Scott Horton Show - Just the Interviews - 2/21/22 Lyle J. Goldstein on Today’s Developments Concerning Russia and Ukraine

Episode Date: February 21, 2022

Scott is joined by Lyle Goldstein of Defense Priorities to discuss today’s developments as Russian officials appear to be ramping up their rhetoric in regards to exacting control over Ukraine. Goldstein is convinced conflict will soon break out, the only question is how large.  Discussed on the show: “What Germany Sees in Ukraine” (Real Clear World) Lyle J. Goldstein is the Director of Asia Engagement at Defense Priorities. He is the author of Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry. Follow his work at The National Interest. This episode of the Scott Horton Show is sponsored by: The War State and Why The Vietnam War?, by Mike Swanson; Tom Woods’ Liberty Classroom; ExpandDesigns.com/Scott; EasyShip; Free Range Feeder; Thc Hemp Spot; Green Mill Supercritical; Bug-A-Salt and Listen and Think Audio. Shop Libertarian Institute merch or donate to the show through Patreon, PayPal or Bitcoin: 1DZBZNJrxUhQhEzgDh7k8JXHXRjYu5tZiG. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Book club on Monday. Gym on Tuesday. Date night on Wednesday. Out on the town on Thursday. Quiet night in on Friday. It's good to have a routine. And it's good for your eyes too. Because with regular comprehensive eye exams at Specsavers,

you'll know just how healthy they are. Visit Spexsavers.cavers.cai to book your next eye exam. Eye exams provided by independent optometrists. All right, y'all, welcome to the Scott Horton Show. I'm the director of the Libertarian Institute, editorial director of antivore.com, author of the book, Fools Aaron, time to end the war in Afghanistan, and the brand new, enough already, time to end the war on terrorism. And I've recorded more the 5,500 interviews since 2000. almost all on foreign policy and all available for you at scothorton dot four you can sign up the podcast feed there

and the full interview archive is also available at youtube.com slash scott horton show all right you guys on the line i've got lyle goldstein now he used to be with the uh u.s navy and uh has since gone independent he's uh here writing for real clear world what Germany sees in Ukraine. Welcome back to the show. Lyle, how are you doing? Oh, thanks, Scott. Glad to be here. I wish it were under happier circumstances. I'm doing, I'm doing well, though. Thank you. Great. Yeah, I agree. So, listen, I mean, I'm really happy to have you on. You're one of the brightest guys that I know that examines issues of America's relationship with Russia and China. So I'm really happy to have the opportunity to hear what you have

to say about what's going on right now. And starting with, what's going on this morning. And I don't know if you know, but my wife, Larissa Alexandrovna Horton, she is Ukrainian and speaks Russian very fluently. And she wasn't translating word for word for me or anything, but she was, we were watching this morning, the Russian National Security Council, I guess it was, held a meeting and streamed it live on YouTube. And essentially what was happening was the various people were coming up and explaining that they were ready, for war and that it was weird

it was the FSB guy who said we're ready rather than a military guy I don't know if that's meaningful and he did say it would be a hard fight he wasn't like bragging and boasts and he was saying it would be a difficult thing but yes sir we can do it if we have to and then a lot of the rest of them were essentially making the case that

well the poor people in Donetsk and Lujansk absolutely need our help and Kiev has made them outlaws and they are essentially, you know, one with us, this, that. So they were making the case maybe for not going all the way to the NEPA, but maybe taking Donetsk and Luhansk. But then again, to me, the entire question was, are they really making the case for war because they're going to war? Or they're really making the case for war?

Because Putin's got a phone call with Macron later and wants an even stronger hand than he already had and this kind of deal. And so I just turned over to you what you think is really going on there. Are they really in the final stages of making excuses to invade? Yeah, thanks so much. And again, glad to be here. You know, I love this show and it's so important these days. I mean, it's very hard to try to differentiate between what is just very, very nasty and realistic form of coercive

diplomacy versus what you know what are real preparations for war i mean i like your wife i'm also watching the russian press day to day and uh you know it's kind of extraordinary to behold i've never seen this kind of uh mix of vitriol and uh accusation and um you know a lot of a lot of aggressive and uh bellicose statement so i mean it's very disturbing i mean those of us who've been watching this for years, though, are not, are not too surprised because we've seen this kind of building up and building up and building up. And I mean, it's, you know, I do think, I mean, you know, let's say at the outset, you know, Russia is clearly culpable in many ways for a lot of this. But I mean, you know, we're certainly our country has been extremely negligent

