School of War - The New Middle Eastern Balance of Power, with Elliott Abrams

Episode Date: May 15, 2026

Elliott Abrams, senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and chairman of the Vandenberg Coalition and the Tikvah Fund, joins the show to discuss Israel, Iran, and the new power dynamics in the Middle East. What new alliances have emerged since the chaos on October 7, 2023? How has the current war with Iran reshaped the region? With a storm of competing interests, fragile partnerships, and global stakes, can stability emerge, or is the Middle East heading toward an even wider conflict? 02:10 - Israel today 04:02- Israeli airport security 05:58 - Netanyahu’s domestic political situation 09:07 - Bibi’s secret visit to the UAE 10:15 - American military aircrafts in Israel 12:01 - Israel-UAE relationship 15:57- October 7th Middle East aftermath 17:17 - Erosion of Iranian proxies 19:20 - Israeli-Saudi relationship 20:27 - Egypt’s global decline 22:24 - Turkey’s role 29:09 - Israel-Lebanon relationship 28:30 - Hezbollah factor 32:25 - How to handle Hamas 36:31 - Iran and the future of the Strait of Hormuz Follow along on Instagram, X @schoolofwarpod, and YouTube @SchoolofWarPodcast Find more at The Free Press. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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free of charge. BetMGEMGEMP operates pursuant to an operating agreement with Eye Gaming, Ontario. A new Middle East has a new Middle East has. emerged since the 10-7 attacks. The balance of power is fundamentally altered. Iran has been weakened. Israel has been empowered. The Gulf countries are competing amongst themselves. Today we have Elliot Abrams back on the show and gives us a real tour-to-force tour of the region. Who's up, who's down? What's the future in Gaza, in Lebanon, in Turkey, of course, in Iran. It's fascinating. Let's get into it. Lockhean invasion of the rain.

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Hi, I'm Aaron McLean. Thanks for joining School of War. I am delighted to welcome back to the show today, Elliot Abrams. He's a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He's the chairman of the Vandenberg Coalition. He's also the chairman of the Tikva Fund. Elliot, thank you so much for coming back on the show. It's my pleasure.

Thank you for inviting me. We're going to talk about the Middle East today. Obviously, Iran is the most pressing question there. and the way in which the tentacles of its various proxies are running into opposition across the regions. We talk about Gaza. We'll talk about Hezbollah and Lebanon. But you're fresh back from Israel.

I believe you landed back here in the States yesterday, and I'll just say we're recording this morning of Friday, May the 15th, as these events move so quickly, it's always worth pointing that out. What did you see, what did you learn, what did you hear on the ground in Israel that maybe an American audience can't immediately perceive about the wars in that region at a distance?

Well, difficult question. For one thing, you walk along the beachfront in Tel Aviv. You would never know that there had been two years, two and a half years of war, that people were running into shelters just weeks ago and maybe tomorrow, who knows. So people have, in a sense, come out for air and there appears to be normal life except for one thing.

The lack of very many foreign tourists. Anyone who has visited Israel as a civilian has been through what's often the nightmare of Ben-Gurian airport, long lines for everything. There were no lines. In the foreign passport segment or room in a Ben-Gurian airport, I was one of four people online. So that's really very striking if you've visited the place regularly.

They're also beginning to talk about an election. They have to have one by October, and it could be as soon as September. So politics is very much in the air. And I'd say there's one other thing that's quite obvious in talking to people, which is like the Gulf Arab, Arabs, they are very largely dependent right now on what Donald Trump does. And what is he going to do, for example, about the Strait of Hormuz? They can try to influence it just as the Emirates or the Saudis can.

But fundamentally, they're watching, guessing, and planning. Meanwhile, of course, events continue to transpire in Gaza. and Lebanon, so it's not a relaxing moment, even if it is a moment for people to go to the beach. When you go through Bangorian Airport, do you get the third degree like I always do? I just, if anyone's listening, every single time, and I assume it's because I'm a military age male, almost always traveling alone. But I have never received the level of scrutiny. My baggage in person have never received the level of scrutiny as when I fly to and from Israel.

