School of War - Ep 277: Behnam Ben Taleblu—Will There Be a War with Iran?

Episode Date: February 23, 2026

Behnam Ben Taleblu, Senior Director (Iran Program) and Senior Fellow at FDD, joins the show to talk about the build-up of American military power in the Middle East and what it might mean for Iran and the Iranian regime. ▪️ Times 02:04 U.S. build-up 05:46 Timing  11:08 “Decisive and different”   24:41 Iranian retaliation 30:03 Targets 35:25 Ideology of the Supreme Leader  41:36 A Trump JCPOA 45:46 Regime change by air Follow along on Instagram, X @schoolofwarpod, and YouTube @SchoolofWarPodcast Find more content on our School of War Substack

The deployment of American forces to the Middle East, both maritime and air, is now approaching the size of the deployment of these kinds of assets in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This time, Iran appears to be the target, not of ground action, but certainly of some kind of sustained air and naval campaign. Will it happen? What will happen? What would the components be? How will the Iranians respond? Ben and Ben Taliblu of FD comes back on School of War to help us think through all of these matters and more. Let's get into it. It is for safety for war. This Milwaukee invasion of Hawaii. December 7, 1941, a date which will live in him. A bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a state. We continue to face the way situation

in the grand. It will fight on the beaches. It will fight on the landing grounds. We shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall never have no rest. Hi, I'm Aaron McLean. Thanks for joining School of War. I am delighted to welcome back to the show today. Ben-Benem-Ban-Talablu, the senior director of the Iran program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Benham, thanks for coming back on.

Pleasure. Great to be back with you, Aaron. Quiet a couple of weeks for your issue and likely to stay that way. I jest, obviously. There's so many ways we could start. Maybe before, I want to get you to speculate about the timing of what we might see in the event that the president orders or perhaps has already ordered and we don't know military action. But before we get to sort of the question of Hauer, you've been paying

careful attention to the U.S. buildup in the region. It's pretty substantial at this point. Talk to us a bit about that and what the nature and sort of components of the buildup tell you about the options the administration has and what might be to come. Sure. Well, listen, Donald Trump is being Donald Trump. His cards are quite close to the. chest right now when it comes to policy options against the Islamic Republic. Every day we wake up, we see a different truth social post, different statement by a different member of the administration that leans Washington either towards deal-making or towards war-making with the Islamic Republic. And even if indeed it is going to come down to the use of force, the nature of the operation,

particularly over the past two weeks, I would say, is being drastically debated in very, very different feces in the press, all based, in my view, again, on selective links from the administration that are designed to weaponize and maintain the information space, such that both allies and adversaries do not know the direction Washington is going to go in and do not know the ultimate political goal for the use of force. Now, that can be actually very, very good, but also that can be very, very bad because you want to have a clear political victory at the end of a military victory as well and everything is really being debated on the table from counter proliferation to counter regime strikes from limited strikes to massive strikes to decapitation versus defanging to a resumption

potentially of the logic of the 12-day war to a drastically different regime change sort of operation everything is on the table the firepower is impressive i would say it's also unprecedented almost back to the level that we saw in 2003 but i would still say less than previous instance is certainly less than 1991, where there wasn't, you know, where contrary to what the president wants now, back then there was a significant land operation for the liberation of Kuwait. Here, of course, I think anything ground base would be the president's red line. But we've seen a significant long-range strike capability brought to by the fighters, the F-18s, the F-15s in the region, as well as really the bolstering of America's already,

fairly integrated air and missile defense assets, as well as really, I would say, a whole host of naval assets. Really keep your eyes on the maritime domain here, both the destroyers as well as the two carrier strike groups and everything that comes with these carrier strike groups is really designed to sharpen the knife already at the neck of the government and the Islamic Republic, perhaps get them to really surrender at the negotiating table. And I'll just end with this. You may have seen a recent interview with special envoy Steve Whitkoff on Fox News where he expressed the surprise of the president and the administration. as to why despite this massive military buildup, these armadas, whatever you want to call it,

why the Iranians had not capitulated yet. I don't mean to be disrespectful, but I think that a statement ends up being a great advertisement, unfortunately, for the defunct and, sorry, the not defunct, but the really degenerate resistance ideology of the Islamic Republic. Because if there's anything that these guys know how to do, it's to say no and to hold out and to hold out and to hold out and weaponize time. So we should understand that power adversary conceives of the information space before, you know, a potential conflict is critical,

but also what ideology they bring to the table and what lens they see this military buildup through. And I think we're getting to a point now where in the life of the 86-year-old supreme leader of Iran, and that's a title meant to be taken literally. He may be more content with martyrdom than deal-making. want to come back to the Iranians and the Supreme Leader in their decision-making and intentions in a minute, but just sticking with the American side, let me solicit from you the higher guesswork, the informed speculation about timing. Let's imagine a world, obviously we don't know this, but let's imagine a world where the president has already decided that military action is going to

