Scott Horton Show - Just the Interviews - 11/15/21 Lyle J. Goldstein on How the US Would Lose the Battle for Taiwan

Episode Date: November 21, 2021

Scott interviews Lyle J. Goldstein, who now works at Defense Priorities. Goldstein challenges the idea that a war with China over Taiwan would be fundamentally different from the war in Afghanistan. In fact, he thinks the U.S. had a better chance of victory in Afghanistan. He explains how China could render all U.S. carrier groups useless and force the Americans to rely completely on their submarines. But neither would that be a path to victory because of China’s anti-submarine capabilities. Goldstein also points out that it’s by trying to destroy these Chinese ship-killing missile launch sites that the stage is set for dangerous escalation. Discussed on the show: “Like Afghanistan, a War for Taiwan is Unwinnable” (National Interest) “The Scary War Game Over Taiwan That the U.S. Loses Again and Again” (Real Clear Investigations) “The War Nerd: This is how the Carriers Will DIe” (The Exiled) Lyle J. Goldstein is the Director of Asia Engagement at Defense Priorities. He is the author of Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry. Follow his work at The National Interest. This episode of the Scott Horton Show is sponsored by: The War State and Why The Vietnam War?, by Mike Swanson; Tom Woods’ Liberty Classroom; ExpandDesigns.com/Scott; EasyShip; Dröm; Free Range Feeder; Thc Hemp Spot; Green Mill Supercritical; Bug-A-Salt; Lorenzotti Coffee and Listen and Think Audio. Shop Libertarian Institute merch or donate to the show through Patreon, PayPal or Bitcoin: 1DZBZNJrxUhQhEzgDh7k8JXHXRjYu5tZiG. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

All right, y'all, welcome to the Scott Horton Show. I'm the director of the Libertarian Institute, editorial director of antivore.com, author of the book, Pools Aaron, time to end the war in Afghanistan, and the brand new, enough already, time to end the war on terrorism. And I've recorded more than 5,500 interviews since 2000. almost all on foreign policy and all available for you at scothorton dot four you can sign up the podcast feed there and the full interview archive is also available at youtube.com slash scott horton's show all right you guys introducing lyle j goldstein and uh do i have it right here lyle you are no longer at the naval war college but now you are director of asia engagement at defense priorities yeah that's correct Scott. Great. So you no longer have to begin everything you say with that you're not trying to speak for the U.S. government here. Does that also mean that they're no longer listening to you? I don't know about that, but yeah, it's nice to be no longer working for the government. I'm a bit

more free to speak my mind and and, you know, spending my time as I like. So it's good. Yeah. All right, good. Welcome to the semi-free world. All right, now, big important piece here. Like Afghanistan, a war for Taiwan is unwinnable. Now, so, geez, I don't know. Those are entirely different categories of war, right? A war with China would be a big, fun, naval thing with big guns blazing and stuff, rather than patrolling postoons in their neighborhoods down in Sanjin or Marja, right?

so what's the parallel here well scott thanks and thanks again for having me it's good to be back on your show um right i i you know i deliberately uh grab this um this comparison because i think um a lot of americans want to act like the situations are completely different part of it is right It's, you know, a land campaign versus a naval campaign. But, I mean, look, these are still all our people. These are American servicemen. And to my estimate, actually, this war over Taiwan would be much more bloody and probably less winnable. That is, if we really wanted to conquer those posthum villages and control them for the next 500 years, we could,

it just took more effort than we wanted. But I don't even think if we wanted to put all our effort at controlling Taiwan, we could do it. We simply don't have the requisite firepower. We also don't have the will, but I'm just saying, in my view, why are the two situations eminently comparable? It's not just that there are two unwinnable wars, albeit of different types. One is a sort of counterinsurgency campaign. The other would be a classic conventional war mostly. But bottom line, though, Scott, is these are civil wars.

And that's, I think, what people don't quite get is civil wars are different than interstate wars. And in civil wars, all kinds of strange things happen. But, I mean, the bottom line is what my observation in civil wars is that you're talking about entities that are willing to, you know, to basically give. sacrifice everything in order to achieve their objectives. And that was true in Vietnam when the Viet Cong were, you know, willing to sacrifice millions, basically, to win the day. And they did. And more or less, it was true in Afghanistan. And I'm afraid that's true here, too, where basically the entire identity of China is wrapped up in this question of Taiwan. Americans, you know, we haven't really grappled with this. But I believe the Chinese

have. And I'm afraid we, you know, we are looking at a really bad situation if we don't yield to some realities. So that's where I'm at, Scott. All right. Now, a couple of things here. Well, first of all, just right there, it sounds like, you know, I'm sure you're familiar with the various arguments about the somewhat nuanced and complicated history of Formosa and the native population there. And actually, I guess I I did read, may have been something that you wrote here, I forget now, but recently that China first incorporated Taiwan in, was it the 1670s, 100 years before American independence from Great Britain, something like that.