I get why. I get why, but Elliot, I do think that one day I'm going to write a memoir called pro-Israel despite it all, because it is quite the experience every time. Yeah. Not on this trip. I've got to say, I mean, it was, I don't usually get the third degree. I get the usual questions. It takes a few minutes, but there was actually a lot less on this trip than I've ever seen. People were just walking through the lines. It's, you know, one would like to believe that they've turned over a new leave with respect to handling visitors with charm. That's almost completely unbelievable.

My favorite anecdote on this front is I was leaving Israel. And again, I mean, I'm half joking here. I mean, I, of course, understand the reason for the tight security, but leaving Israel, I had been there. I was embedded with the IDF in Gaza and up north. I had attended a conference, essentially hosted by the IDF, and I'd been given a bunch of books, some of which were in Hebrew, actually. Mementos for me. I don't actually read Hebrew, but some Hebrew, some English books produced by the IDF about Gaza and about the war. And the police officers, or whatever organization, the security of Mangarian come from, are pulling the books, which, you know, have coverage shots of, like, you know, devastation in Gaza out and sort of staring at them and staring at me and asking me, you know, what's the meaning of these books?

I'm like, they're literally from the IDF. I was given them by the IDF yesterday. Anyway. A likely story. Anyway, anyway, anyway. Politics, Israeli politics. How do Netanyahu's political fortunes in the broader question of the constitution of the Knesset, which we really haven't talked about on school of war and probably should talk about how these domestic political issues connect to strategy more?

How do they intersect with the strategic picture? and whether it's Israel's approach to Iran, Gaza, what have you. To be very brief, I'd say they don't connect as much as many people would like to believe. That is, if you look at the positions of those on, let's call it the center left, the main opposition now to Netanyahu, the coalition of former Prime Minister's Bennett and Lapid, how will their policy toward Iran and Iranian a potential nuclear weapon, differ, it won't. Their policy in Gaza, their policy toward Lebanon. I think that there is a wide consensus on national security issues in Israel.

The IDF itself, of course, has an influence over this. So a lot of this is very personal with respect to Prime Minister Netanyahu. It isn't going to, there isn't going to be a revolution in Israeli foreign policy. and national security policy. They will lose the personal relationships that Netanyahu has with President Trump, with Mohammed bin Zayed, let's say. But presumably, you know, a new prime minister can create new relationships. Where there is, they hope, those who are challenging Netanyahu hope,

Where there will be change is perhaps in reducing the amount of anti-Israel hostility that they see and that it tends to show itself in attacks on Netanyahu. There again, I think they're going to find less than they hope for because I think the fundamental hostility is to Israel. And maybe even more broadly, the fundamental hostility is to Jews and its percentage. sonified and Netanyahuas. He's been there for a long time. But you do hear in the average, you know, breakfast or lunch conversation much more politics being discussed now, which coalition will last? And, you know, the fundamental question, can Beebe pull another rabbit out of a hat?

He is the dominant figure in Israeli politics for decades now, the longest serving prime minister ever. And usually when I discuss this would say an Israeli journalist or old friend, they'll begin by saying, never count BB out. And I think that is the beginning of wisdom. I think while you were on the ground there, if not than just before you left for Israel, it was reported, speaking of Netanyahu's personal relationships in the region, that while the fighting was ongoing, a high intensity fighting was ongoing with Iran. Netanyahu made a secret visit to the UAE, which, you know, I think I'm, I like to tell myself that it's hard to shock me, but like even I, even I raised my eyebrows at that. That was a really striking report. What can you

tell us about that and what was the reception to that news in Israel? Of course, it was immediately denied by the Amarades, which led everyone in Israel to say, oh, then it must be true. And there's new news that the chief of staff of the IDF also visited the Emirates during the war. Everyone believes it, and it is emblematic of the level of relationship that Israel has achieved with the Emirates. We know also that they sent not only Iron Dome facilities, but Iron Dome. Domes staff, IDF staff to the Emirates to help protect them. I should add, Aaron, on landing in Ben-Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv, I saw something I've never seen before.

