Scott Horton Show - Just the Interviews - 6/5/26 Trita Parsi on Where Things Stand Between Trump and the Iranians

Episode Date: June 7, 2026

Scott interviews Trita Parsi about the state of negotiations between the US and Iranian governments, as the ceasefire is frequently broken and the Strait remains largely closed. Parsi explains where he thinks the real sticking points lie and the two consider how Israel is complicating the process. Discussed on the show: Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States by Trita Parsi “Iran’s New Grand Strategy” (Foreign Affairs) TritaParsi.substack.com Trita Parsi is the Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and the author of Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran and the Triumph of Diplomacy. Parsi is the recipient of the 2010 Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order. Follow him on Twitter @tparsi  Audio cleaned up with the Podsworth app: https://podsworth.com Use code HORTON50 for 50% off your first order at Podsworth.com to clean up your voice recordings, sound like a pro, and also support the Scott Horton Show! For more on Scott's work: Check out The Libertarian Institute: https://www.libertarianinstitute.org Check out Scott's other show, Provoked, with Darryl Cooper https://youtube.com/@Provoked_Show Read Scott's books: Provoked: How Washington Started the New Cold War with Russia and the Catastrophe in Ukraine https://amzn.to/47jMtg7 (The audiobook of Provoked is being published in sections at https://scotthortonshow.com) Enough Already: Time to End the War on Terrorism: https://amzn.to/3tgMCdw Fool’s Errand: Time to End the War in Afghanistan https://amzn.to/3HRufs0 Follow Scott on X @scotthortonshow And check out Scott’s full interview archives: https://scotthorton.org/all-interviews This episode of the Scott Horton Show is sponsored by: Roberts and Roberts Brokerage Incorporated https://rrbi.co Moon Does Artisan Coffee https://scotthorton.org/coffee; Tom Woods’ Liberty Classroom https://www.libertyclassroom.com/dap/a/?a=1616 and Dissident Media https://dissidentmedia.com You can also support Scott’s work by making a one-time or recurring donation at https://scotthorton.org/donate/https://scotthortonshow.com or https://patreon.com/scotthortonshow Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Ladies and gentlemen of the press have been less than honest. Reporting to the American people, what's going on in this country. Because the babies are making this. We're dealing with Hitler Revisited. This is the Scott Horton Show. Libertarian foreign policy, mostly. When the president visit, that means that it is not illegal. We're going to take out seven countries in five years.

They don't know what the fuck they're doing. Negotiate now. End this war. And now, here's your host, Scott Porton. Okay, welcoming Treata Parsi back to the show here. He is, of course, the co-founder of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. And this here is his substack, a treataparcy, that is treataparcy.

That is tritaparsi.com and his latest here. Iran moved to change the U.S.-Iran equation yesterday. This is a few days old, but just a few. Welcome back to the show. Trita, how are you doing? Great to be away as you, Scott. Great to have you. And as we were just talking about before we went on,

you're also the author of the invaluable treacherous alliance, the secret history of America, Israel, and you can see it right there, over there, the maroon one. And I love that book. It's got so much of the history of the relationship between our three nations here. always with the poor Iraqis stuck in the middle. Yeah.

Like they just happen to be located in the wrong place for Israel and Iran to have a strategic rivalry if you ask me. And I bet if you ask them. But anyway, that's a big part of it. But so anyway, very great to have you here. And I'm very eager to hear your latest assessments of the state of the so-called pseudo-war, pseudo-seasfire, also with including some explosions. and the apparently ongoing talks to nowhere. I guess my, let's start with this.