happen. That would be consistent with the administration's behavior during the 12-day war, and you just made reference to it now, you get these conflicting statements, you get, information picture that's confusing. Meanwhile, there's a strategic plan unfolding that's not been declared. This has obvious military upsides and obvious political risks, which we can go further into. Based on your expert reading of the tea leaves, on the assumption that military action has already been greenlit, or let's just say very close to greenlit, what would you speculate the timing would be? You know, this is one where no matter how long you live and work in Washington, you are no experts. And certainly in Trump administration 2.0, where even if you've mastered the Kremlinology

of who's up, who's down, who's in the president's here, and you still will not know the hour. And for those of you fellow theology minors like me, yes, quote unquote, knowing the hour is a Quranic reference. But to the presidents, I think, again, this is exactly where he wants everybody. If we had to look at the things on his calendar, look at the things that matter, I would say, keep your eyes on the state of the union on Tuesday. In my view, it's unlikely to start a major military conflict before the state of the union, and that cannot be wrapped up by the end of the state of the union. So unless, you know, this was some end of days type of operation here that could wrap everything up in a matter of hours, I find it highly dubious that, you know, Trump administration

would attack before going into the Congress and basically having to take criticism for a war that already some Senate Democrats and some House Democrats as well as some folks on the Republican side are beginning to critique through the lens of the War Powers Act, for example. So I don't see himself being willing to open up that line of criticism preemptively. Moreover, I would say we would have to look at potentially what may be on the Prime Minister of Israel's calendar as if this white being is really American operation, American Israeli operation, or a first American then is really a cleanup operation. And I believe the Israelis this week are having a high-level meeting hosting, I think, an Indian prime minister. I have to double-check about that,

but it's also unlikely that that would happen at the same time. And so if I have to project, based on the news, there are round three of indirectly negotiations scheduled for Geneva, again, to be moderated by the Omanes this Thursday. And if we look at past being prolonged, the president likes the strike when markets are closed, usually the attack window, given that Iran is eight and a half hours ahead of East Coast time. And when markets closed, would mean an attack from 5 p.m. to 10 p.m., you know, basically from Friday into the weekend. So while I think the attack window is open and everyone's guessing when is the imminent part of the window, if past this prologue and we're going to transpose the logic of past rikes onto the president,

again, which is much more art than science. My guess would be he could come as early as this coming weekend. Well, we'll hold you to that. Your credibility is now stake to that prediction about him. I'll bet one Iranian rial. What is one of Rady and Real are worth right now? Is that a fraction of a penny? What is that? Certainly. I think it's about 1.4, 1.5 million to one West dollar on the free market.

Well, there you go. Good to go. All right, you're on, one real. So you made reference to potential scope in time of U.S. strikes. Obviously, we've got the capabilities for deployed in the region for a sustained campaign, if that's what the president decided. Talk about what the objectives of such a campaign might be, obviously up to and including regime change and how practical you think that is.

You also talk about, you know, I'm curious your view about what the shorter run, more limited options could be. You know, in the lead up to Venezuela, we also had, you know, it's not actually was smaller, but still a significant armada off the coast of Venezuela. A lot of, you know, U.S. air assets in the region as well, sort of a somewhat smaller version of what we've got massed right now. And then it ended up being really, you know, a shaping campaign and then a single spectacular special operations raid.

You know, my suspicion is if the administration felt that it could somehow take out the Supreme Leader, maybe a small handful of people and then work with the next layer down, sort of as they've been doing in Venezuela, they would leap at that option. But I'm skeptical that such an option exists in Iran. The next layer down might not be as amenable to cooperation as the next layer down in Venezuela was. But talk just about limited strike options and more middle to long run strike options. Well, let me pick up right where you left off, because if I have to intonate, I would exactly footstump what you said, which I think if the president was left to his own devices, and indeed based on reports from January, I think to NBC first, the president was looking for something

that was, quote, unquote, decisive and different when it came to, you know, acting on his red lines against the Islamic Republic, the Venezuela option would indeed loom large. It was a gamble, but it was a gamble that paid off. And actually, I think, you know, if we're looking at the more transactional nature of the president, that might be something he is interested in. It's also possible, of course that, you know, those who are pushing for regime transition or regime exit or regime rotation don't have a really good understanding, as you mentioned, of the Iranian national security deep state and the kind of people who might be in round two, three, four of that system. Yes, Iran has a supreme leader, but if you look very closely at the Iranian, you know,

structure of power, despite having a supreme leader, the system is less of a pyramid and more of a series of overlapping twin pillars where unelected institutions check elected ones, quote-of-quote elected ones, more likely selected ones, hardline revolutionary institutions check traditional state institutions. So the IRGC affects the army. And Hamide, who's been the longest serving dictator of the Middle East in the contemporary period, has institutionalized loyalists, and not known for their capability, but known for their zeal or loyalty in mid-and-hire-ranking tears of both the civilian bureaucracy, but more importantly, the national security states. So from there, I don't think any Venezuela option exists. If we're looking at the state structure, there's no one-to-one