Yeah, yeah, but that it's gone back and forth and, and, hey, the Taiwanese don't want to be ruled under the Communist Party, which is a Communist Party after all, and that's kind of another complication here but I think it sounds like what you're saying is that all that is moot because what really matters here is what is the Chinese Communist Party on the mainland's point of view

and their point of view is they're taking this island back huh right I mean at some level it is just an issue of power and um you know I'm a realist and I think power matters a lot of power is probably I don't know of any given political international problem

if power seems to be about 80 to 90% of, you know, determining the outcome in most cases. But, you know, it's not, but there are other factors, right? Moral factors, factors of national identity, things like that. And in this case, those are quite important. And I think Americans are very a historical. You know, they don't, you're not particularly interested in the history of Formosa. And for good reason, it's an incredibly complex picture. My judgment, you know, I've taught a lot about this and done a lot of reading on the subject.

And my conclusion is that the island is more Chinese than not. Let's put it that way. And the Japanese did rule it for 50 years. That's absolutely true. But, you know, look, the Japanese went on a, basically on a rampage of conquest that our country knows about, you know, very well, right? It almost included Hawaii and included a lot of East Asia. So, you know, we're well aware of that. And Taiwan was part of that sort of orgy of conquest, if you will. And that was well recognized by both President Roosevelt and also

President Truman. And literally, they codified their assessment that Taiwan was Chinese. You know, they said in the Cairo Declaration and in the Potsdam Declaration, both. They said it, you know, it's very easy to find, you know, Formosa is part of Chinese territory. It must be given back. So they said that unequivocally. So, you know, it'd be one thing if either Roosevelt or Truman had said, the fact that they both said it tends to mean that it happened to be true. And that was America's understanding. So I don't, you know, we can't suddenly rewrite history and go back and say, well, actually, we didn't really believe any of that, you know. So to me, the history is important. Americans should acquaint themselves of the history. We can't just say it doesn't matter.

But as you point out, and maybe it's all beside the point because China's going to do what they're going to do. And there's not much we can do to stop it. Now, I saw a thing recently, I guess it's probably a year so old, but it's John Mearsheimer, who's, I think, considered the dean or one of the leaders of the realist school of foreign policy in America from the University of Chicago. Not my realist, school. A little bit of a different realist than you, huh? Yes. So he says in here, one of the things that he says in here that I thought was really important was, well, what's all the debate about?

The decision has already been made, as he put it, by the American deep state. And that that means the admirals, essentially, the intelligence services, and I guess the major arms industries in their think tanks, they're defending Taiwan and it's not up to a vote it's not up to the Congress it's not really up to the present it sure as hell isn't up to a bunch of you know dissenters complaining about it after the fact in the media we will defend Taiwan and the Chinese need to know that and hopefully that will continue to dissuade them from trying it well I mean you know I think that's that's John's opinion

and I you know I consider him a friend so you know no disrespect to him but i think that's a bit um how to put it this this fails the the realist test in my view because um for realists we don't think that hope is a strategy but this seems to be seems to me it's very much premised on hope um rather than reality um you know it may be true that in some places in Washington, there is a consensus, but that's, you know, what, 8,000 miles from the Taiwan Strait. And I don't think those people have a clue. And I dare say, I'd say it, I don't think my friend John Meersheimer has a clue what the actual

military balance is in the strait. And the fact is there is no military balance in the strait. My assessment is China could take Taiwan probably within 72 hours. There would still probably be pockets of resistance to mop up after that, but it could be that quick in my estimate. So, you know, we can talk all about, you know, how to put it, the dislike consensus that's emerged, but I see very, very little to indicate that there's any kind of serious preparation by the United States to try, even if they were to try.

So, you know, we can talk about the various efforts that could be made. You know, I mean, there's a lot of discussion about, well, we can sell Taiwan this, and we can sell them that, and they can try this, and they can make it into Fortress Taiwan. Look, is a Fortress Taiwan kind of conceivable to me? I suppose. A Fortress Taiwan, in my view, would look. something like North Korea. It would have a lot of concrete poured all over the place. You know, I mean, in other words, you just have tunnel after tunnel after tunnel. And, you know,

that's really the only way. Now, is that sort of defense plausible? Well, I suppose. It might require sacrificing, you know, a quarter of the population of Taiwan, ultimately. But it might do the work. But, I mean, that kind of fortress Taiwan takes decades to build. then I don't see any evidence that that's underway. You know, Taiwan spends on a good year 2%, but often less than that. And they spend it on the wrong things. And all the evidence suggests they're not serious at all about defending themselves. So I really don't see, I see a lot of talk, but I don't see any real suggestion that Taiwan is defensible and will be defended.

