you were making, you know, solid choices, they were going to have some negative consequences too. And so MacArthur at the time is sort of the darling, ironically, of the China lobby, which he didn't necessarily care that much about China in the context. He cared about the Philippines as much as anything, of course, understandably. But also the, the Hearst. newspaper empire, media empire, that love the idea of the entire war being under MacArthur's control, which MacArthur certainly wouldn't oppose that. And so, you know, they're invested in that

idea. And that also means kind of pushing back against FDR's Germany first policy. So there, there were all these sort of layers to the political argument at the time. And yes, on the, on the right of the spectrum, it tended to be a little more pro-Asia, more pro-China. And certainly, you know, pro-McArthur. Yeah. Well, I want to come to China in just a minute, but sticking with MacArthur in the Philippines for a second, talk about the rationale, the strategic rationale for liberating Luzon and then conducting the liberation of the rest of the Philippines, which follows on in the midst

of the, you know, the compelling need to defeat Japan and how, you know, sort of the same structure of question, how MacArthur thought about all of that and then speak to his own personal connections to the Philippines. And then what's your assessment of the strategy and how it actually functioned? Yeah, the roots of it are in the, I discussed in the previous volume of the series, Island Infernos, which covers 1944. And it covers the famous meeting of Nimitz, MacArthur, and FDR in Oahu at or near Pearl Harbor in July of 44, in which they're trying to figure out what they're going to do. And really what a lot of this boils down to is, are we going to invade at Formosa, today, is Taiwan, are we going to go back to the Philippines?

It's not always an either-or, but it tends to boil down to that. And it was the Navy arguing for Operation Causeway, the invasion of Formosa, and of course, MacArthur vociferously arguing for a return to the Philippines. He gets what he wants, as we know. And I think largely because even Nimitz comes around to the idea that invading Formosa would be a really tough go. and it really honestly would be the army having to carry most of the load in terms of service forces to support the massive invasion and the campaign that would follow there. And even though when you did that, you were going to have serious problems on your flanks with land-based air, you know, Japanese land-based air in the Philippines attacking your shipping and, of course, fleets coming from there and whatever else.

So MacArthur kind of wins that layer of the argument and, you know, of course, the sort of, you know, emotional side of liberating people to whom we had an obligation in a way. We'd been an imperial overseer there for 50 years. We'd lost the archipelico to obviously a terrible repressive Japanese presence for many Filipinos. And MacArthur is arguing we have a moral obligation if we are America to do something about this. and it's a i think i personally think i still can see the strategic decision either way because the tragedy of going back to the philippines and i hope this is what really becomes especially apparent in this volume three where you see the terrible nature of the fighting and louzahn and in manila itself of course too that in choosing to liberate them you have

brought war to them destruction and all the disruption and it's a civil war already going on like in many occupied countries. The Filipinos are such a huge part of their own liberation through guerrilla operations and support for the Americans. But they're losing their homes. They're losing their wealth. They're losing their lives. The Filipinos have an extremely high percentage of people who die in the war that's just like on par with Poland, you know, in other countries that are better known for suffering in World War II. And a lot of this is because we've chosen to come back there in liberate. And that's the essential dilemma that's going on in France. in Belgium, in Holland, you know, friendly countries that you're liberating.

So I see it as still something of a strategic toss-up. And I'm a little reluctant to kind of exceed to one side or the other and say it's some easy call. I don't think it was then. And I think it still is in that light even 80 years on, in my view, at least. Well, talk a little bit about, you know, beginning in January, how Luzon and then, you know, Manila and everything I was Craigador go. So, reading your account, I was struck. I spent a fair amount of time thinking about the Korean War last year. And I came across the name General Willoughby.

And I had like a shutter went up my spine because, of course, this is the man who gets the Chinese intervention across the Yalu in late 1950, completely wrong. And I confess I did not really know that he was already getting lots of things wrong. Oh, he was already well-established. So, yeah, talk about all that. Talk about intelligence expectations and how it actually goes. Yeah, on the Intel side of the house, Willoughby is one of one of my whipping boys throughout this series. And it's not as if he's dumb or something like that. I mean, he's a very sharp guy and he's a self-made guy.