My understanding is that both sides have absolutely impossible demands that the other side are not going to give into. Such as Iran is saying, you're going to leave the Gulf and turn it over to us and kiss our ass and give us sanctions relief and back off all your demands as far as taking our nuclear material out of the country and just forget you, middle finger. right they're not climbing down

I don't know what if they if they've climbed down on anything let me know but I don't know what and Donald Trump is saying give up essentially your nuclear program no enrichment no whatever you have left of uranium hexafluoride gas sitting in their canisters and whatever all of it you're going to give it all up and you're going to completely relinquish control of the Gulf we're going to go back to the status quo on February the 27th pretend this whole thing never happened as far as that goes

and I don't know if he dropped, you're going to see support for Hezbollah or not, but anyway, that's enough. They're never giving in to that. So we have, despite Trump's numerous, you know, I don't want to say promisher, but, you know, implications of an impending deal here to end the war. It seems like we actually are not anywhere closer to that

than we have been for a while, and including with more kind of skirmish and attacks in the Gulf. And then as your article indicates here, Iranians are ready to go ahead and escalate because the status quo is not serving them very well. So whatever. I said some things.

Respond to all that and then say whatever. So, Scott, I actually do think that a lot of those different things that have been circulating as demands, and many of them have circulated because Trump himself has said it, are not the things they're negotiating about. Because if they were, it would be absolutely right. There's no way there's going to be a deal. if those are the actual demands.

That is some of the stuff that has been said publicly. I think at various points, perhaps they were considered to be serious demands. At this point, both sides have become much, much more realistic. They have actually bridged a lot of gaps on a lot of different issues. The last remaining, well, I wouldn't say last, but one of the remaining ones right now is the release of Iranian assets, frozen assets, as part of the memorandum.

Oh, yeah, I don't have a different point. tell everybody. Yeah. And there's some disagreements there, and there's a proposal that just came into the White House earlier today from the Iranians and the mediators on how to resolve it. And there's some indications that suggest that it could actually end up being resolved. And if that's the case, it seems like that memorandum,

it's important to understand the larger issue may end up becoming impossible to bridge. but they may still be able to sign a memorandum, which ultimately in the long run may end up becoming meaningless if they can't get to a final deal. But for the memorandum, I do think that there is a chance because there has been progress made. And in fact, I would point to what happened in the Persian Gulf just five days ago

with the Iranian attacks. Let me give you a little bit of a background of what happened there. So about 10 or so days ago, the U.S. side, I think this is kind of after the visit with Xi in China, Beijing and which became clear that the Chinese were not going to help the United States on this issue. The U.S. started tightening the blockade. They did so partly because they were trying to pressure the Iranians to come back with the response. The Iranians were taking a lot of time, but also because they really wanted to squeeze the Iranians. At first, the Iranians responded

proportionately and the U.S. could easily absorb it, so nothing changed. But four or so days ago, they decided to change the equation. And that's when they even announced that they're now going to respond 1.5 for everything the U.S. does. The U.S. had, when I say tightening the blockade, they had blown up Iranian ships. They were targeting radar systems on the Iranian mainland, et cetera. So it was a low-level war within a ceasefire. Then the Iranians responded. They said it was 1.5.

I would say it's closer to 5.0. They struck Kuwait. They struck Bahrain. They struck Doha. They struck UAE. They struck Jordan. They struck Iraq. And they were essentially trying to say, we're not comfortable with a lower level escalation,

a lower level exchange of fire. We know you are to the U.S. But we're comfortable with a full-scale escalation. And we know that you are not. And essentially, the ball was back in Trump's court. Question was, was he going to then reciprocate, escalate further, or was he going to climb down? And up until now, at least, we've seen a climb down. And the Iranians climbed down as well.

Trump was playing down the Kuwaiti attacks. He said, oh, you know, it's not a big deal. That's something you do when you want to reduce the pressure on yourself for having to respond. In one of his interviews inside the White House, he said, well, look, we did a lot of nasty things to them. And they reciprocated. So he kind of admits that the U.S. actually initiated this round. But then that the Iranians escalated so hard and the U.S. decided it's not worth to go further. and they backed down.

Diplomacy continued. They were still exchanging messages, and now a proposal came in from the Iranians that there is some hope, I don't know, the details as to whether it's going to work or not or any reactions from the US side that could resolve that issue. If that issue is resolved,

I think the memorandum is actually likely going to happen. What happens afterwards, of course, is very, very difficult. But we're already seeing some signs that the US is shifting its focus to the post memorandum, negotiations. Okay, so

the first major issue, which, you know, they're kind of far apart, but I can see what you're saying, it seems more reasonable that they could come to an agreement on control of the Gulf going forward and how that's going to work.