Well, but maybe the admirals think that our carriers, battle groups rule the seven seats what the hell are you talking about we'll just send in the lincoln from here and the eisenhower from here and the nimitz from there and the gerald ford from over here and we'll kick their ass what are you talking about well right i mean i think americans like sports analogy so it is kind of funny to talk in those terms got but of course you know talking about americans getting killed so it's not you know it's a heavy subject but um The fact is, to my estimate, that carrier groups are almost worthless in a Taiwan scenario. The carriers are big, they're vulnerable, they're easily spotted, and they will be attacked by so many different vectors that they're more or less impossible to defend.

I mean, what are those vectors? They'll be attacked by China Submarine Force, which is nothing to sneeze at. There's, they will be attacked by a very large PLA Air Force and Naval Air Force. So, you know, literally we'll have hundreds of fighters coming at us and launching their missiles at extended range and whatnot. So, you know, this is a pretty ominous set of forces that are coming at us. And then on top of that, you will have a totally new weapon, or I could say even more than one type of novel weapon, but this would be the so-called anti-ship ballistic missile, as-bim as it's been called. Now we can also talk about hypersonic weapons.

So, you know, the prospect of that carrier making it anywhere within, you know, say, a carrier to be at all useful has to come within about 300 miles of Taiwan at least. I mean, it really has to come in closer than that. And to my estimate, there is really no way it could get that close. There's just too many, too much firepower. It would be too dangerous, right? I mean, are we really willing to sacrifice, you know, the 5,000 Americans on that carrier or on the escorts, right? I mean, how many people in a, how many Americans in a battle group?

I don't know, 30,000 or no, it couldn't be that many, but let's say 10,000. You know, they are going to be in a very precarious spot. So all that firepower to me, Scott, means that more or less the battle groups cannot go in, the carrier battle group. So who, you know, so the fight is left to submarines, essentially, and drones, I guess. and well that's okay but you know we simply don't have enough and they don't have the firepower and the Chinese spend all their time thinking about how to stop our submarine force because they know they're the only ones they really have to contend with so you know to my estimate Scott it's a there's no balance and this you know is you know what makes this really scary I think

is that this may well come true. I mean, you know, China has really been developing the forces it needs. And I think they're ready. I think they're ready more or less 10 years ago, but they're more, you know, they get more ready every day. I just saw today a new development, which is pique my interest. You know, one way that China will conquer Taiwan is by a very skillful use of drones themselves. Okay.

But they've developed specialized drones for their purposes, right? Different purposes than we have. you know, their drones are not like hunting down terrorists and, and killing them. Their drones are for carrying ammunition across the strait because those first couple lodgments of special forces say they're tough to reinforce. So they're going to fly drones in to get them the bullets and beans and bullets that they need to keep fighting for the first, you know, 24, 48 hours. And, you know, I've seen now very good evidence that they have those ready to go.

All right. But so, I mean, from the Naval War College, what is your estimate of the American Admiralty's estimate of the situation here? They understand the reality as you teach it or they're listening to... Hold on, hold on. I don't work in Naval War College anymore. And I just want to be very clear about that. I did work there for 20 years. I'm proud of what I did there, but that's in my past now. Yeah, no, but now it is. But I just mean, up until recently, I mean, do these guys read with you, right? And is there some kind of, do you have any indication that the admirals say to themselves that this guy, Goldstein, ain't too far off? And we've got to recognize that, or don't they, or what? Well, my observation, having worked many decades with the U.S. military is, you know, these people are, you know, they're military professionals. They're apolitical, generally. and they are, you know, the way they work is, okay, the president has given us a mission. We have these, you know, ships and platforms to achieve the mission, and we're going to achieve the mission. There's no question of can we achieve this? Can we do this? Is it, is the mission feasible?

