Sea Control - Sea Control 191 - The Arctic with Dr. Elizabeth Buchanan and Katie Burkhart

Episode Date: July 26, 2020

Links1. "What’s at Stake With Rising Competition in the Arctic?" by Brian Sittlow, Council on Foreign Relations, May 1, 20202. "The United States Must Defend Open Seas in the Arctic," by Jerry Hendrix, The National Review, May 13, 20203. "Why NATO Needs a Standing Maritime Group in the Arctic," by Colin Barnard, CIMSEC, May 15, 20204. "The U.S. Navy Returns to an Increasingly Militarized Arctic," by David Larter, Defense News, May 12, 20205. "Russia’s New Arctic Policy Document Signals Continuity Rather Than Change," by  Ekaterina Klimenko, SIPRI, April 6, 20206. "The Overhaul of Russian Strategic Planning for the Arctic Zone to 2035," by Elizabeth Buchanan, NATO Defense College, May 19, 20207. "Developing Security in a White Water World: Preparing for the Arctic," by Ian Birdwell, CIMSEC, June 10, 20208. "Presidential Memorandum on Icebreaking," the White House, June 9, 2020

Hey folks, Jared here with your regularly scheduled dose of Sea Control. This week we have Dr. Elizabeth Buchanan and Katie Burkhart discussing the Arctic, Russia's 2035 policy document and activity in the Arctic, Chinese intent, and the variety of cooperative fora in NATO and the High North. We've also announced the next phase of Project Trident. Project Trident is your opportunity to shape the future of maritime security. Our next theme is regional strategies, and we've partnered with the Okuska Council for Asia-Pacific Studies, the Dominican Naval Command and Staff College

and the Institut für Sicherheitspolitik in Kiel, Germany submissions are due August 31st you can find more information on our website at simsec.org finally just want to advertise for the SimSec Podcast Network and our second podcast feed The Bilge Pumps

you can find them on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify and wherever else you download your podcast it's more low-key, slightly less serious approach to current events in the maritime domain and naval history by three historians Check them out wherever you download your podcast. With that, I'll turn it over to Kimber's men. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security.

Aloha, showmates, and welcome back aboard Sea Control. Today, I'm joined by Dr. Elizabeth Buchanan and Katie Burkhart, and we're going to be discussing a range of maritime security issues in the Arctic. As always, our views are our own and do not reflect the official positions of any institutions with which we might be otherwise associated. Elizabeth, Katie, thank you so much for joining me today. So before we start, I'd like to ask each of you to tell the listeners your backgrounds. Elizabeth, would you mind starting?

Thanks, Jared, for hosting this discussion on a topic that's, you know, very near and dear to me. So I have a PhD on Russian Arctic strategy, and I specialize in polar geopolitics sort of more broadly. and the future of contested global commons with a particular interest in the role of energy. I'm a lecturer in strategic studies at Deakin University here in Australia and I'm delivering the defence and strategic studies course at the Australian War College here in Canberra.

And I'm also a non-resident fellow of the Modern War Institute over at West Point. Very nice. Thank you. Katie, would you mind introducing yourself? Yes. Hi, and good afternoon to everybody, and thank you for having me here. I am a member of the Coast Guard Commandant's Advisory Group. It's a team that does strategy and communications for the Coast Guard's senior leader, the Commandant, and I am a former Naval Surface Warfare Officer in the U.S. Navy. I spent 10 years between active duty and reserve before shifting to my civilian and public policy career. Thanks, Katie. So, Katie, we'll start, we'll jump right in on your background. Why would it be appropriate to have someone with a Coast Guard background

on a podcast about Arctic maritime security? Well, I really appreciate you having me here because I think that in the U.S., at least, the Coast Guard is really a leader within the interagency on not just on Coast Guard policy and strategy, but just on operational presence. And that goes back a very long time. If you go back to when the U.S. purchased Alaska from Russia and therefore became an Arctic state, the federal government officials that arrived in Alaska came on a Coast Guard cutter, at the time a ship part of the Revenue Cutter Service. And over 150 years, the Coast Guard has really been the leading maritime operational surface presence in the region, both off the coast of Alaska, as well as if you look at World War II, defending Greenland during that conflict, and even through today as we operate icebreakers as well as lots of other assets across the Arctic. So I really appreciate the opportunity to talk to you today about all things Arctic. Thanks. So then let's start by describing the space of the Arctic. What constitutes the Arctic and which countries are considered Arctic states?

