School of War - Ukraine’s Top Drone Commander on What the Pentagon Keeps Missing

Episode Date: August 4, 2026

Yuri Fedorenko has spent four years turning a volunteer rifle company into the 429th “Achilles” Brigade, one of the most lethal units in Ukraine’s Defense Forces. Today,  he joins School of War to discuss how the battlefield has evolved since Russia’s full-scale invasion: improvising with commercial drones in 2022, scaling a unit that now hunts targets at an unprecedented scale, what life is like on the front lines, and what the U.S. military can learn from his unit’s drone revolution. This interview was originally conducted in Ukrainian and has been translated and dubbed into English. 02:23 – Yuri Fedorenko on Returning to War 05:08 – Building a Volunteer Unit Overnight 07:37 – Discovering the Power of Drones 09:18 – The Birth of Achilles 11:14 – Ukraine's Drone Revolution 13:12 – How the Unmanned Systems Force Works 17:43 – Why Drone Forces Punch Above Their Weight 18:59 – Inside Russia's Rubicon Drone Unit 21:35 – Beating Rubicon 23:04 – Lessons America Must Learn From Ukraine 25:29 – Why the West Should Train in Ukraine 26:54 – Why 20th Century Warfare Is Obsolete 27:20 – Drones Alone Cannot Win Wars 28:14 – Ukraine's Final Message to America This episode of School of War is brought to you by Maven Smart System, the builder platform for the American warfighter, fielded across the force and live on the frontline today. Learn more at palantir.com. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This episode of School of War is brought to you by Maven Smart System, the builder platform for the American warfighter, fielded across the force and live on the front line today. Maven Smart System isn't just software you use. It's the platform you build on. Every day, thousands of uniformed service members use AI coding agents to build their own agentic applications across all warfighting functions on top of the DOW's integrated ontology. What once took a contract in a year, now takes a warfighter and an afternoon. Administered by OSWCDAO, powered by the Palantir platform. One platform deployed everywhere at all classifications. Build at the speed of war.

Today's episode, another interview I recorded while on the ground in Ukraine earlier this year, tells the story of the war there from the perspective of a brigade commander in the new unmanned systems forces. Major Yuri Federenko. It's a fascinating tale of how the equivalent of, in effect, a pretty rag-tag National Guard infantry company, evolved in combat to a brigade-level force dedicated to unmanned warfare, innovating and incorporating new technologies to the point where in 2026, it's a major operational factor on the battlefield. I spoke to Major Federenko in the area of Kharkiv, where his Achilles Brigade was fighting. He himself is a fascinating figure, a politician turned warfighter whose job is to navigate the politics of Ukraine's armed forces as much

as it is to navigate the battlefield itself. This conversation really opened my eyes to the sheer complexity of the military situation and the nature of the evolving war in Ukraine. And I hope it helps your thinking along too. Let's get into it. It is a perspective for war. This Lockhean region away. December 7, 1941, a date which will live in infantry. A bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a state. We continue to face the rain situation in France. We'll fight on the beaches. We shall fight on the landing ground.

We shall fight in the fields and in the streets. We shall never have no rest. Hi, I'm Aaron McLean. Thanks for joining School of War. I'm delighted to welcome to the show today. Yuri Federenko, he is the commander of the 429th Brigade, Achilles of the Unman Systems Force. Sir, thank you so much for joining the show. You seem like a young guy. Tell me about yourself. Tell me what you were doing before the war.

No, actually I'm not that young anymore. I'm 34 years old. This is my second time experiencing the war. I served in a specialized unit of the National Guard of Ukraine until 2015. When the war began in 2014, I took part in the fighting. I firmly believe that if the enemy had been pushed out of eastern Ukraine, crane at that time, the war could have ended. I was wounded in 2014, and I was discharged in 2015 for health reasons. From 2015 to 2019, after being discharged from the army, I started my own business. My military brothers played a key role in supporting me. We built a business focused on interactive smart homes, which provided enough for my family, and allowed me to help

those still serving. Who needed help the most? In 2019, after Vladimir Zelenski, became president, I was invited to join a political movement. Given my military experience, I ran for the parliament, but I didn't secure a seat. Instead, I became an advisor to the defense committee. It was a crucial role. Then in 2020, the community in Kiev placed their trust in me, and I was elected as deputy in the Kiev City Council, where I still served today. In the second half of 2021, it became clear there would be an escalation in the conflict. Well, I didn't believe there would be a full-scale war at the time. I was positive that the enemy would escalate the offense in the Donetsk and Lahansk regions.