It's not a question they ask. The question is how to achieve the mission with the resources they are given. And so, you know, what I fear here is, is one of the reasons this is a bit of a nightmare is I do think there's a lot of misperception here, a kind of thought that this is something, you know, our Navy rules the sea as it always has, and we have no worries. You know, the Chinese Navy can't stack up. So it's an island, you know, we got this. I think that is very, very backward thinking. you know, look, I think there is some inkling at the Pentagon that there's a problem. Let's put it that way. I mean, you know, you can read the comments of former assistant secretary of defense, David Okmanek. He was in a piece featured with me alongside in a piece for real clear investigations. I think it came out in early 2020 or late 2019. You can look it up. And he, Akmonic says in that publicly, he says, you know, we've done more than a dozen work. games and in every one, the United States loses these war games. So he said that, not me. And I,

you know, I think he's probably right. And I mean, that should be really troubling, right? I mean, if you run a war game over and over and over again and you lose every time, I mean, some people dismiss that as saying, well, it's just the military industrial complex asking for more money, I don't buy it. I think that's the real deal. You know, and I'm afraid, I don't. I don't don't think there is a technological solution. Now, Akmonic thinks there is. He says, well, what this means is we have to buy lots of fancy cruise missiles. They're called El Razum. There are sort of, this is one idea of how to destroy a Chinese invasion fleet. But I can give you my reasons why I don't think that that will work. But, but, you know, this, you know, leave it to

American technologists to, you know, take an impossible situation and say, hey, you know, all we need is the right technology and we can handle this. Well, I mean, you know, That's what they said for 20 years in Afghanistan. You know, we'll just build these. I mean, you know more about Afghanistan a lot more than me. You wrote the book on it. And, of course, you were right about everything, Scott. But, I mean, the point is, like these people said, we just need if, you know, we'll fight at night.

We'll kick down doors. We'll use special tactics. We'll use our, you know, fancy night vision goggles and our helicopters to ferry us around. And we'll, you know, use those heavily armored trucks to drive through. the valleys in Afghanistan. I mean, you know, there's always a so-called technical solution, but sometimes there isn't. And in my read of the situation in the Taiwan Strait is there is no technical solution to the fact that China is 90 miles off the coast of this island.

I mean, you know, imagine if some country tried to defend Cuba against the United States, if we wanted to take over Cuba, but just imagine Russia. Well, Russia figured this out, actually. actually, the Kremlin did, and they figured out the only way to defend Cuba was to put nuclear weapons on it. Now, we could put nuclear weapons on Taiwan. And actually, Scott, probably your readers don't remember. There was a day in the 1950s where we did put nuclear weapons on Taiwan. Eisenhower did that, and he did it very specifically because he knew that really was the only way to assuredly defend Taiwan was to put nuclear weapons on it. Of course, we removed those.

Why did we remove them? Because China said we had to as part of the. agreement to have a relationship. So way back in the 60s and 70s, this was all discussed, it was all worked out, we removed our bases, we removed our nuclear weapons, removed all our forces, and came to an agreement that actually, more or less, Taiwan is Chinese, and we were going to, you know, remove all our forces. So, you know, Americans somehow forgot all of that, but I think probably we need to rediscover it. Look, I'm not advocating that we surrender the whole Pacific to China, no way. But the Pacific is very large, and Taiwan is a particular case. We have defense agreements with Philippines and Japan. In my view, we should retain those.

I think we can reform those relationships. But, you know, what I'm saying is if China does conquer Taiwan, and they might, it's not the end of the world. It doesn't mean China owns the Pacific. We shouldn't panic and act like the sky is falling. It's just a little island off the coast of China. That's all it is. Well, a couple things here. Well, first of all, but the semiconductors. What about that, Lyle? It's not just an island. It's an island with really important computer manufacturing facilities on it. Well, that is an interesting wrinkle. I don't know that that really changes the situation. I mean, honestly, it may make it more appetizing for China, right? We can imagine they may have adjusted their war plan to account for the fact that they would like to not destroy that factory or those factories and maybe even try to capture those personnel, make sure they don't get flown out as the missiles start hitting. I could imagine that. But do I think, you know, this justifies the U.S. going into a catastrophic war, risking nuclear war.

risking a massive defeat? No, I don't think so at all. There are some contingency planning. It seems to be underway as far as I understand it, that the U.S. is seeking to kind of replicate some of this technology. I also, you know, people have wondered, and I guess I do too, you know, would the U.S. target these facilities if it, of course, comes to worse? You know, in other words, we don't want them to fall into China's hands. I don't know, though, that we would really stomach pummeling our ally here, or first-while allied, you know, during, as a conflict was erupting, just to, as it were, to, you know, that kind of scorched earth policy. I don't, you know, but to me, I don't think, I think those are commercial calculations

