School of War - Ep 273: Matthew Kroenig on China’s Nuclear Test

Episode Date: February 9, 2026

Matthew Kroenig, Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, joins the show to talk about the new nuclear age the world is entering. ▪️ Times 03:27 Secret Chinese testing 07:35 Seismic monitoring and de-coupling 11:40 U.S. testing plan  15:30 Why might we need more nuclear weapons? 18:01 New START 21:23 How many nukes are needed? 27:04 If deterrence fails  30:20 Limits, if any Follow along on Instagram, X @schoolofwarpod, and YouTube @SchoolofWarPodcast Find more content on our School of War Substack

Last week was full of big news on the nuclear front. The new start, arms-controlled treaty expired. The United States Department of State accused China of conducting nuclear tests. These are big stories that I don't think got a lot of attention, certainly not the attention they deserve. So today we welcome Matt Kronick back to the show to help us understand this strange, concerning new nuclear era that humanity has just entered.

Let's get into it. December 7, 1941, a date which will live in history. The bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a state. We continue to face the great situation in France. It's a fight on the beaches. There's a sight on the landing ground. You'll bike in the fields and in the streets which will never surrender. Hi, I'm Aaron McLean.

Thanks for joining School of War. I am delighted to welcome back to the show today, Professor Matt Kronig. He is a professor at Georgetown, where he teaches in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. He's also the vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council Skokroft Center for Strategy and security. He is an expert on nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, the author of numerous books on that subject. And Matt, you are here today to discuss with us what was a pretty huge week in nuclear news. Thank you so much for coming on School of War. Thanks very much for having me, Aaron.

It's always a pleasure to be back. And big week indeed. we have a lot to discuss. So a lot happened. There was a kind of a barn burner of a speech from a senior American diplomat named Thomas DeNano out in Geneva. I realize you don't hear things

like senior diplomat and barn burner of a speech in combination very often, but I actually think it was. Like it was quite a speech about the future of America's attitude towards arms control and nuclear weapons. You had obviously the expiration of the New START Treaty,

which we can talk about what that was and what that means. But then the thing that that caught my eye and what what immediately made me want to pick up the phone and call you map was sort of buried a little bit in all of that news was and again forgive forgive the expression but a bombshell revelation that china has been conducting nuclear tests and this really did not get i think the attention that i think it deserved i think i saw it on something like page eight of the wall street journal print edition which yes i do i do subscribe to the wall street journal print edition so you can

you can infer from that what you like but we i want to start us there and let me just read I'll read the paragraph from the speech where DeNano makes this claim. He says, Today, I can reveal that the U.S. government is aware that China has conducted nuclear explosive tests, including preparing for tests with designated yields in the hundreds of tons. The PLA sought to conceal testing by obfuscating the nuclear explosions because it recognized these tests violate test-banned commitments. China has used decoupling, a method to decrease the effectiveness of seismic monitoring to hide their activities from the world. China conducted one such yield-producing nuclear test on June 22nd of 2020. Matt, what does all this mean? Well, it's a big deal, Aaron,

for a number of reasons. First new start expiration. There's been binding bilateral arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union and then Russia since the early 1970s. So this is the first time in essentially a half century that there have not been binding arms control agreements between the United States and Russia. I think it's a good thing on balance and we can talk about that. But then the nuclear testing, essentially since the end of the Cold War, the major nuclear powers have not conducted explosive tests. You had North Korea, a rogue state that conducted a series of tests, but there was a moratorium in place among the major powers. And there has been speculation over the years that maybe Russia and China were cheating using this decoupling method that we can talk about. But what was notable about Donato's speech is he said publicly for the first time that we know that China is doing this.

And really interesting put an exact date on it, which seems to suggest that we have pretty good intelligence and put the Chinese on notice that their efforts to keep this secret from us are not working. So I think there's a lot to unpack here. And we are, I guess, bottom line up front is that we are entering a new nuclear age like we've never experienced before, where we need to deal with two nuclear superpowers, Russia and China, at the same time. So I want to kind of take each piece of the situation that you just outlined and go into more detail on it. But let's stick with the testing for a moment. What are the origins of the moratorium on nuclear testing? There is a treaty architecture there, right, but it's not ratified.

