School of War - Ep 51: Alexander Mikaberidze on Kutuzov

Episode Date: November 29, 2022

Alexander Mikaberidze, Professor of History and Ruth Herring Noel Endowed Chair at Louisiana State University in Shreveport and author of Kutuzov: A Life in War and Peace, joins the show to discuss the Russian general Kutuzov, the hero of 1812. ▪️ Times  • 00:53 Introduction • 01:31 18th century Russia  • 04:00 A young officer • 08:57 Modernization   • 12:11 Catherine’s wars • 14:30 International relations • 17:00 Shot in the head - twice • 22:11 Promotions • 29:18 Tolstoy’s take on Kutuzov • 32:32 Czar Alexander • 39:21 Austerlitz • 48:28 Grand strategy in 1812 • 57:21 Tolstoy and reality • 1:02:09 Legacy

The Russian Empire was built by men like Mikhail, Elaryanovich, Golanoshev, Kutuzov, a veteran of Russia's 18th century wars against the Ottomans, the Poles, and others, and later, and most famously of all, the architect of Russia's strategy to defeat Napoleon in 1812, Kutuzov was the warrior diplomat who epitomized the Russia of Tsar's Catherine, Paul, and Alexander. No less an authority than Tolstoy argued as much in war and peace, where Kutuzov is portrayed as a kind of quintessential Russian soul, less an actor-in-world events and more someone who achieves victory in the long run through an acceptance of the forces of history. My guest today takes a different view of the man, and I just note that this is one of my favorite

conversations we've recorded thus far on School of War. I hope you enjoy. It is a prescription for war, this Iraqi invasion of Hawaii. The bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stay on it. We continue to face a grave situation in Iran. The people who are not these buildings. We shall fight on the beaches. We shall fight on the landing grounds. We shall fight in the fields and in the streets.

We shall never surrender. Hi, I'm Aaron McLean. Thanks for joining School of War. I'm joined today by Alexander Bika Berizzi, who is a professor of history and Ruth Heron-Noel endowed chair at Louisiana State University. Shreveport. He is the author most recently of Kutuzov, A Life in War in Peace. Thanks so much for coming back on the show. Thank you so much, Aaron. It's a pleasure and enjoy to be here. Last time we talked to the Napoleonic Wars in their global context, and this time we're going to

zoom in on a figure who has a critical role to play in those wars. You paint this picture of a life that illustrates and is at the center of this, you know, essentially the second half of the 18th century Russian history into the Napoleonic War. So why don't we just talk about you know, why Kutuzov, what is the big picture significance of this man? And then I'd like to hear a little bit about the Russian world into which he was born, which is, I think, again, before, you know, those of us who understand Russia essentially from 19th century literature, I don't know a lot about mid-18th century Russia. So maybe you couldn't tell us a little bit about that. Absolutely. Kutuzov offers a good example of biography as a form of military history.

You know, there is different ways you can do military history or history in general. And to me, a kind of biography offers a more nuanced, more condensed look at this snapshot of the historical period. Kutuzov in particular is particularly interesting because he had a very long career and distinguished career. He starts serving in 1762 and he will end serving in 1813. So it's a span of five decades. And to me, I was struck that his life back to way is the saga of Russian military history, dramatic history that is full of ups and down. So it's a period of Russian imperial growth that made it of such an iconic historical figure.

That's one reason. But the second, I think, important reason is that I was always puzzled how historical figures are kind of remembered, how they're perceived, how they commemorated and portrayed. And Kutuzov, along with Napoleon, offers a good example of historical myth-making, where oftentimes the reality is consumed by later day legends and myths. And in Napoleon's case, as I point out in the book, Napoleon himself creates the legend that ultimately consumes him as kind of this real persona of him. And so when he becomes a young officer, I should know this, but in the early 1760s, is Catherine in charge yet?

Yes. So she actually comes to power just as he's commissioned. In fact, that's the first kind of turning point in his life is that the summer that he's commissioned as a junior officer is the summer when Catherine sees his power in the coup. And of course, he would rise to a level where he would have close relations with her and her successors, vivid relations, even. in certain respects. I did not know much about the brief reign of Tsar Paul until I read about in the book. You should get to that as some wild material. So when he, so he's a young, you know, young equivalent of a second lieutenant. What is, what is Catherine's vision, what is her attitude towards the West, her attitude towards the South? What is the imperial

program here that Kutuzov is embarking upon as a young officer? That is a great question because in many respects, it is a question that is pertinent to in light of current affairs in Eastern Europe. Some of your listeners probably follow this story that just a few days ago, Russian authorities dug up the grave of Gregory Pachomkin in Hirsson and, in fact, we stole his body. Because Pachomkin is the architect

of these Russian imperial expansion into what is today Ukraine and further on into the Balkan Peninsula. Catherine, of course, approves and it's done with her approval, but Russia is a newcomer, because it's a new kid on the block. As an empire, it was only proclaimed five decades or so old. So it needs to prove itself and proving it involves conquest of the neighboring territory, is kind of expanding the borders. And one of the key directions is indeed in the southwest into the territory of what is today, Ukraine,

and what was back then Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and further on into the Ottoman-controlled Balkan Peninsula. And Pachomkin kind of pushed Catherine and Pachomkin fought several major wars against both Poland and Ottoman Empire, in which Kutuzov received the Baptist by fire. And so it's his proving grounds. And he is fortunate in that during this conflict, he was encounters the best, some of the brightest military officers,

in Europe, and these were Russian commanders, two of them in particular, one of them probably familiar to your listeners, the future generalissimo Alexander Suvorov, the man who is brilliant by all accounts. And the second one is lesser known, but no less brilliant man by the name of Peter Riemensov. And Kutuzov served under both of them. He had the opportunity to learn from them, from their kind of pioneering approach. We oftentimes talk. about Napoleon as kind of, you know, this ability, you know, focus on speed, mobility, devout force in order to concentrate it at the strategic point. All that is part of Remensis approach to war and Kutuzzo as a young officer is exposed to all of this. He learns a lot

by observing these senior officers. How is what Kutuzov is like as a young man, you know, his family? It is a well-off family. By the time Kutuzov goes into some, military sledge. His father has to fill out paperwork, and in that paperwork, the family owns several hundred serves, several villages, so the family is clearly well off. Although, you know, I do mention that at the height of his kind of career when he owns the sons of those serves, when Catherine has rewarded him for his vast estates in Poland, even then he consistently complains about lack of money. The second thing I think we need to point out is that he received good education.