and we can wonder what would happen to the global economy, you know, I, look, if the U.S. in China go to war or China tries to conquer Taiwan, absolutely the global economy is going to have a major hiccup, I mean, if not total indigestion for a few years. But again, I don't think it needs to be catastrophic from an economic point of view. I mean, that is to say, you know, I think recovery would be quite possible. Look, Scott, I mean, you know, a lot of people say, well, Lyle, the problem with what you're saying is you're just basically saying, well, China's going to take it and there's nothing we can do about it. So you're just leaving them, these poor people to their fate. Well, I guess that's true in some respect. However, here's what I'll say,

is that, you know, my guess is if the U.S. were to kind of adopt a kind of position of clarity on this and just say, hey, look, we feel badly for you folks in Taiwan, but sorry, you know, we can't defend you and you're you're on your own. And if we were actually candid with the with the Taiwanese people about the situation in that respect, I actually think at that point Taiwan would say, would say, okay, look, we need to rethink this. And they would start talking with the mainland. Right. And now, now I know Americans generally going to be very skeptical of talking with the mainland, fine. But the fact is, there's a pretty good record of negotiated solutions to problems. And I don't think, you know, China's not that eager to have a bloodbath in the Taiwan

straight. And, you know, I do think this would entail a lot of people getting killed, both Taiwanese and Chinese. So, I mean, they'd like to avoid that. So I think a negotiated solution to this is quite within the realm of possibility if they were, if both sides were serious. And that, by the way, you know, people forget in 2015, the end of 2015, I think December, The president of Taiwan, Maying Joe, and Xi Jinping sat down and had a very cordial meeting in Singapore. So it's not that far-fetched, like the idea that there could be some kind of meeting of the minds, an agreement. Would Taiwan get everything it wants? Absolutely not, but probably China would neither.

It would be a negotiated solution. So I think that's probably the best way to go for everybody involved, including the Taiwanese, who are looking at, you know, if this war unfolds, want, a significant amount of Taiwanese people will get killed. You know, it's terrible. Hey, you all. It's the digital age, and dating is no exception. Well, DROM is a new values-based dating app. Pick deal breakers and deal makers to find like-minded people that care about the same core values as you. Drum can help you find your perfect match locally or anywhere in the world, and it's video only for more authenticity. Drum is free and available for Apple and Android phones. and tablets. To install the app in your browser, go to drom.date slash scott.

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And I'm glad you mentioned ballistic missiles. I mean, first of all, the sea skimming supersonic cruise missiles, the anti-ship missiles, I think just on the face of it, as you're talking about, they have a longer range than our F-18s. And so that pretty much is checkmate on the aircraft carriers. But then even on top of that, you mentioned anti-ship ballistic missiles. And this is something that carriers just have no defense from whatsoever. and are, I guess, the targeting is sophisticated enough now that you can go ahead and hit an aircraft carrier dead center

with a ballistic missile and sink that thing. Well, you're probably right in some respects. I mean, you're certainly correct to identify that I did not mention that the sea skimming cruise missiles, which are supersonic now. That's right. I mean, Russia really has pioneered this technology. And Russia is about to deploy a hypersonic cruise missiles, Zircon, which the Chinese do not have, but they want it really badly. And believe me, I think they may be depositing some red envelopes in Moscow to make sure they get their hands on the design.

But China does have supersonic, not hypersonic, but supersonic cruise missiles. And we don't. We do not have a supersonic cruise missile. We were funding one, but it didn't come to fruition. So I'm just saying you're exactly right that in many respects, our surface forces are really in enormous danger. You can't overstate that. And these cruise missiles, these supersonic cruise missiles that you rightly identify as a major problem, are fired by both Chinese submarines. Then they're fired also by Chinese frigates and cruisers.

And by the way, also small boats. They, their small boats can fire these. And then let's go one more step and all their air forces fire these weapons too. So we're talking about thousands of these supersonic exocets, if you will, attacking our carry group. And that's just, I did not realize that at all, thousands of them. Oh, yeah. And from all different platforms. Wow.

And from all different vectors. I mean, that's how you sync a carer group is, you know, I'm hypothesizing, of course, But I'm saying you take it from all these, all different vectors simultaneous. It's a, and you overload the defenses. I mean, and the ship's only defense against these things is a machine gun, correct? I mean, it's a badass machine gun. Well, I mean, there are other kinds of, you know, people have talked about different kinds of defenses for ships. I mean, and, you know, I mean, look, part of the counter argument is, well,

the ocean is really big. And targeting for these things is pretty hard. So, I mean, I don't want to say that it's black and white here. But, you know, look, let's use a historical example. That's the best evidence we have of the British fleet going up against the Argentines. This was, by the way, we're coming up on an anniversary, I guess, for that conflict from the 1982 it was. And the Argentines fielded a grand total of eight, eight of these exocet missiles. I think half of them hit with devastating effect. That's a pretty good ratio. You know, China would have 8,000 or 80,000 of these to play with.