In response, the parliament passed a law to create territorial defense units. One key provision allowed those with health limitations, like myself, to serve again in territorial defense. This was for a reason, as it gave me thousands of other good and experienced soldiers a chance to return. In autumn 2021, the law was passed. By early 2022, I signed a contract as a reservist. Kiev City Council deputies, we developed a program to create training grounds and facilities for territorial defense. When the full-scale war began on day one, we formed a territorial defense battalion and went into battle. You know, I'm old enough to think that 34 is still kind of young,

but you've lived more life in those 34 years so far than most people ever will, it seems to me. So you join the reserves, you pass this law, the full-scale invasion begins. What's your path from that moment to Achilles. In the first days of the full-scale war, we formed the 128th Battalion under the 112th Brigade of Territorial Defense, including the Fourth Company. I wasn't the commander, but due to my experience, I took on additional responsibilities. The company had 100 volunteers, but only about five had real service experience with firearms. The other 95 had never served and didn't really know how to use a weapon.

We gave them a short three-hour crash course in basic training. The next day, on the 25th, we deployed in the direction of Jietelmere. Part of our company was tasked with defending the Chica airfield to prevent a Russian airborne landing. I, along with others who had combat experience, carried out separate operations in the Jitlmere area to stop the enemy. After the Kiev operation, our unit was redeployed to the Kharkiv region. Our company was stationed near the city of Chehuyiv, and our sector of responsibility was the frontline village of Basilevka. Our task was to hold the line and prevent the enemy from breaking through and occupying the village. Our anti-tank weapons were extremely limited.

Just two in-laws, one javelin, a few RPG-5s, that was it. The war looked like this. For four days straight, the enemy would demolish localities and our positions, with artillery, rockets, and tanks with threat. hits, then came the assault. Three to four armored vehicles and 15 to 40 servicemen pushing forward. We would repel the attack and then it would start again. Days of bombardment, followed by another assault. This cycle repeated from February through May. It was one of the hardest periods of the war. But during that time, the people around me, many of them civilians with no prior experience, became real soldiers. Everyone understood that preparation was likely the key to survival. We had

teach ourselves how to use the new weapons, including Western systems like javelins, often just by watching videos on YouTube. And I'll tell you, I know you have more to say, but before you do, I've interviewed a number of Americans who are fighting here with Ukraine. Some of them veterans of our highest level special operations unit, every single one of them has said, I thought I knew what war looked like because of Iraq, because of Afghanistan. It's not the same thing. There's only war when both sides have artillery. That's war. We realized we needed new solutions

just for the personnel to survive. It was obvious that with the amount of people we had, sooner or later they would break through our defenses, causing numerous losses among the subunits. So watching videos online, calling friends and other units, some of them were already dead, some wounded, some still fighting, we began hearing about drones,

small UAVs like Mavics, that could be used to show us what was right in front. front of us, where the enemy was and what he was doing. There were tools to drop some explosives or a grenade or guide artillery fire through them. Natalca Angels brought this to our battalion from the film industry where they operated drones for music videos and films. When we launched our first drones, the entire battlefield opened up in front of us, and we realized the enemy wasn't as scared as we had imagined, and their numbers weren't that big. We decided to connect with the artillery of the 92nd Brigade as we were in their area of responsibility.

They only had older Soviet artillery with very limited ammunition. There was no Western artillery yet. So we carried out our first operation. We would identify targets. They shoot. We informed them about where they reached. They adjust their fire and we carry on. In the first operation, we were able to destroy a command vehicle on an APC 80.

