School of War - Ep 48: Ian Beckett on the Anglo-Zulu War

Episode Date: November 8, 2022

Ian Beckett, professor emeritus of military history at the University of Kent and author of Rorke’s Drift and Isandlwana, joins the show to talk about the two most famous battles of the Anglo-Zulu War. ▪️ Times  • 01:58 Introduction • 02:22 British interests in Zululand  • 06:52 The Zulu system • 09:55 The British plan   • 13:12 The horns of the buffalo • 16:49 Isandlwana • 26:44 Innate warriors • 29:14 Aftermath • 33:18 Movies and myths • 42:11 Rorke’s Drift  • 48:38 Firepower wins out • 53:56 A western way of war?

Scarlet coats and Crash of the Band, the gray of a Popper's Gown, a soldier's grave in Zuland, and a woman in Breckentown. My little lad for a soldier boy, mother's a Breckon Town. My eyes for tears and his for joy when he went from Breckon Town. His for the flags and the gallant sights, his for the medals and his for the fights, and mine for the dreary, rainy nights, at home in Breckon Town. They say he's laid beneath a tree. come back to Breckentown.

Shouldn't I know I was there to see? It's far to Breckentown. It's me that keeps it trim and dressed, with a briar there and a rose by his breast. The English flowers he likes the best that I bring from Breckentown. And I sit beside him, him and me. We're back to Breckon Town.

To talk of the things that used to be, gray ghosts of Breckon Town. I know the look of the land in sky and the bird that builds in the tree nearby, In times I hear the jackals cry, and me in Breckon Town. Golden gray on miles of sand, the dawn comes creeping down. It's day in far off Zulu land, and night in Brecon Town. That's the poem Ascendalwana by John McCray.

Let's talk about the Zulu Wars. It is a prescription for war, this Iraqi invasion of Hawaii. December 7, 1941, a date which will live. in infamous. The bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stale. We continue to face a grave situation in Iran. We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds,

we shall fight in the fields and in the streets. We shall never surrender. I am Aaron McLean. Thanks for joining the School of War. I'm delighted to be joined today by Professor Ian F.W. Beckett, who is Professor Emeritus of Military History at the University of Kent. He is the author of numerous books, most recently, works, drift, and Asandawana. And it occurred to me, I should probably double-checked my pronunciation of these things before we began.

The production growing up in the United States, there's not the same, I think, cultural exposure to the Zula Awards as the UK. So forgive me in advance if I hang on any of the African names. Is Andwaan, there is fine. Okay, I was in the neighborhood. I was in the neighborhood. If you would, let's give a bit of context. We're going to obviously spend the episode talking about the events of Vatel 1979 in these two battles, linked battles in particular. But what are the British doing in the

19th century, second half of the 19th century in South Africa? What is their interest in what, I suppose, is known as Zulu land at the time? Okay, right. Well, essentially, it's a matter of the route to India. And Britain had seized the Cape of Good Hope from the Dutch in 1806, primarily because it's on the route to India. So it's a matter of sort of imperial security. And then, It was a Dutch colony, so there was an Afrikaner population. They're pretty much trekked away, as they say, from British rule in the 1820s, established these two independent republics, the Orange Free State and Transvaal, which is Transvaal is sometimes called the South African Republic, north of the Orange River and the Valle.

And because of the concerns for India, because the Afrikaner communities were, going, beginning to go into Natal, which is on the kind of the southeast coast of southern Africa. Britain annex that in 1843. And then there was this idea that because you've got this fragmented collection of white colonies, Afrikaner colonies and the two British ones, that that was, that was a danger, really. Particularly it might lead also to the intervention of other European powers. and Britain took the, that had a plan for what was called Confederation. So it wanted to unite all four of the white colonies in South Africa under British control.

And at the same time, it also perceived that there was a threat to security generally from independent African kingdoms, such as the Zulu. Britain took the opportunity to a next transfowl in 1877. What happened was that the transvaal fought a war against another African people, the Bipidi, which they, effectively lost. And the Transfowl bankrupted itself. So Britain took the opportunity to annex it in 1877. Now, by annexing the Transvaal, Britain inherited an existing border dispute between the Burrs and the Zulu. And the man who was the High Commissioner in South Africa, a man caused Henry Bartle Freer, again saw this as an opportunity in a sense to kill two birds who run stone by neutralizing the Zulu threat as well. So he organized a border commission in 1878 to adjudicate between the Boer and the Zulu

claims to the territory on the western part of Zulu land, eastern part of the transvault. Much to his horror, the border commission found in favor of the Zulus. So they then manufactured a crisis. There had been a number of border incidents and Freer manipulated these incidents to present an ultimatum to the Zulu. And the whole idea was to neutralise the Zulu kingdom, which was a powerful African kingdom. And at the same time, if you neutralize the Zulu, you would also persuade the Afrikaans in the Transvaal that it was in their best interest to come under British protection. Because already there were misgivings in the Transfail. But it ended up in 1881, there was a rising against the British, which we call the First

Burr War or the Transfail War, Ango Transfail War. So it's all connecting in a sense to the idea of British security of the route to India. And I suppose in the sort of style of the times, the ultimatum that was issued was full of terms that were basically unacceptable to the Zulu. Absolutely, yes. In effect, I mean, in effect, the main sticking points, I mean, there were cattle fines and things like that. But the sticking point was the demand that the entire Zulu military system be dismantled. And the whole of Zulu polity is unconstitutional. depends on this military system that had been evolved since really about 1828.