parallel, certainly not in terms of society, because the forcing function for this entire crisis is the most violently suppressed street protests in the history of the Islam Republic, 36 to 43,000 killed just in a matter of days in January under a 20-plus day internet blackout. So I think while we are talking about the guns and bombs, I think the political logic is. has to be able to act on the political rationale for the president's red lines, which was to find a way to level the playing field between the state and the street and Iran. And perhaps most importantly, to push past the Venezuela option, there is no clear military parity between Venezuela and the Islamic Republic. We can talk about symbolic strikes, but the Islamic Republic has used ballistic

missiles against American bases in response to strategic air strikes by the U.S. before. In 2020, for example, Iran responded to two U.S. bases in Iraq following the killing of Qasem Soleimani with what was then the largest ballistic missile barrage against U.S. forces in recorded history. Now, thank God, no one died, but it was about over 100 to 120, if I'm not mistaken, or even 140 traumatic brain injuries at that installation. And then fast forward to 2025 when the U.S. took out Iran's nuclear program, including the Crown Jewel, the water of fuel enrichment facility underground, Iran responded with, again, ballistic missile strikes at Alludeid base,

and in particular a $15 million geodesic ray dome at Alludate. This basically impeded secure communication. While in each round, the U.S. let Iran get the last word in, the U.S. was content that that which it took away from Iran was worth significantly more than that which the Iranians, you know, damage or took away from it. Conversely, the Iranians got the impression that because they were able to close their that they politically could claim victory. I don't see any kind of phrasing or signaling between both sides.

Who knows what is going on behind closed doors? But I think this time, given that the Iranian strategy declaratively, from political elite, military elite, religious elite, and again, from the Supreme Leader of Iran, has been to say that we will respond majorly, even to a limited war, has us having to have to gear up for in terms of contingencies, a much larger and a much more sustained campaign,

rather than a one-off or a two-off military operation. And conceptualizing this as a campaign is going to be critical for U.S. forces to be able to maximize everything that they have in place and to be able to nullify Iran's most likely strike vectors. Yes, there is going to have to be like any military operation or suppression of any military defenses. But from there, I think we're likely to see a major defanging operation

before we get the political targeting in Iran. And that defangging operation is probably going to be designed to go after both ballistic missile production, which the Israelis hit in October 24 and in June 2025, but still did not destroy, as well as the chains of bases. Iran has at least three kind of, you could say, vertical chains of bases in the west, in the center, and in the east, as well as along the Persian Gulf Coast, were a short range that go 300 kilometers to 1,000 kilometers or medium range that basically go the 1,000 to 2,000 kilometers, ballistic missiles are housed. The Israelis in the 12-day war were able to get Iran to operate from further and further

range. Certainly, I think more American air power can limit the room for these missile bases to be active. If we build on the logic, and I think this is going to be key for America to turn off the main military tool of the Islamic Republic, regardless of its political aim in this operation, it will be to control and turn off long-range precision fires by the Islamic Republic. And that doesn't mean just deterrence by denial. That means a major hunting mission. There's two ways you can do it. If the Israelis went after the, quote-unquote, archers rather than the arrows,

so after the tells and the launchers and the rail launchers and everything else that the Islamic Republic had in the first round, and they're able to cut that launch capacity by a half, given the significant more strike options that we have in the region, and perhaps the bringing on of, again, B-2s or other heavy bombers, Washington could either target those subterranean bases and collapse them and entomb both the missiles and the launchers, thereby deny the IRGC, the Supreme Leader and whatever is left of the command and control of these long-range strike capabilities

or basically use cheaper, closer standoff weaponry to basically shut off the entrances. And this is something that people who look at, you know, commercially available satellite imagery have been paying attention to because these facilities have been hardened. So if there's ways to get around this and basically block the entrance, you basically have taken away the major kinetic tool

that the Islamic Republic has to respond to, you know, a more protracted era campaign. And that protracted era campaign can be American, can be Israeli, can be joint, and it can then pick apart perhaps the political elite or could perhaps be able to do things that go beyond just defanging and that could be actually helping to pave the pathway

for a future round of Iranian protests by going after besiege, paramilitary, law enforcement forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and this larger kind of spinal cord, this apparatus of repression that exists across Iran's 31 provinces, that again, their activity was the forcing function for the current crisis that we're in. I've just seen reports, by the way, as we talk, that the Secretary of States visit to Israel, which was originally scheduled for the weekend, has now been postponed to Monday, which if you were paranoid could be another indicator that the weekend is the time for the strike. Okay, Benham, what you say has a logic to it.

It makes good military sense, I think, again, on the premise that the administration's decided to proceed and that its goals are fairly maximalist. But here's my hesitation. What precedent do we have with this president ordering the kind of sustained campaign you just described, including all those attendant risks? Not that the shorter, more, you know, splashy operations that he has ordered were without risk. They were actually extremely risky. But the man has a demonstrated preference for Soleimani, for killing Qasem Soleimani in early, early 2020.