Yeah, so many people have different definitions of the Arctic. The most common one is just to say anything above the Arctic Circle, which is roughly 66 degrees north. And that's the most common definition. So that gives us eight Arctic nations or the Arctic Eight. If you start with the U.S. and go around, that's the U.S., Canada, Denmark by way of Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. You may also hear people talk about Arctic coastal state, which would exclude Sweden and Finland, who have Arctic territory but don't have a coastline on the Arctic Ocean. For any of your American listeners, they might be interested to know that the U.S. law has been passed that defines the Arctic for the U.S., and it's roughly the Arctic Circle Line, except it dips down and covers the entire Bering, all the way down to the Aleutian Chain.

But depending on your field of study, you may be interested in a broader definition of the Arctic that covers certain social groups or peoples, or maybe covers the whole river sheds that feed into the Arctic. So lots of different definitions there. Thanks. Elizabeth, I'm going to come to you for this next question. What should I make of China's assertion that it's a near Arctic state? Is there a made up 87 dash line somewhere that dates back 4,000 years to support that claimancy? Well, I think the China card has really drawn attention to the Arctic. It's kind of a new geopolitical flashpoint, if you will.

But I think I'm going to go the other way with this question. So there's not really a claim here that we're talking about. It's more of a soft power push to legitimize Beijing's global polar aspirations, right? And there's two key parts to this. So Beijing has an identity project here. It's a legitimate actor in the Antarctic by the way of the treaty. So that's something that from a camera point of view, we're very, very, you know, attuned to.

And it's also a legitimate actor in the Arctic in terms of the small section of the Arctic Ocean, which is international waters. Second, Beijing is strategically looking to diversify and future-proof its resource supplies and shipping options. So the Arctic offers both. We have a shorter Asia to Europe transport route via the Northern Sea route. You've got optionality for transit corridors if the West cut off the Malacca Strait, or if we have more tension in the South China Sea. We've got fisheries, minerals, and hydrocarbons. So that's really what's at stake, I think. And we're talking about strategic interests rather than any sort of formal claim, for now, at least. And I would ask then, what is China actually

doing in the Arctic? Well, we know in 2016, no, wait, in 2018, sorry, they put out a strategy for the Arctic. So we know that it's a strategic interest. I think we have to be really careful in talking about, you know, China entering the Arctic in a formal sense. They've taken advantage of sort of Russia's economic position following sort of Western sanctions. They don't have access to the technology or more so the capital finance for any of these energy ventures along the Russian Arctic zone. So they've kind of become an actor of necessity for the Arctic's largest stakeholder. So Katie, I know we spent a lot of time talking about conflict on SimSec, obviously not you and personally, but SIMSEC in general, we do talk a lot about conflict, whether it's Russia or China.

Are there areas where these countries collaborate well in the Arctic and do so successfully? And what are those? Yeah, I appreciate you asking that because for so long, the Arctic has really been known as the pole of peace. And it's very important for most of the states there have said that their goal is to have it remain a place that is stable and peaceful. And the U.S. policy is that as well. And so there are lots of areas where countries collaborate. From a Coast Guard, I can just give you some more tactical and operational examples. If you look at the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, which is a venue in which the Coast Guard equivalent agencies in those eight Arctic states we mentioned before actually operate together, they have ways that they communicate

about common threats. And they exercise the search and rescue, oil spill response, and these other common threats to the nations and to the physical environment. In another example, I know people often look at U.S. and Russia as sort of a flashpoint, and that potentially is a place where conflict would arise in the Arctic. But there's plenty of cooperation there as well. For example, the U.S. and Russia submitted a joint bid to the International Maritime Organization in the past couple of years to have a voluntary traffic separation scheme through the Bering Strait. So these are like real tangible opportunities for collaboration. And so even though we are very concerned about the potential for future conflict

as the geopolitical environment of the Arctic changes, we also want to make sure that we're focused on those areas where we can continue to collaborate. Thanks. So then what is the Arctic Council and what does it do? So the Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum that includes the eight Arctic states that we mentioned before. It's really looked to as the premier regional governance mechanism for the region. So again, it has the eight Arctic states. What's unique is that it also has permanent participants for the indigenous communities that aren't necessarily linked to any one nation. And then it has observers, and those observers might be nations such as China, but also nations like Germany and the UK, and as well as non-governmental