We destroyed two enemy positions, including a mobile headquarters, and burned a fuel station, which they stationed on the territory of an old Kolkos. Everything started burning after our first operation with the artillery. Witnesses say they saw it from as far as Kharkiv. The Russians burned really well. Everything became clear then. Drones gave us a real advantage, a way to survive, and a way to execute our combat mission. I imagine that there were a number of companies on the front lines during the Battle of Kharkiv

or just during the fighting in 2022 in general that are innovating, realizing they can use these off-the-shelf drones for ISR, yours wasn't the only company to come to that conclusion. How does your company become its own battalion, its own regiment, and now a brigade in this new organization, the Unmanned Systems Force, for which we have no counterpart in the U.S. military. This is a completely alien idea for us. So, yeah, how does this innovative, scrappy company figuring it out to survive

become Achilles and what it is today? The task wasn't only... only to survive, but also to destroy the enemy on the battlefield. And everybody clearly understood the Russian boot on the Ukrainian soil meant killings, rape, hunger, humiliation, and the destruction of everything connected to a normal human life. So there was no way back for us, only forward applying pressure on the enemy and making it impossible for them to continue fighting against Ukraine. That meant weakening Russia as much as possible, both militarily and financially.

We had no other choice. This understanding became the driving force that allowed the unit to grow from basic rifle unit to one of the best units in the Ukrainian defense forces for locating and destroying the enemy. By 2025, the unit had ranked in the top five among unmanned systems units and within the top 10 overall across all units in Ukraine. Talk about how you're organized. Again, this idea is totally alien in the United States. We don't have this, a unit that's just devoted to the combat employment of the unmanned technology and innovating within unmanned technology, sort of without limit, right? Talk about the introduction of the FPV drone onto the battlefield.

Do you remember when you first became aware of this? What did you see and how did you start to integrate it into what you're doing? At the beginning of 2023, a decision was initiated by Chief Commander Zilluzini and made by President Zelensky to create specialized, strike units focused on unmanned systems as part of assault brigades. They were called the Company of Strike Unmanned Action Corps, or Unmaned Companies. We, in territorial defense, as the infantry unit that had gone through the Kharkiv counterattack, we reincorporated into the 92nd Brigade and got ourselves a non-stop ticket to the war, entering a specialized subunit. At the end of

2022 and the beginning of 2023, we began using our first FPV drones. We only received five drones per month from our guys in the special services of Ukraine that could carry under 500 grams of useful load, but it marked the beginning of a new phase in the war. In the specialized unit, alongside Mavix came fixed winged drones, FPV drones, and heavy drone bonners, what the enemy called Baba Yaga. It was a different range of unmanned warfare that was raw, but already could destroy the enemy. In defensive operations, we can detect the enemy before they even reach our positions and strike them with drones, artillery, or both. In many cases, they're destroyed. They're before ever making contact. In offensive operations, drones give us full awareness of where the

enemy is, how they are positioned, and how to coordinate our fire. We use them to guide artillery and attack drones, strike the enemy's infantry, and send in our assault units. This approach defined how we fought from 2023 on. It didn't replace traditional tools of intelligence, but it became a critical part of modern warfare. By the end of 2023, we had become one of the best companies of strike unmanned aerial systems. That success came from the team and its work. Everything is people. Because of those results, initiated by the commander and chief Zelensky, the unit was expanded, from a company to a battalion. In 2024, we continued to grow and became one of the top performing battalions in the defense forces. And by early 2026, the decision was made

to expand again, this time into a full brigade with up to 6,000 people. Now let me continue answering your question. You asked why the new unit was created and how all of this works. I'll explain the logic in broad strokes without going to details that the enemy could use. Droned subunits inside mechanized or assault units hold the front line and prevent the enemy from advancing, and within those units, there are clear divisions, or there should be. Within a brigade, each battalion has its own area of responsibility, and its UAV units operate within that sector. Brigade-level drone units work even deeper beyond the front line, though I won't be more specific for obvious reasons. At the Cors Little, those operations extend deeper still. This covers the entire