The Zulu is a sort of a nation in arms, you could argue, in a European sense. But by striking the whole basis of that and demanding that that be dismantled, then it would totally undermine the Zulu policy. So there was no way in which the Zulu were going to accept that ultimatum. Let's talk about the Zulu system, if we could, for a few minutes. What is their military system? What is distinctive about the Zulu nation compared to other prominent African nations of the day? Well, it's not unlike other Banu peoples.

And it's kind of a series of age regiments. So when a boy is born, he grows up within a kind of a regiment, which they call Amurtho. And they're based on a cohorts of age. And they, in a sense, owe their loyalty to the king until they are about 40, 40 years old. They cannot even marry, for example, until the king decrees that that particular regiment can marry. And for much of the year, these regiments, it's a sort of a nation in ours, but it's not actually a standing army per se, because for most of the year, these regiments are at homesteads throughout Zulu land.

They're cultivating crops. They're looking after the king's cattle. and all the cattle belong to the king. And they are only summoned, you know, sort of once a year for kind of an annual ceremony. And then they dispersed the homesteads again. So there is a certain misunderstanding on the British part of the nature of that system. It's not that Freire describes, you know, that Keshweo, who is the Zulu king, as having 40,000 manslaying gladiators,

a senibut manslaying gladiators available to him. It's not quite that at all. So there's a basic misunderstanding of the system. Nonetheless, if you dissolve the regiments and order the regiments, then the whole of the economy of Zulu Lam, which is based on the system, is dissolved, and the king's authority goes with it. And I assume that this regimental system, the sort of political order that you've described is probably all tied up with, you know, essentially religious beliefs on the part of the Zulu. It wasn't just a sort of bloodless way of maintaining self-defense, but this went back a while? It's not really akin to religion. There is a sort of a system whereby, in terms of making

war, then the Zulu have a system whereby it prioritizes, for example, the use of handheld weapons. I mean, firearms are available in Zulu land, although they're fairly, they're often percussion muskets. They're not modern firearms. Only very few modern firearms have reached through your land. And the whole Zulu kind of system, it depends on honor and, you know, closing, very close, getting into hand-to-hand combat with your opponent. So it's all, the system in many ways of space is a kind of honor system.

It's not really a religion as such. Okay. Okay. So the ultimatum is issued. It's December of 78. And then. Yeah. of December 1878.

So what is the plan? What is the operating concept of the Brits as they march off into Zulu territory? Well, there's an assumption, of course, that this is going to be just a walkover, like many other colonial wars have been. And the British Mother-in-Chief was Lieutenant General Lord Chelmsford. And the plan is to divide, is to invade Zulu land with three out of five columns. The other two are columns in reserve. And he decides that he would go with what's called the central number two column.

And all these columns in effect are going to converge on what is seen to be Tesweo's main. It's not in the sense of capital in the European sense, but it's his main homestead, which is what was then called Yolandi, and these days is called Ondini. So the idea is that all the three columns will converge, one from the north, one from the south, one from the west. The Zulu will be drawn into an open battle, therefore British firepower will prevail. And that fits very much into the Zulu intention as well, because Keshweo understands that, you know, if he can inflict a defeat on the British, then they might be prepared to negotiate. He is always actually prepared to negotiate from the very beginning.

There is a sort of a peace party within the Zulu policy, though it's not a very prominent one, includes some of Kesheyeo's own half-brothers. So Kesheweo wants a battle, and so do the British. And as the British invade, the intention is also to destroy crops, to sieve livestock, and to burn the homesteads, because the timing of the invasion is actually very, very carefully worked out because it's the, just the start of, it would be the, time of year, the invasion is scheduled for January, it would be the time of year when the Zulu should be actually planting crops. So by invading that time, they're not able to do that.

At the same time, the rivers would be relatively high because of recent rains. So that would mean that it would be less easy for the Zulu to, in the sense, stage some kind of counter-invasion into Natal, which was a fear on the part of certainly the colonists in Natal. So it's very well-timed, and both sides in the sense want a battle in the open. And the British obviously thought that this was going to pleasure their strengths, but as it happens, this did not prove to be the case. I expect most listeners could probably picture what one of these British columns looked like more or less in the second half of the 19th century,

transitional technological moment between the era of the Civil War and Crimea, on the one hand, and the First World War on the other. But how did the Zulu actually fight? What was their sort of their tactical concept, if you will? Okay, well, it's called the horns of the buffalo. And what you have is you have, it's hard to describe without showing you a diagram. Well, of course, there's a great scene in the movie. You can see the horns on the cattle, on the steer.