You land and there are banks of gates that normally would be filled with planes from Delta and United and Lufthansa and British airway, etc. And those companies are not flying to Israel right now. And all those gates have a massive. American military aircraft. It is extraordinary. It is really like an American military base. I've just never seen anything like that in Israel

or at any other commercial airport anywhere in the world. It's a reminder of the degree of cooperation and indeed integration. And I think the trip, which I assume did take place to the Emirates, by the Prime Minister and separately by the Chief of Staff of the IDF, is a reminder of the choice the Emirates have made to a much greater degree than any of their Gulf neighbors for an alliance with Israel, a military and security alliance with Israel, of course, with us as well.

But the others have it with us. They just don't have it much with Israel. So I want to pull on this thread, and I wasn't really planning to go in this direction, but this is so interesting. So, Elliot, let's try to talk about the structure of the new Middle East that is coming into focus. Now, what are we, two and a half years on from 10-7. So, but let's start by just unwrapping the UAE, Israel dimension a bit more. Why?

Why is it the UAE, as opposed to Saudi, as opposed to the Qatar question kind of answers itself, but maybe you'll explain it for the audience. Why is it the UAE specifically that this particularly close relationship develops, even within a broader con, I would assert, I'm curious if you agree, within a broader context of warmer Israeli Gulf relations in general, that this is the particularly close one? I think the UAE is unique in a couple of ways. They made a decision years ago to modernize the economy and society

if you go to Dubai or Abu Dhabi, you see it physically. That is, you see the skyscrapers. You see the international community that's there. You see the prosperity. You see the economic modernization. You see the decreasing dependence on oil. They make more money now from their immense sovereign wealth funds than they do from, if you will, merely the sale of oil.

and they differ from the Saudis who are also trying to moderateize in that they don't really have much of a domestic population. That is, there are roughly a million Emirates, but there are 30 million Saudis. And although Saudi Arabia is not a democracy, public opinion counts. And it circumscribes what Mohammed bin Salman can do, for example, in joining the Abraham Accords and normalizing with Israel. That is not a popular goal in Saudi Arabia today, and he's got to be aware of that, whereas the rulers of the Emirates don't have to worry about public opinion in the same way. And, of course, it's a lot easier to modernize when you have a very small population and much greater per capita wealth. The Emirates have also, I guess I'd say, followed the logic of the

conclusions they are drawing. The logic would suggest Iran is a perpetual enemy under the current Islamic regime. Who is a reliable ally against the Islamic Republic? Who is reliable

and capable and courageous? And the answer is Israel. A more reliable ally in the sense than the United States because they can't be sure what policies we're going to to follow. Maybe we'll do another JCPOA someday. Not so with the Israelis. And the Israelis approved, certainly in Midnight Hamer, what they called

Rising Lion last year, that they're willing to attack Iran directly. And they're willing to help the Emirates defend itself directly. We know now about the Iron Dome battery. We don't know what else has been done between the two. governments in terms of military and intelligence cooperation. So the Emirates are fully in it. They obviously joined. They were the centerpiece of the Abraham Accords in the Trump first term. And they haven't pulled back from it. Nothing, not even the Gaza War, has led them to pull back. They're fully in it. This is the kind of Middle East they want to see with an integration of modernizing Arab countries with Israel against the threat to all of them, which they do as Iran.

Well, let's move around some of the heavyweights in the region and how they fit into the new balance of power. Saudi. I took, I know this particularly groundbreaking idea sitting here in the spring of 2026, but I took 10-7 itself to be an effort to disrupting. disrupt Israeli-Saudi normalization, which at the time was a hot topic. Not the only strategic rationale for what the Moss did, but certainly high up there on the list. Where does that process stand? What is the Saudi attitude towards Israel, towards Iran? Obviously, not a great deal of love loss between Saudi and UAE. How do they fit into the new balance of power? Well, I think you have to go back, as you suggested to 107.

