School of War - Ep 231: Peter Rough on Russian Drone Incursions into NATO

Episode Date: September 16, 2025

Peter Rough, senior fellow and director of the Center on Europe and Eurasia at the Hudson Institute, joins the show to discuss the recent Russian drone incursions in Poland and Romania and what they mean. ▪️ Times     •      01:08 Introduction     •      01:35 What actually happened?     •      05:30 Destructive decoys             •      07:27 European moods     •      11:23 Rightwing response              •      16:32 Strategic autonomy              •      23:52 Zapad           •      30:00 On/off switch             •      33:31 Where do we stand?    Follow along on Instagram, X @schoolofwarpod, and YouTube @SchoolofWarPodcast Find a transcript of today’s episode on our School of War Substack

Recent days have seen a dangerous new development in the Russia-Ukraine war. The incursion into Polish and then-Romanian airspace, NATO airspace, in other words, of Russian drones. Too many for this plausibly to have been a mistake. What happened? What were the Russians trying to accomplish and what's going to be done about it? Let's get into it. It is the for war this Iraqi invasion of July, May December 7, 1941, a date which will live in infantry. A bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a state. We continue to face the grave situation in the ground.

We shall fight on the beaches. We shall fight on the land in the fields and in the streets. We shall never surrender. For more, follow School of War on YouTube, Instagram, Substack, and Twitter. And feel free to follow me on Twitter at Aaron B. McLean. Hi, I'm Aaron McLean. Thanks for joining School of War. I am delighted to welcome to the show today.

Peter Rao, he's a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. He's the director of the Center on Europe and Eurasia. Peter, thank you so much for coming on the show. Aaron, thanks for having me. It's great to be with you. I want to start us with the Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace, which occurred now last week. We're recording this in the morning of Monday, September the 15th.

And this incursion occurred the night of September the 9th into the morning of September 10th. And so we're going to talk about the implications of that today and what it means for the bigger picture. But let's start with the thing itself. What actually happened? That's a good question. So on the evening, as you mentioned, Tuesday heading into Wednesday, some 19 Gerbera drones produced in this now infamous facility in Tartostar in central eastern Russia, so east of the Urals, launched as they always do in these air duels against Ukraine. But some 19 of them, if not more, veered into Poland. and the NATO lines scrambled a response.

There were Polish F-16s involved, as you would imagine, an Italian-A-Wax plane, a Dutch F-35s, and a few of them were shut down. Some exploded. The Warsaw International Airport was shut down for some time. There's reports of one drone up near Kedansk, which your viewers and listeners will know is some ways away from the Belarusian border. So there was a dramatic night, and just by way of it, explanation, these drones, these Russian long-range drones, are made of foam and plywood.

So imagine the defense economics of these cheap systems flying into Poland and then these exquisite systems shot down by sidewinders, which cost some $400,000 a pop. It's a bit of a parenthetical, but there's an interesting, I think, lesson there about the cost of defense versus offense. Spurred then an Article 4 meeting the next morning on Wednesday. Poland invoked Article 4 of the founding Washington Treaty, which calls for consultations when anyone feels threatened, their territorial integrity at stake. This is, I think, the third time since the founding of the alliance that we've had, a article for consultation in the European context, one being 2014, when the Russians went into Crimea, 2022, when the full-scale invasion took place. And on this incidence, the Turks have called

it five times related to Iraq and Syria contingencies, or maybe four times. But it's some seven or eight times that we've had an article for a moment. So that's an issue of high drama. And here we are now, if you spool it forward with NATO launching an operation response called NATO's Eastern Century, which is a play on NATO's Baltic century, launched in January in response to Russia's hybrid warfare in the Baltic Sea. I think that operation is widely considered a success. It's tamped down some of the anchor dragging and other shenanigans that the Russians have been up to in the Baltic Sea against critical infrastructure. and the hope is that this announced by our new SACUR, and Marguuta, the NATO Secretary General, will be effective deterrent response to the drone attack. And I'm glad, actually, Aaron, that we're recording this today because there's also been news

over the weekend. There's now been a drone incursion in northern Romania. The Romanian Danube Delta is a borderland between Ukraine and Romania. In September 2020, 3, there was a drone system that fell into, crashed onto Romanian territory. The Romanians are very sensitive to this, and two F-16s over the weekend intercepted. a Russian drone that spent some 50 minutes in Romanian airspace. This is yet another incident.