about European security for, you know, for decades. And, you know, so we're kind of harvesting the fruit of this, of a lot of bad policies here. And, you know, I think this was all very predictable going way back to the 90s when I started writing about Ukraine. And you could tell it was going to be an incredibly delicate situation going forward. And here we are, you know, on the brink of a major war. And I have to say, you know, my sense is, given all the evidence I'm seeing that this is more than a show that this is that this is most likely the real thing and so it the question i've been debating for a while in my head is whether uh whether we'll see a big war or a small war and uh you know for ukraine's sake i think i hope that it's a small war of course but i don't know now i mean obviously

it's a giant complicated mess but it seems like in february 2015 if i remember the time lying right here. This is kind of right in the heat of, or maybe there was a lull, but it was right near a time of extreme violence in the, in the, uh, uh, Donetsk and La Hansk, you know, Dombas region there in far eastern Ukraine, um, back and forth, I think most of the casualties are on the Dombast side at the hands of the Ukrainian military. And in February 2015, the Dombas voted to join the Russian Federation. And Putin told them no. and it seemed like there were a few different reasons why. I'll let you explain why you think he didn't then.

And what do you think has changed now that he would go even that far, much less to the NEPA there? Yeah. Well, great question. You're really on top of things, Scott, and it's admirable. I wish all our people commenting and talking about the Christ, we're so well informed. You know, you have a great understanding.

You're exactly right. a period of kind of extreme violence there in early 2015, when basically it was a total route of Ukrainian forces, you know, whether there were Russian regulars involved. I think it's quite likely, you know, at some level. And, you know, more or less, Russia was delivering the news to the Ukrainians that, hey, you know, if things start to get ugly, we'll take this in hand to do what we want. And that's what they did. And a lot of Ukrainians don't. for this, you know, for this kind of misperception on the part of Kiev, but also in Western capitals, including in Washington. So, you know, at that time, though, there was a sense that

they needed, that Europe needed to find a way out of this, and they had set up the, I think the Minsk, you know, chords came out of this to try to shut this down and get some kind of a more stable approach. Putin, though, you know, good question. Why has he been reluctant? And I think, let's, I mean, for people who follow the Russian politics realize, sure, Putin has kind of surfed on a wave of Russian nationalism, no question about it. But, you know, there are, and I put it, there are people much more aggressive and nationalist

than he is. And, you know, I think he likes to see himself rightly or wrongly as a situation. statesman and somebody who's kind of takes a moderate viewpoint. And so I know that's hard for people to believe in the U.S. and the West where he's vilified every day in the headlines. But in Russia, you know, he he kind of paints himself as a right of center, but a kind of moderate still. So, you know, in the daily drumbeat of reports from Dombas and other and elsewhere in Ukraine have kind of created a sense of inevitability in Russia that at some point Russia would take this in hand, like I said.

I mean, let me point to two more factors that may have triggered the change because I've been willing this in my head, maybe three factors. But one, you know, unquestionably, Belarus casts some major shadows over all of this. You know, and I think for Putin and the Russian elite, that was a really kind of, um, how to put it, kind of existential moment where they considered whether Russia might be toppled by external forces, their own regime. Now, I'm sorry, you're talking about the color-coded attempted revolution in Belarus last year? Yeah. Yeah. And I think that they, that really unnerved them and made them think that that was

time to draw some, draw these red lines, which, you know, I think they, they would say they had already drawn but to color them in in in a deeper shade of red and make sure that they were bright flashing you know uh red you know so i think that's one issue uh that that really is sort of lurking behind all of all of this uh discussion and and making the and has made the kremlin that much more aggressive you know this idea that you know if you don't try to save your regime and your ideology and your ethos is it where your national ethos then then you'll just be swept up in one of these colored revolutions and you're going down so so that explains part of it you know there have been moves against ukrainians with uh russian sympathies uh