You know, he's actually German. Comes from Germany. His political views are odious. He's basically a crypto-Nazi on some levels. But he's very dedicated to MacArthur. He's very sagacious on some levels. But he has this and he has all this incredible intelligence apparatus at his disposal. you know, obviously we're breaking a lot of the Japanese codes, you know, he's got that.

He's got the guerrillas, the Coast Watchers, he's got, you know, Alamo Scouts. I mean, you name it. He's got a good array of intel info. And so the reason I take him to task quite often is I think given his advantages, it's amazing how often he's wrong. And one place he's wrong is in Luzon in mis- in underestimating the size of the Japanese garrison. And I think one of the reasons why that happens is he's more dedicated to McArthur Kennedy than he should be and that he always wants to tell him what he wants to hear. And he can be a bit sycophantic on that level.

And I don't think you really want that in one of your key staff officers. Better maybe sometimes if they're a little iconoclastic and they're willing to push back. Easier said than done, of course. So where that sort of bears out in the campaign, as I think McArser doesn't always have a strong appreciation for, the size and potency of some of the Japanese forces he's facing. And granted, this is always a problem in the Pacific War, not unique to MacArthur's command. Nimitz's command had the same issue, too, sometimes where we're not always sure how many Japanese there are on an island or what their

defenses are like or whatever. And it's sometimes a leap of faith. In the Philippines, what is really quite frustrating to MacArthur once, you know, they get ashore on Luzon and they're moving towards Manila, which is the key objective, of course, is that his armies just aren't moving fast enough. And of course, a lot of this is because of his 6th Army commander, Walter Kruger, who's just not wired in such a way to have a bold dash. That's not what he's about. He's a bit more of a methodical commander. He's a good commander. But he's not a risk taker.

He's not a bold kind of guy. And so I think that Willoughby's intel certainly plays some role in MacArthur's attitude about how rapidly his forces should move. But conversely, the 6th Army intel. tends to have a higher estimate of Japanese force is more accurate. And that's partially feeding then the disposition of that commander to be more methodical and cautious in a way. And so you really see this kind of dynamic play out in a pretty frustrating three or four weeks after the invasion itself.

And just speaking about MacArthur on a personal level, how does he react to how things actually turn out? How does he react to the devastation, the violence, the destruction in some ways of you know, a city that means so much to him. What's his, what's his personal take? It's really horrifying to MacArthur. And this is where I have a great deal of empathy for him. I mean, this is hometown, Manila.

That's where he had lived. He loves the Philippines and his people. It's, I think, physically painful for him to see the destruction that's going to be unleashed. Manila becomes a battleground for a better part of a month, February and a little the sliver of March, 1945. And it's, it's one of the largest urban battles in human history. and it's one that's going to see the deaths of some 100,000 Filipinos residents of Manila.

Many of them, of course, caught in the crossfire or dislocated or whatever, but a lot of them because of Japanese atrocities, deliberate Japanese atrocities, which are absolutely horrifying. To MacArthur, this was so troubling that he starts to really get quite short with some of the correspondence attached to his headquarters, and anyone who is around him who alludes to the distrable. instruction. Really, honestly, he's almost like trying to make it go away in his mind on some levels. And the other thing, too, this whole campaign to that point had been such a point of frustration to him,

because what he'd hoped for was a quick dash to grab Manila before the Japanese could do this. Now, it was always a tall order, of course, but I take him to task a little bit for choosing the wrong commanders for their missions. He chooses Kruger in his sixth army for that initial invasion and then the move to Manila and then Eichelberger and the 8th Army to come in later. He really should have chosen Eichelberger if he wanted the bold commander, the fast commander. I mean, Eichelberger is arguably the best army commander in the war, but he's certainly a guy who has a very different disposition than Kruger in terms of movement of forces and rapid and bold warfare. He's more like Patton in that sense. Vohm was a West Point classmate and a good friend, and I found that they corresponded.

It's really quite fascinating. So all of this, though vindicating for McArthur in the sense that we're back in the archipelago and liberating people, including some POWs and civilian attorneys, I do think in terms of the destruction of Mandela, I would bet that McArthur never got over that the rest of his life. Because think of your own hometown, and it basically becoming a field of ruins.