And of the kind of Garan-type drone that we've also grown familiar with, it's a variant of this Shahid system, Shahid system that the Iranians pioneered. And at Russia's true moment of need, dire moment earlier in the war, when things were all turning south of the Russians, the Iranians came in and supplied some of these capabilities to the Russians. So here we are. I want to talk a little bit more about the drones themselves, like the actual objects and what they're meant for, I guess originally produced by the Iranians now being produced or variants being produced in Russia.

So you say it's made of, you know, plywood and, you know, chewing gum and twine. Do we know anything about the payloads or, you know, systems that were mounted on the drones in Poland or Romania? You know, were they, you know, carrying anything? Were they carrying sophisticated surveillance equipment? Or were they, you know, what I'm driving at is where they sort of decoys as objects. So this type of drone is oftentimes been used as a decoy. And last week, there was a night where there were some 800 drones fired as decoys or actual attack vehicles into Ukraine or within Ukraine towards their targets. We definitely know the payload levels of the drones.

And I definitely don't know the answer to that question. But I did see a fancy picture held up by Poland's ambassador to the United Nations in a Security Council meeting where he showed some of the destruction that have been that have been wrought by the by their drones and you know these things are killers so substantial and real and the polls again hair trigger alert when it comes to all things Russians went when bananas and berserk over this incursion and rightfully so so so just to be clear the drones hit the ground and exploded or they hit the ground and damaged things but didn't explode or were shot down in debris damaged things on the ground or all of the above or some of the It just helped me understand.

A combination of all of the above. So three of the 19 at least were shot down, last reporting I saw. Some just hit the ground, some hit buildings, but different outcomes in different places. Got it. And then tell us, you know, you're regularly in touch with folks across Europe. You know, one of the, I think, recurring themes of our trying to understand the war in Israel, in particular over the course the last couple years, is the way in which it's hard to appreciate sitting in the United States, the completely different political mood. attitudes of Israelis.

There's just a vast gulf between how Americans tend to perceive what's happening in that part of the world and what Israelis perceive. What's the mood of, I guess it's a bit of a silly broad question. What's the mood of the Europeans? It's a big place. But maybe you'll break that down a little bit for us. Like, what is the mood on the ground and reaction to this? Well, I think the Europeans are no different than the Israelis in that sense.

You could take a particular leader and compare him or her to Prime Minister and Yan say that is a considered view and policy of. X, Y, or Z European government, but they, of course, sit above and on top of a mosaic of different political movements, strengthening or weakening political coalitions, and all of that is very real. Two points, though, I would make that I think maybe paid the picture of a changing Europe. One is that if we traditionally think of Europe as a Franco-German engine, and sometimes it's described as France and Germany on the one hand and then the rest in a way of central and eastern Europe. Increasingly, I think the more appropriate way of talking about security and geopolitics

in Europe is between North and South. So there is a budding alignment centered on Berlin, which seems to be for real right now, but a defense rebuild of northern European states that have fiscal space to actually invest in defense, but also to write checks and support of Ukraine. And then Southern European states, which may share some of those, dare I say hawkish views that support of Ukraine, but don't have, they've been profligated over the years, so they just don't have the fiscal space or productivity and growth levels are low. And so they're unable to offer the sort of support that Northern Europeans are. And so instead of, I think, describing Europe as sort of Franco German and Central and Eastern Europe, I would say it's really a kind of a Berlin-led, I don't want to

say Axis, but a Berlin-led group. On Ton. On Ton, based on Chancellor Merz. And then, you know, I think Prime Minister Maloney would not along with some of these initiatives, but she can't write the checks. President McCaughan, I think, as everyone who even loosely follows European politics has noticed sits atop a combustible situation and public finances that are wrecked. And so he too might share some of prime minister and Chancellor Merz's inclinations, but he can't write a check either. And so that's one division. And then the second I would say is just between the esprit of core, the sense of nationalism, sense of purpose, the recognition of military investment and defense as a backbone of national.