front line from zero to roughly 25 to 30 kilometers in depth. The unmanned systems forces were created for the following purpose to carry out operational and tactical missions, from roughly 25 to 30 kilometers out to 100 to 200 kilometers, as well as strategic missions against targets such as oil production facilities, weapon manufacturers, and storage depots. At the operational and tactical level, roughly 25 to 30 to 100 to 200 kilometers deep inside the Russian Federation. The task of unmanned systems forces is to destroy radar systems, air defense assets, reconnaissance drones, and frontline logistics. The less equipment and personnel that reach the front, the lower the intensity of the fighting.

By doing this, we create the conditions that allow Ukrainian UAVs to penetrate even deeper. From there, the mission expands from the operational and tactical level to the strategic level, which is the core purpose behind the dedicated unmanned systems forces. And another important part of our work is creating conditions and clear paths for Ukrainian cruise missiles, missiles like High Mars, that attack on an operative level, as well as assembling the use of foreign ballistic missiles like Tomahawks, so that our citizens stay alive and don't get attacked. We are asking again you and American society, through you,

please see missiles like Tomahawks not as what damages the enemy, but as what gives life to Ukrainians, because the more enemy equipment and infrastructure we destroy on their territory, the less they're able to strike our kindergartens, maternity hospitals, and residential buildings. I explained in broad strokes how responsibilities are divided. The ground forces are primarily responsible for targets from the front line out to about 25 to 30 kilometers, while the unmanned system forces operate from roughly 25 to 30 kilometers out to a strategic level, engaging the categories of targets assigned to them.

You may ask, why do the unmanned units work in the front from 0 to 25, where the land component was supposed to work? The answer is, the reform of the military structure into a core system is ongoing in Ukraine, and not all units have full capability. In particular, in unmanned operations, some corps have already developed a strong capacity, while others are still building and training, which takes time. So, until the process is complete, unmanned forces support operations across all. levels, both assisting in the front line and continuing work at operational, tactical, and strategic depth. With the expectation that over time in 2027, as structure matures, responsibilities will become more clearly separate. This episode of School of War is brought to you by Maven Smart System, administered by OSW CDAO, powered by the Palantir platform.

Maven isn't an app. It's a builder ecosystem. Right now across the joint force, thousands of uniform service members are pointing AI coding agents at their hardest problems and building the tools they need themselves, targeting workflows, intel products, battle management. No ticket, no vendor, no wait. The warfighter closest to the fight is now the one building for it. That's how you fight at the speed of war. So I'm sure when you show up on the battleground with your very unique set of capabilities, sort of like an Air Force, except you also have unmanned vehicles on the ground and can do

maritime work as well, so it's more than an Air Force. I imagine you're pretty popular with Ukrainian units. I also imagine you're pretty unpopular with Russian units when your teams show up to support on the line. I've read some reporting about Rubicon and Russian efforts to target Ukrainian drone teams and the personnel. How does that work? How effective is it?

What countermeasures are you taking? how does that particular dual function on the battlefield? I'll divide the question into two parts. First, it's the effectiveness of Ukraine's unmanned system forces commander, Commander Madjar, and the commanders and the teams that make up the unmanned force. The numbers speak for themselves. Personnel in the unmanned system forces account for only about 2% of Ukraine's military. In other words, for every 100 Ukrainian soldiers, only two serve in unmanned systems.

If we look at the budget for 2025, the picture is similar. Out of Ukraine's roughly 800 billion herivnia defense budget, the unmanned systems forces receive only about 15 billion herrithnias around 2% of the totaled military funding. Yet despite representing only 2% of the personnel and funding, the unmanned systems forces are responsible for approximately 35% of all enemy losses inflicted by Ukraine's defense forces. For 100 infantrymen, 35 would be destroyed by the unmanned systems forces. This is an unprecedented level of efficiency. Nobody else in the world is producing results like this, with such a small share of manpower and financing.

