School of War - Ep 177: Christopher Kolakowski on Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr.

Episode Date: February 14, 2025

Christopher Kolakowski, director of the Wisconsin Veterans Museum and editor of Tenth Army Commander: The World War II Diary of Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr., joins the show to discuss the most senior U.S. officer killed by enemy action in WWII, Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr.  ▪️ Times      •      01:44 Introduction     •      02:15 In the shadows     •     03:53 Fathers and sons      •      06:28 Childhood      •      09:30 West Point Commandant of Cadets        •      16:03 Alaska ’41     •      20:18 The Japanese threat      •      24:20 10th Army        •      29:03 Notes for an unwritten memoir     •      31:02 Operation Causeway     •      35:47 Okinawa     •      41:52 Attrition     •      43:50 Another Anzio?     •      50:57 Homeward bound Follow along on Instagram, X @schoolofwarpod, and YouTube @SchoolofWarPodcast Find a transcript of today’s episode on our School of War Substack

George Patton, Omar Bradley, Mark Clark. Names like these, men who commanded America's field armies in World War II, are pretty well known. How about Simon Boulevard Buckner, Jr? He was of the same rank and level of responsibility as these men. He led the seizure of Okinawa, and he would have played a major role in any invasion of the Japanese home islands. But he was killed in combat in the summer of 1945, the most senior American officer to be killed in action by the enemy. Consequently, there was never a memoir, never much press in the mix of everything else that was happening, and his remarkable story has had limited circulation.

We're going to talk about him today. Let's get into it. It is the script for war this Iraqi invasion of the way. December 7, 1941, a date which will live in him. The bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a state. We continue to face the rain. People are not to speak on the beaches, we shall fight on me on the landing ground. We shall fight in the fields and in the streets. We shall never surrender.

For more, follow School of War on YouTube, Instagram, Substack, and Twitter. And feel free to follow me on Twitter at Aaron B. McLean. Hi, I'm Aaron McLean. Thanks for joining School of War. I'm delighted to welcome to the show today, Chris Kolakowski, who is the director of the Wisconsin's Veterans Museum in Madison, Wisconsin. and he is the author and editor, most recently, of 10th Army Commander, the World War II diary of Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. Chris, thank you so much for joining the show.

Well, thanks for having me. So I was just saying before we started recording that I always like episodes like this, because I'll open with a confession, which is that before I started preparing for this, I had basically no idea who Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. was. I might have been, possibly, I might have been able to associate. him with the Second World War. I can't really say for sure in retrospect. I think I might have passed that level of test, but anything after that, no hope. So how did you become aware of Buckner and what led you to this project? I actually started my military history career as a Civil War

historian. And my first book ever was on the Battle of Perryville in Kentucky. Buckner Jr.'s father served in on the Confederate side. And his father later became governor of Kentucky. And so through that, I got to know the family. I got to know some of the family's story and realized that there's this tremendous father, son, and even grandson, there's three generations of Buckner's that end up going to West Point, father's son, and then ultimately Buckner, one of Buckner Jr's sons from the class of 1948. And it's just a family of tremendous military heritage and service. And as I got into it, I realized there'd never been a full publication of Buckner Jr.'s papers. Of course, he gets killed on Okinawa in June 18th, 1945,

senior American killed in World War II and in the 20th century by enemy fire. And that really has put him in the shadows. Right. Because he wanted to write a memoir after the war, unlike the other army commanders in the Pacific, Robert Eichelberger, Walter Kruger, and of course Douglas MacArthur, who did all write memoirs. You know, Buckner kind of faded into the shadows. And I was able to work with the family. I was able to get and really for the first time ever get a full publication of those writings and at least put his voice out there what he's what he left for us of that voice. And Buckner is is one of at least two commanders, senior commanders in the Pacific right, who have Civil War parents because MacArthur's,

MacArthur's dad, right? Isn't that the only father's son, Medal of Honor duo out there? Isn't that right? MacArthur Senior has the Medal of Honor? In the first. Arthur MacArthur, Douglas MacArthur's father got it for the Battle of Missionary Ridge in 1863. It is from Wisconsin. As a matter of fact, the battle flag he carried up Missionary Ridge is in the collection of the Veterans Museum. And then Douglas got the Medal of Honor in World War II for the defense of the Philippines. They're the first father's son medal of honor combination. They've since been joined by Theodore Roosevelt, Senior and Junior. Of course, of course.

And then the other pairing that struck me as I was looking at this is, I guess, Buckner. It's a fine distinction. Buckner is the most senior officer killed by enemy fire. Correct. But then Leslie McNair is basically the same rank and is killed in Normandy by Friendly Fire, right? He's killed by RB 17. And then you also have a couple of Air Force commanders who die in plane crashes, Miller Harmon and Frank Andrews.

And then those three plus Buckner are the highest ranking to die in the war. But Buckner is the only one that dies by enemy fire. It's actually striking. Again, I only know this because I was preparing for this episode, but I looked at the list of flag officers killed in World War II American flag officers. And man, aircraft travel, not a safe enterprise in the Second World War. Seems to be overwhelming majority of deaths or aircraft accidents. It's surprising when you really get into it. You're absolutely right.

You know, people forget air travel in those days. You know, the Wright brothers only flew the airplane in December 1903. So, you know, you hit the 40th anniversary in 190. And it's pretty amazing when you think about technology. But still, they're finally just starting to do a global. And you get a sense of it actually in Buckner's diary because he, you know, he's a pilot himself. He had done some flight training. And it's interesting.