I went to one of the best military educational schools in Russia and excelled at what he did, in fact, to such a degree that even as a young kid, he's just 13 years old when he's asked to teach fellow cadets. He clearly is kind of, you know, doing better than them. And later on, when he becomes an officer, one of the things that I think I reval of him more of a man who was at the right place, maybe the right time. But the more I started him, the more I developed great respect for him because he is clearly a professional officer, a man who could do almost everything that was asked of him. And so I point out in the book, in fact, I struggled to find an other officer, an example, another example of an officer who had as many,

diverse assignments as Kutuzov did because he starts as an engineer officer, then is a staff officer, a quartermaster officer. He's tasked with leading regular infantry, grenadier infantry. He's organizing light cavalry, Lancer Regiment. Then he becomes a diplomat, and then he, of course, becomes the chief who leads the Russian armies to ultimately to the victory over Napoleon. And it's really It's astonishing that whenever Potomkin or his successors needed something to be done, they would effectively turn to this man and say, can you do it? And the answer invariably was, yes, I can. So you talk about the military modernization of the era, and of course this is happening across Europe. What is distinctive about Russian military modernization? Or is it sort of of a

peace with what you would see happening in France or Germany or, I should say, Prussia maybe, or or Britain. A friend of mine, a wonderful historian, Christy Picayekero, out at Judge Mason, a few years back, she wrote a fascinating study on what she calls military enlightenment. Most listeners are kind of familiar with enlightenment, but here we deal with economies with how people engage in war, how, effectively, what kind of wars should we fight, you know, what's the purpose of the world? And Russia, you know, in Kutuzzo's role, kind of Kutuzzo's career fits very well within this

military enlightenment. First, because he benefited from it as a young kid. So he was involved in that school that I mentioned. And that effort, kind of Shuvallov and his military enlightenment leaders, wanted to create what they called a new type of people. That is, individuals who would be well-rounded, not just officers, kind of steep, in their military expertise, but men who will be, as one of them, writes, and is a quote, European-minded, modern and capable of actively serving in a state service. So it's not just

about military service, but being capable of performing various duties all at once. And Chuvalla, for example, castigates existing educational system. And could do the benefit. this from this approach. But later on, when he is already an accomplished man, so again, he goes in the 70s, but now when we get to 79s, an interesting situation develops where by the time he is now in 7090s, this approach that wanted to create new type of people by bringing enlightenment military, you know, kind of enlightenment reforms and diversifying education and emphasizing more about well-roundness creates a counter-problem where the military, where the military schools, not just in Russia, but elsewhere, focused on things that were not necessarily

military related. And as one of the contemporaries complained that the graduates of the military school, they can write a poem and perform a play, but they can't do the basics of military service. So kind of an opposite problem. And so then Kutuzza makes sure that the officers, the educational system produces, are well steeped in the military training. And, And he, he's these cadet corps, the premier institution of military education in Russia for several years, introduces substantive changes in the system to achieve that balance, to create the new type of people who are good officers, but also good citizens. I'm going to miss things here, but we should talk a little bit about the wars that are being fought under Catherine and Kutuzov's role within them.

There's a war, possibly multiple wars. There's a lot. It's hard to keep back, which is why we have you, Alex. Yeah. There's a war in Poland. There's obviously a series of conflicts with the Ottomans. Again, without getting too in the weeds here, what is happening here? Is it just imperial expansion outwards?

Is that the basic force here? Why are we fighting these wars and what is Kuduzov up to? It is, in their respects, imperial opportunism. So Polish Lithu is going through a period of time when this is the state that used to be one of the largest in Europe and state that determined kind of the future of Europe in places like Vienna in 6080s, right? But now we are in mid-18th century and Polish-Lithuanian fortunes have declined while the Russia has risen and kind of process similar to dealing with nowadays. In fact, many of the parallels are still striking. So for example, Catherine was very

keen on propping up pro-Russian opposition groups within Polish Lithuania and then to intervene on behalf, ostensibly to protect the Poles, within the Polish affairs. The same applies in the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman Empire is going through a period of transition and a difficult one at that, and the Russian aggrandized themselves in places like Ukraine, like Northern Balkan Peninsula, like Caucasus. And so we have this series of conflicts that you mentioned, starting in 1760s, both from 1960s to 1792, we have two major wars between Russia and Ottoman Empire. And at the same time, we see the beginning of the Polish-Russian conflict that will

evolve to Polish partition, and the private southwestern Ukraine, and now is pushing into the territory of modern-day Romania, ultimately. will reach the borders of Danube, the shores of the Danube River, where Kutuzov will be fighting in 18, 10, 18, 11. And so here, they have the sustained imperial expansion where Russian authorities are willing to exploit the witnesses of their opponents and to maximize the advantages that they already have in this centralized, modernized Russian military to their own advantage. And prior to the French Revolution, what is the nature of Russian alignment with the major continental powers?

To the extent that there is a system of relations that looks more like the 19th century, what is it? In my last book on Napoleonic Wars, I kind of changed focus and discussion by saying that French Revolution, as important as it is, right, is actually shaping not just the destiny of the of France, but also of places like Poland, a Lithuanian. Because we often forget that justice revolution was raging in France. There was a revolution in Poland. In fact, the first written constitution in Europe, in that sense, kind of modern sense, is the Polish constitution of 1791 that predates the French constitution. And the Europe's free occupation with French affairs kind of gives the wiggle room for Russian to intervene in Poland. And that then kind of creates this effect where once Russian intervention is unfolding in Poland, other powers like Prussia

and Austria are more interested in maximizing their profits in Poland rather than dealing with French Revolution. So we see, for example, in 1990, 1791, all the way to 92, Russian and Austrian attention is firmly on Polish affairs rather than on the French affairs. So that gives French practitioners then kind of the breathing space to act and to evolve. So those events are interconnected, absolutely. And the collapse of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 94-95, of course, is taking place against the background of the war of the First Coalition, which is waged against France or Republican France. Russia not probably prudently chose not to get involved in the wars against France, and instead it maximized its efforts on dealing with Poland, Lithuania, and with the Ottomans.

And in both fronts, the Russians prevailed. Poland, Lithuania, this was destroyed, and in the Ottoman case, the Ottoman Empire was forced to forfeit significant territories in modern-day Ukraine. So Kutuzov is out there as an operational level leader throughout this period. And of course, he's badly wounded. It's shot in the head, which is usually not a – I mean, it's not good in 2022. And I can imagine the outcomes were significantly worse statistically in the 18th century. Especially when you're shot twice, right? Exactly, right?

