Scott Horton Show - Just the Interviews - 10/31/22 Lyle Goldstein on the Danger of Fighting over Ukraine and Taiwan

Episode Date: November 2, 2022

Scott interviews Lyle Goldstein about the danger posed by escalating conflicts in Europe and the Pacific. First Goldstein, who correctly predicted the February invasion, gives his account of where the war in Ukraine stands today and where it’s likely to go. He and Scott then talk about some of the important details for listeners to understand about nuclear weapons and nuclear war. Lastly, they discuss the growing tension over Taiwan. Goldstein is worried that the war in Ukraine mixed with the promise of greater western military aid for Taiwan years down the road will convince Beijing that now is the best time to invade the island.  Discussed on the show: “Threat Inflation, Russian Military Weakness, and the Resulting Nuclear Paradox: Implications of the War in Ukraine for U.S. Military Spending” (Cost of War Project) “Don’t Rule Out Diplomacy in Ukraine” (Foreign Affairs) Thirteen Days (2000) Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy by Andrew Cockburn “The Scary War Game Over Taiwan That the U.S. Loses Again and Again” (Real Clear Investigations) Lyle J. Goldstein is the Director of Asia Engagement at Defense Priorities. He is the author of Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry. Follow his work at The National Interest. This episode of the Scott Horton Show is sponsored by: The War State and Why The Vietnam War?, by Mike Swanson; Tom Woods’ Liberty Classroom; ExpandDesigns.com/Scott; and Thc Hemp Spot. Get Scott’s interviews before anyone else! Subscribe to the Substack. Shop Libertarian Institute merch or donate to the show through Patreon, PayPal or Bitcoin: 1DZBZNJrxUhQhEzgDh7k8JXHXRjYu5tZiG. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

All right, y'all, welcome to the Scott Horton Show. I'm the director of the Libertarian Institute, editorial director of anti-war.com, author of the book, Fool's Aaron, Time to End the War in Afghanistan, and The Brand New, Enough Already, Time to End the War on Terrorism. And I've recorded more than 5,500 interviews since 2004. almost all on foreign policy and all available for you at scothorton dot for you can sign up the podcast feed there and the full interview archive is also available at youtube.com slash scott horton's show all right you guys introducing lyell goldstein he's formerly at the u.s naval war college he's now at defense priorities and at the uh watson institute at brown university the cost of war project and all of that Welcome back to the show. How you doing, Lyle?

I'm doing great, Scott. Good to be back with you. Good to have you on the show. And, man, you wrote this really important thing that I read the whole thing of. Threat inflation, Russian military weakness, and the resulting nuclear paradox. Implications for the war in Ukraine for U.S. military spending. A few major points here, but let's start with, you got it right on this show that, yeah, they're going to invade all right. And I was skeptical because it was something that the U.S. government said. And actually, I did think my main argument was the decent one, which was that William Burns is going to see a peaceful resolution to this somehow because if there's one person up there who knows what he's doing,

it's the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. That's pretty good, but apparently not. But anyway, so I give you credit for that. You definitely saw that the line had been crossed. And I think, as you said on the show, it was the attempted, uh putch in belarus in was it 2021 that uh really was the final straw for moscow before they moved uh on ukraine here um but so um i guess yeah i mean i i remember distinctly in that time frame i think it was somewhere around 2019 even that uh puttin started talking about red

lines and you know i mean he's he's not going to use that word unless he means it and um i don't think it was recognized with adequate seriousness. By the way, you know, I follow China too, and they're also using this word a lot. And I think they know exactly what it means. And there's a failure to take these things with adequate seriousness, I think. But, you know, my view that the war could have been prevented by wise diplomacy, but that was fully lacking in my view. Yeah. Well, and I'll brag that at least the original version of the book that I'm working on now, which was a speech that I gave in 2020, that I had asked you what you thought of it, and you said you endorsed the thing. So that's the minimal version of the same speech that I gave right just a week after the war began. But

essentially the same narrative being that Bill Clinton and W. Bush and Barack Obama and Donald Trump and Joe Biden got us into this mess. Yeah, it's very sad. You know, I, I'm always explaining to people that there's a lot of paranoia, you know, nationalism, and, you know, a lot of delusions on the other side as well. But, you know, Russia, as I point out in this research that I just published is, you know, it is a, Russia is certainly a great power, but a weakening one. And that's been true for a long time. And, you know, but, but, you know, I think it's well known that powers that are, you know, facing very difficult circumstances will be inclined to making desperate move. So that's what you have in Ukraine.

All right. So, and those are, I guess, kind of the major points of the study right is one, we don't need a big buildup because we can see that Russia clearly is not a threat to. Poland or probably even Lithuania or something, right? And also that this paradox that you're talking about, geez, if they don't have much of a conventional force, what does that leave them with? Yeah, yeah, exactly right. I mean, these, I mean, I honestly, I kind of hesitated to write this study because I thought the points were so obvious, but I, you know, maybe it's not, you know, the people need to reflect on the fact that if you look,

at the Russian military power and the aggregate, if you put aside nuclear weapons, that Russia's military is weak and has been weak for decades. I mean, you know, there were whole, literally were for more than a decade, you know, Russia hardly built any warships or put any aircraft into its Air Force. So I mean, you know, we shouldn't at all be shocked that it, It's, you know, that these forces are not performing well in, you know, in this Ukraine war. Now, I will say some of us, you know, including myself, probably overestimated Russian military capability in some respect. But in general, you know, this is a force that has been plagued by accidents, you know, that have been occurring right along. Yes, occasionally, you know, they'll come out with a new fighter or something like that or a new submarine.

So it's not to say they have no capabilities at all. That's, you know, people often say, you know, Russia's military may not be 10 feet tall, but it's also not two feet tall. That's right. You know, but, you know, the main point that the U.S. defense budget is something like 10 times. that of Russia. And then when you throw in the NATO aggregate defense budget, and by the way, that does not include Japan, which Russia is very worried about Japan generally. And Japan has quite strong armed forces, although they don't call them armed forces. They call themselves defense forces. But, you know, in other words, Russia fully manns up its Pacific fleet and guards

its Pacific frontier, you know, quite carefully because I'm worried about it. But I'm not even including that in these aggregate figures, but if NATO aggregate defense money, something like 20 times, not quite, but almost 20 times that of Russia, then you appreciate that Russia is from a military standpoint in quite a desperate circumstance. And by the way, part of Russia's military weakness on the conventional side is that they do put a lot of resources toward the nuclear side. I mean, the amount of Russian military people working just on nuclear weapons is very large, but again, this is partly a result of their, um, um, in, in what they consider very inadequate, um, conventional military forces.