medvich i think it's known he's a he's a friend of putin i think he may be godfather of one of putin's daughters i mean that that you know we shouldn't underestimate that medvich is a major figure in Ukrainian politics and very articulate spokesman of the kind of Eastern Ukrainian approach. And so having him sort of targeted, not targeted, I think he's under house arrest. So I mean, at least he's not in, I don't think he's actually physically in jail. So, but I mean, this, I think has, again, sort of tripped a wire in Vladimir Putin's head and said, you know, this is Ukraine is going down in a direction that he cannot tolerate, you know. And so there you have it. It's sad because I initially thought that probably Zelensky and Putin could actually find a kind of rapport,

partly given where Zelensky's from and his background. But I was definitely wrong about that. We don't see anything like that. Well, I mean, that's a great place to go down a tangent here. I mean, if you compare him to Mikhail Shakashvili in Georgia back in 2008, he's not nearly so reckless as that freak right so um but he did make quite a few moves as you're saying against uh this oligarch who was very close to the russians in the last year taking his media off the air and all of that kind of thing and then i mean is that basically what

i don't know i guess what explains his intransigence then if he's just a comedian and he's a frontman for this guy colomoisky or whoever but obviously joe biden's driving the car anyway right So yeah. Well, I mean, here's the thing. Look, I, I, I, Russian politics is immensely complex. Well, guess what? I think I think we can say Ukrainian politics is also extremely complex. You know, there are high stakes. There's a ton of corruption. You know, personally, I don't think it helps that they've been, you know, we all know, Kiev has been a kind of political hot house related to the whole Russia gate thing. And I hope some capable journalists, maybe yourself, will go after this. issue you know how how is russia gate that whole you know scandal that went on and on and on how it's tied in closely with this whole uh crisis we're having right now i think it is tied we we can go more into that too but but zalinski himself i mean my analysis is it's pretty simple i mean you know he's a comedian but knows very little about i mean he's pretty sophisticated guy and and um you know i think he probably has some political sense right but but i mean how to put it in the sense

of an actor, of a public personality of somebody who likes being a celebrity and obviously can tell a joke, but, I mean, do they have any real appreciation? Have they ever taken, you know, a course in international politics? Have they ever read a book about, you know, World War II or anything like that? You know, I doubt it. So he, you know, I think that as a political neophyte, he was sort of thrown into the maelstrom and immediately realized that the platform he ran on, i.e., you know, let's make peace with the Russians, or at least let's talk to the Russians. He realized that he was going to be, you know, how to put it, rolled. You know, in other words, he was going to face enormous pressure from all these entrenched elements.

And by the way, you know, I include among those entrenched elements, all those Western diplomats in Kiev who, you know, very keen to bend his ear on all these, you know, all these terrible things allegedly that Russia is doing in Ukraine. So therefore, you know, he was kind of brought around to that point of view that he had to suddenly become a hardliner. So essentially what I see is he more or less became, he adopted more or less the positions of his predecessor on among other things, you know, the whole Minsk process. But, you know, NATO, all these things. He basically adopted those positions, probably because he was advised to do. do so by, you know, various ambassadors and probably from the United States as well. So, you know, that kind of, to me, explains how he, Zelensky went from being a comedian with

kind of pro-peace outlook to, you know, parading around in the trenches saying we're going to fix those Russians and one day we'll get Crimea back, which, you know, is a total pipe dream and doesn't help the situation. I mean, you know, a wiser leader would have. have actually sat down with Putin on numerous occasions. But remember, when with the one time where he did sit down with Putin, that was, I believe, in Paris in, what, 2019 or 2018, he, it was threatened that there would be another Maidan. In other words, that there would be another revolution in Kiev,

if he dared to make any kind of compromises, which is a shame, you know, how did it get to that? And I think, you know, it's just, I know. I think it was the right sector demonstrating outside of the parliament, talking about we overthrew the last government. We can overthrow you too. Right. So, I mean, you have, you know, I call it these kind of out of control, radicalized nationalist elements. And Ukraine is not the only country with these people. So they're out there. But I mean, you know, unfortunately we've seen that they're very skillful in Ukraine at mobilizing angry people occasionally willing to resort to violence. So I mean, it's, it's, it's. say it's a hot house and you know i don't envy a guy like zalinski but i of course i and everybody i guess we're hoping for better that that he would be able to find a way through this uh challenging uh circumstances to i mean look you cannot move ukraine it is located next

