Scott Horton Show - Just the Interviews - 5/14/25 Trita Parsi on the Iran Nuclear Negotiations

Episode Date: May 15, 2025

Scott interviews Trita Parsi about the ongoing talks between the Trump administration and Iran. While the talks appear to have some momentum at the moment, Parsi is cautious about getting too optimistic. He and Scott analyze the situation and reflect on the broader regional context.   Discussed on the show: “On Iran, Trump Should Resist the Zero-Enrichment Fantasy” (The American Conservative)  Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States by Trita Parsi Trita Parsi is the Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and the author of Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran and the Triumph of Diplomacy. Parsi is the recipient of the 2010 Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order. Follow him on Twitter @tparsi This episode of the Scott Horton Show is sponsored by: Roberts and Roberts Brokerage Incorporated; Moon Does Artisan Coffee; Tom Woods’ Liberty Classroom; Libertas Bella; ExpandDesigns.com/Scott. Get Scott’s interviews before anyone else! Subscribe to the Substack. Shop Libertarian Institute merch or donate to the show through Patreon, PayPal or Bitcoin: 1DZBZNJrxUhQhEzgDh7k8JXHXRjY Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

All right, y'all, welcome to the Scott Horton Show. I'm the director of the Libertarian Institute, editorial director of anti-war.com, and author of Provote, how Washington started the new Cold War with Russia and the catastrophe in Ukraine. Sign up for the podcast feed at Scotthorton.org or Scott Horton Show.com. I've got more than 6,000 interviews in the archive. for you there going back to 2003 and follow me on all the video sites and x at scott horton show hey guys on the line i got treata parcy and he is the co-founder of the quincy institute for international statecraft and you can find their great website at responsible statecraft dot com

and he writes there a lot and he's got a new one for the american conservative but let me first mention also his books it's one of my favorite books on middle east ever it's so important and good and i cite it all the time because i learn like 10 things out of it that I still remember and I probably should go back and reread it because I bet I'd have like 25 things out of that book that I'd like to remember and tell everybody about. But anyway, it's called treacherous alliance. And of course, it's about Israel's relationship with Iran. Ah, ha ha. It's so good. Anyway, and then he also wrote a single roll of the dice and losing an enemy. And man, is he good on Iran issues? And he wrote this

thing for tech. Where is it? On Iran, Trump should resist the zero enrichment fantasy. Take the words right out of my mouth only you're a much better writer than me welcome back to the show how you doing treata thank you so much for having me scott and thank you for your kind words that i know that you have reiterated not just on this show but on other shows because it comes back to me and i really appreciate it yeah no doubt well look i just want the world to know what's in there so don't flatter yourself too much it's just that the book is good um no you did a great job it's absolute masterpiece treacherous alliance um but anyway on uh on the nukes trump's Talking to Iran, and according to the Post and the Times in the Journal over Israel's dead body,

I'm not exactly sure how much of that is good cop, back cop, and how much of that is, you know, potential personal problems between the two of them, inshallah. But so tell us everything that you know and think about the Iranian nuclear talks going on right now, Trita, please. Well, I mean, to your first question, I do think that this rift between Trump and Netanyahu is a very serious one. I think it's real. I don't think it's theater or anything like that. The question is, will it be decisive? Is it temporary? Is it reflective of a realization on Trump's end that really his interest, America's interest and Israel's interests are really diverging in the Middle East.

And as a result, obviously he has to prioritize America's interests, unlike Biden, who clearly did not. Or if this is a temporary phase of tensions between the two, but that afterwards they will converge on some sort of a unsatisfactory compromise that at the end of the day prevents Trump from really pursuing U.S. interest in a much more decisive way, that remains to be seen. But if you take a look at everything that has happened from him, first of all, putting pressure on Netanyahu to secure a ceasefire right before he came in. which was very important, but unfortunately he didn't follow through. He didn't sustain the pressure.

And as a result, that Tanyao found a way to restart the war to the manner in which he fired Waltz, after realizing that Mike Wals was coordinating with Israelis to kind of corner Trump and Iran, the fact that he even started the talks with Iran without coordinating with Israelis. He struck a deal with the Yemen-Ihoutis that leaves the Israelis in a compromise. position and he didn't even bother to let them know about it because ultimately he doesn't have to. To releasing an American prisoner in Gaza instead of letting, you know, the Israelis handle it given the fact that the Israelis are not particularly interested in actually securing the release of these prisoners and hostages. All of these different things are not fake.