And I mean, how are you ever really going to get past that? It had to be really difficult for him, I think. And what is the Japanese defensive concept here? Sort of theater-wide, big picture. Why are they standing and fighting in places like Luzon? Okinawa is a little bit more obvious, I guess. But what just talk is, are we just delaying and buying time and either, you know, planning to fight to the bitter end

or hope that there's going to be some let up in the demand for unconditional surrender? Like, how are they thinking about the war? Yeah, I mean, that's the Japanese last go at this point. They've lost the initiative and the control of the sea and the air by, you know, 1945, but it doesn't mean they've lost the war as they would maybe see it. What they're holding out hope for, like you said, Aaron, is something short of unconditional surrender, of course. And really, the best way to achieve that is to bleed the Americans, to absolutely bog them down and bleed them.

And, you know, that option was available to the Japanese. They were willing to stand and fight. So, you know, they'd lost the Battle of Lete Gulf, you know, in October 1944, which meant that the U.S. naval forces were going to be preeminent in the Philippines, of course. They had been degraded in the air, but they had unleashed a new weapon, which is going to have significant potency, the kamikaze. I mean, that's in play by the fall of 44. And you see kamikazis attack McArthur's invasion fleet in January 1945.

They kill, I think it's 500. 103 sailors, and they also killed Lieutenant General Herbert Lumsden, who was the Britishly as an officer attached to MacArthur's headquarters, didn't sink any ships, didn't stop the invasion, but it gave you a little preview what was going to happen in Okinawa. So for General Yamashita, who is the overall Japanese commander in the Philippines, he has a kind of inland defense concept, which would become more popular now, infamously, of course, since Pelaloo, the Japanese not necessarily investing everything to stop the Americans of the waterline. line, but using good defensible inland terrain to just basically bleed them. And we'll see that, of course, at Okinawa quite famously too. So that's his concept. What astounds me about him that, I mean, I still, I wish I could have talked to him about this because it's just so hard for me to believe.

He will later say, and it's, of course, in the context of a war crime trial in which he's accused of being responsible for the atrocities I mentioned moments earlier when he did not order them, of course. He will claim that he did not intend to defend Manila, that he wanted to be a kind of open city to leave, that he was going to fight elsewhere. And I find that astounding on a number

of levels, because if you want to bleed the Americans, I don't know of any better way than to get them involved in urban combat. I mean, you talk about a manpower suck and how deadly that is and destructive, and it tends to be, as we're seeing, you know, right now with the IDF in

Gaza, it tends to be time intensive and go on and on, it's really hard to control. I don't know of any better way he could have done that. And he also didn't seem to grasp the incredible value of Manila to the Americans, certainly on a political level and liberating the Philippines and all that. But on a logistical level, you know, as we discuss, MacArthur's campaign here is enormous. This is a huge army, huge military force you've got.

So it has to be sustained. Manila is the number one way you're going to do that. credible harbor you simply had to have. So it's a very valuable objective. And yet the general will claim that he didn't intend to defend it. Very odd thing in my view. But certainly, you know, so why does it happen? Because he's in the northern part of Luzon, really quite cut off from portions of his army. And there's also an Army Navy thing going on there. And that most of the the Japanese who are stuck in Manila and sometimes out of communication with Amashita in the north are naval guys.

And so, you know, they basically wreck the harbor and they decide they're going to hunker down and fight to the end. And that's precisely what they do. So let's, obviously, I mean, we could do a whole series of episodes on each one of these campaigns, but in the spirit of doing a little summary justice to each major part of your book, let's shift to China. Where I get another sort of striking observation that you make, you're sort of referring to late 44, and you talk about the failure of American grand strategy in China, as of 1944,

which is, you know, I think for somebody who's not professionally following the period a little earlier than you might have expected to be able to pronounce an American grant strategy in China had failed. What were the failures that were baked in already by 1944? How were things going? I mean, as I see it, the failure you can mark is when Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell, he's basically a relief when shankashak says i can't work with this guy anymore you've got to get him home and the americans do so and why do i think that i mean certainly there's a lot still well could have done better i mean i i explore that in the series but it pointed out to some serious issues in in chinese and american relations and and as partners still was frustrations were