In the same spot. Almost, almost same spot. Okay, so tell us about this. Yeah. So there was the first time Kutuzov suffered. the injury, and it's the most dangerous one, is in the Crimea. And actually, at the end of the war that Russia was fighting against Ottoman Turks from 67, 767 to 7074, unbeknown to these kind of warring sites in the Crimea, peace was already

signed at Kuchygynhaegi in 74, but the news hasn't reached them yet. And so there is a battle for it in a remote corner of Crimea in late summer of 74. And it involves this Ottoman expeditionary force that has landed on the shore of Crimea and is making its way inland. And Russians try to stop that force by sending a small unit. Kutuzov is there. And the two sides meet in this very rugged valley. And so at their fighting, Kutuzov rallies his granted years and kind of leads the charge.

And as he's leading the charge, at one point he seems to have climbed on a boulder so the troops could see him, right? And as he turns his face to rally and kind of call them, Ottoman bullet hits his left temple, penetrates his skull, goes through his skull, kind of in frontal lobe, and then exits on the exact other side on the right temple. And it's absolutely stunning, because Ukrainian archaeologists have done archaeologists, kind of digs on this vandal size, and they found many of the Russian and Ottoman span bullets that tend to range from 18 millimeters to about 25. So that's from half an inch to almost an inch.

Even a small one of this, even 18 millimeter striking you in the skull passing through your frontal lobe without affecting your brain. I don't know what the odds of that are. The velocity, I guess, would have been a lot less. and bullets today. Yeah. Yeah, but even then. It's still a bullet in your brain.

Yeah. And then, you know, considering how dirty those bullets were and right, they were flying on the inwards, somehow Kutuzov was rescued from the battlefield. His soldiers carried him out. And there was a very talented French surgeon in the Russian service who clearly did everything right. He cleaned the wound. He prepped it.

He kind of treated it so that they took Kutuzov. a year to recover, but he made complete recovery. In fact, this kind of the traditional view of Kutuzzo wearing an eye patch and kind of he's blinding one eye is actually not true. He never wore an eye patch. The eye patch is actually an invention of Soviet cinema. And his eye, he could see through his eye, but it was the nerves and these muscles so that eye were damaged by this head. And so the eye was little bit skewed. The second time he's injured is actually also in Crimea, at the northern part of it, where during the siege of Ochocoff, Kutuzza was looking out of an embrasure, out of a fort, opening,

and the Ottoman bullet struck him in the front, and in the cheek, penetrated his mouth, and went through the neck. Once again, remarkably all the crucial nerves, arteries were not affected. In fact, he made the recovery six months later. He was back in Settle. And if we can count the third one, although after these two egregious ones, it's probably not as serious.

On the field of Austerlitz, the famous Napoleonic victory, Kutuzov, of course, is a nominal commander-in-chief. And there he gets a third injury in the head when a splinter struck him in the face, but it's a kind of passing wound, a flash wound, but it does leave a scar on his face. So it's a contemporary is all marvel.

How come does this man get shot twice in the head and survives? And the conclusion was the destiny is preparing him for something great. Oh, clearly that prophecy got fulfilled in 1812. And he's recovering for the first one, I think right? He ends up in Berlin. Is that right? He goes on a tour. That's right, to Berlin, to Leiden in Netherlands,

and then stops in Vienna. So he kind of grant tour to recuperate. Catherine, the Great, the Empress of Russia, she actually provides him with state support for it, so a rather handsome financial support that allows him to travel. So he meets Frederick the Great, for example. He meets some of the leading Prussian and Austrian military figures.

So let's talk a bit about Kutuzov and Catherine and then her successors, Paul and Alexander. And obviously the Kutuzov-Alexander relationship is, central to the history of Europe. Towards the end of her time, she entrusts him with diplomatic missions, correct? I mean, he becomes a very senior and central figure in the Russian government. And then, so let's start there. And how does Paul's arrival and then Alexander's arrival, how do all these things affect Kutuzov's fortunes? Kuttharine. Kuttharine noticed an early part of his career. ID don't kind of trust these claims, the early biographers of Kutuzov made that,

It's Catherine who noticed him when he was just a young officer and had him promoted. They were, you know, looking at the archival documents, we see that the promotions had nothing to do with Catherine's choice. But later on, when he's a senior officer, Catherine does pay attention to him, especially after that degree is kind of injury. The correspondence between Catherine and Potomkin is full of references to my general, my Kutuzov, kind of this. There is a certain kind of affinity she feels for him, especially, after he makes would seem to be a miraculous recovery. And she did increasingly entrust important missions. Probably the most important one that gave him was to be the ambassador of Russian Empire to the Ottoman court, where it was of spent 1793-94 in Constantinople in Istanbul.

And he did very well there. He won't his duties admirably. He comes to assessing situation. And so in the book, I point out that at a time when many people thought that the Ottomans were preparing for war against Russian Empire and to that, you know, Russians were so concerned about and anxious about it that Catherine Niven ordered preparing armies for war. Kutuzov sends this steady series of reports that point by point dismantle this warmongering claims and points out that Ottomans are nowhere ready for war. And I like these kind of foods on the ground, very sober assessment. He's very rational man. Then after he comes from an empire, Catherine entrust him with the directorship of the premier institution of military education.

That's also a crucial appointment since he's in charge of preparing future duration of officers. And at that kind of moment, she passes away. And her successor is Paul, who notoriously had a very difficult, complex relationship with his mother, kind of disliked. That's one way put it. Yeah. But Kutuzov was able to adjust. And in fact, that's one, I think, one of the less palatable size of his character, something that his contemporaries remark and something that I emphasize in the book,

but many of his Russian and especially Soviet biographers tended to shy awake and obscure or completely be silent. And that is that Kutuzov was oftentimes a psychopathan. He was a Kirtier and a Nenei. kind of sense of it. In fact, contemporaries accused to him of being a courtisan for his willingness to debate himself among the people who had the power. I kind of part of me understands why he does it, right, because he's a part and parcel of this society, very hierarchical based on privilege, based on this patron and client networks. But part of me, of course, wants him not to debase to the

degree that he did. And the most famed infamous incident, of course, is when upon returning from Constant Noble, he kind of goes to one of the Catherine's newest lovers and infamous scene when he prepares coffee, freshly brewed coffee for his lover and serves him in his bed. And that struck everyone at the time as being just ridiculous, except for Kutuzov, who does it repeatedly. And of course, that part is like, I understand the patron-client relationship, but can you please not prepare a fresh coffee and serve. Have a little self-respect. I was going to say, as you started to describe this aspect of his character, as I say,

it sort of reminds me a bit of John Churchill, the Duke of Marlborough, who, you know, Winston Churchill, of course, makes a virtue out of this flexibility. Yeah, that's right. But as you narrate the details here, I'm not sure that John ever prepared coffee for, you know, and I don't think, did Anne have a lover, well, you know what I mean? Like, there was not quite that level of debasement. Yeah. In fact, later on, I think the good example will be Pushkin.