But what about that nuclear material and promises of no enrichment and all that? Trump is way up on that ladder and so are they on the other side. They are, again, when it comes to what they're saying, publicly, but also what was said publicly by White House sources was very interesting. And it surprised me because my own conversations with the administration had left me with

the impression that Trump was not going to accept this specific element. And again, we don't know the full details, so it's difficult to judge. But it said something along the lines of what, that, you know, there would be IEA oversight over how the Iranians would dilute, um, uh, port. of the stockpile. That was what the Iranians were insisting on. They did not want to ship out the full amount. They wanted to dilute it.

And the U.S. position earlier on was no. All 100% of the stockpile should be sent out of the country, the U.S. position that was that it should be sent to the U.S. The Iranians said absolutely never would that happen. But keep in mind, Scott, in the JCPOA, the Iranians did ship out 98% of their stockpile. To Russia, right? I don't recall if the full amount went to Russia,

but you have a better grasp for the details. But they did. And Trump, I think, is asking for 100% because he wants to outdo Obama. Now, it may still be 100%, but it was interesting to me to see that the White House was talking about that someone will be diluted on Iranian soil.

If that is the case, that means that it's not 100%. Trump has settled for something less. And I think the Iranians will ship out a very significant portion of it. Now, of course, all the details of that is going to be handled after the memorandum is signed. So it could still go down south. Some of these other variables, they made progress and then both sides backtrack.

But one thing that makes me against all odds, a bit more optimistic than pessimistic. It is not to say that arguments I'm sure you would put forward of how untrustworthy the Trump administration has proven itself to be to the Iranians, given the fact that the Iranians have been involved twice in the midst of negotiations, but also the fact that Trump, of course, withdrew from the deal in the first place. Both sides really need a deal. Trump, he can say whatever he wants about the midterms

or that he doesn't care about the pocketbooks of Americans. He absolutely needs the deal. We're going to see oil prices go up dramatically in a couple of weeks because inventory is part of the reason that old prices didn't go up high as high as it should have. Inventory was very high. throughout the world when the war started. And that gave a significant buffer.

The US used a lot of its strategic reserve as well. That is now starting to run out. And we're going to be hit with some very significant problems. In addition to the fact that there's accumulated problems that are coming about as a result of the straight being closed for as long as it now has been closed and a lot of ships there are stuck. He absolutely needs a deal. And the Iranians need a deal.

They need sanctions relief, not just because the economic situation, but for a security reason. if they believe that it was the perception of their weakness that led to them being attacked, then they need to be able to rebuild their defenses in a manner so that they don't get attacked again. And that's going to be extremely difficult for them to do without sanctions relief, mindful of the plethora of problems that they have right now. So both of them are in dire need of a deal. In a manner that I would have to say, frankly, I did not see during the JCPU.

Both of them needed a deal back then as well, but it wasn't as dire. It wasn't as pressing as it is right now for both sides. Hey guys, Scott here for Mundo's Artisan Coffees. It's the Scott Horton Show-flavored coffee, breakfast blend. It's part Ethiopian, part Sumatra. It's really good. All you do is go to Scott Horton.org slash coffee,

and it'll forge you on there to Mundo's artisan coffees. Get it, they hate Starbucks because they represent the war party, of course. And so they're Mundo's, and they support peace. And guess what? Scott Horton's Show Coffee is the number one bestselling coffee at Mundo's Artisan Coffees right now. Just go again to Scott Horton.org slash coffee. And it's also true that Trump did bond the crap

and the Israelis, especially America, bond the crap out of Iran's nuclear facilities last June and really set them back years, you know, in concrete terms there. So I think that was, I'm afraid, part of the reason that the war broke out on the 28th was because on the 27th, the Iranians were like, look, we could forego enrichment for up to five years because what the hell, it's going to take five years to get our act together ready to enrich again anyway, right?