organizations and intergovernmental organizations like the Red Cross or the IMO. So a very broad, diverse group of stakeholders. And the Arctic Council is really focused on cooperation, like we just talked about, specifically in scientific research, as well as the physical environment. And so they have six working groups and really they are trying to get after the tangible ways to work together, whether that's an oil spill response or whether that's in research on the flora and fauna of the region. And some of the other things that are unique about the Arctic Council, it's not a treaty organization. Like I said, it's just a forum. So it's really not binding their decisions. However, it has facilitated binding treaties. So there's two

treaties, one on search and rescue and one on oil spill response that were facilitated through the Arctic Council. And then one other note that the Arctic Council explicitly excludes security from its mandate. So often we hear that, hey, we want this region to remain a cooperative place, and yet we have no avenue for the arctic nations to discuss the very important topic of security it's probably one of the greatest criticisms thanks elizabeth sorry did you have anything to add on the arctic council before i go to the next question no katie has kicked out of the park awesome so elizabeth one of the reasons that we're seeing this sudden surge in interest and what i'm interpreting as a sudden surge in interest is as we started to prep for this

and I started to accumulate Arctic articles and links, I quickly became overwhelmed with just the sheer quantity of writing that's being done in the Arctic. It's the release of the basic principles of the Russian Federation's state policy in the Arctic to 2035. What was that document and what was in it? So the document lays out Russia's strategy for the Arctic out to 2035, so exactly what the title says it's going to do.

Overall, Russian Arctic policy has been, you know, quite pragmatic. The document itself is a new iteration and followed closely and implemented, you know, there's not often any surprises from Russia when it comes to the Arctic, which in some ways is quite useful for the West. This basic principles document outlines Moscow's long-term sort of priorities for the region. It does focus on, you know, the national security and methods to protect national interests in the Russian Arctic zone. Overall, it's another tool to kind of emphasize in a policy way the high priority for the region. There's quite a lot of continuity from the previous iterations of this document.

So, of course, sovereignty and territorial integrity, front and centre. Moscow's interest in preserving the Arctic as a zone for peace and cooperation remains a feature, which is great news for its neighbours. But there was a little bit of change in this recent document, which was interesting for those of us that follow these things quite closely. For me, I was very, I was really interested in the sort of new framing of cooperation in the Arctic. So usually Russia would refer to, you know, cooperative environment or whatnot. But now it is seeking, quote, stable, mutually beneficial, end quote, ties in the region. So, you know, that's much more of a, I guess, structured way of cooperation, removing traditional alliances, taking ideology out of the equation. So the focus of this document still remains, you know, on defensive militarization, but they're framed in terms of Russian military modernizations programmed for the Arctic, serving to ensure Moscow can deter foreign military aggression in the region. which for those who follow arctic affairs we often only really see the news the news headlines of russia you know militarizing and promoting military aggression in the region and for me

another kind of interesting change was this introduction of an assessment of national security in the arctic so there wasn't so much of a a threat perception it was framed in terms of challenges. So Russia's really taking some leadership here in terms of the Arctic narrative. For Moscow, it's now listing domestic demographic and economic concerns for its high north indigenous population as key threats to the national security agenda in the Arctic, which is good to see whether or not that remains something that's delivered. We'll see in 2035. So I guess the sudden surge in interest of Russian Arctic affairs, you know, did come off the back of this policy document. But I just want to point out, like, that's normal with every new policy document that's tabled, especially under the Putin administration.

You know, take, for example, the flurry of Russia claims the North Pole articles and predictions back in 20, what, 2007, you know, when Moscow planted the Russian flag on the seabed. And, you know, we're a decade later and we're still waiting for Russia to literally claim the North Pole. So hot takes are frustrating when they're under-researched or outright wrong. But it has to be balanced from my perspective with at least this topic is getting some limelight. Thanks. I want to go back to your mention of the new framing of cooperation and their focus on mutually beneficial. Do you think that's externally targeted? And so who is that targeted at? So I suspect that's targeted at China, which for some people in the field, you know, that's an interesting take. But I think Russia was well aware from the beginning of the position it put itself in, in welcoming Chinese capital to the Arctic. I don't think you know it was a choice but a choice that was you know a first priority but

