School of War - Ep 218: Lawerence Freedman on Endless Wars

Episode Date: July 29, 2025

Lawerence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London and author of ‘The Age of Forever Wars’  in Foreign Affairs Magazine, joins the show to discuss why protracted warfare seems to be a mark of the era.   ▪️ Times     •      01:32 Introduction     •      02:01 Aligning strategy      •      04:37 Mass      •      07:14 Iraq and Afghanistan      •      11:14 Al Qaeda            •      14:25 Survive          •      17:50 Results matter     •      22:04 Trade-offs      •      27:23 Avoiding mistakes        •      32:13 Why does Putin continue?     •      38:29 Concessions Follow along on Instagram, X @schoolofwarpod, and YouTube @SchoolofWarPodcast Find a transcript of today’s episode on our School of War Substack

We live, some say, in an era of endless wars. And it does seem to be the case that wars in the 21st century have a habit of running longer than those who start them would wish. What are the causes of this phenomenon? Is it novel? How should planners and leaders think about the situation? We discuss these issues with the great Lawrence Friedman today and also have an interesting discussion about the state of play in Ukraine at the end. Let's get into it. December 7th, 1941, a date which will live in history.

The bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a state. We continue to face the great situation in the ground. We'll fight on the beaches. We shall fight on the landing grounds. We shall fight in the fields and in the streets. We shall never surrender. For more, follow School of War on YouTube, Instagram, Substack, and Twitter.

And feel free to follow me on Twitter at Aaron B. McLean. Hi, I'm Aaron McLean. Thanks for joining School of War. I am delighted to welcome back to the show Professor Sir Lawrence Friedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King's College London, author of many books. One impressive tone was called Strategy, another was called Command. Recently, he had an article in foreign affairs called The Age of Forever Wars, Why Military Strategy No Longer Delivers Victory, and that's what we're going to talk about today. Sir Lawrence, Thank you so much for joining the show.

Pleasure. You know, authors don't write titles necessarily. The title of your piece, nevertheless, comma, the title of your piece suggests or implies there's something about the situation you are describing, this disjunct between hopes for a short war, but realities of often long wars that is, if not peculiar to the modern age, certainly a distinctive characteristic of the modern age. Why is that? Why is this situation something that we seem to encounter a lot today?

Yeah, I mean, I think, as you say, I didn't write the title. I'm perfectly happy with the age of forever wars. I don't think I'm quite saying that military strategy can never produce victory. I guess what I'm saying is that there needs to be an alignment between political and military strategy, and that's where things so often go wrong, that the pressure to have a shore war is pretty obvious. I mean, if nobody knowingly goes into a long war, war if they can avoid it. So all the pressures on military staffs and their planning and thinking about new technologies and tactics is to work out how they can win quickly because, say, you don't want to plan for a prolonged, grueling campaign. It's all the Russians have got themselves into at the moment. Plus, there are enormous demands involved with a long war that requires you to readjust your economy, big issues of mobilisation of industry and of manpower, and without necessarily having a clear endpoint. So the reasons why people, if they're going to have a war,

when a short war, is not difficult. It's just it's actually quite difficult to achieve, because once you start on a campaign, unless you get a quick victory, unless you're surprised, and normally it depends on surprise, unless your surprise works, then the other side has a chance to adjust, fight back, before you know where you are. Weeks have turned into months and months have turned into years.

And I take to be one of the things that you're suggesting that, in a way, military planners are in a tight spot. That is to say, if you want a short war, which a rational person would, well, then it's only rational to plan for how to win a short war. But if you're a military planner and you're devoting all of your attention to that, There's at least two problems I take from your argument. One, of course, if you put all your efforts into planning for a short war, you still could end up with a long war and you haven't done the planning for it.

That's problem one. Problem two is there may be aspects of what would be required to win a short war, namely the realistic political objectives that you just pointed to, that may be on some level out of your hands. That is, you might have the best operational concepts around and the resources to mount those operations, but it still won't work. I mean, we could pick any number.