He documents his flights around the Pacific. So it's a real interesting look through his diary that global network that we take for granted today in the jet age was really being built during World War II. of course it had its problems along the way and that's where you get a lot of what you're talking about with the air crashes yeah well you know look any any depiction of you know air combat in world war two like in masters of the air last year i mean obviously looks harrowing but honestly the thought of even just getting on one of those things looks pretty harrowing to me compared to you know what you're used to today absolutely so let's let's talk about buckner then buckner junior say a bit about you know the world he grows up in the west point he goes to i guess teddy

Teddy Roosevelt is responsible for his appointment and the army he comes into. What is the United States Army that Buckner, Jr. joins? Buckner Jr. was born July 18, 1886. And when he's one year old, his father is elected governor of Kentucky. His father is 63 when Buckner Jr. is born. So that's something right there that's unusual. He grows up his toddler years in the governor's mansion of Kentucky. His father will later be a vice presidential nominee for the Gold Democrat Party in 18. 1996. Buckner Jr., age 10, goes to the convention, and by all accounts, was a tremendously charming presence. So he's one of those people who has a very interesting, wide-ranging childhood. He goes to West Point, as you mentioned, a presidential appointment by Theodore

Roosevelt in 1904, and he graduates in 1908. And it's an in an army that is changing. It had been an army that, you know, 1908, 10 years after the war with Spain had been fought and won. And so the United States had gone in a very short amount of time as a result of that conflict from being a continental power to being a global power. And so you have West Point is trying to adapt the lessons of Spain. They're trying to modernize the curriculum. And it's an army as an institution that is beginning to grapple with what worldwide responsibilities mean. As a matter of fact, Buckner, his first duty station upon commissioning is the Philippines.

And so he spends a few years out there in the Philippines, which is still kind of at the very tail end of some of the uprisings. He's in the Central Philippines at the same time that John Pershing is doing some of his exploits against the Moros down in Mindanao and kind of pacifying the last resistance in Mindanao, just to give you an idea of where we are. It's also an Army, you know, flight. The Army's first airplane and first airplane accident is 1909. You know, so it's an army that's read and the internal combustion engine is

starting so they're starting it's a it's a period of transformation and buckner junior will be a part of that he'll take flight training before world war one he'll be an infantry officer but he'll be you know he'll already be seeing the possibilities of an air arm and then later you know after after world one although he hasn't served you know teaching at west point and then stints at the war college as a student and instructor the command of general staff college before that is a student and instructor you know it's a period of great transformation, and Buckner is in a position to be a part of those conversations as the Army tries to develop two through and beyond World War I. You have, you know, the book that you've just produced is it's the core of it is the diary

of Buckner's time as Army Commander, but you have some chapters of your own, both surveying other, you know, important episodes, really surveying in, in brief form the rest of his life, and then offering some, in my opinion, really thoughtful analysis of his decisions. And I was struck by your depiction of his time as, I guess it's commandant at West Point. Yes. You know, what did that period in his career reveal about his character? What did the cadets think about him when he was running the show there? Buckner was commandant of cadets from 1933 to 1936, and he was the deputy from 1932 to 33.

For your listeners out there that may not be familiar with the structure of West Point, superintendent is a general officer. and then immediately below the superintendent is the commandant of cadets, which the civilian equivalent would be dean of students. The commandant of cadets' responsibility is the instruction, discipline, and command of the Corps of Cadets and the officers that are assigned to help guide the tactical officers, as they're known. So it's a very important, very influential role.

And if you think about the class of 1936, which has his leadership, which is Buckner all four years, is either these. assistant commandant or the commandant. It really marks a generation and is a legacy form. And you think about some of those graduates, Bruce Palmer, William Westmoreland, Creighton Abrams, Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., just to cite some of the most prominent. They are the senior leaders of the Army and the military in the early Cold War all the way through the Vietnam era. And they are formed as officers by General Buckner. Buckner himself was, among his peers and his superiors, he could be very convivial, he could be very personable. But to the cadets in particular, he wanted to come across as a disciplinarian and was very strict, very demanding of the cadets.

Part of that, though, he realized, and he's in this way, his West Point, one of his West Point mates, George Patton, agreed with this. If you are not disciplined about details like dress, having your equipment. equipment ready, things like that, you're not going to be disciplined about what you need to do for your mission. You're not going to be disciplined about things like weapons and vehicle care and things like that. And Buckner also believed in physical fitness, take the cadets out on marches. They maneuver. In fact, during the summer maneuvers in 1933, there was a torrential rainstorm. And one of the attacks came to Buckner's tent and said, you know, sir, should we call off the training tomorrow? And he looked at the rain and he said, I don't see why we should.