But even before we get to the legality of everything, like why once upon a time did people want to stop testing nuclear weapons? Well, the main reason to conduct a nuclear test is to test the design of your nuclear warhead and the physics package. And during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union conducted mini tests to perfect their nuclear weapon design and try to make the design more efficient, get larger yield, lighter weight warheads, and so on. By the end of the Cold War, well, actually, let me go back. And then during the Cold War, there were several arms control agreements on the way limiting types of nuclear testing. So it used to be countries would conduct atmospheric nuclear testing. And then with the limited test ban treaty shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to only do underground testing.

But by the end of the Cold War, there was a sense that the United States and the Soviet Union had done all the tests that they needed to do. nuclear era was behind us. And there was this effort to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty that would ban all nuclear tests above and below ground. And many of the major powers signed up for this. The United States and China never ratified. Bill Clinton wanted to ratify, but Republicans in the Senate were opposed and in part precisely because of this issue that's come to light in the past few days. They were worried that we wouldn't be able to verify the agreement that Russia and China would be able to cheat. So the United States never ratified.

And nevertheless, the major powers agreed to respect this moratorium where they would not conduct a test that produced an explosive yield. And again, speculation over the years that Russia and China have been cheating on this moratorium. And just in the past couple of days, it's become clear that China has, in fact, been cheating. If you wanted to hide a nuclear explosion, I mean, I guess bearing it underground as a start, But what is this decoupling method, you know, if you want to do a test and hope the world doesn't see, what do you, what do you up to? Yeah. So the main way the international community detects nuclear explosions is through a system of seismic monitoring. So there's a comprehensive test ban treaty organization that operates the system of seismic monitors all over the world.

So it's essentially the same technique you would use to detect an earthquake. because if you conduct an underground nuclear test, that's a big explosion. The Earth shakes and you pick it up on these seismic monitors. And so, you know, to get into the jargon here, you know, the nuclear explosion is coupled with the surrounding Earth. It shakes the Earth and it's picked up on these seismic monitors. This decoupling method that Donato talked about and the, you know, Republican senators worried about back in the 1990s is, well, if you dig a big underground.

cavern and conduct a nuclear explosion, it's possible to decouple that explosion from the surrounding Earth. So you don't get the big seismic waves that picked up on the detectors. And so Donano said that China has been using that method to conduct underground explosions in a way that are not detectable with this seismic monitoring system. And could we speculate, you know, where this might have occurred? I mean, do we know where the Chinese testing facilities are? Like, put some color on this, even if you're not. it has to be speculative to a degree. Yeah, so the Chinese have had a main nuclear testing area, the Lop-Nor testing area, going back

to the days of Mao Zedong. And over the years, U.S. government has said that given activity around the Lop-Nor test site, we have concerns about whether China is abiding by its moratorium on testing. So presumably using other technical means, the U.S. government was picking up activity at the site that they thought may be consistent with nuclear testing. And Donano in his speech just a couple of days ago did mention this Lopnor test site. And so, you know, the United States has a testing range out in the West, the Nevada test range. And so similar in China, it's an outlying area far away from major cities where you can, you know, do things like conduct nuclear explosions without bothering the neighbors.

roughly when did America stop testing its own weapons? When did that actually come to an end? Yeah, that's a good question. I'd have to double check. But during the Cold War, the United States conducted a lot, I think, in the hundreds of nuclear tests, first atmospheric and then below ground. And I do think it was up until near the end of the Cold War that the United States conducted test. And again, as long as the arms control or the nuclear arms competition was going on with the Soviet Union, having a modern effective nuclear force was, of course, a top national security priority. And I guess that's the crux of the issue, isn't it? I mean, and I'm not an expert in how you make a nuclear bomb, but I expect that as with every other kind of technology, even if the basic

principle of nuclear explosions probably hasn't undergone an enormous amount of evolution in our lifetimes, probably a lot of other things about how you make these bombs has. And so how do you really know at the end of the day if it's all going to work as a whole system if you don't test it. And that's the advantage that the Chinese. And I guess we've also, we are under the impression that Russians as well, but this particular moment with the Chinese asserted specifically by the Trump administration, they have this advantage that they are testing. So they know, they know what's working and what doesn't work in their own systems. That contributes to their ability to deter. That contributes to their confidence that should they come to and exchange their stuff's going to work. And that's why,