to russia it has a lot of people who speak russian and who are interested in russian culture and and you know there's so many ties that bind them that i mean it's sort of ridiculous to the idea that you can excise all Russian influence from from Ukraine and and so a leader with foresight would recognize that and just sort of find a way but we haven't seen that really well now I guess I'm sorry I got so many different questions I'm not sure which one to ask in which order let's start with what's the worst case scenario do you really think you think you think you're going to take the whole eastern half of the country march to Odessa and take Marya Pole and all that or they're just going to take the very far eastern provinces I

think you already said you're pretty sure they're doing something here by the way the new york times headline is live updates putin prepares decision on breakaway ukraine regions that's their headline for the meeting that took place this morning that we talked about earlier yeah yeah i mean they were setting him up to decide either way i guess you know there's so much um kind of uh spinning and and misinformation and um you know it's going on on both sides i think so like i i i i I wouldn't want to say, you know, whether a war will happen or not at this point. I mean, I mean, it's clear to me as a military analyst. That's most of what I do.

All the military pieces are in place. So, you know, whether Putin has actually sent the order out as U.S. intelligence alleges now or not, I couldn't say. But my sense is, and this is, you know, just partly based on what I've seen on the military side, Scott, is that I think that Russia, Russia is prepared to go big, I think that they would definitely stay away from Kiev. It's not to say that, you know, the Russians have, you know, such military superiority. If they want to run a column of tanks down the central boulevard in Kiev, you know, the Maidan, they can do that. But I don't think, and they might, just to say they can do it and scare people.

That's part of this is about intimidation and symbols and stuff. like that it occurs to me they may want to strike at at lavov in particular because that's kind of a hotbed of ukrainian nationalism so i wouldn't be surprised if if air strikes or missiles that's in the far west of the country that's in the far west so so i because i think that they may want to part of this is to to say that you cannot just sort of put aside russian aspirations and capabilities and so that message may come in the form of severe punishment i don't think that though that they will meet out extraordinary punishment in kiev itself because kiev is a huge city um it's kiev is quite on the fence i mean there's sort of you know it's a mix of people and cultures

and and if you will kind of a sacred city also in russian uh sort of history so i don't think that they will uh i don't think kiev will be you know destroyed or something like that you kind of there were some headlines like that i don't see that at all um but to your point I do see is very likely Russian movements against both Kharkov in the east, in the far east, and also Odessa in the far west. Why do I say that? Because a couple of reasons, you know, Kharkov is pretty obvious because it's so close and there's a lot of... Well, Odessa is kind of right in the middle in the south, right?

Odessa is pretty far west, actually, on the western side of Ukraine and the south. Northwest. So, but this is, I would say, is also a sacred city in the Russian mind, almost up there with cities in Crimea, Sevastopol and so forth. So, you know, to me, it would be very high in their list. You know about the atrocities that went on there, the how a number of pro-Russian people were burned to death, you know, in that horrible incidents. And that was also in, that was in 2014. You know, that hasn't been forgotten. But I mean, there would be a couple of reasons for this, both sort of, as I pointed out, like historical, cultural reasons. Then, you know, I have had quite a bit of interaction with the Russian Navy over the years, and they have a lot of pride. They want to, you know, like any military service, they want to show themselves as being relevant, important. And so for them, you know, nothing could be more glorious for them than to land. in southern Ukraine, you know, using amphibious ships, which have been sent to the area,

probably for this purpose. And so to make some kind of landings there and then to attack Odessa, that would be, you know, how to put it, that would be sort of solidifying the important role of the Russian Navy in Russian history, which, by the way, you know, is not something to take for granted that Russian Navy often gets the short end of the stick, you know, while Russia favors, you know, tanks and air defense and so forth. So that's a kind of bureaucratic. explanation. But also it would kind of, I see a kind of pinster movement, almost like a Stalingrad move that traps most of Ukraine's forces in the east near Lukansk and Deneutsk. But this, by attacking in the southwest, also have the benefit of pulling forces away

from the east and kind of unhinging the Ukrainian command. So, I mean, I guess this is a long way of saying scott i i see a kind of very major operation that takes some some serious bites out of ukraine um both in the east um uh and in the far west um give me just a minute here listen i don't know about you guys but part of running the libertarian institute is sending out tons of books and other things to our donors and who wants to stand in line all day at the post office but stamps com? Sorry, but their website is a total disaster. I couldn't spend another minute on it, but I don't have to either, because there's easyship.com. Easyship.com is like stamps.com, but their website isn't terrible. Go to Scotthorton.org slash easy ship. Hey, y'all Scott here. You know the Libertarian