and they went out and trained. Now, the cadets had some opinions about some of these things, particularly Benjamin O'Davis, who later wrote in his memoirs, he said, going through some of that stuff at the leadership of General Buckner, as he said, quote, gave me a greater preference for wanting to fly. Buckner sometimes even said, you know, light baggage. Everybody should be able to sleep with just one blanket and all this and send all the excess baggage back. And as Westmoreland put in his memoirs, he got a Bronx cheer for that statement. And he also said, you know, there were rumors of a Mrs. Buckner, which in fact there was. He was very happily married. But we always thought maybe he slept in his own cot or on a concrete slab or something. You know,

he didn't seem quite human to them. But again, that was part of Buckner's leadership and trying to get them to, you know, trying to, trying to influence them as officers, I guess. I'm inclined to be troublemaking and respond to all that by saying he sounds like a Marine, which of course he ends up he ends up commanding is it the only numbered army with a sort of core level marine component is that is that how would you characterize it yeah and actually i think you hit on something i think that's why he like he got on with marines so well but yes 10th army is a unique organization in the u.s army of world war two it's one of only two field armies that had a significant number of non-us army troops fifth army in italy always had a foreign contingent, sometimes British, sometimes French, sometimes other nations as well. But 10th Army is the only one in the Pacific, and you're right, half of it, one of its two corps were Marines, the third amphibious corps, the other one being the Army's 24th Corps. And so working together and working with the commander of that corps, Roy Geiger, who was an

accomplished officer himself, and I have come to respect perhaps more than any other Marine General, you know, working with him, working with the different doctrines and standards and even, you know, nomenclature sometimes and putting this fighting force together. The other thing that should be mentioned, and the diary talks about this in some detail, 10th Army never actually came together as a fighting formation until the fleet, the invasion fleet finally united off Okinawa. The Marines were down to the Solomon Islands and they sailed from there to Okinawa, 1,500 miles.

The army troops from fighting troops are in Latea in the Philippines and they sail up to Okinawa in 900 miles or so. And then you've got support units as far away. way is Seattle and San Francisco. You know, and so putting all this together would be a difficult task if everybody was together. You know, think of all the challenges that Eisenhower had melding that force for the invasion of Normandy, and everybody's in southern England. Buckner's got to do this over the full expanse of the Pacific.

And the fact that he's able to do it and that Army gets ashore and then prosecutes a successful campaign is attributed very much to General Buckner, at least in the way I read it. I have more questions for you about 10th Army, and I want to get into that and into Okinawa in some detail, but I don't want to skip over some other stuff before we get there. Because to me, one of the interesting things about Buckner's career, in addition to him, you know, being obviously a very interesting person and commander himself, is the way in which there are a couple of episodes in which he plays a leading role that are sort of strategic dogs that don't bark in the Second World War. So he commands the defense of Alaska for several years. And there's certainly there's ultimately action up there. even quite significant action, right, on, I'm not even sure I'm going to pronounce this correctly, but Atu. Atu and Kiska.

But there's certainly there's never a, you know, the Japanese invasion such as it is never, never escalates to the point where it becomes a major theater of the war. And then, you know, I also want to talk a little bit later about Operation Causeway and, and, you know, his role in planning this invasion of Formosa or Taiwan that never actually happens, you know, and it's always one of the themes of or sort of sub-themes of this show that's become clear to me as we've done it over the last couple years is to really understand conflicts, to understand something like the war in the Pacific. It's not enough to just pay attention to the major episodes that everyone knows because they happened and they were significant. You have

to go back and look at all the alternatives that didn't occur because those alternatives loomed very large in the minds of the decision makers and shaped their decisions. And so for that, for that reason, I find Buckner's career, you know, kind of steps on these things. It's really interesting. Can we talk about the defense of Alaska and what that involves and how he sees his role up there? Sure. Alaska in December, 1941, was one of the key outposts in the Pacific for the Army. The Army of the Navy had developed this thing called the Strategic Triangle, as they called it, and it was basically where the defense of the West Coast started.

And it started at Panama, it started Hawaii, and it started in Alaska. And Buckner is sent to Alaska in October of 1940 to basically create the defenses of the territory. It's not a state until 1959. When he gets there, there's 400 men at Fort Chilkut Barracks and a cannon. And the cannon is a monument because it's an old Russian canon from the days when it was, Alaska was still under the Russians. And as one of his engineers would later say, he was given a 10-year job and he did it in a year and a half. In fact, there's a lot of Alaska infrastructure even today.

And if you look at the map of the military bases of Alaska, virtually all of those, Buckner either created or had a heavy infrastructure. in creating, even the naval installations as well. It's pretty amazing. And by December 1941, there's 22,000 troops. There's a few dozen aircraft that will be augmented shortly after Pearl Harbor. And then augmented again once it's discovered that the Japanese have landed at Atu and Kiska in June of 1942. And then Buckner, with the assistance of the Navy and the Air Force, will suppress the Japanese and then will be part of the campaign that throws them off in May, 1943 at Atu and then Kiska in August of 1943. A couple of other quick notes about these, just for some of your listeners, maybe familiar

if they know World War II history. Number one, Atu and Kiska were a latent threat to a vital land-lens route for aircraft to the Soviet Union. The Alaska-Siberia-Al-Sib route, 8,000 aircraft went from Alaska over the Bering Straits into the Soviet Union to go fight the Germans over the course of the war. it's pretty amazing when you think about it most people don't know anything about the al-sib route but with the japanese sitting in the allusions that's a latent threat that needs to be needs to be taken care of the other thing that i would mention is attu among the pacific battles

is except for iwo jima is the bloodiest pacific battle of the war proportionate to the level of forces that were engaged there were only a few thousand japanese on the island they almost all died die and the Americans land of divisions, the seventh infantry division, but proportionate to the numbers, only Iwo Jima exceeds at two. And then the last thing I'll mention is if you've ever seen the movie Devil's Brigade, one of the things they don't talk about, it's about the first special service force, the American Canadian force. Their first battle was Kiska. And then they were sent to Italy and then south of France, which is what most people are familiar with. So it's a really interesting campaign. And, you know, I talk about in the book how Buckner's death removed two

chapters of the Pacific War, or two important parts of two chapters of the Pacific War, Alaska and Okinawa. And we'll get into Okinawa, I'm sure, in a little bit. But it's a fascinating, fascinating period up there, both for what could be, but also what ultimately is not done for a lot of different reasons. And it illuminate, if you look at the war from an Alaskan perspective, it illuminates a lot of allied strategy. And why, and decisions and the impacts of those decisions. Well, let's linger on that for a second, if you don't mind. Sure.