All right. Now, so there's a couple of things here when it comes to the current war and the threat of nuclear weapons. I mean, first of all, I think it's important that we have, you know, quote unquote, adults such as yourself talking about the risk of nuclear weapons. warfare here because, I mean, sorry to be a jerk about it, but just from the point of view of John Q. Public, and I was raised this way, so I know that this is right. That essentially no nukes means like hippies with signs outside, but not experts in suits who know about this

stuff. And all the wonky wonks at their think tanks have a very smart nuclear weapons policy, thank you very much, and don't need advice from a bunch of liberal hippie women out chanting in the street kind of attitude. So then when somebody like Henry Kissinger and George Schultz and William Perry and yourself say, hey, listen, these machines are really dangerous and they could be used and we need to be very careful about what kind of steps we're taking in a confrontation with a power like Russia. I think it's really important and I hope because of the social psychology of the situation. Wow, that's the guy from the Naval War College, huh? That people stop and take a listen. in a little bit different vein that it's not really a joke.

And, of course, my primary concern, and I learned this, I guess I had known this my whole life, but especially Daniel Ellsberg, is on about this, is the virtual impossibility of a limited nuclear war, where essentially once nukes start going off, everybody escalates until we're all dead, and there's essentially no way out of it. You might as well have Donald Rumsfeld sitting in every chair.

So, you know, I guess, but also let me go ahead and bring up the situation on the ground in Ukraine Putin says come on that's a bunch of propaganda just because I threaten to nuke you 50 times me and all my staff doesn't mean we're going to do it and you're just trying to pretend

that we need to do it when we have no need for nukes whatsoever and of course they would face plenty of problems if they did nuke Ukraine not least of which would be the east winds and the blowback the literal

back draft fall out onto their own territory. But anyway, so that's a lot to chew, but I know you can do it. So what do you say? Well, I mean, I think the risks are there. Listen, I'm very pleased to hear Vladimir Putin say at Valdi, I believe it was on the 27th, ironically, on the anniversary of the most dangerous day of the Cuban Missile Crisis. But we can talk about that. That had a little, that's interesting. But he did say fairly emphatically that Russia has no intention to use nuclear. weapons in Ukraine. So I find that statement encouraging because now, of course, you know, we know that

the Putin is not always telling the truth. You know, he's often playing chess. And, you know, I think it's fair to say on the nuclear question he's been talking about on both sides of his mouth, you know, on the one hand, offering very robust warnings that are clearly nuclear. And on the other hand here, denying that he has, and the way he put it was, we have no need to do that, which kind of leaves a bit of an out, right? Meaning if the need does arise, he would do that. So, you know, to me, on this matter of nuclear weapons, words are cheap, and we need to think deeply about interests and how the situation is evolving. and I remain extremely concerned about the nuclear issue. Before the statement, I must say I was my, how to put it, my concern had reached, if you will, a peak level.

Why? Because I'm watching this battle unfold in Gerson. And, you know, we all know very well that the forces in, the Russian forces in Gerson are supplied over that the wide river. It's, you know, it's a challenging situation for any, for any, for any, military and you know russia could face a kind of desperate situation now you know again do you really want a power with uh you know something like 10 000 nuclear weapons to be in a desperate situation i mean no you absolutely do not and i you know i must say i i think well i would like to believe that that there is no possibility to fight a limited nuclear war i wish that was the case that's just

it's not how I see it, you know, and we have to deal with objective reality. And the unfortunate truth in my view is that Russia is rather well prepared for a limited nuclear war. They have all the weapons in place. We, on the other hand, do not. And, you know, I'm somewhat glad of that because it suggests that our view, you know, that we are extremely reluctant to go there and we should be reluctant. But I can't say that Russia is reluctant. I mean... Well, the news law is...

Hold on. Let me walk that back. They are, of course, they're reluctant. They know they would suffer, you know, an enormous loss of prestige. You're right to point out the radiation problem. It's not a small problem. And, you know, so... And I think they would have to be utterly desperate to do it. On the other hand, I have documented, and those of you, you know, on my Twitter feed, you can see at Lyle Goldstein, you can see I've documented now probably nearly a dozen very overt calls from Russian hawks saying, hey, we need to use this now.

And by golly, it will be militarily useful. This is what they're saying, not me, but they are saying it will be military useful because Russia, you know, because, now the Ukrainian forces do have large concentrations of armored vehicles and infantry, and those can be dealt with with tactical nuclear weapons. So I guess, you know, I continue to be, I'm happy that Putin made this statement. I would like to see a lowering of tensions overall, just in general. I do think we, the more this war goes on, the more likely we are to see escalation to the nuclear level and um and you know there's so many ways that escalation could occur uh not just a russian first use because of a battlefield um issue by the way i one last thing i'll say here and

again you know we can chew through the details here scott and we should but um there was a study at naval war college unclassified so people can find this on google i think and i participated in that study uh naval war college we brought in the best uh best experts on both nuclear strategy and also on Russian defense policy. We put them in a room and asked them some tough questions like when would Russia ever use these things, that is tactical nuclear weapons. And, you know, the conclusions were very stark. I mean, on the one hand, they said Russia is extremely reluctant, you know, unlikely to use these in any scenario. However, there was one caveat, one scenario where they did see use as quite possible that was identified

as Ukraine and also noted that if Russia was losing on the battlefield and these losses were humiliating enough to threaten the survival of Putin's regime. I think we're in those circumstances. And that's very scary. I mean, I'm just saying this was all predicted and thought out by people who were not swayed by emotions who were just thinking logically through a set of scenarios back in 2019. And this is all in an unclassified study that's on the web. Well, I think the Director of National Intelligence confirmed essentially that same argument as their high-confidence assessment to the Congress in a hearing.

So that, yes, we judge that if they lose the war, that the Putin government might consider that an existential threat to themselves, therefore the state, therefore the nation. and take it that far right then and there. Right. And, you know, so I think if the U.S. is smart and our allies will play our cards correctly, we should be much more cautious, I think, and start to seek an end game. I just floated across my desk minutes ago a new article in foreign affairs by Preeby and Cherup, I think that is saying, you know, hey, you know, even if a piece in Ukraine is not right around the corner,

the United States needs to start laying the groundwork for a way to get there. So I haven't read the article carefully, but I intend to, but it's encouraging to see that a kind of blobby publication like foreign affairs that they're starting to discuss real, real diplomacy it's appalling that there is no diplomatic track with with russia right now it's that you know if there was one lesson from the cuban missile crisis it's that we must communicate with our uh opponent or adversary whatever you want to call it in especially in a nuclear crisis it's to me it's unforgivable that there's no that uh blinkin and labrov are not speaking on a daily base well i mean i think the only um communication between them is just the threat. If you use nukes, this is what we will do to you. That was the report is they

made it very clear. And then they've pretty much made it clear publicly what they would do that they would. And there's, you know, multiple sources saying this. David Petraeus notably was seemed to speak for the administration when he said that they would destroy the entire Russian military, conventional military in Ukraine and sink the Black Sea fleet. And that's after they're already using nukes. So we think they're going to do then. And, They just say like that'll work, though, trust me. Yeah, I mean, I've read some of those discussions and probably not all of them, but I don't find that threat credible because I think the United States knows that it would be,

you know, that would be the end of the planet. That's why, you know, to me, I just, you know, I'm not, again, I wish, I wish this was not true, but I do think in a way Russia has trumps here on the nuclear side. Why? Because they hold they hold substantial

superiority in tactical nuclear weapons. They have many thousands of these and they're easily deployed. We have a few hundred and they're not easily deployed. So that, you know... They're sending more now. And that is what they now...