I suppose that's actually a very common situation, you would suggest. Yeah, two very good points. I think on the first one, I think as we've seen with Ukraine, but it's been relevant in other conflicts as well, including Israel's, is there's always an issue of mass, of quantities as much as quality. A long war, protracted war. You've got to keep on producing stuff. There's no good just having a,

small stock are really super weapons if you've gone through them quite quickly. So I think one of the issues that hit Western governments, as they look at what's happened with in Ukraine, is how much they've struggled to develop their productive capacity. If you don't think about mass, if anything goes wrong, you're going to be in trouble, even a short delay. I think the second point is really important on the disconnect between military planning and political objectives.

So we had quite an interesting example in the other direction with Iran. President Trump was told that if he wanted to achieve the objectives of really being sure that you'd eliminated all of Iranian enrichment capability. Then it'd take a few weeks

and many sorties and so on. And that's not what he wanted. His political objective was party, obviously about Iranian enrichment capability, partly about a quick win, which you could get by following it through on what the Israelis had done, but absolutely avoiding the sort of war that his base doesn't like a forever war in the Middle East. So he did gear his political objectives to making sure the military campaign, to keeping it as short as possible. And that, of course,

leaves open an issue to which I've also referred, which is if you don't quite eliminate war of Iranian capability, then you may be going back in again at a later day. It's not inevitable. I don't think it is. But that's the issue. So there's trendoffs.

And the more you want to achieve, the more you've got to put into it, and the bigger the risk of failure. And I guess examples on the other side, you've cited Putin, hoping for a short war in Ukraine a couple of times so far in our conversation. There's the American experience in, I suppose, both Iraq and Afghanistan, where you could argue in both cases there actually were successful short wars.

There were won quite decisively, but then they, well, I'm actually curious how you would character, is what followed the counterinsurgency of the intergency, a second war, the same war? Well, they were described as wars, and people felt that they were wars, soldiers got killed, that they were killing. So there were just a different stage. So I tend to think of these things in terms of stages. It's not, I mean, with any sort of war, it's very rare that you're fighting the same way from day one to the end. There'll always be different shifts in terms of the, you can argue how this intense conventional war in Ukraine for three and a half years.

But how it's being fought now, it's very different from how it was being fought right at the start. So what happened with both Iraq and Afghanistan is, as you say, very successful conventional campaigns that didn't last very long. Apparently achieved their objectives in toppling regimes, but were not so successful in putting anything in their place. So, you know, one stage, you get rid of the Saddam and you get rid of the Taliban. Next stage, you can't get anything in place that is authentically. Iraqi or Afghanistan sufficiently to build on that and reproduce stability. So you find yourself in insurgencies, in both cases quite quick. And these drag on because you haven't got an obvious way or bring them to a conclusion

until you basically decide you've done enough of go home. But you don't. Obviously with Afghanistan, that's a more complex in the case of Iraq. and the Taliban come back. So I think it's always useful to think of any conflict in terms of stages. So what's been going on with Iran easily goes back to 1979 in the Iranian Revolution. It hasn't involved armed force at different stages. Do you put the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon as something connected with the Iranian Revolution,

some ways it was. So, you know, you can take this too far, I guess, and see everything as part of one conflict that's been going on forever. But you do have to realize that there is a stream of history. And what you think is an end point isn't necessarily an end point. It just leads on to the next stage. So I want to linger on the Afghanistan example and talk about political objectives. I pick Afghanistan only because I know something about it, but you may want to illustrate with other conflicts there, as you know, as probably a lot of listeners know, the Americans and Brits and allies and others settled pretty early on in, what was at the Bonn conference?

I think that's December of 2001 on a political direction for Afghanistan. I think it's codified in this constitution a few years later. It was strikingly Western in its character. A bit of a mishmash in other respects, but the predominant trend was Western. And the goal, at least by the time we were in the sort of full-blown counterinsurgency phase some years later, was to establish the authority of this government, so constituted. There were some military problems that were never really solved, right? The Pakistani sanctuary question was quiet for a couple years,

but then it was just sort of allowed to fester. And we can talk about that. But on the political front, it struck me that there was a myopia about what was politically possible. Not only among military planners, it's well enough to push military planners around and say, you guys didn't understand, you know, the deep politics of this or that country. Okay. How much do we really expect, you know, military staffs who think about military things to deeply understand the politics of this or that country?

The problem is the politicians. And the diplomats seemed to me to not understand the politics either. There was a sort of universal myopia, which then created, I suppose, I don't know, this last part I'll put as a question, but to follow the logic of your argument, created a situation that was borderline unwinnable. I think that's right. So what happened, again, you have to go back to the start. The start was Al-Qaeda, which had a base in Afghanistan. It might have been possible with a bit more pressure and time to persuade the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden.