survival and sovereignty that you do see in countries closer to, closer to the eastern flank, or in the eastern flank, I should say, closer to Russia. And then some of the Mediterranean and Western European states, which are just less, I think, honed in on this as the driving issues for Europe. So if you speak to a Spaniard or a Portuguese or an Italian or a Greek, migration will feature at the top or near the top of their pressing issues, if you speak to a Finn or at any of the three politics states or a poll, it's Russia, Russia, Russia. And that expresses itself in some of the ways they're talking about Ukraine,

security guarantees, troop deployments, et cetera. So one more European politics question, then we'll go back to guns and bombs and drones and stuff. Talk about how what you just described, this emerging sort of north-south, German, Italian axis as opposed to the traditional Franco-German axis. How does that intersect with another phenomenon that you can sort of observe from afar here in the United States, which matches elements in American politics, which is this robust European populism on the rise as more centrist parties seem to fail to deliver what what citizens and voters

want. So, you know, parties like the AFD in Germany, how did they, and again, like kind of an absurdly broad question, so maybe you'll break it down a bit for us, but like parties on the right, like the AFD in Germany or more populist left-wing parties, how did they view the Russia issue and the Ukraine war issue? And then how does, if, if, if, if, if, if, if, you know, if, if, if, if at all, how does this event last week, this dramatic incursion into Polish airspace and the smaller incursion to Romanian airspace affect that phenomenon, if at all? So the, there we call it, the populist right, the national conservative right, the right wing, anything that differentiates it is to the right of kind of the establishment right, as we've come to

understand it of Europe and the United States, I would say has different stripes and shapes to it as well. So in Italy, for example, Georgia Maloney, who was branded. And pathetically so by a lot of American commentators prior to her election as the second coming of Mussolini and a right winger. It's in a lot of ways sort of an ideological confectionary dream as I see it. She's pro-American. Yeah, she has kind of a national conservative quality to her. She wants to work with the United States.

She believes in NATO. And then there are others in the Italian right-wing system like famously embodied Mateo Salvini, who had a lot of prominence as interior minister, who's much more Russiophobes. and wants to work closely with Moscow. He wouldn't maybe call it appeasement, but he thinks that there are all these watchwords like dialogue and detente and outreach that are possible and feasible with the Russians. So there are variations and differences within the systems.

I would say that in the German context, the party to the right of the Christian Democrats and Christian Social Union, the CDCSU, which is the establishment right, is the AFD, as you mentioned. And they are across the board, much more closer to Salvini's line on Russia, I'm much more interested in an outreach. And that's an area where they view there's an

opportunity for attack. So if the Germans were to deploy into Ukraine post-seasfire, should we ever get there as part of a reassurance force or training mission and the Russians were to rocket a German base and kill some German soldiers, which would be no small thing, because after all, you're killing German troops in the case of Russia. They would use that as an opportunity to go on the attack and say, see, you're pulling and lurching us into conflict with Russia. And whenever there have been 20th century disasters for Germany, it's always been war with Russia. So that would tug on the heartstrings, I think, of a lot of Germans. And I expect the AFD to, and they are reading the Polish drone incursion through the prism of that argument. So pulling us into war with

Russia, we should push the Ukrainians into a settlement. This isn't our conflict. Those are Slavic peoples anyways, the old German inclination that everything between Berlin and Moscow are a bunch of small tribes anyways that could be sacrificed at the altar of great power politics. And then there are some of the Central Eastern Europeans. I mean, there's a lot of variety there were going to have elections in the Czech Republic, where Maloney's sort of ally or part of the same parliamentary group in the European Parliament, Petrofiela, the prime minister is a staunch, pro-Western, pro-NATO, conservative. He looks to be on the ropes against somebody who's taking a slightly different tack, closer maybe to the Orban or in the

case of Italy-Salvini or RFDA line on on Russia, Ukraine. I'm simplifying, but you get the point. Where it's really interesting is in Poland, where you have a lot of different parties on across the political spectrum. But Donald Tusk, the prime minister, is nominally part of the EPP. So this is the censor-right establishment group in European Parliament. But by the conservatives in Poland, who define themselves as conservatives, the more national conservatives, he's considered a bit of a squish and establishment to Trump hostile. But they are all tough on the Russians because their polls in a way, and there's only kind of some rather fringe-like groups that are Russophile in the Polish context. So it really depends where you go. I expect that like everything

in politics, this issue, this incident, both Poland and at a minor level now in Romanian over the weekend, it's just going to cause these parties to double down on their arguments less so than reappraised their thinking, which is, I think, probably true of our current age in a lot of ways. Yeah, yeah, it sounds familiar. I don't know if I if I envy you or pity you as a Europe specialist because it does seem with a sort of bipartisan American trend towards less involvement in Europe. But I don't mean that histrionically. It's not like we're, even with President Trump, it's not like we're walking out of NATO. But nevertheless, you have a kind of unified view across both parties for some time now that Europe is less