They are, but you know, this is these are I can explain why I don't think these are easily deployed but in a word there these are air dropped weapons so that that requires

quite a bit of handling how insane is it that they're sending more tactical nukes to Europe right now in the middle of this crisis is that supposed to be some smart move

in a game of bridge or something that I don't understand well it's another to me it's another desperate move you know I don't think we I don't think

they're they're grasping for some kind of counter move here and you know they're looking for the right level to show resolve and capability without you know setting off an explosion but I guess just to finish my thought there is I think Russia has superiority in tactical nuclear weapons that's pretty extensive and moreover you know they have at least parity at the strategic level so I mean And unfortunately, I mean, my understanding of how this might look is a fairly wide-scale use of these things. In other words, I kind of doubt they would just deploy one or two. I think it would be more like a dozen. I don't know how the West would respond.

But if the West did respond, as you said, and I guess Petraeus has said, but smart people like Richard Betts, who I respect very much at Columbia, said, well, our immediate reaction would be like massive conventional strikes across the board. At that point, I would expect Russia to unleash part of his strategic arsenal, meaning, you know, taking out an American city or at least an American base, you know, to say, okay, is this where you want to go? You know, whether it could be stopped at that point is a legitimate question. I don't know, but that's kind of my picture of the stepping right up to the apocalypse. And, you know, I hope Americans realize just how.

incredibly dangerous this is. I mean, the president said, I think, on October, about October 6th, he said, you know, we are closer to Armageddon than we have been in 60 years. I mean, that is just a, it's an incredible statement and should make all of us reflect, you know, in my view, you know, Americans should be in the streets. Like, why, how do we get here? As a national security specialist, I'm incredibly embarrassed for my profession that we allowed this to get to this point. We should never have been here. And it's a, you know, it's a terrible day. We're not doing our job right. We're not keeping the American people safe if we're that close to Armageddon. So, you know, I'm depressed and

humiliated, but we try to carry forward and prevent the worst. Yeah, man. Well, listen, there's a couple of points here now one thing is about the current troop build up and force build up inside russia the conventional force the reaction to their loss of northern lehonsk in mid-September there and according to daniel davis who i know oh he's also at defense priorities your colleague there who i know that you guys know and respect each other's work then he's terrific he's such an ace yeah so he says there's a big conventional assault coming. And his only question is whether they're going to cut through Belarus and try to flank the Ukrainian forces in the West or not, but that it's coming as soon as the ground

is frozen and hard so they don't have to stick to the roads anymore. And they can just blast through like the Americans in the Iraqi desert and do whatever they want. And so I wonder what you think about that part. Well, I think that is possible. I mean, I have seen some signs of that, including, I think, what I believe in the last, you know, since Russian forces pulled back from Kiev and, you know, generally focused on Donbass, my sense is that. they have been holding a lot of forces in reserve now look people a lot of people don't realize but russia has to hold a lot of forces in reserve right because they don't know they may be at war with nato in a week um you know uh like i said they're worried about they have other worries

um not just what's going on the caucuses which is you know kind of dismaying but over in tajikistan and they have concerns uh in the far east as i pointed out so i mean russia just cannot leverage all of its combat power against Ukraine, that they must hold this kind of strategic reserve. Now, can some of those reserves be deployed as for a kind of new set of winter offensives? The truth is, I haven't seen any hard evidence either way. I mean, we have seen some Russian troops go into Belarus. My guess there, and it really is just a guess, is that those forces have been more of a faint kind of an attempt to have the Ukrainians believe that they have to watch their backs, that they also cannot put all their combat forces,

say, into Gerson that they need to hold forces back closer to the western border with Poland, just in case. So that's kind of how I read that. Now, you know, I guess it depends how, what kind of risk that Putin is willing to take. I mean, like I said, my overall evaluation is Russian forces are strapped and, you know, I don't see a lot of light at the end of the tunnel there. I mean, it's true that like I said, we haven't seen some of their crack regiments and their elite forces haven't seen them fighting much in the last four or five months, again, which may imply holding out for this later offensive, you know, trying to apply some of the lessons they've learned. Yes, using, you know, I have seen hints that, you know, Russia's eager

for the leaves to fall because once the leaves fall, then they can, you know, really take out a lot of the Ukrainian positions that are hiding in various forests and stuff like that. I mean, of course, that now kind of goes the other way, too, though, as Ukraine has more and more artillery systems, so forth. So, you know, and the cold also cuts both ways, right? I mean, you can, not like Ukrainians don't know anything about winter. So I'm not so positive that everything turns in Russia's favor this winter. If I had to, if I were a betting man, I would say we're going to see more stalemate. Maybe, I mean, Russia seems to have stabilized the line and seems to be again making incremental progress around Bachmuth. And I guess yesterday I was

the Russians are claiming a new breakthrough around Ugladar, which is near Zaporizia a little bit. So, you know, we can maybe surmise that instead of going for the ultra-risky strikes against the, you know, Western Ukraine or Odessa, that maybe Putin has taken kind of a middle ground, which would be to push hard and to try to capture more of Zaporizia. So that, that I think is quite plausible. But, you know, to me, I wonder if, you know, everybody looked at Putin's, you know, this land grab, if you will, the annexation of the four Ukrainian oblast. Everybody took that as an extremely aggressive maneuver by Russia. And yes, one can interpret it that way. But another interpretation would be they were looking to end game, meaning Putin is, you know, has.

has thought carefully about his next moves and doesn't see any great military moves. He understands that this is more or less a stalemate and he's just trying to shore up his support and claim his land, you know, these areas and wants to kind of move to a settlement. And, you know, they have been right along for the last two or three months. The Russians have been saying we're ready to talk. So, you know, to me, I don't know. I guess that's a long way of saying I'm uncertain. I think we shouldn't be surprised if Russia launches winter offensives,

but on the other hand, I don't think that they are, you know, a short thing. Sorry, hang on just one second. Hey, guys, anybody who signs up to listen to this show by way of Patreon will be invited to join the Reddit group. and I'm going to start posting stuff over there more. That's patreon.com slash Scott Horton's show. Thanks. Hey, y'all, Libertasbella.com is where you get Scott Horton's show

and Libertarian Institute shirts, sweatshirts, mugs, and stickers and things, including the great top lobstas designs as well. See, that way it says on your shirt, why you're so smart. Libertas Bella, from the same great folks who bring you ammo.com for all your ammunition needs, too. That's libretasbella.com. you guys check it out this is so cool the great mike swanson's new book is finally out he's been working on this thing for years and i admit i haven't read it yet i'm going to get to it as soon as i can but i know you guys are going to want to beat me to it it's called why the vietnam war

nuclear bombs and nation building in southeast asia 1945 through 61 and as he explains on the back here all of our popular culture and our retellings and our history and our movies are all about the height of the American war there in, say, 1964 through 1974. But how do we get there? Why is this all Harry Truman's fault? Find out in why the Vietnam War by the great Mike Swanson available now. All right. And by the way, in case it sounded like I was saying that Danny Davis said they're sure to win, he certainly did not say that. He was just saying the invasion is coming but in fact you could say he was even giving the ukrainians advice about how they might counter it in some of those pieces and people can read it uh danny at