but we're here now um I think it's a way that they can put some distance between themselves and China to sort of mandate you know this is not this is not a welcome card into the Arctic you know you can't access the northern sea route as you see fit we're going to have mutually beneficial engagement you know in the arctic so you will pay your tolls etc all right thanks i wanted to discuss a few of the principles uh and those would include quote unquote to protect the arctic environment can you quantify the effect climate change is having on the arctic and i realize that's a big ask so just kind of a summary of what is happening and what's making the northern sea route more attractive the environmental focus i think on the arctic agenda is a long time coming

in sort of a serious, tangible way. It's often kind of added on to the end of policy documents as we ought to do this sort of thing. So it's good to see there's a maintained kind of commitment to the environment. I think it's really apparent the effect that climate change is having on the region. Just look to, you know, last month's Norlisk mining accident,

which in the Russian Arctic zone, a fuel tank spilled into the arctic ecosystem and and russian river system up there it's kind of a case in point of the serious costs of climate change in the arctic right you've got melting permafrost is threatening these aging existing infrastructures in the region but i think we overlook the military concern here so infrastructure and ports are eroding so we get to see the impact that this will have I think the most recent assessment of global warming in the Arctic has actually seen calls that Arctic Ocean waves could potentially reach two meters. So just the sheer knock-on effect basically redesigns the Arctic operational zone, potentially. Technology and hardware, for example, that's designed for polar operations might not be fit for purpose.

but I guess the bigger picture problem is we're not really looking past the immediate effects of climate change in the region right we've got the focus on the opportunities that climate change presents in the arctic so thinner winter ice and ice-free summers mean quicker cheaper transit along the polar sea lanes or easier access to resources but we're overlooking the costs and those are fatal for the arctic opportunities right like how do you man a workforce in a region that's potentially uninhabitable um in terms of you know temperature so i think the environment has has kind of been weaved back into into strategy especially for the kremlin for two reasons you know first i think it's a point of collective arctic state interest so it's a mutual talking

point, if you like, kind of extends the potential for sort of dialogue and discussion with its neighbors. We can all agree on that. But second, I think it's the safest policy to push in the region, right? I doubt any Arctic state is going to lash Russia for its commitment or interest to preserving the environment. And I actually think this is likely to feature as part of Russia's Arctic Council chairmanship, which begins next year. Thanks. Katie, just to piggyback off that, do the Arctic states all have a similar approach to climate change? I actually sat in a war game in the Pentagon in 2015, where one of the speakers mentioned the Russians at that point, 2015, five years ago, thought that climate change was a phase and things would eventually be in cooling again. Well, so I think generally, as Elizabeth said, the talking point on the climate is one that's easy for everyone to get behind. Now, the specifics of that vary country by country because the physical environment is very distinct country by country.

For example, Norway's coastline, even in the Arctic, is ice free year round. And that's just not true of Canada. And the Northern Sea Route is becoming more accessible more quickly than the Northwest Passage. And so each country's approach is going to be distinct and based on the needs of their people and their nation. I will also say that in part, it's being driven by their own politics. And so, for instance, in the U.S., the current administration has not put climate at the front of their approach to the Arctic. They have taken a security first approach. And that has not necessarily resonated well at all times with our Arctic partners. For instance, at the last ministerial of the Arctic Council, and they did not sign a declaration, which was unusual because there was an agreement on exactly the right climate change related language. So there are definitely disagreements, but I think where the rubber meets the road in terms of the actual cooperation, in terms of the scientific cooperation, that remains very strong. And I think is one of the ways in which the countries can kind of cling to those cooperative tissues that can withstand some of the other tensions between the nations. Thanks, Elizabeth. I'll come back to you because the other basic principle I wanted to discuss involved the northern sea route. What is the northern sea route and why is it important to Russia?

The basic sort of strategic studies 101 is the reality of 90 percent of everything is shipped. So maritime security is literally at the heart of strategic studies and the only way for even the US, right, to project its power abroad. We have a few key global shipping routes, but with the growing global population and increasing demand for goods, these artilleries are going to be congested. Some of them already are. And I mean, let's just take the commercial kind of equation here. Slow shipping equals economic losses. Key shipping lanes, for example, the Marcus Straits here in Asia, so my end of the woods, you've got this route looking after the majority of the global population, but it's on the doorway to an emerging potential flashpoint, right? The South China Sea.