You cite somebody, I can't remember, I don't know if it's Billy Mitchell. Someone you cite in your book describes Alaska as the aerial crossroads of the world, which makes anyone who's flown to Asia from the East Coast knows that to absolutely be the case. I remember flying to Asia for the first time some years ago and falling asleep and waking up in the middle of the night and checking the monitor on the seat back in front of me and realizing with a shock. that I was something like 200 miles north off the north coast of Alaska and thinking to myself, well, good Lord, I hope. I guess if anything happens out here, that's that, because no one's coming to help you up here.

But talk, you know, what, so Pearl Harbor happens, you know, then by that summer we have these landings out there, these Japanese landings out in the western reaches of the illusions. What is, what does the Japanese threat picture look like? Like, what are they anticipating actually happening potentially? What are they preparing for? the Japanese land on the allusions and this is this is actually something that that john partial and tony tully in their book of on midway shattered sword really get into it's a misconception that the illusions is a diversion from midway it's actually two major operations mounted at the same time

and the japanese want to secure bases in the allusions for really two reasons number one secure their northern flank the eastern end of the or the western end of the allusions is only 700 miles from the major base of Paramoshiro in the Kirao Islands, which is where the Pearl Harbor Task Force had left to go bomb Pearl Harbor. And then from there, it's a very short hop to Hokkaido, the northernmost Japanese home island. So they're really concerned about that and about Alaska as a U.S. base. The other thing that they want to do is they want to use Atu and Kiska as a potential power projection point into other parts, Dutch Harbor, potentially as far as anchorage, eventually up into the Bering Sea against the Al-Sib route.

When the Japanese get to the allusions, they discover something that American airmen were already starting to figure out is that the weather is atrocious. And it's still something that affects, even affected the North Pacific Cold War. There is an atmospheric bubble that sits just south. That's a perpetual low that sits just south of the illusions. That has been compared to its Earth's answer to the red spot of Jupiter. if you're familiar with that big red spot, that's that storm that roils the entire planet's atmosphere. And that perpetual low gives the allusions extremely difficult weather for flying and for sailing.

There are islands that it's so windy that you can count the number of trees on one hand or they have no trees at all. So just imagine trying to operate in that from a lot of different standpoints. that weather, plus now the loss at Midway, means the Japanese are kind of stuck at Atu and Kiska. They actually think about evacuating in the fall of 1942, but end up staying. And after the loss of Attu, the Japanese decide to evacuate Kiska and cut their losses. But that's what the Japanese are up there trying to do. The United States, you know, Buckner is saying, hey, you know, the shortest route to Tokyo is through the North Pacific. And if you look at a map, it is.

then you look at the weather. You look at the logistical problems of even just trying to supply the army that you would need to go 700 miles from the allusions. And we're talking about the tip of the allusions, really the closest viable base for an invasion of Japan itself

from Alaska would probably be Dutch Harbor or even Anchorage. And you're talking over a thousand miles just to sail from to get to Japan. It's not viable. And so the allies say, plan for something potentially in 1945. We're taking the Alaskan troops. You know, 7th Division goes to the Central Pacific, the Special Service Force, and other units go to Europe. We're going to put

them in higher priority battlefronts where they can do better to win the war. And Alaska becomes kind of a backwater after the Battle of Kiska. And then, of course, General Buckner himself is part of that transfer when he goes from Alaska to Hawaii in June of 1944. So let's, let's be a lot of Let's talk about this then. Buckner goes to set up 10th Army, the U.S. 10th Army. Maybe just start with something very basic. What is an army in this specific sense? I mean, the scale of this, by the way, it sort of boggles the mind.

You know, if you're sitting here, you're familiar with, you know, America's post-9-11 wars. I think at our peak, I haven't checked this. But, you know, sometime in the late 2000 aughts, you know, between Iraq and Afghanistan, America might have had something on the order of 200,000 troops deployed between the two countries, maybe a little bit more. Well, that's about what we're talking about in one numbered U.S. Army, right? Why do these armies exist? What does it mean to be a numbered U.S. Army?

Talk a bit about that. So the Army in World War II, and I'm talking about just the Army itself, not the Army Air Force or anything else, numbered 8 million, and there were 16 million Americans under arms in all of World War II. So that gives you an idea right there. the army is fighting on a scale unlike anything it's ever seen. The army, as these battles are going on, both in Europe and in the Pacific, but it becomes very clear very quickly. The Army fields 90 divisions, and very quickly they organize them in a corps with the Roman numerals. We're all familiar with those. Those are still very much in use today. But the other thing the Army realizes is the battles are getting bigger

as they develop in Africa, but also in the Pacific. They need to create a higher head. headquarters, also to match what the other allies have, like the British and things like that, to command multi-core operations. And so that's where you get these field army headquarters that are created. In the modern army, the modern U.S. Army, these field armies double as geographic commands. Army Central is the old third army. Army North is the old fifth army. And so on down the line.