But the Taliban made a fateful decision not to, not to have him over. But the original fight was with Al-Qaeda. And if you've kept your focus on, that, then that was dealt with quite quickly. I mean, they were pushed out. They went to bin Laden, went to Pakistan, as we know. And I think many people were saying, look, you know, the Taliban represents something in Afghanistan. So if you just exclude it from all future political discourse, then you've set this up for

a long-term conflict. There's no obvious way out. You know, after by 2010 or so, and that was recognized. recognized people attempted to find ways of talking to the Taliban and so on. But it was a bit late by then because they'd reconstituted themselves. They were in a terrible mess in the start of 2002. And you might have been able to do something. So the early political decisions you take, it was a particularly problem, I think,

with American diplomacy at the time. Trump is happy to talk, apparently to almost anybody. It doesn't necessarily get the deals, but you'll talk to them. Whereas under Bush, a conversation with the United States was a big prize. And so, you know, there was a lot of, until they basically concede their positions, we won't talk. So, again, this comes back to the need to match a political with a military strategy. It's very evident with Gaza. I mean, Israel's won in a basic sense in military terms, but it doesn't know how to bring it to an end

because it doesn't want to talk to Palestinians. and therefore just sort of makes a situation worse and brings more international challenges to itself because of the way it's treating the Palestinians. It's extraordinary, but actually sort of sadly, tragically predictable, that an astonishing long period of time on from October 2023, considering how long wars in this area tend to run, as I said, I can immediately think of the counter examples, but any number of Israel Hamas conflicts, let's say,

have been pretty short-lived in their kinetic phase. So here we are, what, a year and a half plus later, Israel has scored enormous victories over the Iranian axis, which was far more formidable. Hezbollah was far more formidable, Iran itself, far more formidable, utterly, well, cut off at the knees, we'll say, at this point. Yet Hamas, the tertiary threat to Israeli security at the start of all this, though it was the one that struck the really savage blow to start the thing, it's, you know, there's a way in which so long as there's one last guy from the Qasan brigades who can wrap himself in the

flag and say, I'm still here, and he's not replaced by something else in Gaza, that they're still fighting. And this was predictable. I think the problem was that as you describe it, that there'd be any number of spats with Hamas, which had a certain form. They would do something Israel would retaliate. That'd be a great furorora and eventually Katow. or somebody would arrange a ceasefire, and you'd go back to as it was. And I think Israel took the view that this is what Chamas did, but they could cope because basically what Hamas could do would send rockets into Israel, and they had Iron Dome, which don't.

And then Chamax did something that just was totally unexpected. On the day, on the day, they said that they're going to eliminate Hamas, which was immediately an objective that wasn't ever going to be fully. obtained and gave Hamas its theory of victory, which is, you're just going to survive. We survive. And that's why a ceasefire is still very hard to arrange, partly Israel, partly Hamas, because they're not going to admit defeat. Poor Palestinians get stuck in all of this.

Whereas with Hezbollah, the aim was totally just to get a ceasefire, so they were no longer supporting Hamas, because they then broke solidarity. and they did enormous damage. And I'm not sure, I don't think Israel began after October the 7th with a view of sort of slowly dismantling the access of resistance as organised by Tehran. But that's actually in the end of what they did. So, you know, Netanyahu could claim this is an enormous geopolitical triumph.

this collection of militias and countries, including Syria, orchestrated by Tehran, has now achieved absolutely nothing and has been beaten up. Yet still, as you say, they're fighting themselves trying to work out what to do with the Palestinians. And by refusing any sort of political recognition for Palestinians, they're making it impossible to bring. this to a conclusion short of measures which I think will be found to accept another work. We can stay in Israel for this next question, or I think we can move all sorts of different places. There's a critique of the IDF's conduct of the war in Gaza from the right, sort of from the Israeli right, that reminds me, I mean, you encounter this kind of critique frequently from the right in protracted wars. The American right, if we went back and looked at old issues of national review during the Vietnam War,

We're just not winning because our liberal generals, our Harvard-educated generals. I'm all-hung, by the way. You know, there's something about the hard, cruel nature of war that they've forgotten, and decision could be within their grasp, but they're not actually seeking it. Their heads are clouded with complicated theories of trying to balance military and political objectives. It's sort of like what you're suggesting, Lawrence, but in a kind of, but to be, to take the critique. Seriously, you know, their understanding of political objectives is not a sound or true understanding of political objectives. They're sort of have these bibles, these political bibles dangled in their eyes that are distracting them from the fact that actually, if you would just win the darn war, you would do better politically.