Alexander Pushkin, probably the greatest of Russian poets. When he's searching for an example of how emasculated Russian ability has become in the relationship with the royalty, he actually refers to Kutuzov and his coffee maker, a coffee pod, as that clarion of this is what we have become, right? Here we have a war veteran, a grisly general who's spent two decades. on the battlefield, gets shot twice in a head, and he stays there meekly, growing coffee for a time-serving kind of lover of Empress, and he is willing to debase himself to that degree. So that actually becomes kind of a symbol of what Russian ability has become. Kutuzov was able, to continue this story of flexibility, he's able to adjust himself to Emperor Paul. And I, you know, I was born and raised

in Soviet, you know, a time. And I remember reading and, of course, teachers teaching history where Kutuzza was perceived to be this kind of voice of Russian way of war. And Paul being the representation of prosophiles tendencies that he brought all that foreign influence and all that was bad. And part of me kind of still harbored those kind of sentiments, but until I looked deeply and what I realized was that Kutuzzo was actually, well, two things. One is that Paul was not that bad. So he's certainly not mad and crazy czar, but he is very rational about many things that he does. And in fact, the reform that he is in popular imagination castigated for actually, actually quite sane and needed the reforms, including the purging of the army of superfluous officers and hundreds and hundreds of generals who were drawing salaries but doing nothing. So all that is needed.

And Kutuzov sees that. In fact, he welcomes Paul the very symbol of the reform of the Russian needs. So he uses Paul to push through a military educational system. And he serves Paul very well, in fact, to a degree that there is a very close affinity. And I wouldn't say friendship, but certainly a relationship between the two. I found letters where Paul invites Kutuzov to come, borrow books from his personal library so they can sit down and read together and discuss. I went through the court journals, something that many of my predecessors have done.

And those court journals are recording on day-to-day basis who came and ate lunch and dinners with the emperor. And I found that Kutuzzo was there. In Kutuzov is virtually the person who talked Paul before his assassination in March of 1801. So is there anything to, I want to carry on to Alexander just a second, but is there anything to the sort of, you know, and correct me if you think I'm mischaracterizing this, but the sort of vision in Tolstoy of Kutuzov as this, you know, it's almost sort of ancient Russian spirit, this voice for something essentially Russian.

Is that a creation? The Tulsar and very vision of Kutuzov will supplant the actual individual. But I think there are kernels of truth in this portrayal. For example, Kutuzzo was a thoroughly traditional man who grew up in a privileged environment and kind of took it for granted. So at no point in his life did he, for example, kind of look at the French Revolution and what it stood for and said, yeah, that's a good thing.

He consistently rejected revolutionary ideals. He believed that Russia has this responsibility of containing the malaise of revolution. So he owned people, right? He was a serf owner. He never crossed his mind to free them. He did, for example, however, kind of was a kind of benevolent, maybe kind of patron all the people that lived on these states that he owned. And he visited oftentimes and tried to promote an industrial growth, you know, going to grow, manufacturing growth there. He, in his letter, says that he's helping kind of lending, helping hand to the serves who were struggling.

But there was still his serves. So that's kind of part of that vision. He was a religious man, a deeply religious soul. So for all that enlightenment talk that we can oftentimes engage in, he retained his belief in, in traditional kind of belief in God. And he was praying on a thing on daily basis based on the correspondence we see. But I think this vision that Tolstoy paints of him as largely a passive man who kind of lets thing go because he understands. that there are much larger things at play and, you know, that he's just a, you know, kind of a small than Portugal in the universe.

I think that is a little bit overplayed because when we get to 1812, and as I show in the book, Kutuzov has a strategy, a grand strategy that he pursues. And that strategy is a correct one for this, for that particular time. It's a strategy that is clear, that is pursued with determination by Kutuzov. and is the one that leads the Russian army to victory in 1812. Well, let's come to that here in just a moment. But let's go back to, I guess it is it 1801? He has this eerie conversation with Paul.

Paul sees himself in a distorted mirror and says, look at that stupid mirror. Looks like my neck has been rung or something like that. It's quite the last conversation. Then he's murdered. That's saying, yeah, two hours later he's murdered. Yeah. on behalf of his son.

And so talk about, you know, the Alexander-Kutuzov relationship is not exactly one that is uniformly smooth. And this has real consequences at Austerlitz and beyond. Talk a bit about Alexander in these two men and Kutuzov's role in Alexander's service. Alexander himself is a very interesting, very complete character. And there is a wonderful new biography by Marit Jare, that your listeners might be interested in kind of looking at. because this is the man who is born into this conservative society, a Russian conservative society, and yet his grandmother,

well, he's born with his parents who are even more conservative than most people around at the Russian court, and then his grandmother, Catherine, takes him away from his parents and plunges him into her court, which is more liberal. And so this boy, this child has to navigate the more relaxed and liberal atmosphere of Catherineian court in Peterhoff and St. Petersburg and his father's polls far more conservative environment in Gatchina.

And I think that shaped his character. So he was two characters in one, right? It certainly doesn't help that Catherine hired a liberal tutor, a Swiss tutor, to raise this man. And this tutor taught him the ideals of enlightenment and the ideals of French Revolution. Because Alexander is still a young man when he's a child, he's actually, he's entering teenage years when the revolution erupts. And so all that had the impact on him. When his father was murdered, Alexander was aware of the conspiracy, but he didn't expect, you can take it with a grain of salt, but he didn't expect that his father.