So the left and the right of that are the sort of the flanking groups. and then you have the sort of the bitware. And the idea is that the left and the right wings will surge forward and encircle your opponent and draw them into what they call the loins, which is the main part of the Zulu army. And then you've got another section, which is the reserve behind that. So it had been very effective, certainly against other African peoples in the past. And as it proved, it was relatively successful against the British as well.

But again, the whole idea is to insert your opponent draw them in, but to get to close quarters with them. The British, in theory, hoped to stand back and just use firepower to destroy the Zulus. I mean, Chelmsford had fought against, there had been a war against the COSA, which had finished in 1878. And the COSA broadly familiar tactics, but they had easily been dispersed by British firepower. So there was this overconfidence that Zulu would fight pretty much in the same way. And if anything, though Chelmsford's issues a pamphlet on how the Zulus are likely to fight, it's almost in the sense that he doesn't either believe what he's been told or what he's actually read, that therefore they're just going to come on in a great mass and they'll be shot down.

But the Zulu tactics were a little bit more sophisticated than that. They said they do have firearms, though they don't tend to actually use them. And the one thing which you could say for the Zulu is that they, because they are so anxious to press an attack in the face of enormous firepower, is that the casualties that they suffer, Adiz And Juana and some of the other battles, are quite horrendous because they keep pressing forward to try to engage in hand-to-hand tactics. And for very particular circumstances, it is Anduana, they were able to succeed in a way that, for example, where Rorke's Drift, there was an improvised defense with mealy bags and biscuit boxes and wagons, they weren't able to penetrate that defense, even though they were a much larger force than the defenders of Rorke's Drift. And the argument goes that if the British undertaken more defensive preparations, it is Andrana, then that might not have gone the way that he did. Am I crazy to draw a comparison between the basic Zulu formation that you just described and is vividly described in that wonderful scene in the movie Zulu by the, I suppose the Boer officer who shows up,

helps Michael Cain out in a pinch? Am I crazy to draw a comparison between that? formation. And isn't this essentially what Hannibal is famous for? It's the center that draws you in and then you're in trouble on your flanks? Yes, I think that's a very fair analogy, yes. It's funny the sort of, you know, basic warfighting logic that underlies. I mean, it's unlike, I don't want to say, but it seems to me unlikely that Jesuea made a study of Roman warfare. No, I don't think so. But, you know, sort of intuitive the logic of the thing. I think that's very fair analogy.

So off we are on these columns marching into Zulu territory, hoping for a quick work of it, the Brits. So how do things, let's set the stage a bit for the 22nd of January. How do things go so horribly wrong? Well, I said the column down in the south, that goes fine, and the column up in the north similarly. But Chelmsford, as I said earlier, is the main column.

and they crossed the border on 11th of January. And Isandwana appears to be a very suitable site for a camp. In theory, when you look at if you've been, you know, for those perhaps who've been to his Andrwara, there's a mountain and then there's a broad plane in front of it. What that tends to disguise is the many water courses, sort of dry water courses that run through it. So it's not a flat plane. There are lots of areas where anybody could be. you know, could be concealed or rather could not be fired upon directly. So Chelmsford

establishes his camp at his Anduana on the 20th of January. And there were reports that Zulus had been seen to the southeast. Now that's the direction of Yolundi, which is the main homestead, a direction in which they would be going. And Chelmsford expected in a sense to find Zulus to the south. east. So what he then, he sent out some colonial forces, colonial volunteers, and what's also called the Natal Native contingent, who are African auxiliaries, who are mostly drawn from Africans who are hostile to the Zulu. And he sent out on the 21st of January, a fairly large force of African auxiliaries and colonial volunteers in that direction. And the man who commanding that was a man, I should notice, that they go out and they encounter groups of Zulu.

So instead of returning to Zandrather, they camp out there for the night. And in the early hours of the 22nd January, having received this report that Zulu had indeed been encountered, Chelmsford decides to divide his force still further. and he takes out just over half of the men who are left in the camp. And that leaves in the camp, in effect, five companies of the first battalion of the 24th foot, one company of the second battalion of the 24th foot, plus elements of the Natal Native contingent, and also some more mounted colonial volunteers.

And marches off in the pre, just before dawn, pre-dawn darkness, to reinforce this other group under Dart. That's the man, Dart. And so they march off. They go off about 3, 4 a.m. And he leaves in the camp, which he thinks is perfectly adequately guarded. These six companies of British infantry, plus these colonial volunteers, plus the Africans. And he also knew that in the course of the morning, what was called number three column,

which is in reserve, he's going to come into the camp, commanded by man called Anthony Dernford, who was a royal engineer. And Dernford's column, a smallish column, consists of more Natal Native contingent and more colonial volunteers. And they arrived at about 10, 30, 11 a.m. And we're not, because watches don't all agree at this time. So there is, in the end, there's about 1,700 men left in the camp. Now, from the early hours of the morning, further reports that come in from Vizettes, scouts out on the plane, due east of Vizalwana, that, again, there were Zulus out there.