They're actually quite real. There's a sense of panic in Israel right now about these issues, But again, it's not clear whether it's temporary or whether it is the beginning of perhaps a new chapter in which the U.S. is not going to be so deferential to Israel in the manner that it has been historically and the manner that it particularly was under the Biden administration. On the Iran front, you know, it's very positive. They've had a couple of rounds of talks, et cetera. But unfortunately, I fear that Trump is backsliding into taking positions that simply will not work and will destroy this amazing opportunity that he has right now to strike a deal that potentially, you know, finally forever would put an end to this unnecessary conflict. Okay, so there's so much there.

But before you get back to Netanyahu and the Israeli position on all this stuff, as far as the Trump position goes, well, never mind the Trump position, but just the situation goes, the JCPOA still exists as a deal between Iran and the rest of the UN Security Council, right? So are we talking about a deal big enough to supersede all of that? or we're talking about finding way for Trump to save face to get back into that deal by maybe getting rid of some sunsets or something and renaming it that, you know, Trump's greatest idea ever plan or something like that? Or what exactly we even talking about? Because it was a big dang JCPOA to put all this to bed 10 years ago. It was a massive deal.

I think there are areas in which it could have obviously improved, but it was nevertheless a huge mistake to walk out of it. it and it's a major headache that he now has to deal with. I think there's a lot of sensitivity in the White House in the sense that they don't want this to look as if it's too similar to the JCPOA. But reality is nuclear physics hasn't changed since 2050. And so if you make a deal that is based on limiting the program and inspections and verification, there's going to be a lot of similarities. But now they are clear, though, treated that they want to completely replace the JCPOA. They're not looking for a face-saving way to get back into it.

Well, I mean, first of all, since Trump is willing to put primary sanctions on the table and lift those, meaning the sanctions that prevented American companies from getting into the Iranian economy, which Obama never put on the table, there actually is a possibility of getting a bigger deal, a better deal in some aspects that could have very different mechanisms and configurations and some of the variables. But it will still have some similarities if it is based on verification. And I think that's totally fine. That's unchangeable.

If they want to go for something that I'm looking for the dismantlement of the program, well, good luck. This is what the U.S. has pursued under George W. Bush. They pursued it under Trump 1 when Bolton and Pompeo was in the driving seat. And it's a complete disaster. It is completely counterproductive. It allows the running program to grow. And then the restrictions that can be put on the program actually are delayed.

And by the time they're put in place, they're not as strong as they could be because the program has grown. But there's a risk that he will go down that path. He doesn't seem to have made up his mind. There are contradictory statements coming from his own administration on this issue. There's some ambiguity coming from his statements as well. But if he really only has a red line of a nuclear weapon, that I think is a very good starting point. That does not automatically lead him down the path of dismantlement, et cetera.

That's completely unnecessary. So he can achieve his no nuclear weapon objective by having a deal that is focused on verifications and restrictions and limitations. Well, and Trit, isn't it right, just the fact that he has said, contrary to some of his underlings that, oh, whether they're going to be allowed in Richmond or not, we haven't decided finally on that. Statements like that, they really do prove, right, that he has been briefed. Someone has explained to him, the Ayatollah's not giving up enrichment.

If that's our target, we will fall short of it, right? Well, on May 4th, then he said that actually he's looking for full dismantlement in his interview with Meet the Press. So, again, there's contradictory statements. Well, never mind that, but just even on the first part, it goes to show that he understands that enrichment is the Holy Grail here. Absolutely. And that—

I think that's very clear. That he's going to have to compromise on it before the Ayatollah does, because the Ayatollah won't. Yeah, I mean, there's no way anyone in Iran would really compromise on that issue. It's a different scenario when you have the Syrians right now essentially bending over backwards and giving up everything, including territory to Israel. But that's because they have been completely defeated in war and 10, 15 years of civil war. That's a different story. That's not where the Iranians are.

In fact, part of the reason why Trump wisely ended this unnecessary engagement against the Houthis, is because he became quite clear to him that the Houthis have military capabilities that can really hurt the U.S., and those capabilities came to the Houthis from the Iranians. And if the Houthis have it, the Iranians have far more of it. So I think he's quite clear that if he ends up going in the military direction will be tremendously damaging to the U.S. So I'm hoping that he recognizes that there is a way for him to achieve his actual red line, but he has to give up some of these fantasies that has haunted U.S. policy makers for too long.