1945 and i just talked to him last week anyway yeah i mean i mean you know one thing i'll just say there is and this is often left out somehow of the western analyses like like yesterday i think there was a big uh new york times piece about how you know how wonderfully successful the ukrainian military has been over the last two months and you know i think we do have to say that that they're these offensive moves into lugansk and um along the neper there near kheerson were quite impressive and surprising um and um show a lot of um how to put it you know let's face it military skill high morale you know you need highly motivated soldiers but i mean one thing danny the point he's made again and again and I have to agree with it, which is like, you know, in modern warfare

to expect troops to advance steadily without air cover and without superiority and artillery is a mighty and almost unbelievable task. So it's quite stunning what was achieved. However, you know, I think this, to expect that to continue is, I think, probably wrong. headed and in general like that New York Times piece from yesterday, you know, said a lot about artillery and spotting with drones. And yes, you know, Ukraine seems to have mastered that. By the way, the Russians also have gotten a lot better on artillery spotting with drones. So both sides, I would say are quite good at that now. But again, does that mean air power is not important? No. It's air power remains incredibly important in this equation. And the vast majority of the air power

here is Russian. And now on the diplomatic question there, are you saying that you think that maybe his annexation of Kursan and Zaproge is essentially so he can trade them away and just keep the Dombas, make that look like a compromise kind of situation? You know, I don't see that. I just, the way... Because that seems like biting off a lot and saying this is all officially Russian territory now. He's going to have to flood that territory with infantry to hold it forever, right? Correct. And I think... that may be a good way to understand the call-up of the 300,000, which is like, you know, Russia's moving to endgame. I don't think they have any great expectation that Zelensky and company

are going to sign on the dotted line. So I think they seem to be moving toward a, if I read it, the way I read it is they're moving toward a, okay, we're going to make a unilateral piece, meaning here's our border. It is these four provinces. Again, that might kind of explain why they're trying to nibble some more off of Zaporizia and close the deal in Donbass, which is what we're seeing, so that they can, you know, claim that they own the vast majority of these provinces. And then we settle into kind of a almost like, I guess you would call it a Korean peninsula situation where there's no formal peace, but the shooting stops. And that's what the Russians may hope for. I mean, like I understand in the Ferson,

and they've been using a lot of landmines. And I would expect Russia to deploy, you know, tens of thousands, maybe even hundreds of thousands of landmines to create just, you know, impregnable areas that, you know, that the Ukrainian army could not possibly march through, especially again, without air superiority. So I personally think probably they are moving in that direction. I suspect Putin and his advisors,

I mean, Putin is in a very, I think he's in quite a vulnerable situation. I think Russians are growing discontented with this. I mean, they've been discontented, but they're growing more discontented. And I think he, when the year anniversary comes on February, I guess, 24th, I think Putin will, if I had to step into his shoes, I'm pretty sure, which is not easy, but I think. He will probably have to say, I fought this for a year, we did our best, and here's what we got. And this is, we need to move on. The, you know, there's so many reasons why Russia is kind of under pressure now. And I think, you know, the quasi alliance with China, I don't know if you want to get to that,

but I think the Chinese are a bit nervous. And, you know, so to me, this. you know, Putin understands that a war that goes on for two, three, five years will lead to probably the end of his regime. Yeah. All right. Now, for him to climb down after a year and say, well, we did blow up a lot of their military and got some of Donetsk. I don't know if he's going to be able to do that. These politicians, right, it's the public choice theory where it's not about Russian nationalists. It's about his. I don't know if I agree with you there. I mean, look, again, it's not to, again, I watch a lot of Russian media so I can see what they're saying.

And, you know, the Russians will beat their chest and say, hey, we own Mariupil. We got them out of the Sea of Esau. We got the water flowing to Crimea. You know, we liberated, you know, we said we were going to rescue our compatriots in Danetska and Lukansk and more or less they did. And, you know, I'm just saying they, I think they probably could, you know, I don't know that they can hold. their heads high, but they will go home and say, you know, they did lop off, you know, in the end, what, 20% of Ukraine. And they regard this as their historical land that they have a right to. Would they like more? Absolutely. But I mean, I'm just saying, I, to me, you know, Putin has to be

more than a little nervous that his forces have been, you know, quite unable to break the military deadlock and you know so that doesn't and as you pointed out I mean just holding that the terrain he has got is going to be quite challenging going forward all right so I do want to talk about China and all that stuff as long as you got time I got time to listen to you say things but I want to stick with this for just a minute you mentioned strategic nuclear weapons and I have these pictures that I can't publish I promise the guy I'd never publish them because he doesn't have a proper copyright or this or that, but it's very high quality panorama photographs that his grandfather took of Hiroshima, I guess, a 360-degree view of the city completely decimated in high

resolution, just absolutely flattened. This is unbelievable. And so that's, I think, a 15-kiloton bomb there, which is, correct me if I'm wrong, that's like pretty high on the scale of a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon, right? Yeah, I think it was 19 kilotons maybe. But anyway, very close to your estimate. Yes, you've got it right, Scott. Today, there are weapons that can be as low as five kilotons. But again, you know, so that's what a quarter of Hiroshima. So still a completely devastating weapon. But yeah, strategic weapons. Well, listen, a lot of people really don't know. A lot, people really don't know a lot about nuke. So can you explain the difference between the size of a Hiroshima bomb or Nagasaki bomb compared to what you're calling a strategic nuclear weapon here, a thermonuclear bomb?

Yeah, I mean, I don't have the numbers in front of me, but I believe, you know, the, if I'm not mistaken, the kind of standard strategic weapons are now, you know, 100 or 200 times what was exploded at Hiroshima. So, you know, there are true city busters and often thermonuclear warheads. And, you know, I think that mostly Russia considers its arsenal kind of allows. resort and they've never kind of entertained this idea of a strategic level nuclear war that that would be limited so i do believe they would target uh american cities and uh indeed they may have in mind a kind of uh warning shot uh you know that destroys one two three american cities as a kind of um you know a reminder of what uh devastation would follow uh it's a horrible way to think

but I guess I'm in the minority here, but I unfortunately think these limited war scenarios are there. I think our side has these scenarios and their side does. And, you know, isn't that the greatest danger, right? That instead of mutually assured destruction, it's we think we can get away with it. But no, it does mean mutually sure destruction, but it just means they try it and then we all die. Yeah. So that is absolutely why. I mean, Nobody knows what would happen. I mean, at the famous line, you know, General or Admiral, you know, I've fought as many nuclear awards as you have, meaning nobody knows what would happen. And that's why, you know, when these nuclear strategists, as you pointed out, when they get up on their high horse and say, here's exactly what would happen, you know, nobody knows.