america's frustrations and they were that the regime was corrupt that it was repressive it was backward. It was not going to fight the way we wanted it to if we were giving them lend Lee supplies and all that kind of stuff that we expected then. We've got a pretty good structure of advisors with the Chinese army who are trying to kind of train them up in the way that we want them to operate, but we don't really understand and grasp the threat that is brewing in the north from the communists. We want any Chinese is going to fight and we're willing to support the communists too at this stage. And the communists are only too happy to kind of lead us down that flowery path, which I don't think the Americans had a good enough grasp of that just

yet. So when Weidemeyer, Albert Weidemeyer, who succeeds still well, comes into the fall of 44, he gets along better with Shankai Shaq. That's great. But the problem still exists of the civil war brewing in China that we're worried about. And China being effective enough to stay in the war and bogged down the Japanese, but not effective enough to achieve the object of a stable, continent-leading, you know, modern China that we want as a partner. And Weidemeyer comes up with the same sort of war-ending concept that still well had. Basically, let's train up a really good Chinese army of 60-80 divisions that we can rely on. They're going to launch an offensive to regain control of the harbors because the concern we have, and this is so bizarre to think of now,

but concern we have is what we could conquer the Japanese home islands themselves, and yet the Japanese could somehow still resist with their army in China, in Manchuria, and so on and so forth. So to preclude that, we're hoping to do, you know, just this, this kind of offensive in addition to securing China as the kind of partner we want. So I think when Stillwell is fired, it's an indicator that a lot of that has really unfortunate gone down the tubes. It's easy for me to say, but I'm an historian looking back. And I'm like, okay, that's maybe what I can pinpoint. At the time, they certainly wouldn't have viewed it that way, of course. And sorry, just to just to clarify what, where do the communists fit in to that concept

for post-war, post-defeat of Japan, China? Is American policy to make peace? How is that actually going to work in the views of the administration? And then how do people, like, how does, how is Stillwell thinking about it? How does McCarthy think about all this? Presumably his attitude differs from FDRs? Yeah, I mean, Stillwell is happy to support any, Chinese who was going to fight the Japanese. And still, all is very kind of right wing in his

politics. So he's not pro-communist, as he will later be accused by, like, during the, by many in the Joseph McCarthy era and all that's very grossly unfair. But the dynamic in play in China is you basically have a kind of three-way civil war. And we tend to forget this. There's within the Japanese occupied zones of China, there is an accommodationist government, almost kind of similar to like the Vichy government in France or whatever, that says, Well, China's future is with Japan here, and we will make the best of that and have some sort of new Chinese nation. There's Shanghai Shack, of course, and the nationalists. And then the communists are like the smallest of the three, ironically enough.

And they tend to be the strongest in the north. And they will later promote the idea that they were really fighting the Japanese hard and all this. And that's absolute nonsense. They really weren't. They were accommodating with the Japanese as they could. And they were growing a political movement in the north and a military force. because they were looking ahead to the day when they would cross swords with Shanghai Shack and vice versa. And so Shang is constantly worried about that.

And so one of the reasons why he's tolerating the despotism and corruption is not because he's an idiot. He isn't. He's quite effective on many levels. But he realizes he needs as many allies as he can get for what are going to be his real enemies, the Chinese communists. And the Americans, you know, it depends who we're talking about. But I think largely they don't quite grasp that. What sort of peace do they envision? They want Japan out of China.

And they want an accommodation, a kind of coalition government, between the nationalists and the communists. Well, we all know when you're sitting in with communists, it's a zero-sum game. You know what? Either you're going to survive or they are. And that's generally the pattern of history in relation to communists. And I think the Americans kind of have to learn that the hard way. I really think Shanghai Sheck understood that maybe a little better than his allies. did at least maybe during the war years.

Well, and let me ask you this, because the Truman administration obviously will basically defend itself against the claim that it lost China by pointing the finger at Chen Kai Sheck. I think Dean Atchison, as late as, you know, his memoir, President of the Creation basically makes this case. It was, you know, what are you going to do? Like, Cheyenne Keishk was such a loser. There was nothing to be done.