And it's very clear that the main Zulu army, which is about 20,000 men, so considerably more than in either of the two halves of Chelmson's force, had been sent by Keshojo to deal with that column because it was the one he recognized as it was accompanied by Chelmsford, and that was the one that if he defeated it or blunted it, would be most likely to lead to a negotiation. Now, the Zulus had very carefully concealed their approach. There is a lot of dispute over exactly where the Zulu army counts,

on the night of the 21st, 22nd of January. And there is some dispute over whether they actually intended to attack on the 22nd of January because it's a day the dead moon, the eclipse of the sun is due. And that's sort of a bad omen. Having said that, there's an action that takes place in the south of Zulu land on the same day. But generally speaking, what happens is a patrol from the camp comes across the main Zulu army, supposedly all sitting down in the valley. And once, of course, they've been seen, the whole lot moves forward. So the man who's left in command of the camp is a man called

Henry Pulleen, and Dernford technically is his senior officer. But Palline has been told to defend the camp. Dernford decided in the light of these reports that he would take out his column onto the plane to see what was going on. And he sends up particularly. sends other patrols up onto the heights, which are to the north of Izandwana, northeast of his Andrana. And one of those patrols is the patrol that comes across the Zulu Army, just sitting down. So then the whole thing breaks out.

Pauline sent, he's got these six companies of infantry, and he sends four of them effectively out from the camp, keeps the other two back for the time being. and there's no expectation that any problems are likely to arise from this. Messengers are then sent off across the plane to Chownsford. He receives several messages during the course of the day, all of which he ignores because he cannot believe that the Zulu army is attacking the camp. And it's a question of sheer weight of numbers in a way.

The British, there's what has since become clear from accounts that have now been discussed, Robert is that not everybody in the camp is set into the firing line. Many of the men are actually packing up the camp because the expectation is they will follow Chelmsford in the direction of Yolundi the following day. So the firing line is actually very dispersed. And although they put down a considerable firepower from what's called the Martini Henry, which is a very good breach loading rifle, there's a single shot breach loader, much the way that Springfield, they're used by, say, Custer and the 7th Cavary is a single-shot breach loader as well.

And for a long, long period of time, the firing line holds. Meanwhile, Dernford is off across the plane, and he encounters the rest of the Zulu army heading straight for him. He has to withdraw to what's called a Donga, which is a dry river course. And his ammunition supply is relatively limited. Now, there's another big controversy about whether or not the ammunition supply on the firing line failed. It perhaps did not. But these colonial volunteers have much less ammunition. So progressively out on the plane, Dernford and his colonial volunteers are forced back onto the camp.

And at one point, when they are, that particular group, are running low of ammunition and they start to retreat, then the Zulus rise up. And Dernford is on the right flank of the British defending line. Most of the British infantry is well to the left. And in effect, Dernford's subsequent last retreat in this section enables the Zulus to infiltrate between his force and the British. So they're outflanked. At the same time, because of this nature of the horns, Dernford is confronting the left horn of the Zulu army. and the British infantry are confronting the main loins, but there's also the right, and that's gone right around the back of his Andwana and comes into the camp from the rear.

So in effect, the British get themselves surrounded. And there are reports that there is a bugle was sounded to bring everybody back into the camp area to a much more tighter defensive formation. But once the British starts to try to do that, the Zulu is a lot faster on foot than the British. And it then becomes just a mass of hand-hand fighting throughout the camp area. And one of the old stories was it was the Natal native contingent, the native exiliaries that their collapse brought about the collapse of the British fire line.

That's not the case at all. it's a general pressure of numbers. So if you've got, in effect, 20,000 Zulus and most 1,700 men, not all of whom are in the farming line, then that pretty much explains the defeat. Can I ask, before we get to the afterpath, can I ask, in addition to their obvious valor in the fighting itself, I mean, in the face of this withering, you know, firepower, that the Zulus are extraordinarily brave fighters, there's a kind of operational excellence in what you describe. I mean, extraordinary mobility and stealth and sound decision-making.

You know, it seems like is a good plan well-executed or improvised well-improvised. You know, what can you talk? I'm just curious, you know, there are no, there are no staff colleges, there are no training depots, right? There's none of this stuff that would allow a Western Army of the day or today to achieve these same ends. How are the Zulus able to fight so well, and not just fighting the sense of fighting, but fighting the sense of operating. They do have some experienced commanders. A man called Chin Shueo is the man who's generally in charge of the Zulu army, the Zulu impute, is Andrana.