Well, as you said, if the red line really is, the Ayatollah can't make nukes, well, that's easy. And they signed the nonproliferation treaty back in 1968, you know, Yeah, I'll see you guys tomorrow at the barbecue. We already saw all that. Exactly. Let me... But there's technical issues there that I think they underestimate it.

And now we're in a situation in which they realize this is going to take longer. And you have a hard deadline with the snapback sanctions expiring at the UN in October and the Europeans being very inclined to trigger those snapback sanctions before October, because they essentially believe that if they don't use it, they will lose it. And that will put us in a much, much more antagonistic situation in which it deal with will become even more difficult. Right. So, now, you mentioned there the deal with the Houthis that America made without Israel.

And I talked with Dave DeCamp today, and he confirmed me that, yeah, the Houthis have attacked Israel since then. So they clearly were not part of that deal. I'm only chuckling at Trump's diplomacy there. But wait, real quick, just and say whatever you want. But my question is, do you think that that was part of the negotiation with Iran that, because Just a couple weeks ago, they were saying the Houthis shoot at us one more time. We're going to bomb Iran and hold them responsible for it.

Now they're cutting a deal. And I wonder whether they made a deal with Iran that, you know what, let's make a side deal over Yemen right now and get that out of the way. Because it reminded me of some of the side diplomacy that Kerry did with Zarif back 10 years ago. They actually had a deal to attempt to solve the Yemen war back then that then the Saudi stiff armed and destroyed. I think it actually was even more than that because the Iranians apparently played a role in convincing the Houthis to agree to this deal. So it's not just that, you know, they had an eye towards Iran. There was an Iranian element. An Arab diplomat told me that this deal with the Houthis would never have been possible had there not been three rounds of successful U.S. Iran talks preceding it.

Very important. Yeah. So it really shows how important that diplomacy. he is. Yep, just like remember when the sailors got captured, I don't know what they were doing in the wrong waters, or at least the Iranians claim they had sailed too close to Iran, and they captured them. But it was right in the middle of these talks.

So Kerry and Zarif went mumble, mumble, fist bump, and then they were released a couple days later, right? Yeah, I mean, it took, I think, about 48 hours. It could have taken even less, had it not been for the time difference. But they were in Iranian waters, but it was a complete mistake. They had just committed a couple of navigating errors and malfunction of some of their instruments, and that led them into Iranian waters. But something that could have become, you know, a crisis that could have led to war was

resolved within 48 hours because the two foreign ministers at the time were in such regular contact with each other so that they could easily resolve that problem. Right. Okay. So what does Benjamin Netanyahu really want? You know, when I recommend your book all the time, Treacherous Alliance, I always say that one of the things that's so impressive about it is you don't really deal with news cycle stuff at all. The whole book is told from the point of view of the highest level

strategists in Israel, the United States, and Iran. And of course the Iraqis are stuck in the middle of the poor guys. But you talk with the highest level strategies about their long-term thinking and when they've decided to change one overall regional strategy into another one and all these type things. So then does Netanyahu really want war with Iran? Is he want America to have a war with Iran? He thinks with an air war, we can get a regime change? Or is he just bluffing because he would rather have them as an enemy to scare all the Sunni kings into his camp or what?

No, no. He wants that war. He wants the United States to really cut down Iran in size, shift the balance in the region to Israel's favor, sustain that balance by regularly bombing Iran. Because if you take a careful look at what the New York Times story revealed last month, month about the plan that the Israelis were pushing onto the U.S., they were pushing a plan in which the U.S. would take a central role in the so-called Israeli military option. There is no Israeli military option. It's an American option. The U.S. has to do the heavy lifting at it. And it would

only set back the program one year. So after a year, the U.S. would come back and bomb again. These Israelis are essentially not just pushing war. They're pushing an endless war onto the Trump administration. And this is why he rejected it, of course. It doesn't mean that, unfortunately, can come back into play. But no, the Israelis absolutely want this confrontation, and they are quite disturbed by the fact that Trump has decided to, at least for now, move in the opposite direction. Well, those of you who listen to me tell you to listen to Mike Swanson at Wall Street Window