And so the army creates field army headquarters. They send three to the Pacific, the even numbered ones, six, eight, and, 10, odd-numbered ones go to Europe. And then two, second and fourth, remain behind as training and defense commands in the continental United States. 10th Army is the last one to see action. It's created in the summer of 1944 by personnel brought down from Buckner's headquarters in Alaska, also from personnel from the United States. And basically, their job is to take the two assigned Corps, 24th Corps of the Army, and then the Marine Third Amphibious Corps, and then execute whatever their assigned amphibious mission will be, originally Operation Causeway, later Operation

Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa. And so it's a strategic headquarters, and it's one of those where in 1942, the U.S. Army actually wrote doctrine for what a field army should do. The Corps is a very tactical headquarters. The Army is sustainment, its logistics. It's kind of the land component command to use a modern parlance. But it also can oversee military government, which the 10th Army does. The 10th Army also has something unique is that it's got its own tactical air force that is subordinate to the Army commander.

All the other air units assigned to other army, field armies in the war are assigned to cooperate. But this one is under Buckner's direct command. So it's a complex job. To be a field army commander in World War II is a very complex job. And it's one, Buckner, frankly, I think Alaska in a lot of ways, when you think about what it takes to command a department like that through the things that we touched on in our discussion earlier, in a lot of ways, it's a great preparation for what Buckner's going to have to do as commander a 10th Army. Right, because in addition to, you know, just the complexities of everything you just outlined,

you are operating in the very upper reaches, the rare atmosphere of Army-Navy politics as well. Very much. Just politics as such. I mean, that's going to be part of your job at that level. Buckner figures that out real fast, and he learned some of that in Alaska, because he wasn't going to get where he needed to go without the help of the Navy. And when he gets to Hawaii, he learns, he figures out real fast that the commander of Army forces in the Pacific, a guy named Robert Richardson, has all the authority over Army

forces except actual battle command. When the army units in the Central Pacific have gone into action, they've gone into action under the command of Marines or under direct command of Admiral Chester Nimitz or his chief deputy, Raymond Spruitts. And so Buckner realizes real fast that his fate and really the key person to decide when and where this army of his is going to fight is Admiral Nimitz. and the diary does a real good job talking about how he spends a lot of time through beings personal and professional and social. You know, working with Nimitz. They knew each other. They had known each other.

They had had meeting, been in meetings together before coordinating things with when Buckner was in Alaska. But the way Buckner cultivates that relationship and you can tell when you read the diary how successful he is. Because Nimitz trusts him and Nimitz backs him all the way to the end of his life. And the nature of this diary, just to talk about the document for a second, it's sort of, it's quick moving, it's cursory, there's short entries, and these are really meant to be notes, right? I mean, there's going to be notes for a memoir that unfortunately never got written. That's absolutely right. And that's why I included the letters to his wife during the battle is because when he writes to his wife, Adele, he's much more expressive, as you would be when you're in a letter as opposed to making quick notes to yourself in a diary. And in some ways, that might have been a rough draft for a memoir that he was doing through those letters.

But even within the notes, it's interesting sometimes the little quotes or the little quick impressions that he makes. He's one of those people that can turn a phrase, but can also use a phrase to convey a great deal in a very short phrase. It's, I mean, obviously, his death is a tragedy for a variety of reasons. But I have the sense, having reviewed your book, that it would have been, it would have, been a memoir much worth reading, not only for its historical value, but he gives the impression of somebody who could write. Absolutely. And he's got a sense of humor too.

This is not in writing, but you recount this moment from his Alaska days where a couple young women knock on the door when he opens the door and they're chit-chatting. He asks, I can't remember exactly what he says, but they respond. Like, no, no, we've got to go to that old, old fogy Bill Buckner's house for, or Boulevard Buckner's house for a party. Do you know where he lives? And he sighs. says, well, you better come in and have a drink because you're going to need one if you have to deal with him or something to that effect.

You know, that's just, that kind of humor is important when you're, when you're going to write. Okay. So speaking of politics, he finds himself in, in the midst of this debate over what's going to follow the conquest of the Marianas, which we just did an episode actually recently on the show about Task Force 58 and the Central Pacific campaign. The Marianas are secured. And then there's a question of what's going to come next to. is 44 turns to 45. Is it going to be Formosa, now called Taiwan, or is it going to be an axis that moves through the Philippines? Talk a bit about that debate. What was the conception of the Taiwan operation,

which never came to pass? Why was it rejected? Just give us a sense of all of this. Sure, sure. So, yeah, as the two drives are coming together, you got Douglas MacArthur coming up along the New Guinea coast from Australia, and Chester Nimitz, as you mentioned, coming straight west from Hawaii through the Mariana's.

Both of these two offensives are approaching the objective area, the triangle, as they called it, of the China coast, the northern Philippines, and Formosa. And there were two competing plans. Douglas MacArthur had always said, I shall return, I want to return. You know, redeeming that pledge has been his aim in life ever since he left the Philippines in 1942 under presidential order. The other proposal, which is coming as much from Washington as it is as Nimitz's headquarters, although there's some question as to how lukewarm Nimitz was about it, was to a launch Operation Causeway, which would have been a two-pronged landing.

The first part would have been to secure southern Formosa. Second part would have been to secure a port, ammo, on the China coast, with the way of the aim then of opening of line of supply to Changaisek's armies, which were holding down millions of Japanese troops that America did not want to have to fight in the islands. And so that was what Operation Causeway was. There's a lot of debate. In fact, Franklin Roosevelt comes out in July of 1944 to meet with Nimitz and MacArthur,

and hears about it. That's been much discussed and dramatized. Ultimately, Buckner actually makes one of the key contributions because there's a lot of discussion about the politics. There's a lot of discussion about, you know, just a lot of different factors. But Buckner comes back in September and says, look, I can do this, but I don't have, right now, I don't have the support and service support units that I need to get my army ashore and to keep them ashore the way we need to.