It's sort of oversimplified. But that seems to me to be like basically the assertion. what what what what truth was there to this defense i mean what was it true i mean what was cheng kajek destined to lose it seems like you don't you don't think that can you make the case i don't think he was destined to lose and i don't think he was a complete loser or awful or what i mean he had warts he had some serious issues so i wouldn't shrink from that but i think he was given an unfair shake maybe by some of the Truman administration like atchison who were trying to to lay the whole blame on him and maybe

Maybe that's not really fair. There's a lot of mistakes Shankajek made, of course, like any leader. But I do see the situation as possibly retrievable, but it was probably going to take a better understanding on the Americans of the true political dynamic in China, maybe an more unvarnished view of communism. And that would have been a hard thing to do in the context of World War II when we have a great alliance with another communist country, the Soviet Union, right? So that would have been tough to do.

but if we've got a better understanding, we prioritize and have more resources go into China and all that. Partfully, what Shang is angry about half the time is we're promising him one thing, and then reneging, you know, classic example. We promise him extensive amphibious operations in Burma, you know, in the Cairo conference. And then we basically pulled the plug on that after the Tehran conference when we've promised Stalin that we're going to invade in France. And we realize we can't do both. we don't have the resources. So from Scheng's point of view, he's just constantly coming up against this sort of uncomfortable reality that he's the last option for us. And I think that if you have maybe a different prioritization, who knows? I mean, who knows how things play out. But certainly,

I mean, as I see it, you were likely to have more influence to the outcome you wanted if you had greater priority. Yeah, it's it's kind of unsettling to look back on it. Because I take your point, And I think it's a really important point that in retrospect, I mean, we can all, we all know what happens in 1949, the defeat of the nationalist by the CCP and how it really is. I mean, along with Hitler's rise to power, Russian Revolution. I mean, it is one of the great tragedies of the 20th century and of human history. And of those tragedies I just named, it is the one that is the gift that keeps on Gippie. I mean, it is the problem we are still confronting. But that's easy for us to say, having watched everything unfold.

And so, you know, if in 1944, it would have been difficult to find somebody with the perspicacity to see that looking forward. You know, it makes me wonder what we are sitting here in 2024 complacently assuming that is a few years from now going to seem insane, if not criminal, in retrospect. It's very much. Beyond your warrant, perhaps. But feel free to respond if you have. Well, I think it's a great point, Aaron, because it's very humbling. And I think when you think of it that way, it really helps you take a step back and have respect for the historical actors and say, you know what, they didn't see how it was going to play out, just like we don't

now. They were making tough decisions in the moment. They were fighting an existential war. They were doing the best they could on some levels. And I think that's why it's good to step back and feel that way with Shankai Shaq, Shaq, too. Now, after Atchison wrote his book, you know, Shang's diary has become available. And we know a lot more about his inner workings and and, you know, who he was as a leader and a person and all that. And he's come to have a more favorable light, I think, among many historians by now. And even in China, too, where there's a recognition of the role the nationals played in defeating the Japanese and creating a modern, powerful China on many levels.

Because you remember, too, from a Chinese point of view, they're dealing with what they call a century of humiliation, which they've been dominated by these imperial powers, mostly Western but also Japanese eventually, too. And that's not a good thing for China either. So, yeah, I do think that it gives you a sense of humility. And maybe that's a really good thing, I hope. Well, let's shift gears again to Okinawa. And then what I'm really interested in, actually, and you spent some time on is Operation Downfall and the sort of the horrible war that never happened in Japan.

But what do you think is, I mean, I don't know why I think this. And maybe this is just idiosyncratic and more of an observation about me. but I feel like Okinawa in our popular culture, maybe it's the Marines, maybe it's the PR machine of the Marines strikes again. Okinawa is somehow better remembered than what we've already talked about, either the Philippines or China, though China, of course, was a huge issue at the time. And I, you know, I don't know if that's true, I guess, but it seems true to me. But what was it important to you to draw out about the campaign in Okinawa?

And then I want to get on to how it was the springboard for what was to come. Yeah, I mean, what was important to me to draw out is that it's a like, pretty much most of them. It's a joint army and marine operation. It's running very well at the command level in terms of inter-service cooperation and all that. It's also, I wanted to point out the toll that took on the Okinawans, which I think sometimes gets lost in the maw, and also the interesting dynamic among the Japanese command structure, where General Ushijima has two key staff officers who see the battle very differently, one of whom, once the old aggressive, stop them at the water line, let's constantly attack and bonsai people.