As a result, the enemy is naturally trying to counter us. I'll explain how. Now, what did the enemy do? First, it's important to understand that none of this would have been possible without the support of our partners. Financial assistance and equipment provided by our allies became that, pill that was able to cure a lack of certain tools right in the moment. What did the enemy do? Their approach is relatively straightforward. They have more manpower because for us it's capital, but for them, it's resource. First, the Rubicon subunits, they recruit young, technologically

capable personnel who can quickly think and their priority is Rubicon equipment. Second, they receive priority access to equipment. Better drones, better technical solutions. Everything that's better is for them. The third factor is the most important. Unlike us, Rubicon is not focused on a wide set of missions, not from the front line to a strategic level. The way we do it, while the army accumulates capability. Because they have more people and prioritized equipment, Rubicon was able to focus on two objectives. The first is disrupting logistics. When Rubicon deployes to a sector, it immediately works to identify and control the key supply routes. In most areas, there are only a handle of roads connecting front-line positions to the rare. Rubicon places those routes under

constant surveillance. Every five minutes a drone flies by, making it difficult to move personnel, ammunition, or evacuate wounded soldiers. The second objective is to blind Ukrainian forces. They target our reconnaissance drones and take away our eyes or ability to see, and they target our drone operators and strike system to take away our ability to fight. To accomplish this, they have a lot of Electronic warfare, signals intelligence, reconnaissance drones, strike drones, additional supporting aviation, who work on a single solution. But they are only solving two assignments for which they are quite successful.

We, a specialized subunit Achilles, encounter Rubicon frequently, and there is an ongoing duel between our unit and theirs, which at present, I believe we win most of the time. But of course, in some cases, the enemy is successful, and we should admit that. We study how the enemy modernizes the enemy modernizes their technology and the way they organize their subunits and how they determine assignments. We constantly monitor the enemy. They are a serious opponent, but they can be fought.

And we have demonstrated that repeatedly. We, as in both unmanned forces and the defense forces, altogether. You may not be able to answer this question. So just say so if you can't. But I'm curious, when they do win, what are the key tools or mechanisms that allow Rubicon to win? and how are you thinking about defeating them as this fight develops? When we go to a sector too late, Rubicon concentrates its subunits in main sectors

where Russian forces are preparing offensive operations. If they arrive before us, dig in, establish their positions, set up their systems, and stabilize their operations, then the situation becomes very difficult. And we are blocked. The enemy gains advantage.

Our greatest vulnerability is, logistics. The most dangerous moment is when we're moving into position, bringing in equipment, trying to establish ourselves, and digging in under fire to be able to reach Rubicon. Those are the moments when the enemy has the advantage and can catch us. If Rubicon is already established, they can control the roots we need to use and make it extremely difficult for us to operate. In those situations, they have the tactical initiative. Taking it back is very difficult. We have to get into position under fire, establish ourselves, conduct reconnaissance, understand how they're operating, locate their systems, and destroy them. But if we anticipated their arrival and got there first,

if we were able to dig in, establish our position, and build out our system before they arrived, then they lose that advantage. You've been very generous with your time. Thank you. One last question for you. For this American audience, a lot of military in the audience, what's the most important thing for this audience to understand about the war in Ukraine that they may not appreciate from a distance. I'll answer your question, but first, let me ask you one. And I'm happy to spend more time with you if it helps more Americans understand what we're doing.

But first, tell me, what kind of sport do you like the most? Me personally? Yes. I was a rower. When I was playing, watching sports, I watched all kinds, but when I was playing sports, I rode, you know, racing boats. And one more question. In your opinion, who is the greatest athlete in history? It can be from the Olympics, but who stands out to you the most? My favorite is a man named Stephen Redgrave, who rode for UK

because he had five gold medals in men's eights. And I don't know if you know him, but the reason why I was so impressive is that was five different Olympics. So 20 years of gold medal dominance. Let me ask you this. If you wanted to compete with that athlete, would it be enough to study everything about them? How he trained, how he prepared, how long he spent on that, who they trained with, to watch all his performances, analyze all his potential competitors? Would that be enough to beat them?