will be murdered. One can I put wondrous. Like, what did you expect? Your father will just be imprisoned or be in retirement or what exactly. But anyways, he's shocked by the news of his father, father's death, and kind of he starts his reign in the shadow of that murder. And of course, he is kind of surrounded by the people who murdered his father. So that's also kind of burden. And so one of his first decisions, therefore, is kind of, is to find a way he can balance the authority of those conspirators. And his way was by choosing Kutuzov, men whom his father trusted, to choose him as the governor general of the imperial capital city. And so Kutuzov, who searched up and down and I cannot find any evidence implicating him in the conspiracy, which is an interesting

kind of point in itself that the conspirators didn't try to recruit him. But Kutuzov now becomes Governor General St. Petersburg, but it doesn't mean that he's completely outside the court, not at all. The very people that murdered Paul were people that he engaged with within the patron client networks, right, within the wider noble society. And so Coutuzzo therefore finds demonstrates this yet another kind of character trait where he tries to navigate this court politics by doing what Alexander expects of him, but maybe not doing it too well because he doesn't want to burn his bridges with this key influential nobles. And one of the famous examples of this that I discussed in the book is when Alexander told him that you need to

put police agents trailing some of these conspirators. And the way police does is so inept that they are kind of shadowing the carriage of one of the conspirator leaders. They're shadowing openly, kind of sitting in the back, no disguise. This will be like a police car nowadays, actual markings with the sirens, right, following the suspect. And the suspects, these conspirators actually own coachmen are making faces and ridiculing the policeman as they're traveling. And so Alexander is told about this and he's, is quite pissed off. But it, I think, shows this Kutuz's degree of flexibility. Now, that, becomes a liability, however, once Alexander is able to remove the conspirators from the power.

So once he negates them, neutralizes them, then Kutuzov is the liability because of that flexibility, because it's unclear which way he might lean. And so in 1802, he's removed from power. And Alexander remembers that kind of flexibility, that uncertainty of Kutuzov's, which way he will lean. And there is also this generational issue between Alexander, who is in his, rightly in his 20s, kind of young man, and Kutuzov, who is much older, comes from the, what kind of, Kathirinian background. And the reason I mentioned is because Alexander surrounds himself with these young man who has, who have new ideas. They want reforms. They want changes. They go to the degree that they consider constitutionalism, they consider emancipation of serves, all.

these kind of radical transformations, that would have been completely alien to Kutuzov. And if we read the transcripts of the meetings of the so-called unofficial committee where Alexander met with his young advisors, you see how disparaging they are of these old-timers that they all. They're kind of too sad in their ways. They're too conservative. And they also are kind of commenting that even the way they talk, the way they behave in the court, the way they come and kind of bow in front of the czar, all that kind of robs them the wrong way, because it's all manifests of the old way of life. And these young men want something different.

And so Alexander, therefore, dislikes Kutuzza for his character as well, for who he is, the way he carries himself. And that there is one letter in particular while Alexander complains about the psychophancy of Kutuzov, that whenever he comes, he's too submissive, kind of too psychopath. And that becomes an issue in 1805 when Alexander appoints Kutuzov to lead the army against Napoleon, but then when he personally comes and takes over the army, then Kutuzo finds himself constrained, where between the reality of what needs to be done and the fact that the czar wants it done differently. So let's talk about Austria.

And I think, you know, people will, to the extent that listeners have heard about Kutuzov, because it's in Tolstoy, you know, it's Austerlitz and in Borodino in 1812. It's what they'll remember. So what actually happens at Austerlitz? Just say a few words, if you would, about Austerlitz in its broader context. And then the Kutuzov-Alexander sort of dance that occurs there. So this is part, of course, the war of the Third Coalition, which erupts in the late summer of 1805. It's the war between France and a group of European powers that include Britain,

include Austria and Russia, along with other smaller power, but these are the main ones. And the coalition decides to launch this massive campaign against France, a coordinated assault on French interests in Northern Europe, in Netherlands, the Dutch Republic, the Italy, and, of course, the main thrust. in Central Europe where Austrian and Russian armies were supposed to smash through Bavaria and get to the French borders. And Russia committed well over 100,000 troops for this campaign, and the main army that was sent to support this Austrian attack in Germany was given to Kutuzov. And so in September of 1805, Kutuzov leads some 50,000 men on his loans, 800,

plus miles of marching from Russia to Bavaria. And there is this long, long-standing myth that began actually in 1960s with some of my colleagues not being critical enough in how they analyze their sources. But there's this myth that the Allies, when they are planning, they didn't account for the difference of calendars, that Russians were using Julian and that the rest of Europe was still on Gregorian calendar. but it's actually not true. If you look at the archival documents, the very documents that they drafted, worked, and signed, you see that the Russians used both calendars,

Gregoria and Julian, in their correspondence and in the correspondence with the Austrians or any documents that were shared, we're all in Gregorian calendar. And that's particularly important when we look at the memorandum that the Russians and Austrians drafted

in the summer of 1805, which laid out a timetable when the Russian army was supposed to leave and when it was supposed to arrive in Bavaria. And that timetable is clear that Kutuzzo was supposed to be in Bavaria in late October. Now, he arrives about week late. And that is crucial because Austrians, without even waiting to see if he's going to be on time or not, in September, decide to preemptively strike into Bavaria, which creates a gap between, their army and Kutuzov's army, a gap that Napoleon brilliantly exploits, and that

massive maneuver in October that isolates Austrians at Ulm, destroys their main army, and then allows Napoleon to pursue the Kutuzov's army, which successfully retreats and they regroups. And that adjunction in November, Emperor Alexander joins the army. And by the statute of the Russian military statutes, as soon as the Russian ruler joined the army, he effectively became a commander-in-chief and took over. So irrespective of the fact that Alex said, Kutuzov, you know, Mifahil, you go on and you commend the army. The fact is he's there. And as there, everyone understands that the final decision, right, the buck stops with the czar. And so Kutuzov finds himself in the hamstring

that whatever he says needs to be kind of also double-checked by the emperor. And the emperor is surrounded by that same group of young, ambitious men, for all of them, including Alexander. This is their first war. They've never been to war before. They're all excited, right? The old thing that war is like the thing that you read in books and see in the illustrations. It's all about heroism and great heroes making decisions at the right time and the right moment.

And so they decide to go on offensive and engage Napoleon who they believe is weak. we know that's not true. We know that's part of this calculated image that Napoleon crafts to mislead the Allies. And the voice, kind of being like Cassandra, the voice of reason that tries to tell Alex, don't do it, that we are walking into a trap, is the voice of Kutuzzo. And he repeatedly, in the last day of November, goes to the Tsar and tells him, instead of attacking what we need is time. We need to be methodical. We need to retreat. We need to bid for time because more reinforcements will come. Napoleon is too far away from France, from his bases.