Listeners may remember for Operation Midnight Hammer, going after the Iranian nuclear program doing its substantial damage in one night back last June. Obviously for Venezuela and Maduro recently last December. These sorts of extremely dramatic. risky but very high payoff operations, clearly to the guy's taste. I guess you could, you could respond and talk about, you know, the balance of responsibility between the U.S. and Israel. But this sort of sustained campaign that you're describing, I'm not sure what the, he inherited the counter ISIS campaign, so that was a kind of sustained campaign, but he didn't order that in the first place. I'm not sure there's any precedent for this, or am I forgetting

something obvious? You're absolutely right, Aaron. If we're looking at the way the president has used force and then also to run to the other end of the spectrum as entertain diplomacy. The patience and the preference is for something short, sharp, and decisive. I mean, even if we're going to go to the other side, diplomacy, you know, Trump gave a two, two month window and stuck to that two month window in 2025 for the Islamic Republic. Just days ago, he said 10 to 15 days for negotiations. We could potentially be in the middle parts of that chunk of 10 to 15 days, depending on how you want to count. So I think realistically, whether we're talking about deal-making or war-making, the preference, again, is for that short, sharp,

and decisive. And if I want to, you know, with respect, draw a line from Machiavelli's the Prince, there's a desire in doing anything public, whether it's public violence or public diplomacy, to leave onlookers satisfied and stupefied. I think President Frum kind of coveted that awe factor, both for U.S. military force and for diplomacy. The things he has protractive campaigns on are actually the political and economic fronts, which are admittedly less sexy and are the low and slow both the way president deals with domestic

and foreign adversaries, which is kind of continuously picking at an issue or continuously marshalling a legal, political, and economic architecture to deal with an issue when he doesn't want that to be a priority number one, two or three issue. The question is, once you do start firing weapons, you know, weapons of war,

you know, commencing hostilities with the Islamic Republic, and they respond as they are quite keen to respond. It could actually be the national security decision-making of the regime that forces the president's hands here. And let me unpack what I mean. While the presidents may have a preference for something short-sharp decisive, he, based on recent reports, may be employing the logic of Vietnam. You know, many have drawn an analogy to Operation Rolling Thunder.

I think the more appropriate analogy might be linebacker two where there's a heavy bombardment and an attempt to pivot to negotiations, but either way, he may be trying to force using military means a diplomatic end to the crisis. In the high likelihood that the Islamic Republic means what it says, that it will treat any strike as a major existential attack and regionalize or internationalize the war, much like the regime did to its own detriment during the Iran-Iraq war when it regionalized and internationalized the energy war in the Persian Gulf,

the Islamic Republic may think that by going hard and fast against even a limited strike, they can provide a deterrence because they can point to and aggravate the adversary's image of war, which is costly, and thereby induced Trump to be more restrained. But this actually misreads the president's consistent through line on if you spill even an ounce of American blood. He said this and acted on this during his first term. He said this actually, while in opposition, you could say, and particularly in the post-October 7 Middle East space when he was campaigning. He talked about if you touch in America. will come after you. And then finally, now this seems to be the same logic when he's back at the

helm in the White House. And you can only look at examples where the president has restrained Americans from using force, you know, Iraq, 2019. And then all the way up to, you know, Iraq, late 2019, 20, when there is bloods filled, you get the cycle of violence that leads the killing of Qasem Soleimani authorized by President Trump. So Trump may conceive still of a limited operation. He may want still a limited operation, but the Iranians may be the ones who think that they are deterring him and then they may actually induce him into a much larger campaign. That I think is one potential escalation pathway we have to be ready for. But otherwise, the philosophy you paint is the philosophy that I agree with and I see being kind of lived to the day here in Washington.

Let's pivot to the Iranians then and their capabilities and intentions in general worldview. If they wanted to retaliate, the Americans, the Israelis, some combination thereof, launch a campaign, or even something limited, and they wanted to retaliate in ways that were more than merely symbolic. So we've seen the symbolic retaliation a number of times, as you just described a few minutes ago. But they actually want to draw blood. They want to inflict pain, however unwise that may be. And I agree with you completely, by the way. I think it would be unwise. Talk to us about these short-range ballistic missiles.

Talk to us about other assets they may have. have and the vulnerability or lack thereof, depending on the circumstances of all the naval assets we have in the region, bases in the Persian Gulf, diplomatic facilities. Like, what could a, what could a retaliation campaign put at risk? Well, I want to draw one fundamental contrast with the 12-day war in the situation we have now. And that's not the more or the heavier, I could say, U.S. presence in this part of the world, but it's actually two threat factors, U.S. forces, simply need to be more aware of because they were not turned on or they were not online during the 12-day war.