I guess the president has said he wants to, he wants to test. What are the pros and cons of the United States embarking on this new testing regime, which we seem to be about to do? Well, first on what the Chinese gain, you're right that they have more confidence that there's work. But then also, if you want a new warhead design, if you want to try something that's a larger yield or more efficient, you really do need to test for that. And so China may have a new warhead design. And so China may have a new warhead design. have more of a reason to test than the United States because we do have more of a test record during the Cold War. They were a little bit later to the game. And so I suspect that China's doing this not just to make sure everything works, but because it's experimenting with new types

of weapons designs. And so as it relates to the United States then, pros and cons of a return to testing. You know, one, all the, you know, I'm a political scientist, not a nuclear engineer, but all the nuclear engineers agree that if the United States wanted new designs, we would have to return to testing. Now, there's no one calling for new designs right now. I personally don't think it's needed, but if we did want new designs, we'd have to test. And so the question then gets to yours of, can we be sure that everything works? And here the scientific community is somewhat divided. So Lawrence Livermore has the most advanced supercomputer in the world, or maybe they're number two right now. They go back and forth with the Chinese. But one of the things,

they do with that supercomputer is conduct a simulated nuclear explosions using test data from the past. And some of the scientists I've talked to there say actually these computer simulations are even better than real tests. Because with real tests, you're blowing up some of what you want to study. And so they say we never need to return to testing again. Other scientists I talked to elsewhere say, well, no, of course we have to test at some point. You know, you think your car is going to start in the morning, but until you turn, the key you really can't know. So I think those are some of the potential advantages if we need new warhead designs, just making sure that it works. There are also cons as well potentially,

but I've been going on for a while, so I'll pause there. Well, no, no, this is interesting. So that, I mean, I mean, these are, these are all what the real significance of the week is, is it punctuates and emphasizes trends that have been developing for years now, but all of a sudden it's just, we woke up last week and it was all just real, that we are in this new age of of at this moment, unconstrained, legally unconstrained, nuclear competition with Russia and China. And not to mention the North Koreans and there's other factors, but the major players are the United States, Russia and China. And so let's stick with this question of new designs.

I mean, this is, you know, I think for a lot of people, the notion that you would need the new, I think a lot of people appreciate the fact that the development of nuclear. weapons during the Cold War got to the point where there are weapons that can level whole cities a single blast i mean if they know a little bit more they know that you know there are warheads or you know there there are missiles that can deliver multiple warheads so it's harder to even if you're going to attempt to intercept things it's hard to intercept so the people are generally aware that we can kill cities and the russians can kill cities and other chinese can kill cities if they want to and so with that fact on the table it might be reasonable to ask well why on earth would you need more or

different? Like what what what further advance as it were is necessary when you already have that capability? And it sounds like you you sort of agree that maybe for different reasons. Explain your position why we don't need new designs in this new era of competition, but also give us a sense of why those who argue that we do like what would be useful about new designs. Yes. Well, and it's important to distinguish between the delivery vehicle and the nuclear warhead and the explosive package in the warhead. And so I do think that we need new and different. kinds of delivery vehicles for the moment we're entering into. And so there is a plan underway to modernize our strategic bombers, modernize our intercontinental ballistic missiles, modernize our

submarines. I also think that we need new theater-based nuclear systems. But that's not constrained by this testing moratorium. We've always been able to test delivery systems. And so then when it comes to the physics package, as you rightly point out, you know, during the Cold War, we designed a lot of different types of nuclear warheads, including kind of dialy yield, where we could make them very low yield, very high yield. So I just think when it comes to the physics package, we don't need anything new there. And I don't think there's anybody really calling for new physics packages. I think the real debate is over numbers of warheads and what kinds of delivery vehicles they're deployed on and also where they're deployed. Do we need more in Europe and Asia, for example?