107 was the product or a manifestation of a really smart Iranian foreign policy, which was we're going to surround Israel, we're going to surround it with proxies. We're going to build our Iranian influence in Iraq and Yemen and Syria and Lebanon and Lebanon and Gaza. And so it's good for us in Iraq. Iran as a regional power, but will also surround Israel, ultimately strangle it. And that policy seemed to be working. If you look at the level of Iranian influence, it looked as if Israel did not really have an answer to that Iranian policy.

But they went too far. They presumed too much. and on 10-7 they attack in a way that severely damaged Israel, and by the way, if Hezbollah had gone into it, would have damaged them even more. But it was a bad move. It turned out to be the beginning of the end for that Iranian policy because the Israelis have so greatly set back Hezbollah and Hamas. and this train of events helped lead to the overthrow of Assad. So now, you know, you and I are sitting here talking in a week in which Israel and Lebanon are talking in Washington.

Obviously, Shara and Syria has a very different policy toward the United States, toward his neighbors, toward Iran. And the proxy war, in a sense, ended in 2025 when Iran. attacked Israel directly. Another mistake, I think, on the part of Iran. And then came Rising Lion and Midnight Hammer and this year's war where enormous damage has been done to Iran. I think for the Gulf Arabs, there is a huge question here, as there is for Israel, which is, what is American policy going to be under President Trump and with two and a half years ago, under potential successors. But we can start with Trump.

Is he a nightmare for the Gulf Arab? Is the president actually going to let Iran take over the Strait of Hormuz, such that every Gulf oil producer is in their thrall? Is he going to lift sanctions and unfreeze assets so that Iran can rebuild its economy? Or is the United States going to maintain a revolution? really tough line and keep Iran down at the levels that they are now. The Saudis, I think one could say, are hedging. They talk to the Israelis, but obviously it's not of the level that Israeli-Amerati relations are. Their rhetoric in the last two and a half years since October 7,

the rhetoric about Gaza and about Israel has been extremely tough. Their relationship with the Emirates has declined. And I don't think it's just that, well, Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayat are rivals. They don't like each other anymore. It's a psychodrama. That may well be true. Probably is true.

But the Saudis are not joining up for this Israeli Emirati, maybe Israeli-Emarati American, New Middle East. They are looking at a region in which the key power is really Saudi Arabia. And it's very striking to me because if I go back to the George W. Bush administration and previous administrations, the most powerful country in the Arab world, It was Egypt. If you wanted to get something done, let's say in the Arab League, you wanted Arab votes in the UN.

Talk to Hosni Mubarak. And Egypt is truly peripheral now. It's partly the product of poverty, of the general population. It's partly the question of how stable their own politics are. They did finally, it seems, send a squadron of. aircraft to the UAE in the last few weeks. Aircraft, which I think it's fair to say are useless, but are, you know, a gesture of Arab solidarity.

But today the question of who leads the Arab world is a Gulf question. The balance is completely shifted to the Gulf and its Qatar, the Saudis, the Emirates. And the Saudis, of course, look at these two tiny countries. the Emirates and Qatar, Qatar with about 600,000 actual Quddery citizens. And they've got, as I said, 30, 35 million people. And they think they are clearly the country that should be the dominant leader in the Arab world. And they are also in a way that the Emirates is not now doing.

they are now trying to build a relationship with Turkey. And they would like to exercise influence in Syria and in Lebanon in a way that the Emirates is much less interested in doing. So it's a real scramble. Are you one of those media strategy people clicking through slides, scrolling spreadsheets? Yes? Good. This is for you. Because on Spotify, there's an audience that's different.

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Spotify advertising. You're among fans. So let's, another question for you about a major regional power, and then I want to bring it back into the immediate neighborhood of Israel and go deeper on Lebanon. and Gaza, but Turkey. So if the elements of the new Middle East and the shifted balance of power since 107 are obviously an empowered Israel, obviously a weakened Iran.