So it's just, you know, I'm just saying. And the defense is, yeah, you might shoot down a few of them or you'd be able to use decoys and so forth. but some of them are going to get through. And, you know, another thing people don't realize is, okay, maybe it's true that one of these exocats or, you know, these sea skimming cruise missiles, perhaps you don't sink a carrier with one hit or two hits. Fair enough, but it's a mission kill. It means the carrier is disabled enough that it can't launch aircraft, you know?

And even a worse scenario, Scott, what if that carrier is disabled, more or less? And then you got all of a sudden you have 5,000 American hostages there stuck out there. We have to try to mount a rescue mission. You know, imagine that. I mean, that could be catastrophic for the U.S. Navy where our ships are trying to rescue ships that have been disabled and just it becomes a shooting gallery because the Chinese know exactly where all our. our ships are coming to, right? They know, you know, so this is in a way, is an ideal targeting solution for them. And this is a total nightmare, Scott. I mean, look, I think we have a great, a great Navy and armed forces, and they want to defend our country, and they are capable of defending our

country. But you have to give them, put them in a scenario where they have a good chance of winning, and this is not that scenario. So if this battle were fought head-to-head Chinese Navy versus U.S. Navy out in, you know, near Hawaii or, or let's just say it, midway, I think we'll clean their clocks. I think we're much better, a lot more experience and so forth. But that's a different kind of fight than what we're talking about. I mean, if we fight this war right off the Chinese coast, the tables are turned against us, and this is the worst.

That's why I often use the Gettysburg analogy, you know, that did I use this once on your show? Anyway, this Union cavalry officer comes to Gettysburg and says, yeah, looks over these hills shaped in a fishhook and says, this is good ground. You know, we might be able to beat the Confederate Army here because of this favorable ground. Well, this is the opposite. You know, Taiwan is the worst possible ground to try to fight China.

It's very favorable to them. And now, Lau, can you address the anti-ship ballistic missiles? Because we don't hear a lot about that, but I read a great thing by the war nerd years ago about how game set match. Aircraft carriers are obsolete. They're nothing but essentially, you know, shiny stars on the shirt of some admiral, but they're nothing but a death trap for the 5,000 aboard if they ever get in a real fight with anybody who knows how to fight back.

Well, I recall listening to some admirals talk about the 1980s and saying already that, you know, the use of aircraft carriers to try to, uh, um, move them aggressively into, say, the barons or the area near Kamchatka, you know, close to the Russian coast to, to, you know, assault Russian bases that, that these, I'm told by these carrier admirals that they were retired at the time, but they said they thought they would be destroyed completely, you know, and that they would never make it anywhere close to the Russian coast. So, I mean, arguably, this technology, frankly, was obsolete decades and decades ago, well before the advent of the anti-ship ballistic missile. And that only, the only reason the aircraft

carriers survived as kind of the capital ship of the fleet was that, well, not only the prestige that that accrued to it during World War II, but also that the Korean War and the Vietnam war where we were in situations where more or less beating up on countries without, that didn't have, you know, that couldn't wield any, that had no navies, you know, Vietnam didn't have a Navy, more or less, in North Korea. So what I'm saying is, so those were favorable situations for aircraft carriers. But so that led them to stick around. But the truth is they've, for such a long time, more than half a century, they've been

increasingly vulnerable, especially to anti-ship cruise missiles, but also submarines. So, right. So here comes along a new kind of weapon, which I think has just sort of put an exclamation point or underlined this fact which already existed, and that is that you don't have to do much damage to these ships to make it a mission kill, and they can be targeted. You know, I mean, that's a pretty big, look, the Chinese have worked very hard to develop real-time surveillance of these things using satellites, for example. And so I do believe they're able to track our carriers as they move all around that become

experts at sort of watching our bases in various ways. They have an enormous merchant marine and fishing fleet. They've also developed a large aerial contingent, which flies at great distances to look over the Pacific. They're developing drones that will play this role, too. But I mean, the point is, to sink a carrier, you need real-time information about where the carrier is. But I don't think that's going to prove very difficult for China. I think they've developed probably not one means, not two means, but redundant, maybe five to ten different ways that they track our carriers as they move around the ocean. Like I said, including drones, satellites, also fishing boats and so forth, submarines, drones. So, I mean, if you can track them, then you have a

very substantial chance of killing them. Yes, I think that's right. Now, you know, has our Navy been thinking hard about how to defeat this thing, of course. And, you know, you can be assured that one of the main ways our Navy wants to defeat them is by attacking at the source, right? Kill the, shoot the archer, right? So this leads you into that situation where, oh, you know, we suspect that this province in this warehouse is holding these archers, these, these DF21D or DF2. launchers. So, gosh, you know, Mr. President, we think it would be advisable to, you know,