And one thing which I think is important is that most, before a battle, the Zulus had to be ritually prepared for a battle. Now again, there is a dispute as to how far that had been undertaken because of the suddenness with which they had been discovered by the British patrol. And it seems that probably only the reserve was doctored in that sense by the sort of medicine men, the which doctors. So, to a very large degree, you're absolutely right. It's almost instinctive.

I mean, they were well trained, they were well drilled. They had not fought a European army. They had never fought a European army. They had come across the Burrs. They were in isolated battles, but they had not fought the Burr since 1838. And the only real significant battle in which Zulu had been engaged were back in 1856 when Kesheyo defeated one of his own brothers. But they are so very well drilled and trained in these particular tactics,

which have been long evolved within the Zulu polity, it goes back to Shaka, who was the great Zulu leader from about 1818 through to 1828, age and 28, 89. What can say is almost instinctive. And there are these stories of the Zulus sort of going to grab. I mean, when the British do have two six-pound artillery pieces. And the accounts suggest they soon realized that when the gun was stood back from the

artillery, the gun was about to fire, and therefore they went flat. So, you know, there's a lot of instinctive military skills, which I think they undoubtedly show, but they do take horrendous casualties. But, you know, are courageous enough to press the attack despite that. And what is the ultimate consequence at Dissanda want to talk about what happens towards the end of the fighting? Well, roughly around about 800 of the defenders are killed. It's the largest single days lost by the British Army between 1857 and 1914. 1857 is the star of the Indian mutiny. It has a tremendous impact in Britain because of the sheer scale of loss. There are, in addition, somewhere about 300 African exiginalries are killed,

three to 400. Only 55 Europeans escape from his Anderrana. And of those, only five are regular officers. And it's, Keshweo supposedly had told his sort of commanders that it's the red coats who have to be disposed of. And as it happens, the five regular officers who were wearing blue patrol jackets. They weren't wearing, you know, traditional red of the infantry. They were all in staff positions. They were in their, in their blue patrols. The Zulus probably lose in somewhere around 3 to 4,000. You know, it's a very, very high death toll. The Zulu Reserve had not been engaged at this Anduadwana.

So that's somewhere between 3 and 4,000 men. And they sweep on. Those who try to escape go down what's called fugitives' trail towards the Buffalo River, which is in flood. And therefore, it's very difficult for those, the survivors to get across the river and what's now called fugitive's drift. They're pursued by the Zulus who are in action, Adisanduana. But the reserve goes off and goes towards Natal

and is able by linking arms to cross the river a little bit further away from fugitive's drift. And then Keshuea had told his commanders that they should not invade Natal, that they should keep out of Natal because that would give them. Again, there's very much this sense in which he wants to appear that the independent party, which in many of the vegetables, he was.

It's very against his wishes. Most of this reserve three, four thousand men, a name of Dabalazi, who's one of his half-brothers, sweeps on to into the town, presumably to lift cattle. And then they come across the isolated post of Rourke's Drift, which appears to be, no, very thinly defended, and therefore that's attacked. Some other groups of Zulus did raid into Natal.

They all withdrew subsequently, as indeed did, those who attacked walks drift. So it undermines the whole, of course, British plan. There can be no easy victory. Reinforcements had to be rushed out. Chelmsford, the column in the south, once he heard about his Andwana, immediately hauled up and plays got a shoddard.

showy, waited for relief, and though it wasn't actually very closely besieged. Chelmsford relieves a showy in May, but he doesn't undertake a second invasion until June. And then ultimately that does succeed in defeating the Zulus at Yolongda in July. But this defeat had been an enormous shock to the British. They're not used to. This does not happen in terms of defeats against indigenous peoples. The only comparison really was that there was a battle in the second Afghan war, My Wand, in 1880, in which another British and Indian force was defeated, where it's again, the losses of nothing

like the same scale as Zandwana. Let's talk about Rourke's drift for a minute, which in terms of its scale, I suppose, is not quite on the same level as Zandwala, but it certainly has a cultural impact that's, you know, as significant. And I can, I will confess, in preparation for recording this, I watch the moon. movie, the Michael Kane, Zulu, which I had never seen, you know, growing up in the States in the 80s, the 90s, it's not, I'd not come across it. And it was, I have to say, it was, it was fantastic. It was, it occurred to me as I was watching it that I've seen so many parts of

it before because so many later films and shows are, I mean, Black Hawk Down is essentially a remake of Zulu. I mean, it's got the same exact structure, the same exact themes. And I'm sure that Scott, the director of Black Hawk Down had Zulu in mind when he was constructing Blackhawk down. But so, well, maybe a good way to start here is it, is it from a perspective of military history, is it worth watching or is it all fantasy or, you know, what's your view? Yeah, I mean, it's somewhat inaccurate. It's, the funny thing is that the Zulu War was almost forgotten in Britain by the so middle of the 1880s. There are other things which are in the press.