Institute has published a few great books. Mine, fools errand, enough already, and the great Ron Paul. Two by our executive editor, Sheldon Richard. coming to Palestine and what social animals owe to each other. And of course, no quarter, the ravings of William Norman Grigg, our late-great co-founder and managing editor at the Institute. Coming very soon in the new year will be the excellent voluntarious handbook, edited by Keith Knight, a new collection of my interviews about nuclear weapons, one more collection of essays by Will Grig, and two new books about Syria by the great William Van Wagonin and Brad Hoff and his co, co-author Zachary Wingert. That's Libertarian Institute.org slash books.

All right. So you talk about, you know, bad policies led up to this. And I want to go back to that in a moment. But can you talk about what good policies might diffuse this situation on the American side here? I mean, Biden has already said, hey, let's set up a verification regime so that you can be certain that we're not installing Tomahawk missiles in Romania and Poland. And he won't write it in a treaty. And they keep stamping their feet. No one gets to close the door on NATO membership. You know, the Russians can't tell us who to close the door on, but they can just close it themselves.

We all know they don't want to integrate Ukraine anyway. And the Germans and the French would never allow it anyway. And Biden has mumbled a few different times that like, look, man, we're not bringing Ukraine into NATO any time the next 10 years anyway, which is a pretty significant thing. I know it's not signing a new treaty, but, you know, Bush and Trump and the Americans, they just tear up treaties all the time.

whenever they feel like anyway. But, so it seems like the assurance he's gotten, um, on Ukraine, NATO membership is as good as any other one just because it's believable. You know what I mean? Not that like, oh, good, Biden made a promise. And so that's sacred, but just it's pretty obvious that he means it when he says it, that we're not bringing Ukraine into NATO anyway. So what's left that America's got to do to appease this guy to make him back off,

you think? Yeah. It's a great, it's a really interesting question. One more point I meant to add on the last question about the geography or what a war might look like. I should have said, you know, there's a major Ukrainian victory, sorry, Russian victory, which I think probably has a hold on President Putin's mind which is the victory over the swedes 1709 in at poltava look on the map and where you know you think oh he defeated the swedes somewhere near sweden no this was right right near right in ukraine and poltava is very much a sacred term and kind of russian history and anyway poltava is near it's actually a province of ukraine right near harcov so you could see i would suggest that that is

probably a place and one more issue is the water for Crimea and Crimea has had this problem of the last few years that they have insufficient fresh water and and I think this will be a major objective of war so so this is why I would suggest that I think a decent amount of Ukraine will probably be uh come under Russian well I mean that kind of answers the the other question which is it sounds like you're saying there's so much advantage that they think that they could take here that they're going to take it maybe you know resentment at NATO expansion is just an excuse after all. Well, I think that that's some of it.

And part of it is, it seems like Putin, you know, he feels, I mean, this is a guy who, you know, people forget about this, but, but well before Russia, you know, Putin kind of styled himself as a kind of westernizer, you know, and somebody who, uh, like to hobnob with leaders, you know, remember when, when George Bush looked into his eyes. so forth. I mean, this, so he had that kind of disposition. Uh, but now he feels kind of, uh, severely wrong. You know, he feels completely like isolated and shut out from that whole, uh, thing, you know, that whole kind of, um, approach. And so he's sort of, you know, as it were, this is his, his revenge, uh, you know, in that he's kind of taken, um, he says, you know,

if I, if I can't, if I can't discuss or, or negotiate even, on European security with Western leaders, including the United States, but other leaders as well, you know, then I'm just going to do what I need to do for Russian interests. And that means basically, you know, not negotiating the future of Eastern Europe, just taking, you know, what he needs, what he wants and feels that Russia needs in Eastern Europe. Now, I don't want, you know, I'm not saying that he's going to invade the Baltics and Poland or something like that. But I mean, he's taking very strident measures to show that if Russia is ignored, then it will kind of strike back. I mean, what kind of offers could have been made?