French army is suffering from attrition. Its logistical lines are stretched. Time is our friend, right? We will gain more from bidding for time. And Alex, there is a famous exchange when I kind of cite in this conversation where at one point when Kutuzov yet again tells him, let's wait, Alexander turns to him and says, you spend your time fighting the Turks and the French and beating them up, or sorry, Turks and Poles, but now that you're facing real enemy, now you're suddenly, you know, the courage is leaving you,

and Kutuzov is dismayed by this, this accusation of cowardness. The guy who spent his entire life on the battlefield gets shot in the head every other week, And now he's being accused of being covered. And so he famously tells Alex that, well, from now on, I can just be a regular soldier. And you command it. And Alex said, no, no, no, no, you're going to stay in charge. And he factually imposes on Coutis of this plan of going out and attacking Napoleon, the Austerlitz. And then we have that amazing scene which Tolstoy does so brilliantly of the War Council.

In fact, that scene is almost entirely taken by. I told story from one of the eyewitness accounts. And we see the Austrian officer, Bayrothar, reading this long order, kind of disposition of what the army is supposed to do. And Kutuzov already knows that no matter what he says, this plan will take place, that he's been overruled repeatedly by the emperor. And so he does the next best thing. He just reclines his sofa and takes a nap.

And so that becomes this iconic scene of him being resigned to accept the fate. Tolstoy kind of uses that to point out that Kutuzov accepts what's to come. But what he doesn't say is that right of the council ends. Kutuzov goes and makes one last ditched effort to stop this battle because he knows they're going to lose it. So he goes that night to senior court officials. Michael Tolstoy. And he tells him the following. And this is a quote from Tolstoy, you know, the way Tolstoy recounted later on.

And he says, Kutuzov told him, his majesty tends to fight a battle. But you must tell him to stop, not to do it. Because we are almost certain to lose the battle tomorrow. It's amazing, right? Here you have, Commander-in-Chief, flat-out telling, we are going to lose the battle. And then Tolstoy looks at him. It's at 3 o'clock in the morning. He was sleeping when Kutuzov showed up.

And he snaps at him and says, guess what? My job is to dabble with sauces and roasts. Yours is to fight war. So go and deal with it. So Kutuzov then goes back and this rejection, right, rejected, downhearted and watches in dismay as these orders are being copied, are sent out.

And he's not the only one who knows that things will be going really bad. Peter Bagration, probably one of the brightest Russian commanders, who is commanding the Russian right flank at our cilates. He receives his copy of disposition about 30 minutes before the start of the battle. He quickly reads it, turns to his officers and tells him, we'll be defeated. I've just been watching the Soviet War and Peace, which is available in the Criterion Channel. It's a Bundur-Chuk? Am I getting that right? And it's been digitally remastered. Yes, yeah, it's beautiful. It's beautiful and strange.

It's sort of strange to watch this Soviet production of War and Peace, but very interesting in the actor who plays, I've been pronouncing it by Gration, but I defer, yeah, it is really, very good. I recommend it, actually. Yes. So we could probably spend a whole episode talking about the battle itself, but I'm conscious of time, and we are on the sort of penultimate event before 1812 in terms of significant, highly significant military action.

So why do we move to that? Napoleon invades Russia, and you spoke earlier of the grand strategy that Kutuzov developed. Talk about that strategy, how he developed it, and what it entailed. And I want to mention one thing, Aaron, before we kind of get to E. Because it's part of that strategic thinking of Kutuzov. So we see a glimpse of it in 1805 when he clearly validates the situation very rationally, coldly, so to speak, and sees kind of the strategy that the Russian army needs to pursue is that of protracted warfare.

When we look then in 1810, 1811, so before 1812, 1810, 1811, Kutuzov is appointed the commander and chief of Russian forces in the Nubian principalities and what is today Romania to fight against the Turks and to bring an end to a long war that the Russians were fighting. against the Turks. And there we again see a very calculated man, a man who clearly, to assesses this situation, clearly, rationally, and he makes kind of guesses, but informed guesses on what the opponents will do. And it's reading his letters, you see that he tries to get into the Turkish kind of Ottoman mindset and see how the Grand Vizier will react to this situation. What are the political pressures on the Grand Vizier. And he correctly predicts what the ornaments will do,

and then he reacts to it, culminating in this brilliant victory that Kutuzov scores at Russe in 1811 when he completely out maneuver his Ottoman army, traps it in a camp, and forces it to surrender. So when we get to 1812, the war begins in June. Nutuzov is just returned, just returned from the the Newbian principality. So he's not involved in the opening shots of the war. There is no commander-in-chief in the Russian army. Instead, we have three separate armies. One, the main army is led by Minister of World Bakradi Detali. Second army in size is led by Peter Bagration. The third army is led by Tormasov, Alexander Tormasov. And they have a certain kind of level of flexibility and independence because they are

army commanders. But they all kind of listen to Barclay de Toli because he's the minister of war, although it's not the same as having one supreme commander. And so that creates difficulties, especially because Baccharide Toli and Baccaratio and Bacch, D'Azegri on strategy. Bagration wants more assertive, more offensive-minded strategy. Barclay de Toli correctly realizes that what Russians need is a protracted defensive strategy. And so he, He smartly retreats. But that puts him under enormous public pressure from both, from his own officer, from the society, from Alexander, who want victories. No one wants to see the army keep retreating in surrounding cities.

And so in August, just as the Napoleon is getting to Smolensk, Alexander decides to remove Barcreditoli and appoint Kutuzov as the supreme commander-in-chief, in fact, only subordinating all land forces. to one man, and that is Kutuzov. And Kutuzov promises that he will stand up and kind of fight battle against Napoleon, but when I looked at his kind of thinking, especially I looked at the reminiscences of one of his family members who spanned the evening with him before Kutuzov left. And there, Kutuzov actually tells him in family of friends and family that he doesn't necessarily hopes to defeat Napoleon. And that's a very interesting statement to make for, you know, for a new commander-in-chief. But rather he tells his friends and family that he intends to

outsmart Napoleon. And here we talk about kind of grand strategy that, you know, defeat will take place kind of tactical operational level. And Kutuzo has some concerns there because he has studied Napoleon. That's actually a quote from his. letters, that he studied Napoleon. He studied his life, his campaigns, how he wages war. He refers to Napoleon as the greatest captain of this age. So he has great respect for this man. So when he, in the circle of kind of trusted circle, he admits that he might not be able to defeat, but he hopes that on the grand strategic level, he will outsmart. And we see that when Kutuzov takes over command of the army in late August,

despite his promises of, hey, I'm going to go on offensive and defeat Napoleon, he actually continues the Barkar Adetoli's strategy of retreat, and then adds layer to it. And the biggest layer for me is his decision to abandon Moscow. That is a decision that Barclay Detali would have been lynched for. I have no doubt that if he had made the decision to surrender Moscow, one of the officers would have shot him because in the earlier weeks, even before, you know, before he even getting to Smolens, this officer were so radicalized and kind of inflamed that they're willing

to use violence to remove him from power. But Kutuzov was that symbol of Russian might. Greatness. He's a Russian nobleman. He comes from the Suvorovian kind of romance of school. He is the one who just won the war against the Ottoman Turks and kind of brought glory to Russia. and therefore it was kind of okay for him to do it. But on a grand strategic level, that decision is a master's stroke. And Kutuzov writes in his letters that he wanted Moscow to be that point that will stop Napoleon. Because he looks at Napoleon not only as a commander-in-chief of an army, but as a political leader. Napoleon is an emperor and a commander-in-chief.