of a priority than perhaps it once was. It seems to me that the natural outcome of that is, and I'm curious if you're observing this, the natural outcome of that is only going to be increasing complexity and disunion within Europe, which is a place with no shortage already of complexity and conflict. And so when I hear, you know, the French talk about their strategic conceptions of things like strategic, you know, French-led strategic autonomy, I'm just a bit mystified as to the hopes for European unity in the absence of a significant American presence. I don't know how you keep track about it, to be honest. Yeah, I mean, I would say that strategic Autonomy takes a very optimistic, if not outright, Paulianish view of Europe and that absent America.

Apologies, I introduced to what it is for a second for listeners. Sure. So strategic autonomy is essentially the French-led conceit that French strategic leadership financed by German Euros can kind of unify the continent and create a separate pool in international affairs. It's basically the French-led effort, like every French president, to convince the world that Napoleon actually did win at Waterloo, and France is still a great power. And this means that we have to unify the continent under the kind of the brilliance and sagacity of the French president.

And there is another interesting, by the way, of the political right, which I didn't even get to, Martin the Penn and her movement in France, which could win the presidency in the coming years and is already a dominant driving shaping force in the French parliament. But I generally think that European politics is more likely to fracture without American. leadership and is more likely to break into different constituent parts. The U.S. for decades has taken the poison and venom out of Europe by sort of eliminating the power equation and thereby allowing some of the cooperation and in coordination to take place. It's fostered this environment of honey and light in a way that meant no security dilemma. But if the U.S. pulls back, I think you could see a lot of difficulties. I'll just give you one example of this. The European were ready to certain extent to hammer back after Liberation Day on the tariff dispute.

And then came all the different constituencies asking for exemptions from the blowback package. So suddenly the German car industry said, well, you know, we should push back on the Americans potentially, but let's be careful about the German car industry. And then the French said, well, you know, we should worry about champagne and French luxury products. The Italians came in with their own requests. And by the end, you basically had an emasculated European Commission, which has the competency for trade within the European Union with only a few billion dollars worth of retaliatory measures

they could have imposed because so many individual countries had asked for carbouts. And it also got into Washington in a bilateral fashion. So it just showed how Europe really isn't, really isn't as unified maybe as sometimes we're led to believe. I mean, the concept of Europe itself is a little bit laughable. And maybe one last point on that era and at the risk of going on too long. It's very interesting. If you look at the deliberation day tariffs and then immediately afterwards, Secretary Lutnik, Commerce Secretary, essentially issued a stay of execution and said, we're going to

take 90 days to negotiate potentially a new trade regime. And any country that does not retaliate or trading block in the case of the EU gets this period of time for negotiations. And during those 90 days, we had the G7 in Canada, the NATO summit and the Hague. and a European Council meeting. And I can tell you at those types of high-level gatherings, trade is not top of the agenda, but the security environment, Ukraine, how do we keep the Americans involved in Europe? And so the Europeans took a very clear decision that they would subordinate some of their differences on the trade file to keeping the Americans involved on the security front.

And they basically ate the 15 percent tariffs that the U.S. imposed on them and called it the greatest deal on earth, even though they're a bit frustrated by it, because they wanted they wanted American support on Ukraine and security. And that just shows how important it is for the U.S. to be involved, even in the minds of the Europeans. Yeah. The way I've thought about it for a few years is that we forget the sort of founding joke credo of NATO at our peril. This is Lordeus May's comment that the purpose of NATO is to keep, what is it, the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. And it's the third part at the risk of offending our German friends that seems to me we are most at risk of forgetting. One of my Hudson colleagues wrote an op-out on this topic, I believe.

And I don't necessarily have anything personally against the Germans of 2025, but I take that portion of the formula to refer more broadly to the potential for intra-European turmoil and threats, which, of course, tore the continent and the world apart twice in the last century. And it does seem to me we might have some sort of ongoing interest in keeping an eye on that. Yeah, I mean, one other thing I would just note, I totally understand the trajectories, trend lines, projections that showed the Indo-Pacific as the future center of gravity for global affairs and the arguments that are marshaled in that direction. But I would just also note that as things stand right now, Europe is still a vital interest to the U.S. because some 60% of foreign direct investment globally is transatlantic. I think the Europeans have, I want to say, three to four trillion euros bound up in the U.S.