And another who is like, you know what? This is the strategic impact we're going to have is to bleed these guys. And we need to do that, you know, on the sherry line and in the caves and the, and the dugouts and, you know, just we need to just turn it into a bloodbath. And I think certainly he's absolutely right. I think this is better remembered because it fits in with what our popular memory of the Pacific War tends to be as just. that the Pacific War, without all the messiness of what's happening in Asia with Shankajek,

without all that imperial residue that the Philippines brings into play and other places, too, especially with our allies, you know, the Dutch and Indonesia, the British, wherever, you know, so on and so forth, the French in Southeast Asia, you know, that's easier to have this little stepping stone war, Guadalcanal, Tarawa, you know, Saipan, Iwojima, Okinawa, and the bomb, and then you're done. actually the war is much bigger, much more ambitious and much messier than that, and that's the Army's war, as I point out. I think it's interesting and important to look at, not just from a service perspective,

of saying, hey, you know, the Army did this and it deserves credit or something. It's not just that it's the Army's war sheds light of what the war really was. Not a few expeditionary invasions here and there of bitter fighting. Oh, it's way more than that. And so you can get, I think, a fairer understanding. The Battle of Okinawa, of course, is one of the largest in human history and, you know, the ultimate climax in great tragedy of the War II. And I think that's another reason why it stands out to us is it's, you know, you're fighting on a large island, a major island that's really quite heavily populated. And fortunately, you don't have to invade Japan.

So it becomes the capstone to the end of this kind of nightmare that World War II had become. Talk a bit about what would have happened had we not dropped the bomb. And obviously there's many different ways into that question. I'm interested just in the operational planning itself and how we saw the fall of Japan coming about. And then two, I am interested in your take on these sort of always controversial sort of issues of revisionist history. Like the Japanese were going to surrender anyway. We didn't need to drop the bomb.

Just walk us through what we were planning to do had there been no atomic bomb. And then, of course, what actually happened in your take on whether or not the bomb was necessary? Yeah, so there was going to be a two-stage invasion of Japan. And the first would have been known as Operation Olympic, in which General Kruger's 6th Army would invade Kiyushu. And use Kyushu as a major base, especially for air bases, to invade Hanchu, obviously where Tokyo is and a lot of the population in what was called Operation Cornette. So Olympic was going to take place in November 1945. Cornette would be in March 1946. you're invading near the planes near Tokyo.

And eighth Army under Eichelberger was to have the lead role there, but also 10th Army would be in play. And that probably would have under Stillwell, who had come back into play as head of Army Ground Forces, who had taken over for General McNair when he had been killed in the short bombing in Normandy by friendly bombers, sadly. Stillwell was going to get 10th Army. And then First Army was redeploying from Europe to come in there in support.

And actually, it probably would have had a more lead role in 10th Army, but whatever. This would have been the largest amphibious invasions in human history. They would have been one of the largest campaigns ever. I mean, it would have been an absolute total bloodbath. You know, Sixth Army alone was probably going to be 10 to 15 divisions strong, and it still would have been outnumbered at Kyushu. To give you a sense of how the Japanese have building up their defenses, much less the kamikazis.

Everybody saw this as a nightmare. So what's interesting to me is by the summer of 45, All three services, as we'll call them, kind of saw the end game through their own lens. So the Army Air Forces are like, okay, well, we firebom these guys. We can bring them to their knees through this bombing campaign. And then, of course, the atomic bomb becomes the next weapon to help them do that. The Navy is thinking, you know, we can blockade the heck out of these guys. We can prevent that whole China nightmare that we're worried about.

And we can bring them their knees this way because they're close to starvation. And we can mine their waters. And of course, the Army and the Marine Corps are thinking in terms of a ground invasion, you know. And so Truman is having to kind of navigate all of this and figure out, well, what really will happen if we have to do this? And then the bomb comes into play, too. Now, the idea that Japan would have surrendered, I always find that so specious because they had an opportunity to do so with the Potsdam Declaration. They could have accepted that. and that would have been tantamount to a surrender if they were really intending.