And, you know, I hope some of your listeners might see the movie 13 days again. I just saw it again, you know, to honor the 60th anniversary of the, but I think it's quite a faithful tell. telling and you know uh about the cuba missile crisis yeah as a famous general le may and and kennedy uh going several rounds and and general le may saying oh russia will never never will never will never resort to nuclear its use of nuclear weapons at a strategic level because that would be you know national suicide and kennedy in the film at least and i think it's accurate uh kennedy uh you know dismisses the comment because he knows that the le may uh is just speculating. And, you know, are you going to put the future of the planet on somebody's

speculation? Absolutely not. And that's, you know, I again, I underline the point that we shouldn't be in these circumstances. It never should have come to this level. We should have fully understood that Ukraine is a more or less within the Russian sphere of influence and that we shouldn't muck around too much in that area. We certainly shouldn't consider coming to blows or or even anywhere close to it because of that. The same, by the way, apply the same logic to Taiwan. And if we do get into that mess and muck around and consider a use of force and so forth, that it would quickly escalate.

I mean, these are really, to me, this is just Strategy 101. And I'm shocked that people in my field are unable to assess that this would be the case and to act with all due caution, which they have not acted with that caution. That's why I think we're here. But, yes, absolutely, your scenario is the very darkest one. I guess mine is the next to darkest one, which is where this limited nuclear war does unfold with devastating consequences. You know, tens of millions might die in a limited nuclear war.

The planet would end in a full nuclear war, for sure. So Andrew Coburn has this great book on Donald Rumsfeld, his rise, fall, and catastrophic legacy. And they talk about how during the continuity of government exercises in the 1990s, he would often play the president. He was a former Secretary of Defense at that time, once in future, sec-def. And he would play the president and how he would lead the world in all the war games

to total devastation, even when they had built into the game different off-ramps from the war. Okay, we lost five cities, and they lost six, and now everybody calls ceasefire. Nope, he wants to keep going. And, you know, spread the war to China or whatever the hell it is. Can't let them be the beneficiaries of us and Russia blowing each other's heads off, right? So got to take them out, too, and whatever, just craziness.

And then there's just the whole doctrine of use them or lose them, right? That they're going to blow up our submarine pens. They're going to blow up our Minutemen silos. They're going to blow up our Strategic Air Command, all our Air Force bases. So we've got to launch those planes and launch them. launch those missiles and launch those subs and Polaris missiles and give them everything we've got before they can destroy it. And that's the kind of idiot logic that these brilliant geniuses have, this is their, you know, game theory. I wouldn't understand the algorithm, but it's so

smart that it means that they launch everything and kill everybody. Yeah, I mean, this is all correct. And the thing that's, I find quite strange is that in the Cuban Missile Crisis, Actually, we had vast nuclear superiority over the Soviets, and we were still exceedingly careful. Today, we don't have nuclear superiority, not at all. And we're absolutely, you know, I don't know any military analyst who doubts seriously Russia's nuclear deterrence. So, you know, so it's painfully apparent to all that this, we're considering the apocalypse and Armageddon, as President Biden put it recently. So if that's all true, then why aren't we stepping back?

And why, you know, I've always maintained that the only way to get to a peaceful solution in so many of these crises is for the stronger party to use restraint and wisdom. Because the weaker party is too afraid to show any kind of, you know, weakness. So to me, it isn't coming on the United States to be the wise one to be the, you know, to step back. If we can restrain our ideological impulses and think with our heads and not with our hearts, we would quickly come to the conclusion that we need an open line of communication.

We need to settle this mess in Ukraine, partly for the sake of the Ukrainians who are still alive and move to a working relationship with Russia that involves arms control, dialogue, and managing crises, including in the world economy, which we haven't even mentioned, but all these other, you know, second and third order effects of these kind of crises are there. I mean, in that cost of war study I did, we calculated that, or I calculated the United States has already spent the

equivalent of $10 trillion in $22 on nuclear weapons, on this wonderful vast arsenal we have. And that's set to continue this for, you know, for forever if we, if we continue with these kind of very risk-laden policies, you know, or we can try other approaches to our security. Yeah. So while, real quick, just parentheses for the listeners here, if you're not that familiar, you're kind of new with this. If you just look on YouTube, when you see an atom bomb test in Nevada, that's a little one. when they're testing it out in the Pacific Ocean, those are the big ones, the thermonuclear bomb. So go and take a look at that and see what we're talking about.

We're talking about leveling New York City, all five boroughs, as though it was made of paper and straw like Hiroshima was, and that kind of deal. So wrap your head around that. But then, so I want to get to what you're saying there about kind of, it's really the social psychology of Washington, D.C., is what you're talking about here, and of Langley and whatever, Northern Virginia,

where the Pentagon is, whatever county that is, that they call this every time so sick of this my whole life, oh, we're sleepwalking to war. Well, what does that mean? Everybody's awake. It's just they're stupid. And they're all essentially like a bunch of stupid college kids

in a social psychology experiment that says that we have to all agree on this stupid, horrible thing. I know what we'll do. We'll take the side of the Libyan Islamic fighting group. You know, Sarkawi's suicide bomber brigades against MoMar Gaddafi. Why? Because it's the latest fad. And we're sleepwalking to war

for al-Qaeda in Libya. Because that's what Samantha Power wants or something. And this keeps happening. And now we're talking, you know, a serious conversation here about the possibility of nuclear war. And this is what they say. We're sleepwalking to war, which just means that nobody has the balls to say what you're saying, which is blink into Geneva. What are we doing? How can we continue like this? As you put it, we, meaning the professionals there in the think tanks and so forth on the East Coast, you have a responsibility to keep me from getting newked and you're letting me down. And how come you're willing to say that and the rest of them won't? They would rather sleepwalk some more until we're all dead, Lyle. What's going on? Well, by the way, I have a

bit of a theory here that I'm working on that I, to explain some of this behavior, but it's not pretty at all. But I honestly, I think a lot of national security elites in this country, including in Langley and elsewhere, truly embarrassed by what transpired in the, you know, quote, endless wars, right? I mean, and what happened in Kabul was, was horribly embarrassing for them. you know after all we spent uh what at least half a trillion or something just trying to uh put the put the put the uh afghan government together so it could function and then it collapsed in a couple weeks so i mean to to cover up that embarrassment to to erase that stain uh which is as you know is much you know more about afghanistan than i do but it but it is so uh humiliating for our

country uh we need to some kind of grand distraction something to make us look good, feel good about things. And Ukraine has provided just a lovely example in many ways. And I do give credit to brave Ukrainians who were able to hold Kiev and so forth under difficult conditions. But we should have recognized that this would spiral into a disastrous morass, much more dangerous than Afghanistan and so costly. So, yeah, I mean, it's horrible. that we could get to this point, completely agree. I do, you know, I have to, this is such a dark conversation, though.