However, the units I need are on their way to Europe. If you give me them, I can do this. And that's the key thing that turns the whole question, because MacArthur and his staff have said, look, with support from the Philippine people, we can do the Philippines with resources on hand. I don't need anything else. And if you remember getting back to your question about strategic decisions and strategic priorities, what's the great allied priority? Germany first.

You're not going to stop the war in Europe to take an island in the Pacific, are you? And that resource point turns, basically shuts off any debate or any further opposition. We can do the Philippines with what we have on hand. General Buckner, who above anybody else would be the man to know because he's the ground commander designate for Operation Causeway. We can't do this. His math is right. Let's go to the Philippines.

I see. And the idea being that because the Philippines was an American protectorate, there would be this natural reservoir of support, whereas opposed to Formosa, which I guess had been part of the Japanese empire since what, the end of the 19th century, something like that? had ruled Formosa since 1895. And there were a couple of Formosa regiments that actually were sent to the Philippines for the 1941-42 campaign. I see.

So at best, the Formosans would have been neutral, whereas I'll just cite one statistic for the level of support we could expect from the Philippine people. The largest anti-axis resistance in the world, except for the Polish home army, was the Filipino resistance. There were a quarter million Filipino guerrillas waiting for McCorme. Arthur's return. And a lot of them, if you study the Philippine campaign of 44 and 45, helped to liberate the provinces alongside regular U.S. troops. So that's the level of support that it made such a difference in the liberation. We never would have been able to expect any of that

on foremost. Yeah, the scale of the war in and around the Philippines, I mean, we're going to move on to Okinawa here in a second, but just I never, I never know to what extent these are embarrassing personal reflections or commentaries on, you know, general attitudes and knowledge. But I am always amazed at the scale of the fighting in and around the Philippines, both at the start of the war when we lose it and at the end of the war, the scale of the amphibious operations to retake it. The Battle of Lady Gulf, which if I'm not mistaken, right, is the largest naval battle of all time. Largest and bloodiest naval battle in the history of the world. That's right. Are none.

Right there in and around the Philippine waters. Absolutely. Yeah. Okay. So instead of Causeway, we're going to do, it's iceberg, right? Okinawa. Operation Iceberg, yep, the invasion of Okinawa. Okay, so 10th Army shifts planning to that. Talk us through Buckner's role in the preparation and initial execution of iceberg. What's he thinking? What are his priorities? What are his challenges? Buckner is given the mission of securing Okinawa, but also some islands in the general area. And he's given four months to do it. And the objective is it's just like the Marines going to Iwo Jima, which is an operation, operation of Operation Detachment, which is, which will start February 19th, 1945, Okinawa, April 1st. These are the last two stops before the home islands themselves.

In fact, Okinawa and Iwo Jima are administratively part of Japan itself. Okinawa is a prefecture of Japan. The analogy I use is imagine if somebody were to try and invade Hawaii. It's the same relationship, similar relationship between Okinawa and mainland Japan as it is for the United States and Hawaii. So his job is to secure with 10th Army to secure anchorages, secure air bases, and secure radar installations to support air offensives and to support fleet staging for an eventual. Everybody expects there's going to be an invasion of the home islands. In fact, both sides consider the Battle of Okinawa a full dress rehearsal for the invasion of Japan itself. So that gives you an idea.

You know, that's the mentality going into the planning. And so Buckner looks at the situation and decides he's going to bring his army ashore at the waist of the island, a flat plain at the Hougi beaches. The plan is initially to turn south, secure the southern third of the island, with good port of Mahan, the best developed area. Secure northern Okinawa and that it's phase two. And then phase three is to secure some other islands as you get a little bit further north as some of those early warning air raid stations. Ultimately, Okinao will be such a good base for particularly airfield construction, but also naval, some naval anchorages, that a lot of phase three is going to get canceled. You know, he's under no illusion as to what's about to, you know, the difficulty of his task for the importance of it. And he, to his credit, realizes I have to get away.

My headquarters is in Hawaii. We've already talked about how dispersed his units were. He flies around. He spends most of late January and early February, 1945, flying to the Philippines to inspect his troops, you know, going out to the Marines in the Solomon Islands and visiting them and reviewing them and talking through the plans. Do you have what you need? Are you comfortable with what we're going to do? You know, and just getting on that same page. And, you know, it's amazing how much relationships matter in so many fields. I think the military, perhaps more than certainly as much or more than any.

other. And Buckner's one of those who builds the right relationships, make sure everybody's on the same page so that when the Army does come together and actually invade Okinawa on April 1st, they're ready to go. And they hit the beach and they immediately start advancing and doing what they need to do. And the basic scheme of maneuver is you're going to cut this island into, you're going to, what, you're going to go north and then you're going to finish south, right? Actually, the plan is the other way. Oh, the plan is the other way. This is something Buckner doesn't get a lot of critical.