No, of course not. The same applies in war. I could spend all day talking about anything, but I need to draw attention to what the enemy did, what Russia did. To understand this current war in Ukraine, you have to go through it. What did the enemy do? The Russian Federation brought in around 10,000 North Korean soldiers. For the 10,000 soldiers, there were about 1,000 NCOs. They lost over 8,000 soldiers in combat against Ukrainians,

but their higher-ranked officers, their junior officers, and sergeants learned a great deal about how to counter drones, how to hide from them, how to use them, how to apply them effectively on the battlefield to accomplish critical results on the contact line. Upon returning to their home countries, They wrote large tutorials, and now those officers and sergeants that fought against Ukraine are training North Korean soldiers and soldiers from, let's call it, other allied with Russia countries, because this kind of knowledge can only be gained through real combat, and unfortunately our enemies understand that very well.

That's why Ukraine is kindly asking for support from its partners in Europe and the United States. Please help us with people. Give us soldiers who will not necessarily stand on the priority areas, but who can free our resources so that we can defend our country. and by fulfilling war assignments, you will get the best frontline experience of contemporary warfare in the world. This is the largest conflict in Europe since the Second World War. If, for any political or geopolitical reasons, you can't make this decision here and now, but I'm sure you'll decide to do this as time goes by when it's unfortunately not as effective, now you can take experienced officers, reservists. Not necessarily those who are serving in the USA and send them to Ukraine as volunteers the way Russia does.

Your officers and sergeants will have personnel. They will fulfill assignments and will write detailed tutorials on how to fight and how to prepare the army. You will carry the most progressive experience in warfare. Both the USA and European countries should do this. If you can't give us your soldiers directly, give us your retirees and those who will get paid just to fight against the Russian Federation. Then you won't just get an oral recommendation from me, but experience that might help save lives of citizens of the USA and the civilized world overall. This kind of experience is critically important for you. The United States hasn't fought a war on this scale since the Second World War.

You mostly took part in local conflicts, but in conflicts like this, with Russia, the drone systems are absolutely necessary. We talk to many different generals from the North Atlantic Alliance. They think, we have F-16s, we have Tomahawks, precision weapons, the best air defense in the world. But with countries like Russia, it's not going to work that way. They have tools to respond and to respond harshly. Therefore, to provide a good result, you should learn the drone system. Most likely, you'll have to contribute finances, reconnaissance, and people who will have to participate so that Ukraine can prevail. The traditional 20th century approach to warfare and the doctrine you are currently following,

unfortunately are not possible in a war against Russia. We can't hit a drone that cost $50,000 with a missile that cost $2 million. For this, new technologies are needed that are cheap and functional. To conclude, I don't want you to come away thinking that drones are everything. They are a critical part of modern warfare, but you still need air defense, missiles, artillery, ballistic missiles, even rifles. A full system working together that's necessary to fight an enemy like the Russian Federation. At some points, the enemy has 15 soldiers for our one soldier, but they can't break through because modern methods of warfare allow to destroy them on an industrial scale. When we talk about the line of contact, we should talk about a number of measures,

These are preparation of the battlefield, power generation tools, towers with various means of reconnaissance, surveillance systems, electronic detection, as well as echelon to technical countermeasures, tightening of communication means fiber optic cables on positions and so on. This is where the battlefield preparation starts, and only later in this environment the crew completes the task when the drone flies and it destroys something. But we have learned in Ukraine we can share. We are very grateful to the American people and to the American government for helping Ukraine. We can teach you how to survive. We must do this. But first, you have to come and work with us. And then we come to you and work with you.

That's how results are achieved. I'll end with this. A fool learns from his own mistakes. A wise person learns from the mistakes of others. I'm calling on you to be the wise ones. Colonel Yuri Federenko, commander of the Achilles Brigade of the Unmanned Systems Force, I'm honored that you took the time to speak with me in my audience and took time from your incredibly important duties to do that. Thank you for that.

Thank you for fighting for your country and for freedom. Thanks for coming out in school war. Together to victory.