I do think it's a little bit late for this diplomacy. But, you know, people have been talking about Finland and Austria as examples. You know, and I was recently on a call with somebody who said, well, you know, nobody in Europe likes the Finnish example. And even the Finns themselves would never agree to that today. But, I mean, really, I think that misses the point. What Finland enjoyed lots of autonomy during the Cold War, and they escaped from a very virulent kind of oppression that the other countries in Eastern Europe suffered. How did they escape that? By declaring very firmly that they would not, you know, do anything that was contrary to Russian national security interests.

and Finland and Russia have enormous amount of bad blood, enormous. You know, so they had every reason to contest Russia in a very forceful way. They chose not to. They said, no, we're going to try something different. We're going to be neutral and, you know, carefully neutral. And Finland benefited enormously. And today, Finland is one of the happiest, most beautiful, and a well-off country is in the world and it's largely uh goes down to them just stopping uh you know ceasing this kind of endless warfare with the russian so i would like to see um other countries in europe take this very mature approach in eastern europe that is uh you know there's not much you can do about the russian bear

um he is who he is uh you know he's not a cuddly bear um and you just have to deal with that reality and the United States most likely is not, I would say, almost for sure, is not coming to save you. You know, that's one thing this crisis made very clear. And I hope there are a lot of people in the Baltics who are kind of scratching their head going, wow, you know, what does this Article 5 really mean? Yeah. Because it's a question. Well, you know, I saw where someone criticized me, God help me, I read a YouTube comment. And it said, yeah, this guy completely ignores the fact that all these countries want to join NATO.

And my answer to that is, geez, you know, I didn't really think of that because I don't really care what they want. But I guess he's got a point that all these nations are run by people who are a braid of Russia. It's only the USSR is gone, but there's previous history for them to refer back to, I guess. Yeah, I mean, look, the world is full of people who are fearful and who are, you know, who would like to live better and so forth and live in complete security. And what could be better than having somebody from abroad come and solve all your problems and deliver your security? And I, you know, I don't deny that countries like Poland, Hungary, and the Baltics even have done very well off NATO. How have they done well? Well, you know, all the investors think, well, if they're in NATO, then they're probably pretty secure and that's a good investment.

So I'll, you know, I'm willing to invest in all this, all these things that I wouldn't necessarily do if I wasn't sure. I mean, yeah, they have, look, these people have benefited a lot. And probably Ukraine would benefit too. But again, it's pie in the sky because it's quite illusory. And hopefully, you know, I hope the situation will stabilize. But I, we didn't talk about one scenario that does bother me, which is, you know, if you posit that Putin is not, Putin is not. Putin is not really, he's not fearful of Ukraine so much.

You know, Ukraine is kind of a mess now and for a long time. But what he's fearful of is actually is NATO and NATO strength, all the capabilities that are piling up, all the, you know, adversarial sensibility, the constant exercises, their proximity, you know, the new deployments of various kinds of forces. If you posit that that is the problem, you know, and I'm, including that, for example, the missile defense facilities in Romania and also now in Poland. If that's the problem, then messing with Ukraine doesn't necessarily, you know, this war in Ukraine doesn't necessarily solve that. So how does he go about solving that? And I do fear that there

could be an Article 5 challenge in the near future. I mean, and even part of this war where Putin says, look, you know, you, you know, you and NATO seem to believe that I can only have my way in Ukraine, but I cannot have my way in the Baltics and Romania and so forth. And, you know, as he said in his statements that he made, he considered, he put everything on the table. He said, I want all infrastructure, all NATO infrastructure in Eastern Europe gone. We're going back to where we were in the early 90s. I want all that infrastructure gone.

It's not say they can't be members of NATO, but I need all of the bases and so forth to, to be, you know, to disappear. Well, that's an, you know, an extraordinary statement and probably shows his wider intent that is to, you know, that Russia will not be secure until, you know, the threat, the specter of NATO close to its borders is removed. And, you know, to do that, he may well try to essentially to call our bluff, you know, which is to say to put Article 5, you know, very crisply, very, you know, in a crystal clear way to, to, to say. that this is, you know, let's see if the Americans really show up to defend, you know, the Baltics and so forth. I don't mean that he will roll his tanks into Estonia and Romania and so forth and drive to Warsaw. What I'm saying is he may bloody, you know, he may, you know, create a small incursion, raids, strikes, you know, to sort of dare NATO to respond in some way.