Walk us through it. So the idea is you come ashore at Hugushi. It's going to take, they expect the Japanese to do what they've done in most other island battles, which is Meechia on the beach. The island there is about three miles wide. It's going to take you, they estimate it's going to take you two weeks to get across the island. The commander at Okinawa, Usha Jima Mitsuru, who is, for my money, one of the best

Japanese army commanders we face in the war, one of the probably two or three best, decides I'm not going to do that. I'm going to bleed the Americans as long as I can. So I'm going to dig in in the southern third of Okinawa and basically leave most of the rest of the island to the Americans. So when the Americans come ashore on April 1st, as a soldier says, he walks a few hundred yards of shore, he says, I've already lived longer than I thought I would.

It takes him two days to get across the island. And Buckner at this point in a decision that he's, you know, a lot of people criticize him for being conservative and state, he hits out at this point and says, let's start phase two. Marines go secure Northern Okinawa. Army troops, 24th Corps, turn south and let's see where the Japanese are. And that's, you know, that aggression and flexibility is something that he doesn't get any credit for or in a lot of places and is an overlooked decision. And the Marines within three weeks secure northern Okinawa, and then the rest of the battle is going to be fought the southern third where Ushijima has planned it all along.

You said that Okinawa is sort of seen by all sides as a dress rehearsal for, you know, the invasion of the home islands. And my understanding of Japanese strategy, really since the start of the war, which they began. I mean, they attack Polarbor knowing that the, you know, the defense industrial questions, the economic questions are really against them in the long run. And their conception, first of all, they're going to improve their position by seizing, you know, the Indies and so forth. And they're going to improve their access to raw materials and things they think they need. But even so, it's a bad deal. And they know it's a bad deal.

And so their conception broadly is they're going to atrit the Americans who ultimately is an American democracy. American democracy is just not going to put up with endless years of war, you know, to get one little island after the next in the Western Pacific. We're going to just throw in the tal. We're going to come to terms at some point. We're going to figure out that we're going to have to draw a line with the Japanese and just accept, you know, a new order in the Western Pacific. And so this conception, obviously, it's going really badly for them by 1945, but nevertheless, they haven't given up on it, right? Like to include prior to the atomic bomb, this is the whole idea of the defense of Japan,

is we're going to, they're not going to be able to just walk over these islands. We're going to entreat them. We're going to bleed them. And eventually, eventually there will be terms. Eventually, they will negotiate with us such that we will have some say in the matter. So Okinaw is part of that, right? Okinau is part of a continued effort to a trip. That's right.

And if you look at Imperial Japan's experience with conflicts since Commodore Perry's opening in 1853, there's some reason for them to believe that this is what's going to happen. That's how they beat the Chinese and got Formosa in 1895. That's how they, you know, with the boxer rebellion again, that's how they did it to the Russians in 1904 and 1905. You know, the idea that you damage the forces in front of you enough. that they'll give in. We've worked with the czar, might work with the Americans. It's not working. They're continuing to double down on it, particularly as you get close to the Japanese home islands. And as I tell people, Okinawa is the bloodiest battle of the entire Pacific War.

If you look at the 120,000 Japanese defenders, over 110,000 killed, 7,000 prisoners, more than the rest of the war combined. the Americans, 49,000 casualties in the air, on the land, and in the sea. 36 ships sunk, 368 damaged, largely due to kamikaze attacks, although not all. You know, the sea, Okinawa runs red with blood on the land and on the sea and in the air above it. And it is a frightening preview for the invasion of the home islands. As a matter of fact, the day General Buckner's killed on June 18, 1945, President Harry Truman is meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and starting to do the first discussion, of, okay, if we invade the home islands, what is this really going to cost? And Okinawa is very much informing that decision. Part of the reputation for cautiousness concerns this cancellation

of a smaller amphibious landing that was going to be part of the operation to, or the effort to complete the seizure of Okinawa, right? This is a landing at a place called, it's Minnetoga. Talk a bit about that and talk about Buckner's reluctance to do it. describes it as it's going to be another ANZio. What does, tell us what's going on here and what does that mean? So, when you look at Okinawa and it's coastline, there's really only two places to land a major force. Hogushi, which is where 10th Army goes. Plan B is on the southeast coast, a place called Minnetoga, where you can put a division or so

ashore, but the problem is as soon as you get ashore over beaches that it's somewhat questionable, you can sustain troops. shortly after you get ashore, you run right into highlands. And after the battle, it's determined that Ushu Jima had posted a unit right there at Minnetoga, itching for the Americans to come ashore and to fight. There had been a demonstration there when the campaign opened. But as the battle's developing, particularly late April at this point, as the battle in the South is kind of bogging down, Bukter starts getting some proposals from Army officers and Marine. It's not a strict Army-Navy division.

land at Minnetoga enveloped the Japanese defenses, particularly around the town of Shuri. Buckner looks at it real hard. If you read his diary closely and if you have some of the things that I quote in there, you can see. He wanted to do it. He thought very hard about doing it, about enveloping and sending forces to the south. But he realized, first of all, my troops in the front line are getting exhausted. There was one platoon, just to use an example, is one platoon in the 96th division that came ashore on April 1st with 44 men. by April 30th, only 11 haven't been hit, haven't been killed or wounded. So you've got the divisions

that have been fighting all this time are getting exhausted. Plus, they've been counting bodies, and they're realizing that they're killing 15 to 1. So 15 Japanese for one American. Bectar assumes and won't learn until very late in the battle, he understands there's only 60,000 Japanese on the island instead of the 120,000 that we know we're there. So he's looking at the math and realizing, you know what, one or two more good pushes around Shuri, and we're going to get this done. We've got Ushah, or Ushuajima's at the back, you know, kind of, he's running out of men. We know that's not the case, but that's what Buckner saw. Buckner also was thinking about Anzio, which January of 1944 was the landing south of Rome.