The other part of the news from the week, obviously, was the expiration of new start. There have been gestures in the directions of extending it in some fashion. I mean, obviously, we have the State Department saying very emphatically, this is dead. But back during that round of negotiations with the Russians over the war in Ukraine, back in whenever that was, one loses track, November, I think, was this headline in the points of the peace terms. that leaked to the press, one of them involved the extension of, I think they actually got the name wrong. I think they meant New Start, but they said, they say salt or something like that. Yes, yeah. But they meant new, they meant the extension of New Start. And then you hear, it's like every day there's new new headlines. It's very hard to track, but you hear, you know,

mentions that, no, we're going to continue to enforce the restrictions as sort of a handshake agreement between the United States and Russia. So say if you would a few words to eulogize New Start. it's qualities but also its warts and say a word about where things actually stand today in terms of the future of arms control. So first I think there is value to arms control and there are a number of benefits. You know, U.S. Strategic Command commanders have said that they like the certainty that it gives them in terms of Russian forces and what they need to plan against. There are these verification measures that give us more insight into what the Russians are doing. And does, I think, you know, it did constrain the arms competition during the Cold War.

You know, at the peak, the United States and the Soviet Union both had tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. And so putting a cap on that, I think, was helpful. But it's now, and I guess a final benefit when everything else was Rocky and the U.S.-Russia relationship. That was one area where diplomats could get together and talk and agree on things. But I think it has come to the end of its useful life. And the main reason is because of China's rapid nuclear buildup. And, you know, I was appointed by Congress to a strategic posture commission a couple of years ago. And this was the central question really assigned to us by Congress is, what does China's

massive nuclear buildup mean for American nuclear strategy? And essentially the conclusion that we came to is that to deter China and Russia at the same time, you know, essentially two peer powers because China is projected to have 1,500 nuclear weapons by 2035. So that's right there with the new start limits. So this is new. You know, never before has the United States had to deal with two peer nuclear superpowers at the same time. And essentially we concluded that the current and planned nuclear forces are necessary but not sufficient, that we are going to need a larger and or different nuclear force to deal with Russia and China at the same time. So that's the first important starting point. The purpose of nuclear weapons, of course,

is to deter nuclear war, not to have treaties for its own sake. And so the experts think that to deter nuclear war, we need a bigger nuclear force. And new start doesn't allow us to do that. So it's getting in the way of our security goals, not advancing them. We've talked on the show before about the Chinese nuclear buildup and the strategy behind it. We had a great conversation maybe a year ago now with Dan Blumenthal and Kyle Balthor, who wrote some really smart stuff on what China is up to with its nuclear weapons and how it fits into their non-nuclear strategy for East Asia and the first island chain. And these are essentially in their potential power tools of coercion to break the alliance structure in the first island chain. It was really fascinating discussion.

I want to get your take on the Chinese nuclear buildup. But also, I'd like to ask you, you know, what does it really mean for us in terms of the weapons that we need for deterrence. I mean, and again, keep in mind as you're answering, you know, what I think is this widely held question and a reasonable one. It's like, gosh, if it's true that between the various countries, we already have enough nuclear weapons to effectively destroy the world, which I think still is true, even with the new start restrictions, more or less, how is it possible that you need more? How does the logic of that actually function? Well, first, I had challenged the premise, and you're right that people often say we have enough nuclear.

weapons to destroy the world many times over. But actually, it's not true. In fact, Johns Hopkins applied physics laboratory did a study several years back where they calculated how many nuclear weapons would be required to kill 100% of the Russian population. Not that anybody's arguing we should do that, but just as a, you know, kind of a thought experiment. And I think they calculated that something like 140,000 nuclear weapons would be required for that. The United States only has 1,500 nuclear weapons today, so well short of what would be required even just to destroy all of Russia. So they are the most powerful new weapons ever invented, but I think people often, in their minds, kind of overestimate what they're capable of. So then bringing back to U.S. nuclear strategy, I think, you know,

kind of these ideas of mutually assured destruction that people learn about in college or high school classes, it kind of assumes, okay, we're going to threaten to kill a bunch of people in Moscow and Beijing. They're going to threaten to kill a bunch of people in Washington, New York, and Los Angeles. Nobody wants that. And so that's why deterrence holds. And if that were our strategy, then, you know, maybe, you know, how many nuclear weapons do you need to kill a lot of people in Moscow and Beijing? You know, maybe two is enough. Maybe four is enough. You know, certainly a couple hundred would be enough. But that's not U.S. nuclear strategy and hasn't been for many decades. And instead, the U.S. government has assessed essentially that Putin and Xi don't care if there