So when you hear Japan was intending to surrender, that's a half-truth. There were some Japanese who were at that point, some Japanese in the higher reaches of government or the military or whatever. There were others who didn't. So it's a matter who has influence at any given time. What we do know is that the Japanese government and its actions did not accept the Potsdam Declaration as of the end of July, and thus you end up in this next phase of the war, in which you have a dual body blow, atomic bombings and the Soviet Union entering the war,

which are ultimately decisive in tipping that balance to where the majority in power in Japan decides we need to go to the Allies and surrender and cut some kind of deal with them. That's what happens. The other, I mean, a take on the revisionist argument I have come across, and I mean, to be clear for me, You don't have to accept this exact premise, but to me, this all seems downstream of a view that

nuclear weapons were employed and that the consequences were not only, the consequences were tragic in certain obvious straightforward ways and in other ways beneficial. That is a kind of scandal that has to be explained away, that that can't, it simply can't be accepted as true. And then another version of the revisionist take, I've heard, and this is sort of down to the day to day of the actual end of the war, is that the Soviet invasion, was the actual mechanism that compels surrender. And certainly the second, maybe the first bomb,

the bomb on Nagasaki is certainly vestigial. And if anything, and then you sort of, you hear claims actually more intended to signal something to the Soviets than it was intended as a mechanism for the defeat of Japan. I'm curious to know, your response to that whole set of issues. I'm sure it's a like time you're hearing this. To me, it's a classic sort of retro argument.

I've never found any evidence. It says, okay, we are dropping that bomb on August 1945 in order to demonstrate something to the Soviet Union, even as where they're coming into the war to help us as our allies against Japan now. That is, to me, a classic sort of reductionist Cold War thinking. Certainly, I mean, I get the point that the bomb can impress the Soviets in terms of what it means for American geopolitics. political power, yes, but they're deep into spying on the Manhattan Project and they know a lot of what's going on. So I don't know that we really have to demonstrate that to them from their point of view at least. But what I can say, just as a World War II historian, is their primary preoccupation as of August 1945 is ending the war with Japan and doing that the best they can and saving allied casualties the best they possibly can. and the decision makers think this is the way to do it.

I think history kind of bears them out. And I think the point, I think one point that is good that we absorb is that that Soviet invasion, Soviet entry into the war on August 9th was also very significant in this whole thing. I see it as a dual body blow. The atomic bombings and Soviet entry is this sort of wake up call for the Japanese leadership, the holdouts who had said, no, no, we can continue fighting the war. We can do X, Y, and Z. that they now were going to sort of start to lose that argument.

And the emperor himself, who at times is really quite morally vacuous on a lot of levels and quite indecisive, he has come forward and said, hey, you know, we need to do something to end this war. It's that dual body blow. So the rest of it, the Cold War stuff, I mean, I think it's easy to say in the 1960s, this is what was really the agenda. I think when you actually look at the record from the era, it really doesn't quite show up that way, especially of an operational perspective. Well, I want to conclude where we began, again, by commending you.

I mean, this is a really remarkable achievement. And I think you, in the books themselves, but even just chatting today, you make the case very effectively that what seems to be, you know, history that is increasingly distant from us is startlingly relevant. And as much as it grates on me as a Marine to make this concession, I actually think your point about how looking at the Army's war shows something about the true nature of the war. That's an interesting point, and I think an intriguing one. And, you know, when it comes to maybe would make us focus more on China and in the Philippines, one that seems quite plausible.

And how, you know, what I would suggest to people who are interested in picking up your books than they should be is, you know, the forces that are unleashed in the, far from being a vestigial part of the war that doesn't matter in China. You know, of course, the war begins in some respects, depending on how you want to measure it with the Japanese action. in China. And it hasn't ended. In some important ways, it's never ended. The crisis we are facing today is absolutely directly. I don't even want to say downstream. It's a continuation of the war that began in the 30s. Or even the 20s, if you want to take it back to the Communist Revolution in China, or beginning of the Chinese Communist Party in China. So double-barreled last question for you,

one, any big takeaways applicable today that we have an address that you want to make sure you say before we're done. So that's question one. Then question two is, of course, after they're done with your books, what have you read as you've done all this research and all this preparation that might be of interest to listeners to the show? And I would ask you, show up, I mean, you're a professional and you have a sort of obligation to research all sorts of different nooks and crannies, but show a bias towards, you know, books that are themselves particularly impressive pieces of literature that you get real bang for your buck by focusing on. Yeah, in terms of the books, I think Ian Toll's trilogy about the War in the Pacific is just brilliant,