So I think that is, unfortunately, you know, that it's low probability, but it's kind of the darkest scenario here. I call that the big war plus, you know. Yeah. Well, and it does go right to what you were just saying. The question that the Baltic states got to be asking themselves is, do we really mean it? And, you know, I think back on, you know, in Kennan's warning in the New York Times in 1998, where he's talking with Thomas Friedman, and it's just one statement. He doesn't really elaborate about this, but he just kind of says, we're including all these countries that we have no intention of protecting if it really came down to it. I mean, really, are we going to go to nuclear war, even over Poland, much less Latvia? I mean, would even Joe Biden really draw the line

that far east after, you know, Ike and LBJ and Ronald Reagan said, I'm sorry, man, you're too far east for us to fight for you at this point back then? Yeah, it's absolutely right. And I have major doubts. And, you know, there have been, you know, a plethora of war games that have been reported out in the press, I think conducted at least by, partly by the RAND Corporation that showed that the Baltics are completely indefensible. There's absolutely nothing NATO or the U.S. can do, you know, other than kind of lob cruise missiles and try to get in some air strikes, you know, these areas would be completely overwhelmed. extremely quickly. Now, I don't think Russia will do this. I think it has no intention of doing this. They

know very well that the Baltz do not want to be part of Russia in any way, and they do not feel the same kind of kinship. On the other hand, there are Russian-speaking minorities in these countries, and hopefully the Baltz will wisely choose to treat these minorities well, because they do not want an angry bear on their border. Now, I'm not trying to exaggerate the danger of of a russia baltic conflict i don't think that's in the cards but i fear that if we continue to walk down this road of intense uh militarized rivalry that this will you know grow and grow and grow and there will be a sense of uh that you know a spark could could light that i i had a little bit of insight into this when i you know i don't personally don't was never particularly

interested in romanian russian relations but having visited maldova a few times in the last right before the pandemic, I just became acquainted with the fact that these tensions are growing and growing and growing, not just with Romania, but, you know, of course, with Poland and also the Baltic. So, I mean, there are, there are, how to put it, all these fuses to conflict and that we need to be minimizing these, and NATO needs to be extremely cautious and careful. And, you know, talking about Germany a little bit, because I wrote this piece recently. Wait, wait, I was going to ask you about that in just a second, but I wanted to ask you about You know, when you're talking about his statements that, listen, you know, we want a treaty that says Ukraine is never going to be in NATO, and we want, you know, to America to now abide by Bill Clinton's promises from the 90s that we weren't going to move our military into Eastern Europe and that kind of thing.

I guess, you know, to paraphrase Ray McGovern here, these are kind of the opening positions of a severe negotiation. But he knows he's not getting either of those things. but what he wants is a really good middle. And so he's starting with these more kind of, you know, extreme demands looking for a real severe compromise in his favor here. But because he's got to know that Biden's not going to back down that far no matter what. So isn't that what's really going on with that? I see what you're saying. Well, he's still signaling, you know, a possible future that he's interested in anyway, I guess.

I mean, yeah, I think he is. look he you know i think he's looking back at his legacy i think he um is um you know is a leader that that is increasingly willing to kind of vent his his real feelings you know i think these are things that he would have said uh 10 years ago but he he was trying to kind of be accommodating and polite and so forth um you know he still it's it's kind of funny in in in Russian, but he always, whenever he uses the words Americans, he always says, our American partners, you know. So, well, we're busy calling Russia adversaries. He's constantly refers to us as his partners. Right. Yeah, I'd like to point that out all the time, too, that, you know,

people say this guy's a throat-slitten, rootless, strong man and all that. I guess that's true, but he also at the same time seems like a very cautious guy. I mean, he could have invaded Ukraine any time last 20 years. He's held a lot of these, a lot of this bitterness has been piling up, and piling up and piling up and you know this this is when i talk about the you know what we have to harvest the fruits of uh russia gay well you know for the last five years we've been calling russia you know our adversary or our greatest adversary our enemy you know uh who's trying to destroy american democracy and all these things allegedly which i regard is mostly you know 90 percent garbage uh but it uh you know if you tell somebody they're your enemy all the time

this other country will start to believe it. And they've internalized this kind of discourse that came from the United States, really. And now they're acting in a way that we are an enemy and they're doing everything they can to, you know, restructure their neighborhoods to reflect this kind of very deep anger and discomfort. lashing out, if you will.