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How old is the Ayatollah now? I think he is 85, if I'm not mistaken. Does it make a big difference, whether it's him or the next guy in line? It certainly does. It does make a difference because the current Supreme leader, as hawkish as he may be, has actually been one of the key forces against weaponization. Many of those who are in favor of weaponization, Iran, which unfortunately is a growing number of people given the recent developments and Iran being attacked by Israel, seeing how the Biden administration lifted all restrictions off of Israel, all of these different things have made the idea of actually having a nuclear weapon much more attractive to a larger number of people in the Iranian system. They blame Khomeini. They believe that he is the obstacle towards actual weaponization, and the next Supreme Leader may actually have a very different perspective. on this. So it does make a huge difference. It also makes a difference when you take a look at

the Iranians' reluctance into getting into a direct confrontation with the U.S. or Israel, and the Yemenis rather almost eagerness to do the same. And you think about the fact that the average age of the Iranian leadership right now is somewhere between 75 and 80, and the average age of the Houthi leadership is about 40. The Iranian revolutionary zeal is, is, is, is, quite a bit less than what it was 20, 30 years ago, whereas the Houthis are essentially at their apex. Yeah. And then, so it's clear that, you know,

the Iranians have some influence over the Houthis. There was this great Dutch analyst wrote a piece years ago called the Houthis are not Hezbollah about how the relationship between the Shiites in southern Lebanon and Iran does not really compare here. their friends but not really allies and that was older but you know it was years into the war before you know the leader of the houthis al huthi whichever uh was invited to tehran to even meet with the ayatola that wasn't until like 2019 or 20 or something before iran even recognized the new

houthi regime so they're not that close you know they've been in power since the very end of 2014 was when they seized the capital city um so but it but it goes to show though i mean overall that if America could really make peace with Iran, then Yemen would not be a problem. We could, you know, use our new Iranian friends to help influence the Houthis to help us get along. And hey, America could stop supporting Israel, slaughtering the Palestinians, which would deprive the Houthis of their motive to do their bombing campaign that they're doing right now. Their drone and missile attacks that they're doing against the Israelis in the Red Sea and in Israel that they're doing right now. There's obviously room for diplomacy there. And I wonder what you think of this, man. And I don't think this is too utopian because even for having Republicans in there and whatever, because Trump himself said, maybe we can just get along with Russia and China too. And I know he says a lot of things.

I'm not saying, oh, this is clearly what his policy is. But I'm just saying he has said, look, what if we switch from the war on terrorism to nothing instead of to great power competition because that's what the services want? What if we just didn't do any of that? And what if we just tried to everybody make money and just be a normal country in a normal time, as Jean-Curt Patrick said, once a long time ago? And so I wonder if you think that Trump could just get on a plane, go to Tehran, go to Moscow, go to Beijing, go to Pyongyang, and then just come home and be Trump the Great, and just all this will be solved. Yes and no. First of all, I agree. I think that would be a delightful development for the United States to allow itself to be a normal. country, not having to have this manufactured burden of having to take care of every problem

in the world, particularly mindful of the fact that we solve not even half of them because we can't. But that burden to make sure that it is dispersed throughout the system, so it's not just falling on U.S. shoulders, I think would be a great thing. He could go to Moscow. He could go to China. He could go to many places. Tehran will be a tougher place. I think Whitkoff could go. I don't think Trump can yet go. I think he could go at the end of something, perhaps. But remember, he also ordered the killing of Qasem Soleimani. So that's a very sensitive issue for the Iranians. But here's what I worry about. I think he actually has a clear and very impressive ability to make decisive decisions and strike deals. What I don't see him having is the necessary follow-up

and the persistence in pushing the bureaucracy of implementing those agreements. We saw that, for instance, with a ceasefire in Gaza. And that, I think, will be a major challenge. He is amazingly impressive in terms of disregarding conventional wisdom and just doing things. I mean, for instance, we saw now, and I have some prepudation about it, given where this guy, this new guy in Syria belonged to. I mean, he was a founder of Al-Qaeda and other. Nusra in Syria, Jolani.

But, you know, he goes out there, meets with them and says, hey, I want to lift sanctions on Syria. I think those sanctions have been devastating for the populations and they do need to be lifted. It will be interesting to see if those sanctions actually are lifted, though, in the sense that it's going to take a lot of bureaucratic pressure and other things to make sure it happens, hopefully it will. But I'm saying we have seen a pattern in which decisions are made, big decisions, that follow through is a different story. Yeah.

Yeah. This is amazing to see him shaking hands with Al Jalani and praising him. He has a very strong past. Yeah, killing Americans in Mosul and Ramadi. That's his strong pass. It's setting off suicide attacks all across Syria. Yeah. Yeah. No, there's a lot to be quite uncomfortable there. I do think that, you know, lifting the sanctions of Syria, given how what they've done to the population is a necessary step. But I think there should be a more, there is a process. We've seen it in the past, you know, the rehabilitation of ANC, of PLO or IRA, etc., getting groups that have used terror to transition to being more what the mainstream would call legitimate organizations.