We'll see how weakened. We don't know what's going to happen in the weeks to come, but objectively, there's no way back anytime soon to where they were on 106. An empowered Gulf with competition between the Saudis, the Qataris and the Emirates, the Emirates, the Emirates that we've just discussed throwing their head in with the Israelis. Syria gone in its former Iranian satrappy form reemerged as a Turkish satrappy. Turkey. That's my next question. Where does Turkey fit into all of this as a threat on the horizon to Israel, also as a NATO

ally of the United States, a power like others in the Middle East that likes to play both sides of a lot of questions? What's your take there? Well, I'm not a Turkey expert, but it seems to me that Turkish foreign policy has not been very successful over these Erwan years. They had a very friendly relationship with Israel and it's gone. Erwin destroyed it. He has not been able to exercise any great influence in what let's call the Turkic world, the countries with Turkic languages in the Caucasus, for example, and the Balkans. He has not been able to exercise any significant influence in the Arab world either.

The great, you know, fear on the part of the Turks is that there should grow up to be a Kurdish state. But what have we seen in the last year or so? discussions about arming the Kurds to help bring down the Islamic Republic of Iran. So what has Turkey gained? A difficult relationship with Syria, which is also worried about the Kurds, difficult relationship, hostile relationship with Israel. No great influence in the Arab world. they seem to me to be because of, if I can put it this way,

their aggressive posture to be in a fairly defensive situation. No close allies in the Arab world, hostility to Israel, considered to be an unreliable friend, obviously in an anomalous position in NATO. So I see the Turks as sort of hanging there and maybe waiting for the post-Aerwan period to see what kind of policy

they want to pursue. Do they, for example, want to go back to being a reliable NATO ally of the United States? Do they want to join the United States and Israel and some of the Gulf Arabs in a closer relationship with us and against Iran. I mean, right now I see Erdogan as having achieved essentially nothing but a kind of isolation of Turkey with his foreign policy. You know, there's two polls to this debate amongst, I would say, amongst pro-Israel people in Washington, D.C. I've heard the argument made.

I won't name names. You might associate it with some names of mutual friends of ours. That actually Turkey is increasingly central, whether it's through its new role in Syria, but also because of its role in the Ukraine conflict, where it plays a kind of clever game of balance, but certainly sees, it seems to me, the survival of Ukraine is,

as in its broader interest. Obviously, you disagree on some level, but what's your response to those particular points? The Turkey's, you know, yeah, it's playing a role and has formed a relationship with Ukraine, but I guess, you know, one answer is big deal. Everybody in NATO has or should have a supportive relationship with Ukraine.

Everybody in NATO should. Everybody in Europe should. So what would be more remarkable would be a Turkish position of hostility. Yeah, they're balancing, right. Erdogan wants a constructive relationship with Putin and with the Russians, so he's got to be careful how he plays Ukraine. He wants a constructive relationship with the Gulf Aradj who've got, among other things, locks of capital.

He's worried about, always worried about the Kurds in, Iraq in Syria. So, yeah, he's balancing all these off. But tell me which government in the world considers Turkey today to be a reliable friend. I don't think there is one. And I don't see why that is an achievement for everyone. So let's move south. You mentioned that the Lebanese government and the Israeli government are going to be in talks here in Washington, D.C.

Maybe explain a bit for the audience. I mean, it's an odd structure, right? Because Israel, to my mind, and I think to their mind, is not at war with the state of Lebanon. Israel is at war with Hezbollah. So what is to be achieved at these talks? The Lebanese government has a pretty weak track record, I mean, in general, but specifically when it comes to taking a tough line on Hezbollah.