And one is short-range ballistic missiles. You know, both, actually thrice in the April 24, October 2024, and June 2025 missile wars between Iran and Israel, short-range ballistic missiles, sheerly by virtue of their distance, were not employed by the Islamic Republic. However, if we're looking at a much broader target set and the Islamic Republic is looking to, again,

strike larger maritime targets or perhaps actually go across to the other side of the Persian Gulf where there's major U.S. military bases, potentially even American diplomatic facilities on the northern tier of Middle East or on the southern part of the Persian Gulf, you are likely to see all of these installations either be threatened or actually potentially even be hit with some of Iran's most precision strike projectiles. And those are again short-range ballistic missiles. Some of them have a circular air refrable reportedly of about 10 meters. So that actually is pretty good compared to other systems that the Islamic Republic can marshal. And we haven't seen the regime bring these precision strike systems online en masse. So one vector of concern that we

haven't seen in the missile wars of the region since October 7 are short range ballistic missiles against maritime targets or you could say anti-ship ballistic missiles there, but against you know, American military facilities, or potentially even we can add on critical infrastructure, in particular critical energy infrastructure, again, on the Arab side of the Virgin Gulf. Those are cause for concern. The second is, again, unpacking the maritime domain. When we look at the A2AB capabilities of the Islamic Republic, yes, it's not exactly Russia or China, but really, again, dating back to the Iran-Iraq war, which is really the conflict that furs the regime's interest in some of these asymmetric capabilities, and to be able to,

the push back and where quantity can have a quality of its own and dispersal, I can try to overcome larger forces. The regime in that conflict learned the hard way that, you know, you can't just conventionally amass things because they'll be sitting ducks for a conventional military superpower like the Americans. And much of what the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy has focused on are these fat attack aircraft, our underwater vessels, are drones, are anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles to force us to operate from range. And I think they can force us, particularly in the early phases of a conflict to operate from range, and potentially begin to limit traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, if not briefly interrupted,

for a period of time altogether. And while we saw the Houthis employ similar tactics in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Babel Mend up straight from 2023 to 2025, I think the Islamic Republic would have a similar capability to bring to bear in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. We simply haven't conceived of that because it's been a very, very long time since we've had sustained harassment in this part. So think, you know, the Israel-Iran targeting and the potential for the civilian casualties in Israel that we saw during the 12-day war and also the three previous iterations of those missile wars, but these two new fronts coming online. Every base, every facility that falls within Iran's short-range ballistic missile radius, again, 300 kilometers to 1,000 kilometers,

and, of course, turning on the maritime domain. So suppressing fire or engaging in punishments that could be critical to get Iran to turn off this fire is going to have to be a key feature of U.S. military operations if hostilities commence, and one of these two types of threats are turned online in a big way against U.S. forces. This is one big, blaring red light of difference

that we're going to have to pay attention to. Otherwise, going after those three chains of the western, central, and eastern missile bases is going to be critical, as well as handicapping future production if this regime is going to still be in place. There's at least five locations in the center or the north of the country that put together the different components for Iran's ballistic missiles that store the fuel, that do the mixing, and that also do the testing, in particular the engine and motor testing, and as well as the flight testing,

for some of these platforms going after that and actually being able to destroy that through sustained sortie generation, the kinds of which Israel simply wasn't able to during the 12-day war because of the size and because of the distance and the geographic proximity, we now have the ability to, quote, unquote, finish that job. So perhaps more effectively, the U.S. may be able to engage in a defanging mission and then turn over a potentially more tattered carcass of military sites to the Israelis to pick apart, either with any domestic network that they may still have. Remember, the Israelis operated a drone base on Iranian territory against Iranians during the 12-day war and were able to marry that with

air-launch ballistic missiles and other standoff weapons. And there's still nuclear targets, yes? Tell us about Pickax Mountain and any other targets that may be remaining within the Iranian nuclear program. So for a targeter, there's always something left to target. And in particular, in the nuclear world, there's different logics to that. You could go after some of the sites that the Islamic Republic is still building like Pickax Mountain, which is believed to be several times deeper It's a subterranean facility that we believe in the future could be an enrichment facility deeper than Fordo, which at the point of time that it was operational was the deepest Iranian active enrichment facility that was at least declared on the regime's soil, destroying that or again, collapsing tunnels,

going down air shafts, doing things to basically take advantage of how the regime has tried to use physical geography to harden and prevent the U.S. from getting access to the facility. Well, if the U.S. can't access the facility, then to air power, no one should be able to access the facility. And that's something that, again, heavy U.S. bombers, massive ordinance, penetrators, bumper buster bombs can again, meaningfully do, take advantage of the physical geography, as well as the layout of this actual facility with what they can get from imit and satellite imagery and collapse it from the top. On top of that, there's a different logic to go after, you could say previously struck sites like the Isfahan Nuclear Complex, which again,

for commercially available satellite imagery. There has been some burying, there has been some hardening, and the same applies for other smaller, you could say research labs that have a smaller footprint like Talavantu, which our friends at the Dutaisus have been doing a great job about bringing the alarm boulon. For those of you who have been paying attention, Talaan 2 near Parcine,

is basically a site previously associated with Iranian nuclear weapons developments. Why would the Iranians be trying to harden or fix or make more survivable a site associated with past weapons work? Well, that might be because it's not entirely only associated with past weapons work. The regime, by trying to save these facilities, could be tipping its hand about its future nuclear intentions and going after the rest of this architecture of facilities that the regime is hardening and actually use both the intelligence and the satellite imagery to see what the regime is prioritizing and making sure that there's a concentration of force against those assets.