So I don't know. I'm not really convinced this is part of a negotiation per se. I mean, maybe we'll see that. But I, you know, my instincts tell me that, that they're sort of taking this in hand and determined to set up their own security order. And, you know, they, let's face it, they do have some countries that are sympathetic, you know, Hungary and Serbia and so forth that are willing to entertain, you know, that they're willing to sort of get on with Russia no matter what.

So for them, this is kind of an opening, and they may try to make life health for the Baltics and so forth. So we'll see. What do you think, Lyle, about the idea? Hold on one second. If I were advising Putin, I would say, you know, chill out. You know, Russia is not under severe danger and you don't need to do all of this. But, of course, that's a very American perspective. And the Russians, as I've always said, are endlessly paranoid.

And nobody's going to tell them how to organize their own national security. absolutely not yeah hey what do you think about the idea that the americans actually would prefer to see a conflict here because that would be the excuse enough nothing else has been but that would be the excuse enough to put the brakes on Nord Stream 2 and prevent Germany well yeah i try not to be too cynical about american politics but sure i mean there's a lot of people who benefit from uh u.s rush attention and whether it's people in the you know in the energy field i mean seen oil prices going way up with there there are people who are anxious to sell gas in Europe and so forth but but you know obviously on the military side there's huge profits

to be made by people who are going to sell they've already been making huge profits on native you ever seen a V for Vendetta is what's it have you ever seen the movie V for Vendetta where the dictator is yelling it's great it's the guy that played Winston Smith is the dictator but he's yelling we need the people to remember why they need us and i was just picturing him saying that about germany and that how are we supposed to keep the germans relying on us for their security when they don't feel like they have any real security concerns at all because they're getting along with the russians better and better every day yeah yeah i i mean uh i i i wrote about this recently as you know but i i mean generally i am kind of encouraged by by by

the reluctance you see in Germany to really confront Russia, I think that's quite mature. They, you know, Germans know their history. They know how Eastern Europe can be, you know, easily just become a, you know, a giant, whole, you know, crater, a burial ground as it has been so many times in the past. So they're determined to avoid that and not get sucked into it by some of their hot-headed neighbors like Poland. And I applaud the Germans for that maturity. But I mean, let's face it, Berlin is under enormous pressure now. I mean, you know, they've been severely shellacked for their kind of policies that are more accommodating toward Russia, which is, you know, I find

to be really, really terrible. You know, I is sort of hoping that between Olaf Schultz and and Macron, that they would find, the French leader, Macron, that they, the two of them could kind of come up with a diplomatic formula that spares Ukraine and somehow avoids all of this, all of this terrible, you know, all the terrible things that we're seeing unfolding. But I'm afraid that, you know, the United States is sort of can't avoid this constant opportunism where, you know, they're just constantly suggesting that anybody who wants to make a compromise is, quote, weak and therefore, you know, cannot carry the mantle of freedom and peace in Europe, which is, you know, to my estimate, is so juvenile and harmful to the future of European security,

which, you know, it's just common sense. You don't have to have taken any big courses in European history to know that you're that you cannot cut uh cut russia out of europe which is what some people seem to be trying to do but it's uh that's insane and and will result in in uh sort of continuous warfare i mean this could be the first of many wars in eastern europe that that follow let's hope not uh we we need a more mature approach in the nuclear age it's just this is just insanity what what is going on right They're kind of risk-taking that we're seeing. Right.

Okay, listen, I can't tell you how much I appreciate your time, especially for staying over a little bit with me here. Lahl, uh, great talk. Thank you. My pleasure, Scott. Yeah. And take care, everyone. All right, you guys, that's Lyle Goldstein,

director of Asia engagement at defense priorities. And here he is writing at Real Clear World, what Germany sees in Ukraine. Update. Shortly after this was recorded, gave a speech where he announced he was recognizing the independence of the Donbass region. So far it's not clear if he means already the parts that are independent de facto or whether he means to include the parts where the Ukrainian military is stationed.

We don't know yet. But that's the latest as of the time we're publishing this interview anyway. The Scott Horton Show, Anti-War Radio, can be heard on KPFK 90.7 FM in L.A. radio.com, anti-war.com, scothorton.org, and libertarian institute.org.