There's the Second Afghan War. There's the Anglo-Transvail War. There's actually the invasion of Egypt in 1882, Gordon and Carl 2. There are many more things that fill people's minds very quickly. So it's almost forgotten for almost 50 years. And then when the film comes out, which is 1964, suddenly everybody's aware again of the Zulu War. And a lot of, I suppose including myself to some extent,

but a lot of people who have written on the Zulu War began to get interested because they saw Zulu. And so in a way, that has had a very important cultural aftermath. In terms of the battle itself, it was used at the time very much to offset the defeat. So by playing up the defensive war's drift, thereby it sort minimizes the disaster that taken place at its Anduana. So is Anduanas 22nd of January? And the defensive walks drift is 22nd, to 23rd. It goes over into the only hours of the 23rd. And on the face of it, you know, 139 men, many of whom are hospital patients

fight off 3 to 4,000 Zulu and therefore an awful lot of emphasis you put on that in Britain, in the press, in the gallantry and so on. Eleven Victoria crosses are awarded for the defence rewards drift, which again is pretty unprecedented. There was one occasion in the crime in war

when more were sort of given. But for that was for a battle, it spread over about three days. So it's played up for a very particular purpose in Britain at the time. And in a way, the impact of that is there that revives in the 1960s in a curious kind of way. And there's a lot of, a lot is still made of the film Zulu in Britain, in one way or another. It turns up in adverts, no little bits of it turn up in adverts or allusions to it turn up in adverts.

It's still something that arouses a degree of controversy in many circles. Some people are uncomfortable with some of the underlying themes of Zulu. And it's actually, there is a kind of an idea, it's in a curious kind of way. On the one hand, it looks back to some of the great imperial epics of Alexander Corder in the late 1930s, the drum, four feathers and so on. On the other hand, it very much looks forward to the 1960s. So Henry Hook is portrayed as this kind of, I suppose,

60s rebel, the drunk. Paul Newman would have played him if we're in American movies. The real Henry Hook was actually a Toto floe, who ended up as a guard at the British Museum. Or, you know, there's this class antagonism between Chard and Bromhead, played by Michael Kane and in the case of Bromhead. And members of Siff, who plays Charles?

He's, I'll look it up, he's known as famous as Michael Cain, but, I mean, I'll look it up. You keep going, I'll look it up. Yeah. So, you know, it keeps coming back in many ways. Oh, it's Baker, Stanley Baker. Stanley Baker, so is. Curiously enough, actually, you have that allusion to the Star Wars stuff. The idea of Welshmen singing the sort of men of Harlick as the hordes approach actually came from a western called Apache drums, where you've got these Welsh miners who are holed up and sing men of Harlech just before the Apatis are attached.

attack. So that's taken from that. It's not taken from history. There was it, but there is a substantial Welsh role or Welsh contingent, correct? Or is that also, is that you're indicating less than less so? It's a bit of remiss that. I said there's a hundred thirty-nine defenders. And the, the bulk of the defenders are B company of the Second Battalion in the 24th foot, commanded by Gonville Bromhead, John Charles Royal Engineer, who happens to be at Rorke's drift to build ponds across the river. A lot of work's been done on this now. And the 24th foot in 1881, two years later, there's a process called territorialisation, whereby regiments are given

county designations in Britain. That's in 1881. And the 24th foot is designated as the South Wales borderers in 1881. But in 1879, it's the second Warwickshire regiment. Having said that, the depot of the regiment had been established at Brecon in Wales in 1873. So you do get, you're beginning to get more Welsh recruitment into the second battalion, not the first battalion, the first battalion had been out in India for a long time. and in the end it comes down about of 139.

Some people reckon that as few as maybe 10 are actually genuinely Welsh. Usually it's reckoned to be around about 30-ish. And that includes men who have been born in Monmouthshire, which is often regarded as a Welsh county, but actually was part of England at the time. So it's something of a myth that they're all Welsh. but Stanley Baker, who produces the film, is a very proud Welshman. And you guess his mate Richard Burton to do the opening and the closing narration. So it's very much a kind of celebration of Welshness.

And then the reality was rather different. Actually, technically, there were more Irishmen at Gawkes Drist than there were Welshmen. We journalists have an expression, too good to check. New historians are always going off and checking. So I want to get us off the movie and get to what actually happened. But one more, just one last, I apologize, please indulge me. The wonderful drama between Michael Cain's aristocratic character and Stanley Baker's more down-to-ear officer. Is there any reality to that? Well, they were not as young as they were portrayed in the movie.

They were both well into their 30s. They were both professional soldiers. There's no evidence that Chard was any less aristocratic than Bromhead, it's very much played up for purposes of the film. And neither, most certainly neither, there's that moment at the end of the film after the Zulus have disappeared, and they're looking in the sort of the burning ruins of the hospital. And they're ashamed of what they've done.