If war broke out there, Australia would quite literally run out of fuel and pharmaceuticals. So there's the strategic kind of importance. The Northern Sea Route is an emerging global corridor, but it's a centuries-old domestic corridor for Russia. I think we forget that. It runs within the Russian-exclusive economic zone in the Russian Arctic and essentially links the Pacific Ocean to the North Atlantic via the Arctic. I think it's 13 days or so quicker than Suez Canal between the two continents. so there's the cost saving the time saving and the overall security of supply demand dynamics kind of given this lack of congestion and piracy and you know throw whatever else for whatever sort

of security concern you have so it's an attractive global supply highway it's attractive for russia too i mean it's a personal shipping lane to feed arctic lng and energy to its asian markets and even back you know to pivot back to the west to um the european markets so if we want to make an environmental argument as well you know we could state that shipping is one of the least carbon intensive transport methods so it's yeah it's a really significant development i can i just add something jared yeah absolutely yeah i just wanted to add to the this can go in the end of the climate change point that katie made no go ahead yeah on environment as well you know russia's russians love phases so shale gas was also a phase for moscow uh only until

recently did putin even see it as no bubble they quite literally termed it a bubble so i think once the economic costs start hitting these strategic energy project ventures in the arctic we'll we'll start to see change in terms of a commitment to dealing with climate change thank you so then in addition to opening the northern sea route and you allude to this somewhat earlier that russia's been very proactive about securing the northern sea route to include building or modernizing a large number of bases along the route military infrastructure projects what else are they attempting from a regulatory standpoint so this might rattle a few chains which i i tend to often you know kind of do in this field but i think we can fight you know the geopolitical realities

in the arctic uh with the expectations of russian militarization so we've seen it all before during the cold war in the arctic so we have i guess that historical narrative to jump back to so we kind of we know what we we should be expecting from russia's military in the region but if we just strip it back you know russia has the largest coastline in the arctic by far we know there's increasing activity. So it makes, to me, kind of normative sense that they want to secure an open border. But add to that this, I guess, you know, this historical siege mentality, which we could say Russia has. So geography plays a huge part here. And I think we overlook that quite a bit, kind of hot takes of new Cold Wars and whatnot. So in terms of regulations of the Northern Sea

route. I see these quite normative. They're adhering to international law. So, well, at least their reading of international law, I think is the important part to put in there. The agreed rules of the Arctic by raising Article 234 of UNCLOS. So I think we call it the ICE rule in the field. Basically says, you know, areas in which are ICE covered within an EEZ are able to be designated as special areas in which, you know, traditional freedom of sea notions like innocent passage can be rejected. The point is that the US and China see parts of the Northern Sea route as international waters. And so they actually reject Russia's calls for Article 234, mainly on the basis that there's not ice in some parts of this route. Of course, this is coming back to a broader

problem with international law, is that it is more grey than black, right? So Russia is arguing a particular reading of the article and the region once had ice or permafrost counts as ice you know so this isn't to say that no one can use the northern sea route and this is where i'll come into the sort of regulatory point of your question but it's to the contrary it's an important economic tool for the russian budget they need international transit so regulatory wise if china wants to use the Northern Sea Route, which they will and are, they'll need to ask permission in advance is the first thing. The second thing is you need to pay your toll. And third, you need to allow a Russian pilot to navigate the vessel along the route. So I don't see any real difference between these

regulations and perhaps how we can expect Canada to delineate the Northwest Passage as internal waters, because I think the U.S. still views it as international. Thanks. Katie, I see you nodding. You're pretty much in agreement with the assessment there? Yeah, a really great summary of the importance and the history of the Northern Sea Route. I particularly appreciate you putting it in the context of how Russia sees it. Agreed, you know, the U.S. does see the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage as international

transit routes and have been very public and adamant in some cases about their position on that. One thing that I just want to note for some of your listeners, who I think some of which have a Navy or kind of a maritime focus, and that's if you look at the three different routes across the pole, if you just look at the map, and you have the northern sea route across the Russian coast and Northwest Passage through the Canadian archipelago, and then the Central Arctic route or the circumpolar route that's not currently navigable, but sort of across the top. Many project that it could be navigable in the coming decades. All of them have many

points of which to start on the Atlantic, but they all converge in one point as they enter the Pacific, and that's through the Bering Strait, which the U.S. and Russia share a border on. And so I appreciated Elizabeth talking about geopolitics and the sort of foundation of interest in the Arctic and the Northern Sea route being because these are critical maritime routes for global commerce. I just want to make a point that there's a potential choke point in the same way that we might think of the Straits of Malacca as a narrow sort of closing in the future as or if or as commerce continues to grow along any of those routes. No, thank you. That's a very good point. We just actually finished a choke points topic week on SimSec, and a couple of folks chose to write about the Arctic, though I don't think they framed it quite the way that you did, which is interesting to me. Before we transition fully back to the U.S., though, Kitty, I wanted to ask you about the other Arctic states, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark,