from a naval perspective especially. I think that's Ian's wheelhouse, that he's one of the finest naval historians in play now. And I think you'll really get a sense of what the U.S. Navy becomes. And as Ian sees it, just what a maritime war this is on many levels. Now, you know, I tend to chime in in my series and say, okay, yes, but the war had to be fought and won on the ground ultimately. And that meant X, Y, and Z. And I think that that tends to be the equation. But I also would point anyone toward Rich Frank's, his book on Operation Downfall, which is the larger term about invading Japan, you know, in which Olympic and Cornett would have been part of the larger operation downfall. It's brilliantly done. And you're really, if you're wondering about the

side of end game of the war and its legacies, I don't think you can go to any other better place. and he's in the middle now of a trilogy that really does focus to a great extent on the Sino-Japanese War, which I think is long overdue. So the first book is called Tower of Skulls, and then the subsequent books are in the offing now. I think if you want a one-volume look at it,

Ron Specter's Eagle against the Sun is just amazing. And kind of a good place to start on some levels. Any, sorry, Dan, any memoirs or you know you have all these colorful figures who just get less attention i think than the corps or army commanders in europe get any any any primary source documents or anything like that that really stand out to you yeah i i think general icelberger's memoir i highly recommend it it's i think of our jungle road to tokyo and it's it's just so interesting and engaging it reminds me of issenhower's crusade in Europe. And they're very alike in that they really, neither of them really needed ghost

writers. So I think when you look at Eicholberger's memoir, you kind of see the whole war from, certainly from the Army's perspective, coming from Australia and New Guinea forward through the Philippines, but also the occupation of Japan too. So it takes you to the aftermath of the war. I find that one in some ways the most interesting. There's a, at the soldiers level, I think a fascinating book, which isn't very well known, by a guy named Francis Bernie Katanzaro, who was with the 41st division. And it's basically called that with the 41st division in the Pacific. And it's all about what it was like to be a rifleman fighting in the South Pacific in the Philippines. And in a way, that's the real Pacific war on some levels. It's not as much three days of Tarawa as it is

months and months and months in the New Guinea jungles, the Philippines jungles and all that, that maybe is a little more typical. And also, I think, for many Marines, too, you know, like if you served at Cape Gloucester or something, you know, that it's kind of a longer haul sometimes. And I think you get a sense of that in that book. Yeah. I mean, of course, there's tons of others. Those are the ones that really come to mind first, I guess. And final, final thoughts, big takeaways that we need to keep in mind today about fighting in the Pacific. Yeah, I mean, I think if it played out this way 80 years ago, then I think there's some lessons there,

and it's likely to be much the same. And of course, you know, there's been some game-changing weapons and technologies since then, but war is war on some levels. And I think maybe the mistake we make nowadays is to see the Pacific Asia as a kind of maritime theater exclusively and a tendency to say, well, okay, we'll invest our ground resources with NATO in Europe,

and then we'll let the Navy handle what happened to the Pacific. I think that would be a major mistake. I think you're going to need, unfortunately, major ground forces to do most of the heavy lifting, and they're going to have to be Marine and Army, just as they were in World War II. And I think that the two ground-oriented services are going to have to do a good partnership,

just as they mostly did in the war against Japan. When they didn't, it was because of command problems, largely. The level of respect for the average Marine and the average soldier, in combat for each other, was off the charts. And I don't think that that has changed, hopefully, unfortunately, but I think that's really where the war would be one or lost from my very limited perspective. The other legacy I want to talk about that is still with us today is, and this isn't just the Pacific,

but Pacific is a big part of it, the idea that once the war is over, we will find the remains of our fallen, we will repatriate them, bring them home if that's what the next to kin want. So where does that idea to get started? Really, World War II? And, of course, now we expect it. And so that expectation now grows out of what happened to World War II, and it was a massive repatriation program. So that's where I end the series is with that program,

because I thought it was, in some ways, at a human level, the most appropriate legacy. John McManus, author of To the End of the Earth, the U.S. Army and the Downfall of Japan, 1940. That's the third volume in a trilogy that begins with fire and fortitude followed by Island Infernoes. As always, fascinating conversation. Thank you so much for coming on the show. Yeah, thanks for having me on.

I really appreciate it. This is a nebulous media production. Find us wherever you get your podcasts.