They had no facility, the crucial conversion facility at Natanz is destroyed. So if you can't go from to gas and back to metal again, then what the hell are we even talking about, right? Yeah, exactly, exactly. Yeah, and so this is part of the reason I find it interesting that they've negotiated so hard on the stock probably because it's really a question mark to me what the strategic utility of that is for the Iranians at this point. I think there's a perspective there that the stockpile was not

a latent nuclear program or capacity that they had through the stockpile was not a deterrent against a conventional attack but it's still a deterrent against a non-conventional attack. I don't know if that's true,

but that is a belief that seems to be held by many there. But reality is, if the Iranians were to actually go for a bomber right now, I think they would use a program that has nothing to do with any of the element

of the previous program. It wouldn't be building off of existing facilities or anything of that kind. So if it's that option that they're trying to keep alive, I'm not so sure that giving up the stockpile changes that picture. Yeah, that's a good point

because Fordo and Natanz are completely offline. If they're going to have some small batch processing somewhere, it's going to be with other centrifuges that were developed and diverted back a long time ago. I don't buy it. I don't think. that's very likely that they could do that. In fact, Trump at one point,

I believe there was just a clip of him on TV saying that I knew that they were digging and I called them and I told them, just stop because I see what you're doing and I'll bomb you. And it seemed, I mean, who knows? He just says so many things, but it actually seemed credible because there were some important, there was some digging going on at this place called Pickax Mountain, and that they were looking about maybe doing a secondary facility there.

And he's just saying, listen, I already showed you my willingness to bomb me. you. You might as well pull your bulldozers out of there, pal. You're not going to get

any progress made. And so they did quit. That's according to his narrative that they said, ah, geez, okay, well, bluff called and again and back down.

So yeah, that does give them room to negotiate on the nuclear issue since they really are not in that much of a position of strength on that anyway.

You know, hold on to just a barest thing for pride purposes and more or less forego the rest. But let me ask you about Netanyahu here because

if And there are different signs, you know, that Trump, especially from the language of some of his recent tweets and whatever he starts calling him, the Islamic Republic of Iran and whatever, starts, you know, treating them with a little respect. You get the idea that he's softening up his base to accept that maybe they're ready to really, you know,

see these negotiations through now and all that. Yeah, Netanyahu, I don't know what was his most recent thing on this, but I know that there was that interview last week where he was saying, was it two weeks ago? Maybe. where he told Major Garrett from would be CBS News, I guess, that the war's not over. Donald Trump promised me we're going to get that uranium

and we're not going to possibly stop short of that. And then, of course, they're still conquering southern Lebanon. They're past the Latani River. They're trying to take all the territory up to the Zahari River, apparently. And I have this headline here actually from the London Times that Hezbollah rejects U.S. mediated ceasefire as, quote, surrender to Israel. America's trying to call time out right now. And Hezbollah is saying, yeah, right, as soon as you get out of southern Lebanon, then we'll give you a ceasefire there.

And the Israelis really don't want to do that. And in fact, every time Trump says, yeah, I'm making the Israelis back down in Lebanon, they say, oh, yeah, and start bombing the crap out of them again more in order to just prove. In fact, at one point, didn't he say, was it prohibited in all capital? letters or something, Israel is prohibited from backing Lebanon. They completely ignore him. They have total power over his Iran policy because Iran's not going to give up until they get a solid ceasefire in Lebanon, right? So what's the deal?

Yeah. So, but you saw that phone call. Look, I know there's a lot of justified skepticism on what actually happened and that phone call that happened at all. But not my impression and based on the conversations I've had, not only did it happen, and there's probably more to it. It did also incidentally happen as a result of the U.S. detecting that the Iranians were getting ready to strike Israel.

And there was a realization that the Iranian threat was actually a very, very serious one. And so the Israelis are not going to back off until Trump is dead serious. And so far he's not been that serious up until that phone call. We're not seeing that they're withdrawing yet, but it seems like the attacks have reduced. We've seen that pattern before as well in which temporarily the Israelis back off and then slowly but surely they go back in.

I don't suspect that Trump is actually going to put real sustained pressure on them until there is a deal because he's going to pay a heavy political price in certain circles for him putting that pressure on the Israelis. And he's not going to do it unless he has something else from the Iranians. But if he gets that from the Iranians and he fails to, sustain that threshold on these Israelis.