That process has not even been followed here. And in this case, we're not talking about a terrorist who was fighting for some national sovereignty or independence issue, but someone actually was, you know, part of Al-Qaeda who didn't even recognize the legitimacy of nation states. And that process has been completely set aside or fast-track. And that, I think, is setting a dangerous precedent. Yeah. Man, well, I read in Reason Magazine this morning that it's important that America normalized relations with the new Al-Qaeda in Syria as soon as possible to prevent Iran from getting in there and making a deal instead, Trita.

It's, you know, imagine if you're sitting in Tehran and you see that, you know, Al-Qaeda with all of the stuff that they did against the U.S., nevertheless, in the psyche of some American decision makers and commentators is not as big of a problem than Iran is. Yeah. And that there's more sanctions on Iran than that. there now will be on all tied on. Yep, that's right. And you talked about at the beginning the difference between American and Israeli interests.

Well, how about just right there on the very face of it, that Israel's enemy is the Shiite crescent of Tehran power. But it wasn't Hezbollah that knocked our towers down. That was the bin Ladenites on the radical edge of the Sunni side. And so we're still, you know, even though they're enemies of the American people, they're still strategic allies of the United States and enemies of the Shiites. And of course, you know, post-Zarkawi, they became even worse. It's completely genocidal against the Shiites in a way that bin Laden had not been. He was more kind of an Arab nationalist in a way compared to Zarqawi and

Baghdadi and some of the, you know, the successors there. And so here, yeah, they got us on the side of the bin Ladenite suicide bombers against Tehran and the Iranians who, hadn't done anything to us since sort of proto-Hazbalah supposedly with Iranian support bombed the Beirut barracks in 1983. But then Israel knew all about that and let it happen, according to Victor Ostroffsky and by way of deception, the Mossade agent, says they knew all about it. That's what America gets for sticking their nose into our business and sat there and let the barracks get bombed. So that's kind of a wash, isn't it? Yeah, yeah, no, no indeed. So, yeah, they'd go, oh, no daylight. Yeah, no daylight, as long.

as you just say, well, you know, Muslims over there somewhere and you don't want to know anything about who's who or who's on whose side or why or when, then you can get away with that stuff. But you zoom in at all and it becomes completely crazy and even treasonous. So, you know, just like always. But anyway, listen, I'm really glad to hear your study of what's going on in the actual talks. It sounds like things are positive. And after all, the Ayatollah wants to negotiate and not fight. So we do have that. that going for us. And apparently Trump would like to put this to bed rather than make it worse. He's not just going through the motions here. He's trying to get a deal done, right? The spirit of

the thing counts a lot, right? Yes, but I'm still worried. I do fear that he may turn around and once again really adopt this position of zero enrichment, et cetera. And then I think the chances of a deal really goes down to essentially zero. So I think there's a lot of positive developments, but I I am worried that he is backtracking from a position that actually was very, very constructive, reasonable, would work to something that unnecessarily complicates matter. And again, on the normal circumstances, it's not a problem because this is part of the rhythm of a negotiation. But under these circumstances, with snapback potentially being triggered, I think it's much, much better to do a deal fast rather than, taking exaggerated maximalist negotiating position, position as part of the negotiation

that risks, then missing this very crucial window that exists. Right. Yeah, it's perfectly fine. Move your B-2s to Diego Garcia and, you know, thump your chest about no enrichment and then change your mind and compromise. Everybody knows where this is going, and it is like an on-off thing. If you want a deal, you're going to have to accept enrichment. If you want to not have a deal, then just stick with the no enrichment position, and it really is as simple as that. So we'll know how serious. And like we were talking about before, Trump clearly understands what's at stake there, too. It's not just his guys, but he clearly understands what a crucial issue that is.

So either he wants the deal or he doesn't, and we'll know real soon how far they're willing to bend, I guess. Yeah, yeah. All right, well, thank you so much for your time again on the show, man. Appreciate it. No problem. My pleasure. Thanks so much. All right, you guys. That is Trita Parsi. He is at the Quincy Institute for International Statecraft, and he's at tack to check out this one on iran trump should resist the zero enrichment fantasy and hey everybody sign up for my substack scott horton show dot com and you can get the chapters of the audio book as i'm putting them out the audiobook of provoked that is scott horton show dot com thanks for listening to scott horton show dot com thanks for listening to scott horton show dot com and the libertarian institute at libertarian institute dot org