And we have about the same amount bound up on Europe. 48 states or something like that trade more with Europe than they do with China. And so even if Europe declines and has problems in demography, innovation, some of these categories that cause, I think, especially conservatives in the United States to have their eyes glaze over, the Europeans are so frustrating. It's all true. But Europe is still of essential importance. And in the contest for Eurasia, they are our fallback position. I mean, this allows us to kind of be across the Atlantic, to have a spear, so to speak. There's still the first address on any major diplomatic initiative or endeavor that we wish to undertake.

And it helps us to project power, not just in Europe, but in other regions of the world as well. So just like we desperately want to get out of the Middle East for reasons that are understandable, it's been tough because the Middle East still matters. And just like, I think Europe can frustrate us. That's been difficult too. but it's still a vital interest, and I think encouraging our partners to step up without entirely surrendering our leadership role to a non-existent alternative, I think, you know, that's kind of where we are. So back to the war. Help me understand how Putin might understand what he just did. I'm going to operate on

the premise as well that it seems unlikely that, you know, potentially a couple, the number, I think you said 19, but whatever the number is, a significant number. Yeah, 19 is what I've seen at least. Yeah, it strikes me as unlikely that you had, you know, two dozen whoopsies and, you know, it all, it also, if you look at where the drones, I saw a map from the Institute for the Study of War, where the launch sites for some of the drones were, and that they all went south into Ukraine and then back north into Poland. I guess that's possible. Maybe you'll tell me that is what happened. But in any event, I'm just going to operate on the premise here that there was some level of intent behind this. How does this act fit into Putin's broader thinking about, Ukraine and about the war there and his broader strategy? Well, two points I'd make. The first is the Bella Russians seemed to get very nervous very quickly and immediately contacted their Polish counterparts. They put out a statement, I think also in English, on trying to tamp down essentially

this issue set. The Russians were silent for hours. They made no explanation. They're unapologetic to this day. They issued, I think, a social media post. And then Peskov, Dmitri Peskov, the spokesman at the Kremlin, essentially were all inquiries to the MOD, to the Ministry of Defense. This is not really an MOD issue. I mean, it is, but it isn't. I mean, this is a major international event that deserves high level

attention, and it didn't get that. And so I think if the West does not shoot down or take strong countermeasures or a combination of the two against these sorts of incursions, they're likely to continue. That's my first point. As to how the Russians understand it, I think there are probably three dynamics I play that are relevant here. The first is that the Americans and Europeans are in intense consultations over another sanctions slash tariff package against the Russians. In fact, this week, I don't think I'm betraying any secrets. I was supposed to have lunch with the EU ambassador and she had to punt because she had spent like two and a half hours at Treasury in political and technical consultations in consecutive days. So those are very intense, serious conversations

on going publicly reported and the Russian Kremlin's aware of it. Secondly, we also know that there's now post the Alaska and then Washington Summit intense conversations and working groups and announcements on a European force potentially going into Ukraine after a ceasefire. So I think this was a brush pack pitch for that as well. And then third, this is connected to the opening of the Zapot exercises last Friday, which is again, this every five year major war game that the Russians run. The last time they ran one of these five years ago. Actually, the last was 2021, four years ago. And it was interesting. The Russians, if you remember, in the summer of 2021, Ford deployed a lot of military kit and troops and then pulled back their actual personnel,

until then they actually personnel moved up, took their positions, and then went into Ukraine on February 24th, 2022. And I think there's a lot of speculation that the Russians were testing response times, political will, Western ability to actually counteract some of these measures. And so here, too, you could make the argument that the Russians are testing response times, trying to gather data and information about how effective NATO isn't responding to these drone incursions. Has it learned the lessons? I mean, I remember one of my shocking really early discoveries when the war broke out in February 22, 22, and those long tank columns, you remember when the approaches to Kiev were beginning to pile up,

that the Russians had not learned the lessons of the Karabakh War where the Azerbaijani is a pioneer the use of some of these drone technologies that byrakhtars against Armenian tank columns and armor. And I thought for sure the Russians, this is your neighborhood, the Caucasus. This is something that you follow so closely. You're so invested. Armenia is a CSTO member, a close ally. Azerbaijan matters a lot to the Russians.