I want to remind people of a couple of positive things. One thing is President Putin said he would not resort to nuclear use in Ukraine. So I think let's underline that. So I think we may be at a better place this week than we were last week. By the way, I just came aware of a, if you want to talk about China a little, but Chinese signal, I take it as a trial balloon by a return. retired PLA colonel named Joe Bo, B-O is his, well, anyway, it's a difficult spelling in Chinese Z-H-O-U and then B-O. But he said that in the financial times, which is quite, I mean,

it's also a little unusual for him to write in the financial time. So I think this is a signal And China was kind of saying in this, or he was saying, Colonel Joe, that that China would look very, how to put it, be very upset if Russia were to resort to nuclear weapons. So it seems to be this even a kind of overt warning to Russia that it should not use nuclear weapons. So now there are signals the other way, too, that. that China stands by Russia and so forth, but I think that that to me probably is also positive signal shows that Beijing knows how serious this situation is, knows that China also loses if there's a Russia-U.S. nuclear war and the planet ends, then that will be absolutely catastrophic for China as well. And therefore, maybe Beijing starting to step up and realize

it needs to also rain Moscow in a bit, even as it calls for, continues to call for peace talk. So I, you know, we could talk about China's role here, but I was glad to see that. Yeah, absolutely. We're going to change the subject to China in just one second, and that's a great segue. But first, I want to, on the last point, I just need your help because I think you're right. And I'm writing a book about this now, that same speech I'm turning into a giant book. But I'm going to have a section on that. And I already have at least one quote from Ben Rhodes, Obama's old guy, but I know there are a couple of others, but I'm collecting quotes of these goons saying, yes, we're pouring weapons into Ukraine because this is our redemption for what we did in Iraq and Afghanistan, never mind what they did to Somalia and Libya and Syria and Yemen, but they say, you know, this is a good war.

By the way, one more thing. So if you have more of those, like, please email me because I'm building a, like a stamp collection of Democrats saying, yeah, this is how we make ourselves feel good after all the terrible things that we did, is doing this other also even more horrible thing. Well, I mean, for my part, I would have said, you know, I think after the fall of Kabul, we will, any common sense American would say, could we please now close the CIA? Like, why are we giving these people all this money if they're, what they're doing is worthless? So, you know, the CIA is trying to say, hey, we can still support U.S. interest and do some good things in the world by saving Kiev and all this. But to me, you know, first of all, it doesn't wash away the stain of the last 20 years. And second, I think, you know, one reason we're in this pickle is because we decided that we were going to save Ukraine. And that meant torpedoing all attempts in negotiation, including the Minsk Accord.

I just another thing I wanted to comment maybe again somewhat encouraging our conversation has been very dark but I was in Annapolis last week at a conference was kind of a hawk's den I won't name any names but many many many hawkish voices there and I was I must say I was quite surprised how many of them were coming round to the point that look okay yes they all believe to the hill that that Ukraine needs to be supported and more weapons and billions and billions more for Ukraine. But they also said there has to be a eventually there has to be a settlement and seem to appreciate the huge damage to the global system and the global economy, even among all these hawks. So anyway, that's a little bit encourage me, I think. Yeah, it is. And now I'm sorry because I got to ask you to rewind one point too. Can you elaborate a little bit about how they torpedoed Minsk? Oh, well, I mean, I you know, I know you follow that closely as did I, but I mean, my own view is during that critical time, I guess as Trump was handing over to Biden, there was a kind of glimmer of hope right there

because I believe that was when Zelensky and Putin actually sat down together and with Macron and Merkel. And, you know, to me, that was a huge opportunity. you know, that was the negotiation in the Normandy format. And, you know, I applauded Merkel and Macron for putting that together, you know, trying to kind of knock heads together. I think the meeting between Zelensky and Putin was not a friendly one, but it was also, you know, they got to talk a bit. And that was the way forward. And as I read the signals from from Washington at that point, they were all thumbs down.

You know, don't bother with this. We're not at the table. You know, we just need to send more weapons. And, you know, the most immediate problem is that, God forbid, Zelensky, who was elected to make peace, might actually make peace with Putin. So that was the chance. And at that point, as I read it, you know, Washington wasn't even remotely favorable toward walking this forward. And the Europeans did not get the support that they needed, and both sides walked away and started to build up their forces for the war. So, I mean, it's very sad.

And that was the last chance, in my view, last serious chance. I do think Biden could have acted differently through the end of that diplomacy in sort of November, December, 2021. So maybe there were other chances, too. But to me, that was the Minsk did provide an opportunity to give the Donbass region substantial autonomy, but within Ukraine. And Russia probably would have gone along with that and buried the hatchet. But, you know, the Ukrainians, I think, were too stubborn. And we, we ultimately encourage their stubbornness by saying, hey, you just need more javelins. Sorry, hang on just one second. Hey, y'all, Scott Horton here for Tennessee hot sauce company.

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What do you think is the role, and I swear, we're going to get to China here in a minute. What do you think is the role of America's policy toward Germany in all this? Because, you know, I'm reminded of what Chalmers Johnson told me back 20 years ago or something. In the Cold War, the American's greatest fear in the world would have been a Berlin-Moscow, Beijing, access. In other words, for the Reds to take over Berlin. And once Germany and Russia are allied together, then they rule a world island. and American Britain are frozen out.

And so he who controls the pivot land, rules the world and all this stupid stuff left over from Alfred McKinder and all that. And I'm looking at Merkel back, you know, I don't know, 10 years ago, saying she wants the Eurasian home alliance with Russia. And as part of that, she wants to build this pipeline. I might as well call it the peace pipeline, not so that Russia could blackmail Germany, but so that they could be.

economically interdependent. And it's just funny to me because, I mean, first of all, you can tell me whether I'm totally on the mark or not. But it seems like if their biggest fear really is, like the worst thing that could ever happen would be an alliance between Germany and Russia, it seems like the last two times the worst thing that ever happened happened, it was a war between Germany and Russia. And it seems like even if Texans never got to sell another cubic foot of natural gas again, who the hell cares?

when you look at the opportunity costs for keeping the peace compared to having a war between Germany and Russia. And here looks like we might be dragging Germany into a war with Russia. And the whole thing is nuts. But I just wonder if you think that that's what this whole thing with Ukraine is really all about too, is making sure to prevent the peaceful relationship between Berlin and Moscow there.