And that Kutuzov looks at this and they realize that Napoleon needs a political solution to this war. And he wanted, Kutuzov wants to dangle Moscow as the possibility of that political solution in front of Napoleon so that Russians can gain a breathing space, a period of time when they can regroup. And so he says, there is a wonderful quote that I use as a title of another chapters that Napoleon is like a torrent, this massive force that this. landslide likes, rushing down the slope, smashing everything on its way, until something will kind of soak it up. If you just stand there in conventional way, it will overwhelm you. But you have to find a way to soak it. And for Kutuzzo, that sponge, as he says, sponge that will soak this torrent in is Moscow. By giving Moscow to Napoleon, he knows Napoleon will stop there, think that this political center, this historical

capital of Russia, his good trophy for him, he will try to negotiate. And that will be the downfall because Kutuzov knows for certain that there is no way Russians will negotiate with him. And he does. Gives Moscow to

Napoleon. He regroups the army at the fortified camp at Tarutino. Even better than that, whenever Napoleon tries to reach out, and he does on several occasions to negotiate with with Russians. Kutuzo deliberately so cultivates

this outreach offers to create an kind of vision in Napoleon's head that Russians might be willing to negotiate. Loristan, for example, famously visits Russian camp in October, and Kutuzzo

is like, yeah, of course, you want to negotiate, we'll think about it. I will send a letter to St. Petersburg, knowing that that letter will take two weeks going back and forth. That's the two weeks he needs to complete the reforming on the army. And that's as a grand strategic level. And I think here at this junction,

October, Kutuzzo out smarts Napoleon. That's a really amazing account and analysis. And listening to you, I can't actually decide whether this fundamentally undermines the Tolstoyan vision of the essentially passive man who is almost a kind of symbol of determinism and the Russian souls embrace of acceptance of fate or something like that. Because on the one hand, everything you've just laid out is obviously the opposite of all that.

Here you have an active mind making decisions, conceiving of a strategy and executing on it. On the other hand, what is the strategy? Well, it is a kind of, it's Eastern in its way, you know, just to speak in broad stereotypes. It is about sort of accepting the force of this invasion. But let me add a layer of complexity then to that. Because to chip away at the total. certain vision, Kutuzov looks at the grand strategy is to bid for time. But on the operational level, right, what Kutuzov does is he wages asymmetrical warfare against Napoleon.

And here we see him learning from previous experiences of other opponents of Napoleon, and especially experiences in Spain. So what Kutuzov does is in late, in September, in early September, mid-September this time range. So right as Borodino is fought and then they are moving to surrender Moscow, Kutuzo starts forming flying detachments. They saw units of regular troops whose task it is to conduct hidden run tactics and operations. And he forms some two dozen of them that effectively surround the Grand Army and Napoleon in Moscow.

And they are not task of engaging in these kind of protracted pitched battles. Not at all. In fact, I've read the instructions that Kutuzov writes to these individual commanders. And you see what he's thinking. The thinking is asymmetrical, target logistical basis, target communication lines, target can exhaust this army while it is stuck in Moscow because Napoleon is seeking political solution to the war. And then yet another layer to this is that, again, Kutuzov using the prior knowledge of what happened is he, is very keen on inciting what we can call popular war, popular resistance, what Spanish refer to as guerrilla, the small war. In fact, Kutuzov uses this term Malaya Vainat, which is a small war. He deliberately sends out officers to the local communities, to villages, to peasants, to serves, and kind of excites them to rise up by the stories of atrocities

of the French are committing. He actually provides these peasants with weapons, to form the units of local resistance, even when local nobles, landowners are expressing reservations about arming the people that they own, right? What if the people turn their weapons on us? And Kutuzov was like, don't worry, I'm going to excite them against the enemy, right? There is this target that I'm going to paint and they're going to follow an attack. And in those few occasions when the kind of the local resistance got out of hand that targeted landowners, Kutuzov actually diverts his troops.

to deal with the suppression of revolts. And so here we have, therefore, can there men who, on one hand, is passive, right? He doesn't engage in battles. But on the other hand, he is very engaged in crafting the grand strategy and in unleashing kind of the hounds that will hunt down the enemy. And to me, that's, I think, a hallmark of a very capable commander. Now, he'd been, we would be lambasted by contemporaries, especially officers who are upset that, you know,

we are kind of waiting and that waiting doesn't produce battles, battles doesn't produce glory, doesn't give us us promotions and awards. And so they write these letters to Alexander of complaints, saying we need a new commander. You know, Kutuzov is too passive. And Alexander actually convinced counsel, privy council of war to deliver.

review these complaints. And every time the council gets together, they kind of come back and say, don't worry, that's fine. This is a right strategy. In fact, one of the accusations again, Kutuzzo was that, oh, he's just in his quarter sleeping 18 hours a day. And the council received this letter and looked at it and the response was, and this is a quote, well, thank God he's asleep. Every day of his inaction is equal to a battle won. It's a very reminiscent of the complaint being made to Lincoln that Grant. Lincoln's response, he wanted to know what kind of liquor he could, the grant drink, so he could ship it to his other generals because obviously, you know, it works.

Exactly. That's right. That's right. And I think that's kind of, this is the rightness of the strategy, but also the fact that right people at the right positions of power saw that Kutuzov's approach to war was beneficial, meant that despite of vociferous condemnation of his strategy, Dutuzzo was not removed from that. So he had the fate of Barclayet-Datolli. He had people at the Privy Council of War who vouched for him, so stood up for him, and who convinced the Tsar to let him be, essentially, let this strategy play out. And of course, by November, by late November, we see Napoleon retreating.