take preemptive action to strike at these warehouses deep inside China because we fear that they would target our carers. You know, that's how you get in this cycle of escalation where, you know, both sides have incentive to strike first. And that's really disturbing. But the chances of us trying to like wipe out all these systems preemptively, I think is a, that's a, just a pipe dream. I don't. I've never met anybody who took that really seriously. It's just too hard to do. And China is too, the geography is too complex. The Chinese are excellent at hiding things too. So they learned that from the Korean War where they fought us and we own the air. So they learned to be very skillful with how they move things along the ground. They're being pretty blatant here,

building a mock-up of an American aircraft carrier out in the desert, right where we can definitely see it and where they can practice identifying it from different ways, I guess. Yeah. I mean, look, China has, I think, for a long time taken into account that they have to play a kind of psychological game with us. So it wouldn't surprise me at all if this was sort of just a message. And, you know, they want us to have this conversation, Scott. They want us to talk over the fact that our ships are targeted. They want us more or less to know that. Because they, again, I don't think they want to have a war with the United States. They would much rather avoid that. But they want to, the message is, you know, If you try this, you're going to get a very bloody nose or worse. You know, unfortunately, I think what they're saying is pretty credible, though. So, but I mean, look, it's not hard to find Chinese messaging of this type. And whereas China used to be very, you know, what was the phrase? They used to hide their capability by their time.

You know, that was kind of their strategy during the 70s and 80s and maybe the 90s. And now it shifted sort of more, you know, now they're more. confident of their capabilities and they're more sort of brazen. But look, you know, this idea that they're going to take over the Pacific or take over the world, I think, is totally wrong. I don't see any evidence of that. But do they want Taiwan? Absolutely. They want Taiwan. Like, no question in my mind. Could they take it? I think so. I think they could take it tomorrow or next week. I don't think they will. I think they'll certainly wait for the Olympics, which are in February. I don't think they want to spoil that party. That's a lot of investment that they put

in there. After that, though, I'm very concerned. And, you know, as they've said many times, they will operate when it's convenient for them. And actually, I've been watching what's been happening in Ukraine and stuff like that. And I just wonder if Mr. Putin owes Mr. Xi a favor may be, you know, the kind of, it's quite possible that China would act under cover of some kind of other crisis. They've done that in the past. In 1962, for example, when they attacked India, rather suddenly, they had a cover. The cover was a Cuban missile crisis, actually. And so when the Chinese president, Nehru called over to President Kennedy said, hey, John, can you send me some, you know, a couple of airborne brigades and some bombers to fend off the Chinese. And

Kennedy didn't even take the call because he was busy with the Cuban missile crisis. So, you know, you get my point, Scott, is the Chinese very strategic, they will. Yeah, although in this case, is there really any reason to believe that Putin's done anything provocative on Ukraine's border there other than just the Americans claim so?

The evidence I've seen, you know, I see a lot of forces moving. You know, I haven't looked at any satellite photography recently, but I've been watching certainly at sea there's a lot of activity.

So, you know, I don't know. Look, it doesn't make, like, again, I don't see anything happening before the Olympics, and I don't really, I don't see any reason why Putin would undertake any kind of military action now. So I'm kind of at a loss. I don't think that any, you know, I think this is more like, you know, the Russians, I think, want to keep us on edge a bit because partly because we're, keeping them on edge. This is kind of like, you know, they're like, if you're going to move

forces around in our neighborhood, we're going to move forces around in your sensitive area. So that that's the, I guess that's the way I would interpret it. But what I'm trying to get at, Scott, is that they, I think we have to consider that there could be serious coordination between Moscow and Beijing on these things. Well, speaking of that, I wanted to ask you about, you know, this is probably the least quoted Trump quote ever when he said that, yeah, I was. was talking to Henry Kissinger and Henry Kissinger said to me that I was smart that we should suck up to Russia to bounce them against China because China they're the real bad guys right and I thought wow there's something and I noticed I predicted and was right and nobody wanted to

talk about that because here Henry Kissinger is Henry Kissinger he's the grayest of the graybeards and if he says that maybe we should do that then that takes all of the secret conspiracy theory out of Trump wanting to talk with the Russians, because everybody knows he's a China Hawk. And so that makes sense on the face of it. And then, of course, there are people who I guess would rather be friendly toward China in order to balance them against the Russians in the old Nixonian model. Although, you know, I guess fewer people are willing to talk that way now. But certainly some more Democrat-leaning people feel that way about it. So I guess Mr. Realist was, What I'm interested in is whether you think that any of this is smart at all, that we ought to be balancing or attempting to balance Russia versus China or play them off of each other or any other thing, or do you think that that can only succeed in doing what sounds like you're describing, pushing them together, where they're willing to work together against us?