And the Israelis are allowed to ruin the ceasefire by escalating against in, again, in Lebanon. Then I mean, it will really question Trump in many profound ways, but also it will put the Iranians in a dire situation because they may not want to walk out of the deal and lose the sanctions relief over this issue. So one of the things that I wrote in my substack that the Iranians have considered,

in that type of a scenario, which is that Trump actually does get serious with Israelis, but eventually the Israelis managed to find a way to wiggle out of it again. In that scenario, the Iranians may actually start attacking the UAE for every time Israel attacks Lebanon and essentially create a horizontal escalation again, similar to what they did in the beginning of the war. That way they don't withdraw from the deal. They put the ball back in Trump's court and says,

well, if your idea of a ceasefire permits Israel to strike an Iranian ally, well, then it should also permit Iran striking an Israeli ally, which is, of course, the UAE. Now, it carries all kinds of different challenges, and the Emirates are also militarily capable of striking Iran. But bottom line is the Iranians will, you know, fly on parts of the UAE if it goes to that. And then the question is, is Trump going to go back into the war, or is it going to get serious about sustaining pressure on the Israelis. That's the calculation. Whether it works out or not is, of course, a different story.

What a mess. I would have recommended them not doing this work. Okay, two things real quick. Oh, no, one thing real quick then. There's a new piece in Foreign Affairs by Bali Nasser, who I don't know him very well. You may know him. I remember reading valuable things by him in the past,

including Seymour Hershey's great piece, The Redirection from 07 has some Bali Nassar in it. insightful stuff. So he has this piece with a co-author about Iran's new strategy and long story short is all the revolutionaries are dead. And so now it's the guys who fought in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.

The son of the Ayatollah, is maybe not an Ayatollah, but he is the Supreme Leader, and he is a veteran of the IRGC, and I believe a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War himself. And the idea being that these guys, they are ideological, but they're not so much ideological in terms of Shiite religious fundamentalism and radicalism as they are just Iranian nationalists.

And that this represents essentially a whole new generation of men coming to power in Iran with a whole new outlook that may be just as hard or even harder to deal with. but that represents essentially a different and much more kind of nationalist and less sectarian view. I wonder if you read that or what you think of that. So look, Dali and the co-author is Narges Bajogliu's absolutely both of them.

Fantastic. Everyone should read them. They really know their stuff. I am ashamed to admit I have not had a chance to read it yet. It is on my reading list for this weekend. They've written fantastic things before. Their analysis is top-notch. what you described to me sounds very plausible. You saw in the Treacherous Alliance as well that I did write

that at the end of the day, ideology is a factor, but it's not a factor that Trump's geostrategic considerations and that Iranian nationalism was still very much at the core. It's just that it's manifesting itself differently. There's always been several different strands of Iranian nationalism. One is Shia nationalism. One is a more Persian,

pre-Islamic nationalism, but none of them can say that they're the only ones or that they're the only right ones. So there's always been a strong sense of nationalism on that side as well. And it may have become much sharper with this next generation. I can definitely see that scenario. But I haven't read the articles. I can give you any detailed reactions to it. All right. Good enough. Well, that's what I get for asking a question called. And if you were writing about it, it would be at treataparcy.substack.com. This one is about the at least semi-plausibility of the Trump Netanyahu fight on the phone. And then many other great pieces there, treatedparsi.substack.com and, of course,

responsible statecraft for the Quincy Institute as well. Thanks very much for your time. Thank you so much for having me. Thank you, Scott. The Scott Horton show is brought to you by the Scott Horton Academy of Foreign Policy and Freedom, Roberts & Roberts, Brokerage, Inc., Moondos, Artisan Coffee, Tom Woods Liberty Classroom, and APS radio news. Subscribe and all the usual place. and check out my books.

Fools Aaron, enough already, and my latest, Provoked, how Washington started the new Cold War with Russia and the catastrophe in Ukraine. Find all of the above at Scott Horton.org, and I'm serializing the audiobook of Provoked at Scott Horton Show.com and Patreon.com slash Scott Horton Show.

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