Well, I think you've really hit on it, Scott, as usual. I mean, the German, the role of Germany in the future of Europe and in the world generally is of critical importance. And I think I give Merkel and even Schrader, Gerhard Schroeder, credit for, you know, they had a deep understanding, you know, going way back into German diplomacy to realize that, you know, that they, absolutely, Germany should never go to war against Russia again. I mean, that to me was the kind of bottom line plank of German diplomacy, and they were absolutely right. And they really have strayed away from that now and taken a more, much more hawkish line. And that's in line with sort of American diplomacy and American interests. And I'm kind of surprised that the German politics has not provided more of a buffer here, although, you know, although, you know, I do think

Schultz deserves some credit a little bit. He, I mean, he tried to, I think, do some last-minute diplomacy. He couldn't deliver, I guess. He has, I think, you know, of course, the Hawks say he's dragging his feet, but I think probably wisely drawn a line at German tanks. I mean, And he knows that the optics of, you know, hundreds or thousands of Russian, I'm sorry, of German leopard tanks surging across the Ukrainian plane is not an optic that supports German interests, you know, German, you know, how they identify themselves in the world. So I think that's correct. And I'm glad that he is kind of drawing a line there. I'm glad that he's taking off for China. I mean, he's trying to kind of hold the door open on kind of, in my view, to kind of a multipolarity,

which is really, I think, what the world does need and not this kind of bipolarity for the 1950s. I'm very disappointed in the current foreign minister in Germany. I think she is a, you know, she seems to have gone from being a, you know, somebody who would promote peace and more ecologically sensitive future, I thought that's what the Greens were about, apparently has turned out to be a big hawk. You know, and that to me just shows sort of, I don't know, the Germans are not very, haven't thought this through. Actually, I'm hoping to get to Berlin in the near future,

but I'm surprised how Germany has drifted away from its, you know, holding line here on what could be disastrous for Germany. After all, Germany really could, unfortunately, if this is a limited nuclear war, unfortunately, I believe Germany would be right up there in the crosshairs, unfortunately. Because we have nuclear weapons stationed in their country, right? Right, right. Exactly. And I just think, you know, it's going to take some guts, but Germany needs to step up here and play this kind of balancing game that they played quite successfully. You know, more or less, I'd like to see revival of Ostpolitik, where Germany, given its history, it's incumbent on Germany, not to send

tanks, but rather to promote diplomacy and economic interdependence, as you said, the pipeline was not a mistake. It was done very purposefully to preserve this critical relationship and that relationship should be preserved. Well, what does it mean that the president of France is calling the Pope and beseeching him to beseech Biden to talk to Russia? Things really are that desperate. I mean, it just sounds, I don't like being that alarmist. This is kind of part of the reason why I was like, I don't know if they're really going to invade because I hate it when I'm an alarmist and then my alarming thing doesn't happen. That's embarrassing. But then the president, the president, of France apparently feels like if he just calls Biden, that's worthless. So he's going to the

Pope. Is that an emergency or is that just something in the news cycle? And I just picked it out and put some importance on it more than it deserves or? No, I think I think you're saying something quite important. I mean, unfortunately, you know, I mean, in Europe, I'm tired of you telling me I'm right this whole interview long. It's really frustrating. In Europe, I think they're justifiably, their hair is on fire. I mean, from every point of view, economic, diplomatic, security. In the United States, you know, everything is sort of not hunky-dory, but, I mean, things are going okay, you know, and, you know, somehow I think, you know, Biden has set up this

kind of messianic struggle between authoritarian states and democracies and finds this kind of favorable to Democratic Party interests. So, and the Democrats seem to be, well, I guess we say all on board. So I mean, it's, it's very, very troubling and just shows, I think, immense failure of responsible authorities to understand the nuclear risks and to, you know, to walk back from the brink. And, you know, I mean, again, everybody's saying this, but it's right. It's like, how can diplomacy be a bad word? That it's just, you know. All right. Now, so obviously major points here about China and I won't keep you for another hour

but the headline is Biden sends B-52s to Australia and the threat they claim is that China and I like your interpretation of the comments of the great dictator over there at the recent commie party meeting

that they held and everything but Blinken says he thinks they're going to invade Taiwan by the end of the year and they have said forget ambiguity and one China, we're on the side of the sovereign state of Taiwan pretty damn much. And so, should we all be at death con too over that? That was the joke.

Go ahead. Well, I mean, my view on how dangerous this is is that it's very dangerous. You know, I've been saying this for a long time. You know, you talked about alarms, being alarmist and worried when, you know, when, you you know, your alarms are ignored or whatever. You know, I've been saying this guy is falling on Taiwan policy for for more than a decade. Oh, I don't mind that. The only thing that bothers me is when I'm too alarmist and the bad thing I was worried about doesn't happen.

Then I kind of look like a jerk. And I think sometimes I'm overly conservative when I should be more of a wing nut, you know? Yeah, well, I guess I'll call me a wing nut. I'm immensely concerned. I think there are reasons to believe that China would move against Taiwan earlier rather than later. And I'll spell out my logic in a second. But generally, I do think it's fair to say that this whole Ukraine war has given China quite a substantial scare. I mean, that's, I think, the conventional wisdom.

And I think it's probably quite correct. That is, you know, they've seen just how isolated Russia is in some ways, how the West can wield all these tools of financial power and so forth. And then they've seen how, you know, even a military that seemingly went where, you know, Putin is very confident and I think overestimated his military power. So, you know, all these things I think are bothering the Chinese. That's on the one hand. But on the other hand, there are a lot of disturbing trends here. You know, I think, I do think that the Chinese military is substantially prepared for the invasion.

I think that they are, you know, this is a country that has about almost five times the military budget of Russia. And, you know, like I said formally when I was describing Russia's military, Russia's military is stretched in like, you know, at least six or seven directions, only one of which is Ukraine. China, not so much. I mean, sure, they worry a little bit about India, but mostly China's military is bore focused on the Taiwan problem. And they can move those troops and be ready to go very, very quickly. I mean, so, and also Taiwan is much smaller than Ukraine. You know, people are really saying, you know,

it's been pointed out that Taiwan is about the size of Lukansk province, okay? And also, it can be cut off quite easily. So there would be no volunteers. So the weapons would not be flowing at all. in my view to to Taiwan in a crisis. So now, but here's my, the nub of my concern. I think Chinese have been watching all these javelins and stingers and hymars and harpoons, all of this stuff, you know, all this glitzy weaponry that we've revealed for everyone. By the way, that Chinese are busy scribbling, counter, you know, how do they learn the lessons,

how to fight against this. But more than that, I think there's a lot of concern in Beijing that If all these weapons, you know, all the weapons I just named are piling up in Taiwan, and by the way, most of these weapons, shipments are delayed because they're all going to Ukraine right now. So a lot of this weaponry doesn't arrive in Taiwan until 2026, 2027, 2028. So then China looks at the clock and says, now's the best time to go before all that stuff shows up there on the island. So that has really, I don't know if what. you want to call that the goldstein window i'm very concerned about the next couple of years on Taiwan and but i'm i'm concerned generally partly because i think china is building up its nuclear

arsenal there i don't have a doubt in my mind that the you know the leadership is is committed to this and you know if they if they unlike russia we're putin's in a lot of trouble because a lot of Russians have been killed and the economy is really suffering. In China, they've budgeted for all this. I mean, they're literally quite willing to lose hundreds of thousands of soldiers to conquer Taiwan. And that is kind of trumps. I mean, you know, so they have, not only do they have, in my view, they have the capability in balance favors China by a lot. But it's also an asymmetry of will, meaning they consider this a core interest, and most Americans can't find Taiwan on a map,