people die. And we see that right now. In Ukraine, Putin has no regard for Russian life. Mao Zedong during the Cold War famously said if a bunch of Chinese die in a nuclear war, he'll make more Chinese. So that's not what deters them. What they care about is they're themselves, their regimes, their militar forces. And so deterrence is all about holding at risk what the adversary values. And so since they value those things, that's what the United States holds at risk with its nuclear strategy. We don't target population centers for their own sake. We only target legitimate military targets, leadership targets, military command and control, missile silos, some marine bases, etc. And so when we were calculating numbers for new start, we said, okay, how many nuclear

weapons do we need to hold that set of targets at risk in Russia? And the number was 1550, the new start limit. And at the time, China and North Korea had so few nuclear weapons, the assessment was made. that essentially if we build for Russia, we have enough for China and North Korea too. Now with China's massive buildup, that changes. It means U.S. targeting strategy needs to change. We can't just hold those targets at risk in Russia. We now need to have a whole new set of targets we need to hold at risk. Chinese missile silos, submarine bases, air bases, leadership, et cetera. And so that's what's putting upward pressure on the size of our force. We need more nuclear weapons to hold at risk that set of targets in both Russia and now China.

Yeah, as you know, Mac, as we've discussed it before, I'm semi-obsessed with this early nuclear theorist named William Borden, who to the extent that anybody knows who he is, they know him as the villain in the movie Oppenheimer, who turns over Oppenheimer's files to the Senate. But back in 45-46, where he wrote his book, There Will Be No Time. He made an argument then that's very relevant to what you just said

that seems to me to be borderline decisive, even if it's been rejected, probably more rejected than not. in the mainstream community of thought on these issues ever since, though not interestingly enough, as you point out, in the military, and the people actually doing the targeting. They're the ones who are sort of Orthodox Bordenites, whether they know it or not. And Borden's case was, we can talk about, you know,

using these new weapons, these new atom bombs mounted on V2s, is the way he put it, to destroy, you know, London or Berlin. But the reality is when the war actually starts, no one's actually going to do that because it would be insane, not because of humanitarian reasons. but because everyone's first instinct is going to be to try to destroy the other person's super weapon. And so the inevitable logic of the war is going to be you need to destroy the other guy's super weapons before he can destroy your super weapons because the guy left standing with super weapons when the other guy doesn't have super weapons wins.

Because that guy gets to dictate terms. And that's just the inescapable logic of the whole thing. And it seems from what you're saying that the Pentagon proceeds on that planning assumption, One, because there's this cultural analysis that of all countries, the Russians and the Chinese, perhaps least of all, would be deterred by the threat to their populations. But also just for the fact that barring, you know, scenarios where obviously we can't really reject the possibility that there's a, you know, a terrorist or a madman, it's taken over a country and just has plain murder on their minds. The truth is a war will have goals and goals will be pursued with strategies and having super weapons and your enemy not having superweapons. and your enemy not having super weapons, that logic will build into it

and you'll have this exchange based on that logic. And so we can talk all we want about, oh, maybe 50 weapons would be enough. But the truth is if the other guy then has 60, it's not enough. It's not enough. And that's the unfortunate logic we're trapped in. Yes, you're absolutely right.

So one of the benefits of this counterforce, so-called counterforce strategy is because we think that's what the adversaries care about. But the second one, you're absolutely right. God forbid, if deterrence fails and the adversary starts using nuclear weapons, you know, U.S. president's not going to want to go and give a national press conference and say, now we accept our mutually assured destruction. You know, he's going to want to be able to, or she's going to want to be able to do whatever

they can to destroy the adversary's nuclear weapons before they can be used. And so that's another benefit of a counterforce approach. The other one is just law of armed conflict. The United States are the good guys. As people know, it's illegal to intentionally target. innocent civilians in warfare, only legitimate military targets are legitimate. And so the United States tries to do that, comply with the law of armed conflict, even when it comes to nuclear strategy.

And, Aaron, I love how you keep coming back to this foundational nuclear strategist. You and I should really write something on him at some point. I'm all for it. I'm all for it. And this is kind of the, in way, the ongoing premise of the whole show is the first time arguments are expressed, the first time problems are confronted. oftentimes that's when you see them in their purest form, that we can philosophize about that some other time. Okay, so by the way, every time Matt, you and I do an episode

or I do any episode on nuclear strategy, for that matter, I get all kinds of anguish notes from people who, with some justice, by the way, because here you and I are discussing dispassionately, and even with your important comments about the law-von conflicts and everything else, there is a way inescapably in which what we are talking about is a kind of mass murder. And you can reject that if you like, but that'll be my point of view. I mean, there's no way to fight a large-scale nuclear war.