Well, neither Bromhead or Chard would subscribe to those kind of ideals in the 1818. 70s, 1880s. So it's not really a reflection of reality because most of the British officer corps, be the engineers or infantrymen, were aristocratic background. Engineers tended to be better educated than infantry officers. It's a more technical arm. And artillery and engineer officers are both trained at World Military Academy Woolwich, whereas infantry cavalry officers go to World Military college Sandhurst. And you do need a more technical education,

a more technical background to become either an artillery or an engineer officer. But broadly similar, the officer called Victorian Army is very much the same as Landy Gentry, aristocracy generally. There are, I mean, in a sense, there are middle class officers in a way,

but the Victorian middle class subscribed so so greatly to the idea or to the aristocracy than for all practical purposes there's no real difference between them so it's later in the day on the 22nd the troops at Sandoahua have been defeated the British troops

there's been this sort of ritual desecration of the dead things have not gone well for the British and how does news trickle in to Rourke's drift and how does the preparation of the defence actually go Well, it was not a pan until the middle of the afternoon. And you start to get fugitives from his Andwana, who are coming past Rourke's drift. As I said earlier, the Zulu is that those who had fought at the battle had pursued the British who tried to escape down to the Buffalo River. And some of the colonial volunteers, including this chap called Aitendorf, supposedly, rides past Rorke's drift.

one of the five imperial officers who'd escaped, Alan Gardner, once he's on the right side of the buffalo, pens a note to Rourke's Drift. So around about sort of 2.30, 3 o'clock, it's becoming clear that something has gone wrong. Now, behind Rourke's Drift, you have a very large hill called the Oskarberg, Shignani is the proper name.

And when these reports start to come in, they do send up scouts up to the top of the hill to look. And it then becomes apparent, so 3.30, that there are clearly Zulus coming towards Borks Drift. So Chard and Bromhead take the advice of two, you have what's called the Commissariat Corps. And this is the transport corps. and two of the commissaries are former NCOs. So they're former regular soldiers who've joined the commissary corps subsequently. And they were both more experienced soldiers than Charg or Bromhead. One was called Dunn.

And they, in a sense, advise Chard and Bromhead that you're not going to outrun the Zulus, particularly if you try to put the sick in the hospital. There's about, I say 139 defenders, about 20 or so of those are actually sick in the hospital. You're not going to outrun the Zulus. So therefore, your best option is to put the post into a stage of defence. So Dalton's, you have on, Dolphin and Dunn. So they improvise, they bring in some wagons, shown as it's shown very much in the movie, actually. Biscuit boxes, sacks and mealy's, maize, and they improvise this defensive perimeter.

and there's a particular, the reason why the Zulus aren't able to get into it is one, they come piecemeal, they don't all arrive at once. Secondly, they have been on the move since the early hours of the morning. They arrive, and they've run most of the way, they arrive at Rorke's Drift, exhausted, and around much of the perimeter, there is actually a rocky ledge. And when you've put the biscuit boxes and the mealy bags on top of the, that ledge, then actually makes quite a high wall. And the Zulus have a short stabbing spear, and the British have what's called the Lunger, which is a baynet that fits on the end of the

martini Henry, which is quite a long baylet. And actually, the British have a greater reach with the baynets stuck on the end of the rifle than the Zulus have with their Asagai's short stabbing spear. So given the extra height of the defenses in many places, it's exceptionally difficult for the Zulus to get in. So they do make a significant, you know, a series of piecemeal attacks. They do, they do have firearms, but again, there's this myth that they, they use Martini Henry Breachloaders captured as Andrana. They don't. As far as we can tell, they are firing down from the Oscarberg into the perimeter, but they're firing old percussion muskets.

So although there are casualties caused by Zulu firepower, it's not the danger that there's sometimes suggested as it is. So the Zulus keep attacking in piecemeal, and they keep getting thrown back. The most serious part is when they get into, The, Rourke's drift is a hospital, a house that's been made into a hospital, and it's a storeroom. And you've linked, around the perimeter, you've linked the hospital and the storeroom with these improvised walls. And the most dangerous time is towards the sort of evening, 9, 10pm, when the Zulus are able to break into the hospital.

and the British, again, as shown in the movie, actually, the British dig their way through the walls, get the hospital, most of the hospital patients out, and then retreat across the yard, and they've got another line of defences that they've already put, you know, midway along the yard. And so the Zulus are simply unable to get into the defences. And they, in the,

end, the last significant attack is about 4 a.m. and then they just disappear. And again, probably we're talking about 5 to 600 Zulu debt. And the British have, I think, as I recall, 17 debt. So, you know, you're not fighting in the open. You're fighting behind a prepared defense, such as it is, but it's effective in us. The Zulu simply couldn't get over it. Yeah. Yeah. And at a level of preparation. those few hours to become, as it were, serious about the challenge that you face, as opposed to what had happened earlier in the day, where there does seem to be a bit of a lack of seriousness in the hours preceding.