This is a common critique, I think. Yeah, yeah. What is your attitude towards it? So, I think if you go back to Vietnam, where this critique first sort of came in, I mean, you can see it with Korea as well. But that was just basically an argument about foreign policy in the end between Truman and McCarthy. But with Vietnam, there were very complicated theories developed in the Johnson administration, which assumed that military force was a form of political signaling as well. And these political signals could be really quite subtle.

And if you've got them right, you could ease the North Vietnamese into taking more reasonable and realistic positions and so on. and it didn't work. So, I mean, there was something to the critique in that sense. The problem was, and you could also argue, going to Nixon in 1972, that if you removed a lot of the restraints, you could also get results and bring the North Vietnamese to a bargain. Because that was at a time when the North Vietnamese were fighting a conventional-type war, because the Viet Cong suffered in the Tet Offensive.

If you're actually trying, what will then transpired when you got the deal and you left the South Vietnamese to cope with the north, they couldn't because in the end you need the population. These are population-centric walls. Not all walls are, but these were. And if everything you're doing is alienating the local population, or at least making what that was little to do with you as possible, then in the end you won't establish your authority.

So as we can see with the wars in Israel's wars, there's a lot of people who are really fed up with Hamas because Hamas has a totally unrealistic political objectives, how do you really think you're going to push Israel, defeat Israel, truly defeat Israel. But on the other hand, Israel is in a situation with a population, well, what, 60% are below 18 years old, and you're just generating more recruits for the future

because they've seen what Israel has done to them. So you've got to have a political outcome in mind, and this is where I struggle. So I think it's probably true that just thinking all the time about how you refine military force to make it somehow nicer and more acceptable is going to struggle, is it? Military force is violence and brutal and nasty, and you should never forget that. And so over-sophisticated critiques, all the sophisticated theories about the political messages sent by military force are likely to come unstuck. That's different from not having a clear

political outcome in mind, that can be delivered either because you can defeat the opponent and introduce it or because you can do a deal on that basis. There's another dimension, especially to the Korea and Vietnam examples, you point to nuclear weapons in the article as being a factor in all this. I suppose that's less directly a factor with Gaza, though in a way, certainly with American attitudes to the current war, this sort of question of escalation and where will it lead is alive and well. You know, one one reason it seems why these wars drag on and you made reference to Truman and MacArthur is there's a fear that escalating in the specific conflict to win it, however, however one might choose to escalate,

will either distract from a primary theater, which is both in both Korean, Vietnam, primary theater is Europe, or potentially lead to catastrophic escalation, escalation to a, to a, to a general nuclear exchange. But then the consequence seems to be a consequence no one actually wants, which is that the more narrow war just drags on indefinitely. And that's a conundrum. How do you, how do you, how does should one think one's way out of that? It's a conundrum. I mean, it's a trade off. So if you look at the legacy of career, something people now will have no recollection of belly appears in the history books, but was a big deal in Kennedy's first year, which was lous. When there was a.

sort of war. The oceans were not great warriors, but there was a sort of war going on, and the communists appeared to have the upper hand, and the Americans felt that they may have to intervene. And the recommendations for the joint chiefs was this time, don't be afraid to use nuclear weapons, at which point Kennedy looked for any means of resolving this, rather than letting the chiefs have their way. And you can see it with Cuba. as well. They sort of, it was their sort of never again moment from Korea was that you shouldn't fight limited wars. We fought these with one hand behind our back. Now, over time, that fear of nuclear war gets ingrained. So one of the critiques of Biden administration with Ukraine

was they just took it far too serious. It was highly unlikely that Putin would use nuclear weapons because of Ukraine. He never actually threatened Ukraine with giving weapons. The threats were always to the West if they decided to join in on Ukraine's behalf. But Biden was trying to sort of micromanage in some way the nature of support being given to Ukraine. How far your defensive or offensive weapons? If offensive, what range? If that range, what can you hit and so on? And that wasn't what, I mean, Eventually, the Russians tried to play the game. Actually, not very well, but they tried to play the game. But it became an unnecessary source of caution, not that he should ever undress, you know, disregard the risks of nuclear war, but that's not how it was going to happen.