You know, even once the tactical mooks are being employed on land as opposed to against naval targets, like we're starting to talk about casualty levels, civilian casualty levels that are going to be likely quite substantial. So I get these notes saying, you know, what are you crazy people talking about? This is insane. Like you sound like a rational, logical person, but actually what you're saying is complete madness. And look, there's a way in which, you could respond to the events of the last week with something like that attitude the last vestige of of you know cold war arms control is now dead the chinese are here and they are at breakneck pace

building up their arsenal here you have the president of the united states saying we need to test nuclear weapons and a lot of support in the united states for modernization perhaps expansion you can you can share more detail on that of our arsenal what are the limits what you know is this just going to be, you know, I think that the concern would run something like, now we are just in an arms race trapped in this crazy counter-force logic of matching warhead for warhead. What are going to constrain, what's going to constrain this new world? What would the shape of new arms control agreements look like? What are the natural constraints? That is to say, how do we even calculate what we need, given the nature of the Russian, Chinese, et cetera, arsenals? Just help us

understand what the limits of the new world are going to be, if any. At first, and maybe I should have started the show with this to those people sending you those notes who are understandably concerned. I think I would say that U.S. nuclear weapons have been one of the greatest forces for good in human history. You know, before 1945, we saw Europe and Asia consistently consumed with warfare. Millions of people died. After 1945, the United States built these strong alliances in Europe and Asia. And uniquely, the United States doesn't use its nuclear weapons just to defend itself. You know, that's what India and China and other countries do. Instead, the United States extends its nuclear umbrella over the entire free world. So our 30 formal treaty allies, 30 plus formal treaty allies in Europe and

Asia, we go to them and make a deal and say, don't build your own nuclear weapons. You can rely on our nuclear weapons. And that extended nuclear umbrella has deterred major war in Europe and Asia for 80 years and counting and has stopped our allies from building their own independent nuclear arsenals. So a strong U.S. nuclear arsenal is a good thing for the free world. And then this gets to the question of, you know, then does this lead to an arms race? And I guess I would say maybe it does, maybe it doesn't. You know, it's not easy for Russia and China to just snap their fingers and build more nuclear weapons. We saw the United States consistently outcompete the Soviet Union during the Cold War in this area. I think, you know, given Russia's sorry state of its economy and everything

else, we're well positioned to out-compete them again, and I think China, too. But, you know, we don't want an arms race, but the first purpose is to have what we need for nuclear deterrence. And does that lead to an arms race or not? What are the arms control agreements? Those are secondary considerations. You know, we can't choose an arms control agreement that undermines deterrence. Deterance has to come first. So let's get what we need for deterrence. Maybe that leads to an arms race. And then, yes, let's try to constrain that with arms control agreements. What we would need is a trilateral arms control agreement that constrains both Russian and Chinese forces consistent with our deterrent requirements. And there are possibilities. In fact, the Atlantic Council, where I work had a paper published a few

years ago that we should probably refresh, laying out kind of five or six possible arrangements for trilateral arms control that would advance U.S. national security interests. The big problem right now, final point on this, the big problem right now, though, is not the United States. It's Russia and China. Russia has cheated on almost every arms control agreement it's been a part of, and China refuses to even seriously talk about arms control. So I think realistically, there's not going to be another arms control agreement in the near future, and so the United States needs to build the forces required to protect itself and protect its allies.

Well, Matt, this has been a bracing start to a Monday morning. Thanks for spreading good cheer wherever you go. But it has actually been quite fascinating and important. That's why I wanted to do this with you quickly because it just struck me that last week was packed with, you know, potentially world-altering level significance news that was getting very little attention because it's kind of technical. And this Chinese nuclear test happened years ago, the one that we asserted, the State Department asserted. And I think this is something that informed citizens ought to pay attention to and have

informed views about. And Matt, I'm grateful to you for helping us form those views. Thanks very much for having me, and it's always a pleasure. And congrats on the great work you're doing on the podcast. It's one of my favorites.