For sure, they had taken on board those lessons, and yet they hadn't. And so I think it speaks to your ability to actually innovate and learn as an observer, even rather than when you're at war. And while we do have now in Poland a NATO operation set up to inculcate and learn and take on board these mop up, these and soak up these lessons from the war in Ukraine, I think the Russians were going to test that and see how much we actually are learning, how much we really do understand what's happening. And so there's all of that. So just if I want to repeat back to you, I mean, I think I understood you say about the Zappa exercise. So if we, if we understand the 2021, this joint Russian Belarusian exercises having been conducted with an eye towards the invasion of Ukraine, not too many months thereafter. And the equipment that was moved for the Zapat and 2021 was then used for the invasion. So it seems then reasonable to be concerned that things that are happening at the same time as or in coordination with the present day 2025 Zapat exercise could be with.

with an eye towards, you know, things beyond the exercise, future aggressions or incursions or things like that. You know, that that seems reasonable. I guess, yes, obviously the Russians will want to look at the military response to the drones and see how the polls did. You know, I guess the Dutch played a big role in the intercepts, I think, as I understand. See how everybody did. Well, just, yeah, the Dutch sent some F-35s.

So now there are German Euro fighters, French Ruffals. I think the Danes have an anti-air warfare frigate and maybe two F-16s they've sent for this operation, Eastern Century. So there's an attempt to be a quick response. Yeah. And well, as I was going to say, obviously, there's some sort of tactical operational learning that you want to do watching this response if you're the Russians. You know, at the strategic or grand strategic level, I guess the concern would be, yes, this could be a brushback pitch. This could be an effort to intimidate as these important issues of a new.

round of sanctions over the Ukraine war are being determined between the Americans and the Europeans. I mean, you could also be concerned, though, that would have the opposite effect, that it's so, it's such an escalation, even just juror as it is. It's such an escalation that it could contribute to greater European or Anglo-American unity. And I guess it speaks to the dismiss, I just, I mean, I realize I'm out in a limb here. There's a bunch of premises built into this, but the fact that that was apparently dismissed speaks volumes to Putin's view of the European and the U.S. European relationship. I mean, I also think that part of the reason while we're recording this podcast and why there's so much focus on this incident is because we really do view war as a bit of an on-off switch and why they're at peace in the international system or we're at war. And when American ferocity is summoned, it can be intense, it can be potent.

But when we're at peace, we try to maintain that peace and we're almost desperate to return to the status quo ante. I think the Russians see it much more as a dimmer switch, and they're in a perpetual state of war with us, and they just move the dimmer switch up and down based on what they think makes most sense, what they want to illuminate, where they want to go, what they want to turn off. And so in this case, I mean, if you go back and document some of the hybrid attacks, the Russians have launched against the West, there are some real risks of major casualties from a WMD attack in the United Kingdom, which had it just gone a little bit different. could have knocked out parts of Salisbury in ways that would have been dramatic.

Remind everyone what you're talking about? Yeah, there was a chemical warfare attack, the famous script-ball attacks in the UK where Russian agents planted chemical weapons in an assassination attempt. But they did it in a careless way in a city out in public that could have had, it just gone a little bit differently, had the tradecraft or the operational quality not been what it was. it could have killed a lot of people. And similarly, if you remember just, I think two years ago, I don't have my date straight as it all kind of swims together. But the Biden administration had to

make a very urgent warning against the Russians that implanting explosive devices on a cargo plane, I think it was a DHL cargo flight, you know, it's a problem. They need to knock it off because if that explodes in midair, you have a plane going down. You know, and the Russian air defenses, a little bit like the Iranians, if you think about the knocking down of, I think it was a Canadian airliner outside of Tehran, that you have shootdowns over Ukrainian territory of the Malaysia air. I mean, there's just a lot of incidents

where the Russians have kind of tiptoed up and even stepped across red lines in hybrid operations or in, and I suppose this gets back to the question is, what is the Russian judgment of political will? I think you're right. They probably are pretty dismissive, the hedonistic, kind of pathetic West as they see it. And they see a lot of arguments,

in Western literature and amongst Western Politicos who take incidents like that, not as a reason to escalate against Russia, but actually to back down. Given the events of last week, given all of the discussions that you've pointed to, you know, the presidents come out and said very dramatically on social media in the last couple days that he's perfectly prepared to impose crushing sanctions on the Russians. So long as the Europeans, I believe the demand was stopped buying all oil from or all, I don't know if it was oil or energy resources or precisely how it was framed

or what realistically it would need to be framed as from the Russians, which I'm not, I'm curious how you interpret that position. But where do we stand? Where do we stand with the movement towards tightening the screws on the Russians given that they have kind of given us the kiss off in terms of American efforts to reach peace

in the last few weeks? And the overall question of settling the war. Yeah, it's sort of amazing. We haven't really talked much about president, which is rare for these sorts of conversations. But it's a good question. I think the Europeans are a little bit like the dog who caught the car because for months, they've been traipsing through Washington.