Iceland, Canada. These countries are either U.S. allies via NATO, or they work very closely with NATO in the cases of Finland and Sweden. Are they generally united in their approach to the Arctic or are there disputes amongst these countries as well? I think generally united is a great way to describe the overall approach of these countries if you cut across outside of the security into environmental economics and other topics as well. But you use the specific term dispute and something i wanted to just share with your listeners is that you often hear these sensational headlines about you know flashpoints in the arctic and and people are going head to head but the reality is that the true disputes like we might think of in the south china sea

just don't really exist in the arctic there are disputes um your listeners might be interested to know that like the only land border dispute in the arctic is between denmark and canada And I hear that researchers like leave beer for the other country's researchers. I don't know if that's true, but it's that kind of dispute in the same way the U.S. and Canada haven't delineated the maritime boundary line. And then the disputes over the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route by interpretation of international law. So those are the true disputes. And all of these states, what I think is really important is all of these states have really committed to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as being the governing mechanism for really how the Arctic is divided up into territories. And all of the states have committed to using the mechanisms in UNCLOS to resolve any disputes. For example, the extended continental shelf claims. There are some overlapping claims out there, but all of the states have committed to that process, which I think is very important when you think about what are the potential reasons why the current environment could lead to a conflict scenario. thanks elizabeth before we move off that topic did you have anything to add there yeah thanks katie i just wanted to add on so i think one of the biggest issues we have is

disunity within nato um in the region so norway wants nato to host you know installations and we we recently saw they were uk anti-submarine warfare exercise which is quite quite big i think it's a huge signal. And Canada rejects NATO involvement in the Arctic directly. So I think this disunity speaks quite strongly to where the real problems are. They're kind of beyond the Arctic than within the Arctic, which is great. And I think this comes back to the fact that basic history and geopolitics, this is an old frontier for Arctic Eight and the Arctic Five states. It's not a new great game like other global commons. So I think we need to keep that kind of in mind. Thank you. Katie, I'm going to ask you to put your surface warfare officer pin

back on for this next question. Colin Bernard recently wrote a piece for us on SimSec about the need for NATO to establish an Arctic standing NATO maritime group. And this gets into a little bit of what the two of you just been talking about. But for those who aren't familiar, there are four standing NATO maritime groups. Two are made up primarily of frigates and destroyers with the odd auxiliary or US Navy cruiser thrown into it. The other two are mine sweeping mine hunting vessels, Colin's article actually proposed that the Arctic Standing NATO Maritime Group be composed of Coast Guard vessels from NATO countries. Why do you think Coast Guard vessels are a logical choice, or are they? So I really appreciate how Colin pointed out that there are maritime security

challenges outside of naval conflict. He brought up IUU, the potential for an increase in human and economic activity to lead to a growth in some of these other challenges that could be addressed early on with maritime law enforcement, which then makes sense to think that the Coast Guards are a logical response. As Elizabeth said, there's a challenge with NATO unity in the Arctic. I think the other challenge is that approaching that problem, which is shared by all Arctic eight countries with a NATO response, which usually excludes Russia, I think actually detracts from an area of real cooperation. And so I like the idea. I think that, you know, having that level of maritime cooperation amongst the Coast Guards is really important. That's why the U.S. Coast

Guard is so committed to the Arctic Coast Guard Forum. And so I think that it's a really great idea, but maybe NATO's not quite the right mechanism by which to approach that. Thank you. Dr. Buchanan, anything to add on that one? No. Then Elizabeth, we'll finish with a question for you. We've also seen NATO be much more active in the high north, aside from this recommendation to unite the NATO Coast Guards, but the carrier strike group operated up there, I think two, maybe three years ago, recently had the anti-submarine warfare exercise that we were just discussing.

Why did that create so many headlines? Well, I think Katie makes an excellent point. You know, any formal engagement of NATO in the region will detract from the gains and sort of the cooperative environment. So why willingly do that? But in terms of NATO in the high north, I think it makes sense to keep this engagement framed in political terms, which I think high north captures. It's more or less tolerable for Moscow.