Russians are in pursuit. So it's clearly the strategy will kind of prove its worth. Chis of dies of natural causes the next year. Didn't get a whole lot of downtime in that life, it seems. Can you, can you, I want to be respectful of your time here. It's been fascinating. So we've gone on for a while. But just briefly, would you speak to his legacy?

You know, perhaps, I think very interestingly, in Soviet times, but also today. I mean, obviously, actions that he engaged in in his career have relevance to events in Ukraine today. So just talk a bit about the legacy of Kuchuzon. The legacy is, I think, can be divided into two parts. One is the immediate legacy of what he has accomplished in terms of navigating the political, needs of the nation in 1812.

this legacy is not necessarily all positive. So, of course, his strategy, I think, was effective. I think it produced results. But there is a flaw in it that contemporaries complained about, and I pointed out in the book, in that when Napoleon ultimately decided to retreat from Moscow, Kutuzov pursued him, but he pursued him with a certain distance, right? kind of a strategy that later on became known as a strategy of parallel march.

Napoleon was marching and main Russian army was marching parallel ed, kind of nipping at the heels but not trying to destroy it. And Kutuzza was confronted many times on this issue, though, of him not engaging Napoleon, not seeking to completely destroy. And his response was invariably kind of constant that he was thinking down the road, once again, kind of drawn strategic thinking of what will happen in Europe if he manages to completely obliterate Napoleon's power, Napoleon's army. So he was concerned that Napoleon's downfall, let's say Napoleon was routed somewhere at

Smallandsk or captured at Berezina, right? What will that cause in Europe? Will that be another revolution in France and a cycle of revolutionary transformations or turmoil in the rest of Europe? Or more crucially, he, and this is what we see in his letters, is that he was concerned that downfall of French Empire will open the path for the British dominance in Europe, and he wanted to use weakened France, not destroyed by weakened Napoleon, as a way of counterbalancing that British influence. But of course, that meant that Napoleon was not going to destroy

in Russia, but he was allowed to escape, right? He gets out. He forms another army. War rages for another year and a half, cost hundreds of thousands of lives, and of course, enormous material losses until he's finally defeated. So if Kutuzov was more engaged in seeking out that battle, maybe Waterloo would have happened somewhere in remote corners of northern Ukraine or Belarus, right? So that's where his legacies is quite interesting. But of course, the facts on the ground is that he led the army to this victory. And in 1813, when he dies, the Russian army is already seeking liberation of Germany rather than figuring out what to do with Napoleon and Russia. So that's kind of short term. Now, long term, it's a legacy that, in many respects, is overblown.

And it's overblown by both the imperial Russian government and especially by the Soviet government. already contemporaries complain that when Kutuzov died, there were so many euloges written about how awesome he was, that one of the writers at the time kind of spoke that, you know, that this is a pamphlet that appeared in 1813, that Kutuzov accomplished, this quote, Kutuzov accomplished more than Caesar, Hannibal and Cepu O Africanus combined. Come on, now, right? But there was this going to overblown celebration of the man. The fact that Kutuzov received an honor previously or ever since unheard of of being buried in the middle of these great cathedral that became a pantheon of military glory also served the role of turning him into the national institution so that any critical voices or pointing out the problems or mistakes that he is going to make were all drowned out.

Then Tolstoy rises novel that turns Tolstoy into this kind of philosophical concept of a construct that can be just opposed against Napoleon. If Napoleon is a man of action who tries to control his own fate, Kutuzov is a contemplative and a more of a resigned man who understands that there are bigger issues at play and that he will go with flow. And then we get to the Soviet era. And the Soviet era uses Kutuzov to create an image of an archetypal Russian commander with a peculiar Russian way of war.

And that is particularly important during World War II, when, as we know, Nazis invaded Soviet Union in 1941 and the first, what, two years, a calamity for Soviet, right? At absolute disaster. Well, in order to justify this calamity, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, kind of looks back to historical parallels and say, hey, we're not surprised in June of 41. We didn't retreat all the way to Moscow because Germans forced us. This was actually a carefully planned strategy just like Kutuzov did in 1812. And once Stalin kind of lays out his vision, this explanation, then you have generations of Soviet and Russian historians who have tried to build the national

narrative around this mythical figure of Kutuzzo, who makes no mistakes, who anticipates all enemies, moves, who is the symbol of the Russian greatness. And that narrative continues to the present day. There is the recent biography of Kutuzov that came out in Russia. And granted, it's not necessarily a scholarly biography, but it gives you kind of the sense of where some of the Russian writers stand when he said, you know, this author writes that in all of world history, I cannot find accomplishments comparable to those of Kutuzov in 1812. Come on now. And actually, you know, Putin's government and Vladimir Putin's government in the last 20

years and weaponized history for political benefits. And we see especially in the Polyanic era history, which went through the bicentennial celebrations between 1805 and the 18, no, sorry, 2005 and 2012, 15. At each point, Russian government actually used this memory of struggle against Napoleon to deliver this notion of reclaiming Russian greatness. Kutuzov is part and parcel of it to the degree that just this year in September, when there was yet again kind of commemorative events at Borodino, you have, you know, my friends sent me at this,

and a photo of the poster, massive poster, that was made for the event in which Kutuzov stands. It's the largest figure in the background. But in front of him are the rebel leaders, Russian rebel leaders from modern-day Ukraine, leading the commanding units against the Ukrainians in the current war. And it's just juxtaposition of the Kutuzov as the man who led Russia to greatness in 1812, and now this new generation of military commanders kind of trying to lead. Russia to a new greatness. So in that sense, Kutuzov's legacy continues to be with us because he's part of this

memory. And in the book, I kind of end my narrative on kind of this point where I say that Kutuzov is part of history, right, but also is beyond it because this Tolstoyan vision, this myth that the Russian government created, will be with us. for the years to come. Alex Micah Burizzi, author of Kutuzov, A Life in War and Peace. And I have to say, of course, you're an endowed cherry, you're author of these magnificent books,

but your most impressive accomplishment is you are now part of the elect, even elite circle of multi-time, a platoon of war. Yes, I actually, Colin, I don't know if we, it's Andrew Lambert and Alex. Oh, that's actually, it's limited. Yeah, we've got a few. Andrew Lambert is who I want to be when I grow up.

There we go. There we go. It's like I said. It's an electric. I know. I cannot promise that the start of the podcast, you are noting how long this book is. I can't promise my next one will be shorter, but I hope it will deserve the opportunity to come back for what is a very enjoyable conversation. Absolutely. We'd love to have you any time.

Thank you for so much for joining. This is a nebulous media production. Find us wherever you get your podcasts. Thank you.