And in every background conversation at very high levels, they've been asking, what's up with the Graham bill? When are the sanctions coming? Will there be secondary sanctions against the Russians via hitting the Chinese? And if you read that bill, this is Senator Graham and Senator Blumenthal's bill. State drafted. It has 80 some co-sponsors, so the vast majority of the same. Senate in support of it, it calls for very aggressive secondary sanctions against all buyers of

Russian oil. And here, the elephant in the room, of course, is China and India as well. So crushing secondary sanctions against those markets could either push them off and cause them to wind down some of their purchases for fear of losing access to the dollar and Western financial system, or it could lead to another trade dispute and kind of a tit-for-tat escalation like we saw when the administration originally went for tariffs against the Chinese, leading to chip cutoffs, rare earth restrictions, et cetera, et cetera, until there was some sort of off ramp negotiated in London between our trade team and the Chinese trade team. And now there's an ongoing trade negotiation between Beijing and Washington. So to sum it up, is the United States prepared to get into and to put this on the table another dispute with the Chinese as the president tries to land a big mega trade deal with Beijing? I think that's one question.

A second question is, are the Europeans prepared to go along if he's willing to really go after the Russians at the next level? So this, this I think is really, it gets back to my opening point. This really is kind of the key issue because Europe doesn't buy a lot of oil from Russia anymore. There's some that goes to Slovakia to Hungary, but they've basically wound down most of their oil purchases. There's still some gas. But oil is really what the president's focused on in his statement, not LNG. And so that's one question. And then two, I think the Europeans, that would be the price of passage, might be prepared

to take those steps, the Hungarians, the Slovak, if pressure by Washington. But two, are they prepared to join the administration and going after the purchases of Russian oil? And again, that would mean Europe, having just eaten that tariff that we talked about earlier, also taking a really aggressive turn against Beijing. And to date, they've been a little bit hesitant, I think, to take that step. So we'll see, by and large, I think, to your meta points about where are we at and trying to get to war termination, I think the president's pretty frustrated with how the diplomacy is unfolded to date and is now entertaining, adding to the carrots, which is put on the table, maybe some sticks in the form of sanctions, tariffs, etc., all of which have kind of been up for discussion. So when we have this unusual situation, and I'll let you go after this where the president's contemplating adding sticks, but the stick he wants to add all of a sudden is like very.

rich for the Europeans' blood to the extent where I think some of them are questioning the good faith of it. That is to say, you have to, you know, crack down on the, on the Chinese and everything else you just described. What's your advice to the Europeans in all of it? Yeah, I mean, they're asking for sticks and he's like, here's a bazooka, you know, which is pretty aggressive. Look, I mean, I think basically there has been a, I hate to call it hypocrisy because the Europeans have been good on a lot of issues, but there is a bit of a hypocrisy at the core of their position because on the one hand, they say, we have to. we have to win this war originally, now find an equitable and just peace. We have to support Ukraine.

You oftentimes hear bandied about that it's an existential conflict for the future of the European order. But in the next breath, European leaders fly to Beijing with business delegations in tow and say, please stop playing this enormously important role for the Russian war machine. But also, I have my executives with me and let's talk after the break in the next session about trade deals and about restarting economic exchanges and all sorts of issues. So if you really think it's existential, then you also need to be prepared, I think, to move against some of the Chinese on these issues. And in their defense, there have been now listings of some Chinese banks and Russell Funderlands Commission has been a little bit more hawkish.

But at the level that Donald Trump's asking for would be a whole different level of aggression against the Chinese in the economics sphere, which we'll see how they feel about. It's a live issue. I mean, we're recording this on. September 15th and that's being hotly debated, but we don't have an answer yet. Peter Rao of the Hudson Institute, really good conversation. Thank you so much for joining. Thank you, Aaron. This is a nebulous media production. Find us wherever you get your podcasts.