The point is that NATO as an institution left the region following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and with it, the threat dissipated, turned south and kind of ignored the North Atlantic region and its high north component, of which it naturally is part of. But NATO members in the high north never left, of course. They managed their bilateral ties with Russia in Arctic affairs quite well and collaboratively since. I think NATO has now realised Russia never left the region either. You know, it's some of the sole access points for a landlocked state, and the high north is always going to be strategic for Russian naval reach into the North Atlantic and beyond. Russian vessels in international waters are doing nothing wrong,

but the point is NATO vessels in the international Arctic or the high north waters will be perceived as in the wrong. you know this is a this is an issue i don't i don't know how we navigate so the relationship is not mutually respectful in terms of international law and norms like it should be and i don't know how we get there nato needs to be able to access and operate in the high north you know by basic virtue of article five and four of the treaty uh given four of the five arctic rim states, Arctic Ocean rim states, NATO members, you know. But to get there, I think Brussels needs to rediscover its deterrence and dialogue strategy, sort of with regards to Russia. But that's

probably more of a political, you know, issue right now. And obviously, this is not the view of NATO, nor of the position I once held with the NATO Defence College as a maritime fellow. But I think it would be a huge mistake to craft any Arctic role for NATO formally. I think this needs to be tabled by the Arctic Ape. So whether they create, you know, consensus for an Arctic security forum in which observer status might be offered to NATO. But I think any other approach is kind of nonsensical. Thank you. Katie, I'm going to improvise one more question for you based on some emails that you and I sent back and forth. And it's related to the presidential memorandum on icebreaking. Long-running debate the entirety of my career about replacing our lone functional icebreaker. I believe we only have one functioning heavy icebreaker. Where did this presidential memorandum leave us?

Right. So the presidential memorandum, for those who don't know, the president signed out not that long ago, and it really tasked the Coast Guard with the interagency to look at the entirety of the icebreaking fleet for presence at both poles. So the U.S. Coast Guard, by law, is the U.S. icebreaking capability, and we both grant access to the U.S. research stations at McMurdo and Antarctica, as well as operate in the Arctic. And really, I think that this shows the administration's recognition of the importance of the Arctic and the importance of being physically present in order to uphold the rules and uphold the norms that we want to enforce, as well as ensure our own sovereignty. And so the memo tasked the Coast Guard to say how many icebreakers would it take to meet a certain threshold, which is persistent presence or year-round presence at both poles, and then look at some basing options and some propulsion options. And what's great is that this isn't sort of the beginning of the discussion with this administration or even in the U.S. government. In the last year, the U.S. has awarded a contract to build a new class of heavy icebreakers called polar security cutters. They've awarded the contract for the first of potentially three ships. Could be more, but the current contract has options for a second and third. So again,

that would be a heavy icebreaker capable of operating year-round in the Arctic, as well as breaking out McMurdo Station. Thank you so much. Before I close it out, any final thoughts from either of you on uh anything that we've covered yeah i just want to jump in there yeah um for a bit of a different view on your domestic icebreaker narrative you've got over there in the u.s at the moment uh so australia is the largest stakeholder of the antarctic so the fifth largest continent we have a 42 claim which we like to you know push but we have no icebreakers we have one getting built right now plagued by delays and we're currently renting the sole icebreaker we have. So in terms of operational capability and icebreaking,

it's certainly not a problem only for Washington. Thank you so much. Unfortunately, that's all the time we have for today. I'd like to thank both my guests, Dr. Elizabeth Buchanan and Katie Burkhart. Elizabeth, where can we find you online and what are you working on next? Thanks so much, Jared. So I tweet on polar geopolitics over at buchanan lives and right now i'm currently finishing off the first book i have on putin's arctic agenda and i'm delving into the future of antarctica thank you so much katie where can we find you online and what are you working on best place to find me online is linkedin and as we talked about the presidential memorandum the christ guard is focused on

delivering that along with our interagency partners in the next month. And then the next big strategy we're working on is a strategic outlook for IUU fishing that we're trying to build cooperation amongst U.S. federal government partners as well as our international partners to combat that global maritime security challenge. Excellent. Well, thank you both again for joining us. And for our listeners, thank you for tuning in. We'll see you next time. Thank you. We'll be right back.