Great question, Scott. I think about this a lot. I think you're absolutely right that Trump was trying to do that. he sent Bolton over there. I remember it very distinctly. I think it was already in 2017 or 2018. He sent Bolton to Moscow, which in itself was weird because, you know, I don't think the Russians have any great affection for John Bolton. And, you know, I think his, Bolton's mission was to say, you know, basically to scare their crap out of the Russians and be like, look, you know, China is becoming extremely powerful. Do you fully under grasp what that means for Russia? You know, they're going to take over Russia or whatever, and you guys need to cooperate with us and we will help you, that kind of thing. And I think Bolton just got kind of brushed off in Moscow and not

taken seriously, partly because of so much hostility already in the U.S. Russian relationship that his sort of mission, as it were, to pull, I call this a Kissinger move in reverse was ill-fated because, you know, there was just too much bad blood in U.S. Russian relations. And, and nobody could really overcome that. But there are larger problems with this, Scott. I mean, there is this kind of elegance to it, I guess. But I mean, the fact is the Russians, well, for one, look, Russia and China have gotten along well for the last 30 years more, really, 35 years. Sure, there is some bad blood there, but I think Americans may even kind of overstate that.

So look, there hasn't been a single crisis in Russia-China relations of any kind, really. We can point to tiny little hiccups, but nothing more than that. And that's a pretty good record of achievement. And I think Putin and company have succeeded more or less in creating a consensus in Russia that, you know, more or less they have to work well with China. And Xi Jinping has done the same, meaning, like, look, we're going to. to work with the Russians and I don't care what anybody thinks about it. We're just going to do it. And so they've been kind of determined to work together and bridge all the gaps and a lot of

historical mistrust and all that. And it's worked well for both countries. And now I got to say, it's an amazing, I would call it amazing kind of intellectual lash up there. I mean, when I watch the Chinese news and I do almost every day, it's shocking the degree to which they just sort of drink up all the Russian talking points and spout them back out. I mean, in other words, they just seem to be in love with a Russian kind of perspective on the world and doesn't go completely the other way, but it's pretty close. I mean, you can find Russians who are suspicious of China, but generally the elite has sort of taken on this view that they're just going to get along with China no matter what. But, I mean, look, if you take the realism to another level,

would Russia really benefit from hostility with China? No. Russia would be in a world of hurt if they get in a bad, bad relationship with China. I mean, they would have to defend that huge border against China. I mean, that's a pretty ominous possibility. So, I mean, you know, it's not that the Russians are sort of kind and trusting. It's that they know they're in a tough situation, that they are, you know, that China, China is a really strong power right on its border.

And they, the Russians are, you know, they're pretty confident in their abilities, but they're also like, you know, look, we don't want to be in a hostile relationship with China. So why would we want to ally with the West against China? So I don't think, I don't think that's in the cards. And I don't, you know, playing this kind of game, you know, the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Yeah, it works in a kind of desperate situation. But I think it's, there is a kind of a better. way. I mean, Kissinger said this himself. He said the objective of this kind of triangular diplomacy

is to get along better with each of the polls than they get along with each other. And that's a valid objective. I mean, I think if we had a better relationship with Russia, then they would ease up a little bit on leaning on China. If we had a better relationship with China, on the other hand, they would also be a little more reluctant in their embrace of Russia. So that's the basic logic, but it doesn't mean, you know, the fact that, like, we're not going to pull them apart at this point. They're very much in a relationship of, you know, synergistic development at this point. And I think, you know, we have to just live with that and realize that it's not, this sky is not falling and that, you know, some kind of Russia-China alliance is going to take over the

world. I don't, it doesn't keep me up at night. You know, I think they're more concerned about Western kind of encroachments on their sphere. Yeah. All right. Well, thanks very much for coming back on the show. It's been great. Okay, Scott. Yeah, my pleasure. Always enjoy talking with you. It's a great show. You do great work. Thank you. Thanks, you guys. That's a lot of Goldstein. He's now over there with Danny Davis and them at Defense Priorities. And check out this very important piece that they ran over there in the national interest like Afghanistan a war for Taiwan is unwinnable the scott horton show anti-war radio can be heard on kpfk 90.7 fm in l a psradyo dot com antiwar dot com scothorton dot org and libertarian

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