Where does all that stand and where do you think it might go? Well, step back for a minute. and we should state that Hezbollah dragged Lebanon into a war with Israel. There was no reason for it, and it wasn't a decision of the Lebanese government or army. Hezbollah did it, and attacked Israel, and as a result, the Israelis are now attacking Hezbollah, mostly in southern Lebanon, but not entirely in southern Lebanon, also in the Beirut area, also in Beka Valley. And the Lebanese government says, stop. You're right in saying that two of the three relevant parties are in Washington, the government of Lebanon and the government of Israel talking to each other.

And I think what will happen is they'll agree. They've already agreed that as I'll say in a minute. I'm not an optimist about this. They've agreed a hundred times. The formula is that the government. government of Lebanon and the Lebanese army will take over full sovereignty of Lebanon, including right down to the Israeli border. And as they do that, Israeli forces pull back. Israel stops acting in Lebanon. It stops hitting Hezbollah targets and allows the Lebanese government to take those

targets with a base, an armory, a village from Hezbollah, and pulls back the forces that are now in Lebanon back into Israel. That's the right formula. And what will come out of the talks in Washington is a restatement of that formula, and in my opinion, it will go nowhere. I'm really quite pessimistic about this in the sense that I think this is the best opportunity because of the weakening of Hisbalah by Israeli attacks. This is the best opportunity the Lebanese have had maybe in 20 years to take back their country and they're not going to do it.

They're not going to do it because it would mean taking on Hisbalah. It would actually mean fighting. There will be moments where Hezbollah agrees to pull back from this location or that. But ultimately there will come a moment and ultimately, meaning in a matter of weeks or months,

where Hezbo will say no. And it would be incumbent on the Lebanese army, Lebanese armed forces, L-A-F, to fight. And they're not going to do it. Now, the excuse is, we don't want a civil war. I understand that. But the question is, who rules the country? Is it Iran or is it the government and people of Lebanon? And they are, in my opinion, not willing to stand up to that. So to take back their country, to take back their sovereignty from Iran because Hezbollah much more than, say, Hamas, much more than the Houthis in Yemen, Hizbala is an arm of the Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon, which created it, which built it.

Are they going to be able, are they going to be willing to fight to take back their sovereignty? And I think every indication is that the answer is, no, they are not. So the current situation, I think, is likely to obtain for really the foreseeable future. The only answer to it is the end of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yeah. Yeah. And we'll finish with Iran because I do want to get your thoughts on what the road ahead there is. But the situation you just outlined with Hezbollah in Lebanon has a real parallel, of course, with the remnants, the well-armed, at least with small arms remnants of Hamas in Gaza.

and there's a common theme here to Trump administration, foreign policy in the region and hopes for peace, which is in both cases you have an armed group, Hezbollah and Hamas, on the ground, and peace is going to require someone to disarm them. The Israelis are willing to fight in both cases. America actually restrains the Israelis in both cases. The Lebanese, as you just, I think, persuasively outline the case.

The LAF is not going to disarm Hezbollah. There are no obvious parties available other than the Israelis to, quote-unquote, disarm Hamas, which you and I both know means going back to war with Hamas. So I guess to land this in the form of a question, what are we doing here? We're trying to, the administration is pursuing with all kinds of structures and, you know, there's obviously this Board of Peace with Gaza and these plans for future development, but there's an armed group of millinarian thugs on the ground who, they're not going anywhere. What do we doing here, Elliot?

Well, I'm not critical of the administration, not very critical in either the case of Lebanon or Gaza for trying. And I think the idea of getting Lebanese and Israeli officials to meet in Washington, talk to each other face-to-face about, for example, the border. That's fine. as long as the position of the United States government is, we understand that Hezbole is a terrorist group and that Israel is right to be striking it and preventing it from attacking Israel again. Same thing in, and that is our position right now. Same thing in Gaza.