With Israel, incidentally, I mean, you know, one of the fascinating things about the recent events is how little Arab countries have come in on the Palestinian. inside. I mean, rhetorically all the time, but no more than that. And so one of my first encounters with the issue when I was still graduate student in the fact, the mid-70s, and I did some work on Israeli nuclear weapons because what was interesting, and people again forget that Israel is a nuclear power, just doesn't talk about it very much, is the reason why Arab governments came to the conclusion that they couldn't defeat Israel was in part because, because it was a nuclear power. And that was a judgment that fed through the major Arab government.

So it is relevant. It's still there as a factor. And of course, none of them are nuclear powers, despite a couple of attempts to try. So it's always there as a factor in most of these conflicts. But it's not going to, I think, people just assume an automaticity to this, as if you know, in some way, if there'd been a border skirmish between NATO troops and Russian troops as a result of something coming out of Ukraine, that would immediately lead to full-scale nuclear war, which it wouldn't. I mean, there's plenty of restraints in the system that would have

ensured that didn't happen. Again, not to play down the risks, but you've just got to keep them in perspective. And I think that's just a factor in contaminant. international politics. I didn't see what things Trump says as well as things that Biden said. In a second, I'll close with getting your thoughts on where things stand in Ukraine because you've spent a lot of time looking at that situation, writing about it. But first, one last kind of unfairly broad question, though, honestly, if you can't feel these questions, we're probably, we're probably up a creek. But sticking with this theme of the various conundrums and sort of unsolvable problems that just

need to be balanced. So, okay, so we can't actually march on Hanoi and, you know, bomb Chinese territory in the Vietnam War because that's going to create problems that we're not going to want to deal with. So things need to be more limited and we need to have more realistic objectives, but we never really sort of figure that out or settle on it or certainly to the extent we do, it takes us a really awfully long time. You know, that kind of situation, you know, we can point to other powers, other staffs, other political leaders making similar mistakes over and over again. I guess it's a double-barrel question. What is the, why, why did the same mistakes keep getting made?

Question one and question two, if you are a military planner today, we have a lot of folks in uniform who listen to the show, or we also have some politicians to listen to the show. And what, how should one educate oneself besides reading your articles in foreign affairs? And in fairness, to them, your article in foreign affairs basically says you need to have realistic political objectives. It doesn't really tell you how to figure out what that is. How should one educate oneself to put oneself in a more likely position not to make the same mistakes again? I think there's a deductiveness about military force. It seems a very clean and decisive way of solving a problem, and it rarely is. So if you're thinking about initiating military action, you should at least be aware of that.

Within its limits, it can achieve things. It's not an argument that it always ends in. in waste and tragedy, we can think of wars that have succeeded. So it's not that it always fails, but the chances of it failing are quite high, especially if you're too ambitious and you haven't thought through what the other side can do. I mean, the biggest error in military planning is always to underestimate the opponent and not understand their will to fight. So it's rarely, if you can find a better way of solving your problem, take it, and not an alternative way, because military force just creates a new

situation, which may be harder to resolve. A lot of things we wouldn't be still worrying about if people had had a failed diplomatic initiative rather than a failed military initiative. Frankly, sometimes you can't avoid military force because the other side's taken the initiative. I mean, they've made the mistake. And, you know, one of the hardest things, I think, to anticipate is the foolishness of others. You know, one of Britain's most successful wars in recent times was the Falklands because

the Argentinians hadn't thought through Britain's options if they decided to seize the island. So, and, you know, with, I mean, like many other people, I mean, I wasn't totally confident that Putin wouldn't invade Ukraine, but it seemed to me such a stupid thing to do. I thought, surely somebody is telling him. This is just going to land us in a lot of problems. But he thought it would be decisive. And then you have to respond. So I think there's a difference between planning in response to others taking the initiative and taking the initiative yourself.