The regime is prioritizing could be key here too. A greater challenge for us, however, would be, again, with the thing that diplomatically the administration wants, which is how are they going to extract the uranium that is either missing, undeclared, or in tombs. If Washington, from an intelligence perspective, believes that the uranium is in tombs, perhaps they can continue to make sure that the rubble around some of these nuclear facilities remains rubble, or any move to go extract or any move towards previously struck nuclear sites are unsuccessful moves, again, through very good ISR and the intelligence image that the U.S. could have. So you can strike pickax now and you can take advantage of physical geography.

You can strike what the Iranians are hardening. And based on your belief of where the undeclared or intubed uranium is, you can continue to keep that off sides. So let's talk about the regime itself, its representatives who are doing the negotiation with Steve Wickoff and Jared Kushner and the Supreme Leader, of course. You know, the reports out of the negotiations are of continued reluctant, let's just say, I'll be as polite as I can be, continued reluctance on the Iranian part to make meaningful concessions on what seemed to be the three major categories of discussion. There's the

nuclear issue, there's the missile issue, and then there's the question of terror proxies. I've nursed the theory for a while now, and, you know, this is just me, that if the Iranians came to the table with a meaningful set of nuclear concessions, like they basically offered to shut down their nuclear program in a way that was verifiable and sustainable, that could be the ballgame. I could see. I could imagine with that being on the table, this administration, pocketing that, being able to say they, they are the ones. The Trump administration is the administration that finally ended the Iranian nuclear threat. And then basically living with the regime. It would contradict the president's rhetoric in January. There would be downsides. It's not, I think, an outcome that would be cheered by some in Washington. Others, I think, would breathe a sigh of relief. But the Iranians don't even seem to contemplate, you know, a limited set of, I mean, it would be. meaningful within the nuclear file, but in a broader sense, a limited set of concessions that, well, could potentially save their skins. I'm kind of fascinated by the obstince. Even you made a passing reference to it, but let's just reflect for a second on the nature

of quote unquote indirect talks, that they essentially declined to even be in the room with the U.S. delegation, which is remarkable that that's where we are here in February of 2026 with everything that's happened in the wars since 10-7 and their relative standing in the region. So all of that said, speak to this Iranian recalcitrance to engage in meaningful diplomacy and indeed to sort of delay. And then I want to get to the question of the Supreme Leader and his fundamental attitude and mindset. You and I speaking offline a few days ago had a really interesting conversation about a speech that the Supreme Leader gave last week in which she spoke openly of martyrdom, but sort of through illusion to the early Shia figure Hussein, who accepted martyrdom rather than. submit to a corrupt caliph so so tell us tell us why the iranian regime is what it is benham no big

deal let me actually begin with the hominee speech and work backwards if that's okay because that really should focus the minds not because homine is continuing to draw out those analogies but because iran's foreign minister in english seems to be on every channel in the past from fox but much more recently to msnbc to cbs he's doing the rounds in english and injecting cautious opt into the Western debate via his interviews about the prospects for an agreement, the prospects for which, by the way, you and I, even if talking about something fundamentally broader and actually, I know, full nuclear transparency and an agreement that, you know, verifiably dismantles what's left of the regime's nuclear infrastructure and for swears against any domestic

enrichment or any domestic reprocessing could indeed tempt some in the Trump administration to turn a blind eye, a long-range strike, on terrorism, and certainly on domestic. issues like human rights and just go for a TJCFOA or a Trump version of the JCPOA that actually does do much more than that agreement. And that belief in a potential diplomatic off-ramp is the political mission that Iran's foreign minister actually has been tasked with. That belief is designed to impede or limits or erode or get away at the political capital and the room or desire. for military operations against the Islamic Republic who was designed to say, hey, there was always diplomatic outcome waiting for you. Similarly, it's actually designed to buy time for the regime

to actually keep doing what it's doing, which is hardened nuclear facilities, build back better when it comes to ballistic missiles and prepare kind of both the information space and the battle space, ultimately also sustained interest with an ability to, I would say, ability to actually even direct or indirect sit down with the Americans is designed also to get at at the political will, not of the Americans, but at the Iranian population, which is waiting on essentially deliverance from the American military.

To get at the will of that population and say, hey, you know that country and you know that guy who promised you support, well, he's more interested in doing a deal with me than meaningfully giving you support and thereby erode the will of the population in a future crisis scenario to be able to come out onto the street following a potentially limited American

or a limited Israeli attack against the regime's missile infrastructure. for instance. So this way the regime is able to prevent a contagion effect, foreign pressure and domestic pressure. All of this stuff, again, is part of the diplomatic slight up hand of the Iranians. But I do agree with you. I unfortunately, if the Iranians were able to push past all of that, that would be rather tempting for some in the Trump administration. Fortunately, I think for us who would not want that to be the case, fortunately, revolutionary ideology does come with some handcuffs. And it's pretty hard to change some things that are path dependent, and in particular when from the above, not from the Almighty,