The idea was to try and flank the Germans in Italy, at casino, break things loose and lead to the liberation of Rome. Instead, as the, it became a debacle, a near debacle, almost got driven into. the sea. Fifth Army at Casino was not in a position to support the Anzio Beachhead, and it was very nearly a great disaster, and it was hung on by their teeth. And it still made it the campaign for a while because neither Beachhead nor Main Army had enough combat power to reach each other. Buckner didn't want that. And he told his staff, he says, this would be another Anzio, but worse. the amphibious admiral that would have carried this out was Richmond Kelly Turner, who is one of the two most experienced amphibious admirals of the entire war. He did Guadalcanal in 1942, and it's been involved in every major amphibious campaign in the Central Pacific sense.

He told Buckner, he said, look, I'll do whatever you want. If you want to land there, I'll put the men in. But he also said, I consider your decision not to do Minnetoga, correct. And what Buckner ended up doing was relieving his tired divisions with the fresh troops that were considered for the landing at Minnetoga and then resume the attack down against shir. And that, it's still one of the most controversial aspects of the battle. You know, like Buckner, I was a late arrival in my father's life. My dad was at Anzio, believe it or not. Oh, no kidding.

Yeah. And he had, you know, he actually had the attitude that the criticism of the timidity on the Anzio Beach had been overdone and that had they made the dash for Rome in those first few days that, in fact, they would. have been destroyed. That was his, that was his take on Anzio. What is you, what is your, what is your take on, um, Buckner's decision? What's your, what's your pleasure of hindsight analysis? There's a part of me that would love to make that landing, but I'm back to the question we had earlier is I want to know why. I, I, you know, I'm not necessarily interested in the what if. I'm, what, what were the options in front of Buckner and what did you know at the time? And based on what he knew at the time, which is revealed in his diary and his letters and revealed in some of the

other research I did, his decision is defensible. And, you know, with a high benefit of hindsight, we realize that there may have really been an opportunity there and there may have, you know, it may have been something different. But I, I can't fault him for that decision. I get the other arguments, but I can't fault him for his decision. I actually want to read the passage from your book. This is your writing, this is not the diary where you talk about Buckner's death. Because I think you did a really nice job. Thank you. So it's the 18th of June, right?

Sorry. Yes, that's right. It's the 18th of June. He's off. He's visiting 8th Marines. 2-8 is assaulting. I know 8th Marines well. I have a few friends who served in 2-8 actually, much later.

Great regiment with a great history. And he's up there on a hill. Well, actually, before he goes up to his observation point, there's this very moving moment where he sees the body of this recently killed lieutenant David Schneider, who was a prominent college athlete from Iowa, right? Correct. He's looking at the body and he has a sort of moment there. And he goes up and he's on this hill.

He's watching the fighting. He gets warned that he's visible. The stars on his helmet can be seen. He switches out the helmet. I'm going to read from your piece here. After about an hour atop the hill, Buckner decided he'd seen enough. Things are going so well here, he said, I think I'll move down to another unit.

Just after that, a Japanese 47 millimeter shell struck the bold or next to him, knocking the officers down. He was with some of the Eighth Marines officers, and I guess some of his own staff. Wallace and Chamberlain were shaken but unharmed. Buckner was more seriously hurt as a piece of coral had embedded in his chest. He began gasping for air and asked if everyone else was okay. Marines quickly carried him to the hill's back slope and put him on a stretcher. A group gathered as word spread.

This is no small deal here. You have an Army commander. Army commander is getting badly wounded is not a regular occurrence. The first battalion surgeon U.S. Navy Lieutenant Tom Sullivan soon joined and gave him plasma as staff officers radioed for medical evacuation. Buckner kept trying to speak, but could not. He reached out his right hand for assistance in standing. Private Harry Sarkisian grabbed it with both hands and leaned over the struggling man. You're going home, General, he told Buckner.

You are homeward bound. Sarkisian repeated these words as Simon Boulevard Buckner, Jr., gasped his last breaths. I thought was a really nice piece of writing. I just wanted to put it here on the show. Thank you very much. This is a man who, you know, almost most Americans, certainly any American who's given a moment's thought to the Second World War, knows who George Patton was.

Patton had a, you know, a flash and a talent for self-promotion that on some level assured that. But he had a big job. He was a numbered Army commander. That's a big job. Well, there were a bunch of other of those, and Bolivar was one of them. Or Buckner, Buckner was one of them.

What is his ultimate significance? What should people know about him in summary final form? I would say Buckner, Jr., if you want to understand the Pacific War and understand particularly two very important chapters that have for a long time kind of been in the shadows, but hopefully with this book are less in the shadows, Alaska and then Okinawa and the debates that lead to Okinawa. It illuminates those corners of the Pacific War that have been in the shadows and really help people understand some of the important, you know, kind of how the war was fought, how the war was won, and it was not inevitable that it was going to take the course that it did. And if you look at it through Buckner's eyes, as you pointed out earlier in the discussion, he kind of sits at the intersection of a lot of that and helps determine which way the Pacific War is going to go and how it's potentially going to end. And so it's a life of significance, and his role deserves far more attention and appreciation than it's had before. Chris Kolokowski, editor most recently of Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr's diary, which is called 10th Army Commander. This has been really, really interesting.

Thank you for making the time today. Hey, thanks for having me. This is a nebulous media production. Find us wherever you get your podcasts.