And most of the scenarios we worry about involve somebody else taking the initiative. It's quite, I mean, in that sense, Iraq in particular in 2003, was a bit unusual because we were the ones who decided to start with. with Iran recently, I mean, the Israelis are up for it at the moment because they got the bit between their teeth. But normally, you know, we worry about what China will do with Taiwan, say. We worry about others taking initiative rather than ourselves. And he do have to plan for that. And the way to plan for it is making it clear to the opponent. Not that they'll necessarily be defeated, but they'll get into trouble, that it'll be protracted and so on.

whatever Putin says, if he knew in February 22, what he knows now, you assume he wouldn't have bothered. So I think it's important to talk realistically about armed force. Not to pretend it always fails and always ends in disaster because it doesn't, but a lot of the time it does. And the reason for that is you underestimate the opponents and you don't think through, if you're talking about as many wars on, again, not particularly the ones with Iran, but many wars are, about the occupation of somebody else's territory in places where you might not be welcome, what that means and how you have authoritative government put in place. Unless you think about these things, you'll get into trouble. And going back to an early part of the conversation, somehow seeing armed forces

an alternative to diplomacy, there's also not necessarily a good idea. The two can go together. Last line of questioning on Ukraine. Here we are. It's July 2025. War's still going. There has been what seems to be a pro-Ukrainian shift here in Washington with President Trump. It's been a suspenseful roller coaster of a ride since January on that front. I mean, in part of what has caused the shift seems to be the president's conclusion that actually Putin has no interest in some sort of ceasefire or peace arrangement, let's say, that would be acceptable.

to the Ukrainians and the Americans, maybe even unacceptable to the Ukrainians, but still acceptable to Americans. Meanwhile, you know, I've heard smart people say that the reason for that is, I'm curious your view of this, the reason for that is Putin simply can't stop, that he is politically constrained. What's your, one, what's your just read of the moment? Two, if you were advising the Americans or the president of what to do, if your goal is really some sort of settlement here.

What's the road ahead? Yeah, and the road is difficult. I mean, in fact, I did a follow-up on why Putin keeps on going, also put it on my substack as well. I have to get mentioned of my sub-stacking. And there's a number of reasons why Putin keeps on going. Ukraine really matters to him. He can't understand why it's a separate, independent country.

He doesn't think it should be. He thinks he can win the war, for whatever reason, he thinks he can win the war, despite the limited progress thus far, he's worried about losing and a reckoning. I mean, if you had a ceasefire now, and Trump somehow got it into his head, that Putin was up to a ceasefire despite every effort by the Russians to say that's not what we want. They wanted political capitulation by the Ukrainians. And Trump kept on saying, no, Putin wants this, and he'll be happy with that.

And the Russians always said, no, we won't. Because if you just look at what happens with the ceasefire now, Ukraine remains as an independent, sovereign state. It may not be a member of NATO. It's going to be difficult being a member of NATO. But it's got a network of relationships now, particularly in Europe. But we'll keep it pretty well supplied. It's also a very innovative defense producer in its own right, in the way it wasn't in February 22. that we'll get in point where the majority of its stuff it'll produce at home.

And so he's left with not only an independent Ukraine, but one that's shown it can fight and will not abandon its claims to its own territory. So he's left with having captured twice as much territory, Ukrainian territories he had in February 22, 20% of the total, which has gone up barely over two years of continuing Russian offensive by a bit but not much, leaving a territory that's depopulated, economically inactive, full of unexploded ordnance, still a relatively hostile population or element in the population that remain hostile, with an incredibly long border to defend. That's not a good outcome.

Even if it gets frozen on those terms. And I think that's his difficulty. It's nothing he could people always assume that leaders can claim victory even when it's obvious that they haven't got it And maybe you know Trump has got the ability to do that in ways that others don't but I don't think Putin's got the ability to do though So they're in a mess the Russians and and they answer them to the second and the Ukrainians are fighting I mean I think it's been far too much of the Ukrainians being on the back foot and the Russians advancing in the media over the last two years It's obviously very difficult for the Ukrainians. They're tired and they've suffered losses and so on, but they really have help.

They've had three years of attempts to give them winter blackouts, which they've survived, and now hardened their electricity system and so on. I mean, they've done pretty well, and they deserve credit for that. And they'll keep on going because they know what happens if they lose. So they keep on going. So what do we do? First, we really need to step up our own defense production. We need air defraines, they need air defences.