but from the Supreme Leader, you know, there is a drastically different course set here. And that gets me to Hamanae's speech, because Hamanae speech or speeches in general often allude to, you know, Islamic historiography. They draw on lessons of Shiite political leaders who, you know, made deals or made sacrifices. And in this case, you know, the Supreme Leader, he's 86 years old. He has a set worldview. And I unfortunately, feel like we are living in the large social science experiments of will Iran's second supreme leader behave like the first? And the first, Ayatollah Khomeini, the founding father of the Islamic Republic, shrewdly, albeit after years and years and years of pressure, ended the Iran-Iraq

war and framed that as a sacrifice to save the Islamic Republic because he believed doing anything in the interest of the regime was akin to doing anything in the interest of Islam. That's how they managed to square the ideological circle. The phrase Khomeini then used in 1988 to justify a ceasefire with neighboring Saddam, which was to say he drank from the poison chalice. And those interested in sanctions, those interested in limited strikes, and even those interested in diplomacy and engagement, have always tried to replicate that situation of how can you get Khomeini's successor

to drink from the same poison chalice and get a meaningful compromise. And I think at this stage in his life, given unfortunately how successful the Supreme Leader has been on keeping these Islamic Republic on its anti-Israel, anti-American and anti-running population disposition for the past three and a half decades while he has had this job means that I think he's not inclined to make this kind of realpolitik sacrifice or Faustian bargain. And that means that I think he may actually, and it's kind of painful to say out loud, he may make folks burn through the country to get him. It reminds me very much about that title of the book about Assad, which is Assad or we burn the country.

I think it was by Jobi Warwick. I think here, comedy may be setting up the situation where it could be similar in a bid to get him. He may make you burn through the country. And I actually told, I remember telling this to Iranian dissidents who easily retorted and said, what has he left to burn? I think the risk of a Trump JCPOA light. That is to say, a JCPOA that is not demonstrably and meaningfully better. better than the Obama JCPOA. At this point, that's considering the array of forces in the region, the behavior, the

administration, that seems unlikely to me. I think any diplomatic outcome would have to be defensible to those who would claim that this is a rehash of President Obama's style of diplomacy. I actually, I agree with that. My fear, perhaps fear isn't the right word, but my concern with a diplomatic off-ramp in an area where I think a diplomatic off-empt does not exist is not a TJCPOA or even that dismantlement agreement, which would go obviously much bigger and broader. But actually, my fear is, you know, the logic of mediation, in particular mediation by our partners, that instead of even

trying to get something big and defensible or small and indefensible could simply try to buy time for the regime and reduce the prospects of this conflict, thereby create a face-saving line of retreat for some of these forces to leave the region and by time for the Islamic Republic to reconstitutes is an agreement that is not TJCPOA or dismantlement, but an agreement that actually merely transposes the reality on the ground into paper, meaning it simply doesn't have to deal with the enrichment issue of a right, but it can simply transpose onto paper that Iran is not currently enriching uranium and that's because of Donald Trump's airstrike. And then there it can take a few big philosophical points and say Iran is committed to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and never

to create a nuclear weapon and the United States is committed to fold nuclear verification in Iran and to the principle of sanctions relief for commensurate nuclear concessions. And then you can balance these two and create technical and political working groups around actually what it is that the Islamic Republic would have to do physically to build on this promise. And this is actually why I think there is no diplomatic agreement to be had here. It's not just that this entire promise is built on a house of cards, but that Trump already took away the enrichment issue from the Islamic republics. What the Iranians are trying to do now by tempting the administration with diplomacy towards any sort of deal is what we say in Persian Khali Bandi, which translates to wrapping empty.

They're trying to put something in an empty box and present the box. There's nothing in the box. Enrichment was already taken away. The Islamic Republic is the supplicant in this position. It is trying to use diplomacy to buy time to increase its leverage to not be the supplicant. Anything that the Islamic Republic does not give away at the negotiating table, President Trump has to clearly say, and I think our force posture is positioning us to say, that which you do not surrender peacefully at the negotiating table will be militarily taken away from you at the battlefield, much like enrichment was. And this should be the logic governing talks. I don't necessarily see that being the case,

but the kind of agreement that I fear that might be slightly more defensible than a TJCFOA, or I could say have qualms with, is one that merely takes the status quo that is kind of politically the modus operandi in D.C. And politically the modus operandi in Tehran and transposes that on paper and draws on the logic that got us

into the first round of early Soviet-American arms control, which is not to solve the problem, but merely regulate the competition. And I feel like the forces who crafted the JCPOA and the new kind of interlocutors, mediators, might be using all their muscle last minute, try to get this sort of an agreement. And therefore, I wanted to ring the alarm bell on that. The history of regime change by air power alone is a history with zero cases, I think, strictly constructed. There are a few near cases.