I think the idea of, you know, put aside that President Trump is supposed to be head of the board of peace for the whole rest of his life. The idea of trying to put something together, I think, is fine as long as we acknowledge that the Israelis have the right to continue to try to erode Hizbollah and prevent its recomposition. And that is the American position. I think what we're seeing now is Israel has half of Gaza and Hamas has half, more or less, it may be 55, 45, 45 under the control of Israel. I think the next step, frankly, is going to be to try to do some rebuilding in the Israeli governed half of it. Hamas is very much against this and is trying to prevent it, trying to prevent Gazans, for example, who may wish to move at some point to the Israeli part

or prevent now workers who would be involved in construction projects in the Israeli half, which is largely depopulated, Hamas is blocking that. But I think we have the right policy for right now. It's tragic because in both cases, you've got the government of Lebanon, unable to control its own country because of an armed group that takes orders from Tehran. In the case of Gaza, you have no self-government, by Ghazans, you have an armed terrorist group, which is running the half of Gaza where most Gazans live. But as long as these groups exist, as long as they're willing to kill to promote

their ideological agenda, then the United States should be doing essentially what we are doing, which is saying to the Israelis, we get what you need to do militarily. Meanwhile, we're going to experiment with ways of getting people talking to each other about a potential better day. So as promised, let's finish with the great unresolved issue of what the heck we're going to do about Iran. We've talked here on School of War ad nauseum. I worry about the audience getting bored with the strait of Hormuz, with which I've developed an obsession. But I think it's a justified obsession because to me the whole question resolves around the future of the straight. Kind of like the analogy I keep trying, Elliot, is it reminds me of those final months with

the hostages in Gaza how the presence of those hostages just completely scrambled and aside for extremely important humanitarian human considerations, that strategically the presence of those hostages in Gaza just scrambled the whole calculus, frankly, inflated the importance of Gaza in Israeli strategy. disadvantaged Israel and the moment, to me, what are the great diplomatic achievements of the 21st century so far, those last hostages were freed. Everything was just better strategically for Israel and the enemies of Hamas, including the United States. Similarly, with the Strait of Hormuz.

If traffic could just be restored, everything would be easier when it came to dealing with Iran. There'd be more freedom. There'd be more time. I don't know if you assess the issue of the strait as centrally as I, or being as central as I do. There's obviously other important issues when it comes to thinking about Iran. But what are we going to do here? What would you advise be the road ahead? I see the best realistic outcome now as an agreement essentially only on the Strait of Hormuz

and the American blockade of Iranian ports. Those are a match. I don't think we're going to get a peace deal with Iran. I hope we do not seek to get, you know, another JCPOA because I do not want to see American sanctions on Iran lifted, which would only enrich the regime and abandon the Iranian people. I'd like to see is what I call a removes deal. Iran agrees the straight is open. It's an international waterway. There will be no tolls. We agree to lift that blockade. So all shipping, Iranian, American international shipping, can go through the Strait of Ramuz as it was, let's say, a year ago. No deal on anything else, including the Iranian nuclear program. And I think the president should say, I think I've proved that I mean it when I say

they cannot have a nuclear weapons program. And if I see them trying to get the highly enriched uranium out of Isfahan and other places it may be buried, if I see them trying to reconstitute the problem, I'll hit him again. And obviously there would be discussions between the U.S. and Israel and at certain points the President might prefer that the Israelis do it alone rather than it being a joint military operation. My think the best realistic outcome is just open the straight and as to the rest, the President reiterates what American policy is and reiterates his willingness to do it.

The alternatives, I think, are much worse because they, involve an end, first of all, endless negotiation with the Islamic Republic, which will, as always, cheat with respect to the nuclear weapons program and its missile program anyway. I would do a bare bones or moose deal. Elliot Abrams, that was a real tour to force and tour of a Middle East that has changed so dramatically

in the last two and a half years. Grateful for you, as always, coming on the show, and I hope you'll come back soon. I'd be delighted. Thanks for inviting me. Hey, y'all. It's Kelly Clarkson with Wayfair. Ever order furniture online and wonder what if? Like, what if it doesn't hold up? That sofa was four days old. You should have ordered from Wayfair. With Wayfair, there's no what if. Just style you love and quality you can trust.

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