Yeah. Well, so there is this argument. If instead of having your firing line extended, it is Androa, then they'd pull back and you stood shoulder to shoulder in the camp with the ammunition behind them and all the rest of it, then there's a very good chance that they would been able to see off that attack by the zero as it is Anduiluilandah. So you touched on it a little bit earlier in our conversation, but in the aftermath of the 22nd and 23rd, what are the consequences of the fighting? It seems like the Zulus are unable to really exploit the victory to political ends. But walk us through. What does Cheshweo think can do after the battle?

Well, I think he is clearly shocked by the level of casualties and said he had not wanted in any case. He had actually warned them not to attack and fall. fortified post to try to avoid that. He warned his commanders not to go into the tar. After, not only if they had significant losses, therefore, we're talking about, you know, 3,600 dead probably in the two battles. After a battle like that, the Zulus have to purify themselves. You know, that's parts of their culture, ritual culture. So they have, in effect, it would be impossible to reassemble the Zulu army for some considerable

time because they've all got to go through these purification ceremonies and all the rest of it and absorb the losses and so on. So in a sense, the immediate danger to Natal is ended, in effect, by Rort's drift, although whether there is any serious likelihood that the Zulus would invade Natal is probably not very likely. So the British, in a sense, in the military sense, have time to recover. Kesheuio does reassemble the army. and said that the number one column, which is down in the south, had to hold itself up to Shawi, and therefore it's not a danger to the Zulus. Up in the north, number four column is coming down from the Utrecht district,

which is the disputed territory between the Burrs and the Zulus. And in March, Keshweo sent his arm, had reassembled the army and sent the army against number four column. Again, there was a defeated place called Slabarne. The British were raiding cattle, and the cattle raiders get themselves caught on top of Slabar melting, have some significant losses at retreating. But they retreated to an entrenched camp at Cambula.

And on the following day, the main Zulu army attacks Kambula. And again, this is now a properly entrenched defended camp. as commanded by Evelyn Wood, and the Zulus suffer, get nowhere near coming because of the firepower. They again have horrendous casualties. So after that, there's no way in which the Zulus are going to be able to, in the longer term, win this war. Significant reinforcements come from England, as I said earlier. There's a second invasion.

It starts in June. And the Zulus, again, the last battle was at Yolundi, 4th. of July. And again, the Zulu army attacks what's a massive square formation. And they just shot down in very large numbers. So I think the Zulu options after Zandwana are relatively limited. The British have the opportunity because of the lull in operations to rebuild, reinforce, and advance again. And there was that determination because of the nation. the defeat is in Sanduan. And there was that determination, this war would be won.

Hence the reinforcements and the resources that are then sent out to South Africa. Why don't the Zulu and Kachweo put more effort into avoiding the set-piece assaults that are clearly, I mean, it's on one, it's the, if you like, it's the exception that proves the rule, you know, it's, of course there's Zulu valor, but there's also British incompetence may be too strong, but poor decision making that leads to that outcome, in general, the outcomes that happen otherwise are probably the ones you might more expect. And so it's, it's striking to me that they do kind of keep seeking these engagements where they are on the offense. Well, it comes down to the Zulu way of war. They only have one way in which they,

in a sense, no out of fight. Now, if you look at say the COSA, there had been a whole series of of wars against the Coza, in the Eastern Cape, the last one in 1878. Particularly in earlier on, the 1850s, the Coza resort to guerrilla warfare. Now, that's much more difficult for the British to combat. But that's not the Zulu way of war. It is all about, you know, getting, washing the spears, you know, killing, getting to close quarters, killing your enemy, proving your honor, and so on. So it's, it's, and they never really deviate from that.

I mean, come 1881, when the British are now going to fight the Boers, you know, who are well armed, melted, that's going to be a very different matter again. But the Zulus only have one way, one way in which they fight, and they never adapt. Other Africans do, Pesuto do, for example. Yeah, yeah, it is, it's almost, I don't, I'm speaking in broad stereotype. here. But it's almost like they, to use the Victor Davis-Hansomism, they have a bit of a Western way. I mean, they're seeking decision, right? Am I, is that, do you think that's wrong? Is there, is the warrior culture that they actually have not, not quite, I mean, I made the Hannibal observation earlier. There is something sort of Western feeling about their approach, if you

accept that sort of stereotype about a Western way of war. Well, that was a controversial book, as you know. So it was. We could talk about controversial things. He does actually use the Zulu war as an example. I seem to, I vaguely recall. Because college, culture and something, I think, is the- Yeah, Carnage and Culture. That's what we're called in this country. In this instance, yes, there is, you know, there is a very distinct Zulu way of war,

which is not likely, except on the very special circumstances, to prevail against Western Father. But I said, other African tribes, and definitely, Adapt. There's what's called the gun war in the 80s against the pursuit house. The pursuit house were very well armed. That was important weapons. This has been a fascinating conversation. I'm grateful to you for making the time. Ian Beckett, author of Rourke's Drift and Asandalwana. Much appreciate it. Okay, fine. Thank you very much. This is a nebulous media production. Find us wherever you get your podcasts.