You could, everyone tends to point to Milosevic at the end of the 90s, but there's actually pretty substantial delay between the bombing campaign regarding Serbia and Kosovo and his downfall. Libya is another one you hear, but, you know, of course, there was a very substantial ground component of Libyan fighters who did not care for more than Mar-Marcoffi and changed the regime themselves. You know the Iranian people probably better than most commentators in Washington, D.C. What would it take to get the critics of the regime who are a legion, even though tens of thousands seem to have been killed in January. What would it take them to take action again? What would what would have to happen in the air campaign to create meaningful risk to the regime

on the streets of Iran from its own people? This is an excellent question, Aaron, that talks at both the headstrings and the heartstrings of why I'm in this business. Listen, I actually asked a East Coast-based dissident who has family in Iran who actually were protesting at the height of the protest, the 8th and the 9th of January, and thankfully they survived. But I said, what is it going to take after that massive crackdown for your folks to get back on the street again? What are they looking for? What are the signs? Because everybody in Iran, all eyes are trained on the skies.

That's not because they think that it's just deliverance and done. That's because they want Washington to act on what it promised to help again level the playing field. I think the three cases with respect, you know, let me just put that to the side. I think Japan is one worth adding. But obviously, that was nuclear weapons and the potential threat of a land invasion by the Soviet. There's other ways to square the circle on Milosevic. I don't mind a political gap between the end of the bombing and the change of the government, as we saw in Yugoslavia.

In fact, we had a six-month gap between the 12-day war and the protests that were ignited here. So I don't mind necessarily political gaps in the cases between the end of the bombing and the start of the political activity. And obviously, Libya, there was a major ground game, but it didn't turn out anywhere as well as we would have liked. But I don't think that discounts this as an option. Because when I asked this individual and then I began to go back through and look at the statements, the slogans, and just the sheer bravery of the Iranian population, being willing to go out unarmed

against this regime. And just for the past two or three days on major university campus in cities like Tehran and Mashad, you have had Iranians turn out again on the 40-day commemoration to mourn those killed on January 8th and January 9. And this is a population that saw 36,000 to 43,000 killed. and again are turning out unarmed, admittedly in much smaller numbers, but that just gets at this larger ember. And so again, when I ask this individual, what is it going to take for your folks?

Again, not to push, but just I asked, what are they looking for? What would Trump have to do to make it safer for your folks to get back on the streets? He said, to make the security forces, and this is the exact word, Ashonash. Asholash is colloquialism for minceme.

to basically tear apart the state. That would be the sign. So, yes, we have a defanging mission. We have a suppression or destruction of enemy air defenses. We have a counterproliferation mission. But what must be foisted on for the population to see that this time it's different, is a counter-regime mission that targets the institutions in a very public way, whether or not you get Hamid, destroying the Supreme Leader's office,

destroying the office of the presidency, going after allegedly what the New York Times reported, which is these multiple different chains of command that Hamid has created, going after the political elite in that country. These are bitter and difficult things to say, but these are things that the population is looking forth to get back onto the street. Destroying a missile base in Yazd doesn't help you get protesters in Tehran,

but targeting a local law enforcement office in Vakilabad in Mashad can get protests back in Vakilabad and Mashat. that people are looking for how localized the change in the balance of power is and thereby cutting the chain of command between the IRGC, the ground forces, the besiege, which is the all-volunteer paramilitary in the ground forces, the law enforcement forces, which is the national police, plus the special units of those law enforcement forces, plus the vigilante groups like Ansar Hezbollah, plus the foreign Shia militias, like the four Iraqi ones that have crossed into Iranian territory in January. These are what must be targeted. You can target

the bases, you can target the command posts, you can target the training centers, but to render and cleave apart and drill down. Yes, the aracination is necessary, but it is not sufficient to drill down to level one, two, three, four of the command of these different security forces to be able to foster at that mid to lower level because of coup proofing in these systems and because of the kind of the inability to organize at this mid to lower level and because of the lack of capability at this mid to lower level, to be able to pave the pathway for Iranian protest to be married with American air power such that the incentive for individual survival trumps the training and trumps the cohesion of these security forces, where you get firepower

strategically from the air, which potentially could be amended to be drones, could be close air support, could be cruise missiles, rather than, you know, major bombardments through planes, married with street power, to get the Islamic Republic in the thing it fears most, which is that pincer. And I actually think political signs that Washington is not just

to encounter proliferation, that it's not just doing defanging, could get the population on the street and keep them on the street in a big way. It's a gamble, but I think there is no way out but through at this point. Leaving a regime standing like this,

47 years later, when it's at its weakest point and continues to retain This anti-American, anti-Israeli, and also anti-Iranian ideology in this position is fundamentally not charity for the Iranian people. This is not missionary work. This is something in the U.S. national interest to extinguish the arsonist behind the many fires in the Middle East that have kept pulling us back in and back in and back in. So I know the empirics and the theory on the front end do not look good, but I think this is a creative and clever combination to take advantage of the mood on the street. and to work with rather than against the social forces in the region.

Ben-Ben-Benthalibu, Senior Director of the Iran program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, I'm always impressed by your fluency and command of the information involved in this very complicated, very longstanding tension between the United States and Iran and regarding the regime itself. And I hope you'll come back as this situation continues to develop. Thank you so much for coming on School of War. Thank you. An honor.