and that's not going to change. Well, now, is our Navy sleep sailing to the bottom of the Pacific here? In other words, they attack Taiwan, and it's automatic. All sleepy Joe Biden leans on the lever, and everything goes into motion, and then it's another slippery slope to nuclear war? By the way, I didn't mention that another reason why China made, choose to go in the next year or two is they may want to do this while the ukraine war is going on so

that's another factor uh i don't know about that but it's it's definitely a plausible idea i mean think about how much of langley right now i'd have to believe that three-quarters of langley right now is literally uh just watching back roads in ukraine all day and and that uh you know the the chinese realize that is advantageous to them because they're not watching back roads back roads in Fujian province, right? Yeah, but I mean, on the question of how certain the Americans are, that they would go to war with China over Taiwan at the drop of a hat, and there's no question about that. It's all in the blue notebook, and that's the one you pull off the shelf as soon as the war commences, right, or not? Well, I don't think so. I hope not. I personally believe that this

is a bridge too far, that this is not something that we should do. Yeah, but what's the consensus is what I'm asking, I guess. Right. Okay. Well, I guess there's a difference between should and would. Well, Biden has definitely made noises like that. You know, again, if you

look at the polling and things like that, you see a lot of that Americans are, there's no consensus among the public. So, I would say, the national security elites tend to lean forward on

this and say, yes, you know, we can handle this, particularly from what we learned in Ukraine. But I guess I'm arguing against that because I do think, as you pointed out, that not only might we, you know, lose a heck of a lot of ships, and I'm talking about literally half of our Navy, that that concerns me a lot, but there's a substantial chance that a lot of American air bases would be hit. I think the CSIS game, we got a hint of last summer, I think, showed something like 700 U.S. combat aircraft getting shot down. I believe that game probably underestimated U.S. losses. And my view is, yes, this absolutely could also go nuclear for rather similar reasons. And by the way, it may be the U.S. that has to resort to nuclear weapons to try to end this

on, you know, favorable terms for the United States. So, I mean, it's, you know, we should not go to war against another nuclear power. I mean, we need to use wise diplomacy to avoid that. And Taiwan is the wrong place to make a defense. You know, we have strong force in the Asia Pacific, and we have, you know, allies out there who are strong. But so I don't think we have to be particularly worried about U.S. national security or the defense of Japan or something like that. So why we would seek to try to defend an island that's 90 miles off of Chinese shores and has literally the title of the island of Taiwan in its constitution is the Republic of China. So, you know, why we would insist on getting involved in another civil war is.

Yeah, well, see, that's the whole key is, I mean, first of all, ever since Bill Clinton, we can get involved in the Civil War whenever we feel. like it, but also they refuse to accept that it's a civil war. They pretend that Taiwan hasn't been a part of China since the 1600s, and that it's, you know, somewhere near California's coast, not China's or something. But now, let me ask you this, because you are from the Naval War College. I know you must eat in the cafeteria with boys and all that, or you did before you changed jobs there. So there's, you got like a temperature on the consensus of the experts, and I know this can really cut either way, right? Either, yeah, let us.

at them because we're the Navy and we can kick their ass and we know exactly what their capabilities are and what ours are and we got great plans and we're so macho and look at us or it could be actually we ran six or ten war games and we lost every time and we got really sober and thought

man we don't want to lose aircraft carriers to the bottom of the Pacific Ocean have to explain to the president why he has to break out the age bombs now and so maybe they're a little older and wiser adults run of the Navy would try to advise the president that maybe he shouldn't get them into this mess or something i know i'm

just fantasizing here but i mean you have to know certainly a hell a lot better than me what they think about that whether they're just you know brash tough guys sleep sail into war or whether they actually might be preaching caution here because they maybe know better and don't want to drown well i mean i was i mean i you know from 20 years uh working for the navy i would say i i did hear a lot of both um so I know that's not a very helpful answer, but I mean, there's a lot of bravado and a lot of, you know, the idea that, I mean, military officers tend to take a view of like, you know, they're given a mission and whatever, they're not going to say they can't do it. They're going to say they will do it, you know. So that, I mean, it kind of, I think calls out the need for independent specialists to look at this, right, who are, you know, can apply some common sense. That's what I tried to do over time. I was not really involved in war gaming this out there, partly by design.

I just didn't want to be involved in that, you know, I go to China a lot and things like that. So I was tried to stay out of that. But I kept aware of public comments on that. And one of them, you can find, I think the name is David Akmonic in an article called Real Clear Investigations that came out in 2020. He was at Ram, but he was also an assistant secretary of defense. And he was very emphatic. He said, we lose every single game that we put together. The U.S. gets.

And I believe the phrase he used in that article is, we get our ass handed to us. So, you know, that was in, I believe that article came out, again, real clear investigations in 2020, I think. If you Google David Ocmonic, you should find that. I'm also quoted in that article. But he, you know, so I mean, I think Fareed Zakaria has alluded to this too. So other people have said this, that the game after game. Now, there was this recent game in CSIS, but it said the U.S. won, but suffered like horrendous casualties, including two aircraft carriers down.

Look, I generally, I think people in the know, including those in the Navy, realize this would be incredibly costly and that we need to try to use diplomacy if we absolutely can. I mean, if we, you know, we better explore all those avenues. So, but, yeah, I mean, as in any, I mean, the sad truth is that I think people realize that the, this scenario is incredibly helpful to the Navy budget. So, and by the way, the Ukraine war is incredibly helpful to the Army budget. So, I mean, you know, the Air Force is sailing on both of those wins. So, I mean, you know, unfortunately, the Pentagon and the whole national security elite is kind of addicted to these crisis and endless, endless crises, if you will.

And the great power competition floats all boats in the military industrial complex. So I, you know, we need some truth tellers out there to say this is just. not in the U.S. national interest. We can find ways to get along with Russia and China. Neither Taiwan nor the Ukraine are of certainly not core interests, but they really have no great value to U.S. national security, quite the opposite. They are drawing us inexorably toward wars and potentially nuclear wars.

So we need to define our national security differently, Scott, and, you know, that's one thing we're trying to do at defense priorities. All right, you guys, that is Lyle J. Goldstein. No wonder your big brother's official enemy. 1984 joke. Defense priorities and the cost of war project at Brown University,

which is such an important singular resource for the anti-war movement there. So glad to see you're affiliated with them. You guys, take a look at the long version of this. really worth to read, threat inflation, Russian military weakness, and the resulting nuclear paradox. Implications for the war in Ukraine for U.S. military spending by Lyle Goldstein from September the 15th, 22. Thank you again for your time. Lyle. Appreciate it. Thanks, Scott. Always

enjoy talking to you. The Scott Horton Show, anti-war radio, can be heard on KPFK 90.7 FM in L.A. APSRadio.com, anti-war.com, Scotthorton.org, and libertarian institute.org.