They need to be supported. But the, you know, the sanctions piece is an important one. Because the Russian, it didn't make much difference in 2022 because actually it was a windfall for the Russians because of the high oil prices and we haven't worked out how to interfere with their oil supplies. But their economy is totally overheated. They're now moving from a very rapid growth into the, in the other direction. direction, high inflation, high interest rates.

They've used up their rainy day fund paying for the war. The oil prices going down, they're vulnerable. Don't expect it to produce quick outcomes. The logic of what I've been writing is it could well be a long haul. But it's a political decision on Putin's behalf that you're waiting for. And I don't think it's going to be because of exciting economic deals with the US in the future that Trump's promised. I think they want to normalize relations with the U.S.

That's for sure. But Putin's basic objective now is not to lose. And he's finding that harder. And be clear, losing not in terms of being pushed out of all the territory they've taken, but just not achieving any of his objectives. And that which isn't necessarily a victory for Ukraine. I mean, a victory for Ukraine is getting all their territory back, which is also going to be.

struggle. But they're up for, you know, they were prepared to accept the ceasefire because they could do with the rest and they could do with the rest by it. But Russia couldn't. And so unless there's some pressure put on them, partly it's internally generated by their own failures. And again, I think we underestimate the extent to which the Russians are aware about how little progress they've actually made. But, you know, we can add to the pressure. But you've got to be prepared for a long haul. I think to everything that you say, I remain those struck, and I'm curious your view and really why they didn't or why Putin didn't play this card, that they couldn't push with the White House, which as of, you know, a few months ago, my impression is it would have been

open to something like this, a freeze more or less along the current lines, but with significant political concessions from the Ukrainians and really push the Americans to insist that the Ukrainian seed. I mean, you could sell kinds of different iterations, but, you know, they can't join NATO, you know, all this different kind of stuff. You have to limit your military support. We, the Russians have to have some kind. Now, I guess one thing you could obviously say is, well, the Ukrainians will just won't, they won't go for it, so you won't get the ceasefire. But okay, if you're the Russians, then now you have the Ukrainians who have pissed off Washington. I don't understand why they didn't get more aggressive. To me, that seemed like the only

course of action. I think Putin knew it was a blame game that he was and was trying to work out how to stay in the negotiations without conceding on anything, which he did quite successfully for a while, and then it just didn't work anymore. So I think, I mean, I never thought it was likely to happen, but it did seem to me a pretty sensible approach from Putin's point of view, given that this is the most sympathetic administration he's likely to get, to give Putin, to give Trump what he wanted a ceasefire in return for letting the Ukrainians be and hold on to the rest of their country. And then you would have got some concessions, even if you just don't, I mean, the Russian position was we have to get all the political negotiation sorted out. Then we'll have a ceasefire, which is clearly preposterous.

And I think Trump even began to understand that was the Russian position until late on. And if he just said, well, okay, we'll have the ceasefire, but there has to be very serious political negotiations afterwards. Many wouldn't necessarily have lost because you'd have been in these political negotiations and arguing about exactly where the ceasefire lines are and what weapons are to go where and sanctions relief. Also, there's a massive agenda. I mean, one reason why you couldn't wait to sort out all the political agenda is it would take years just to do that. when the Ukrainians come in with demands for reparations and war crimes, tribunals, and so on. But Putin couldn't bring himself to do it. They set out their position in June 24.

They reiterated it in December 24, and they haven't budged. And unless Putin budges, nobody in the Russian system is going to budge for him. So I think, you know, you can sense in some of the Russian commentary a degree. of frustration that maybe they've missed their opportunity with Trump. But that would have required concessions. I don't think Putin had any good ideas about how to make those concessions without loss of face. And remember, he feels under pressure, not from sort of liberal, moderate technocrats,

but from his own nationalists who he's encouraged over the past few years and, you know, are already crossed with him because they thought this was their best chance to recover all of Ukraine and he's bloated. Sir Lawrence Friedman, author recently of a very interesting article in Foreign Affairs, The Age of Forever Worse. He also has a substack with a clever name. Comment is Freed. It's freed with a D. This has been great. I really appreciate you making the time. Thank you for coming back on the show. It was a pleasure. Thanks very much. This is a nebulous media production. Find us wherever you get your podcasts.