Sea Control - Sea Control 192 - IUU Fishing with Gina Fiore and Greg Poling

Episode Date: August 2, 2020

Links:1. The Hunt for the Fish Pirates Who Exploit the Sea 2. Fish-I Africa3. Catch Me If You Can 

Hey folks, Jared here. This week we're talking about fish, specifically illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the South China Sea and elsewhere. We have Gina Fiore and Greg Poling on the program to explain all the complexities of this topic. We've also announced the next phase of Project Trident. Project Trident is your opportunity to shape the future of maritime security. Our next theme is regional strategies, and we partnered with the Okuska Council for Asia Pacific Studies, the Dominican Naval Command and Staff College, and the Institute for Tsikaits Politik in Kiel, Germany. Submissions are due August 31st, and you can find more information on our website at simsec.org. Finally, I just want to advertise one time for the SimSec Podcast

Network and our second podcast feed, The Bilge Pumps. You can find them on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, and wherever else you download your podcasts. It's more low-key, slightly less serious approach to current events in the maritime domain and naval history by three historians. Check them out wherever you download your podcasts. With that, I'll turn it over to Kimber's Men. Aloha, shipmates, and welcome back aboard Sea Control. Today we're discussing fishing policy in the area in and around the South China Sea. My guests today are Gina Fiore, a researcher with Pew, and Greg Poling.

As always, our opinions are our own and not reflective of any institution with which we may be otherwise associated. Great, Gina, welcome, and thank you both for coming on. Hey, thanks for having me. Thanks for having me. So, Gina, we'll start with you. Would you mind telling the listeners a little bit about yourself and your professional background? Sure.

So, I am a researcher and analyst for the Pew Charitable Trusts. I'm also, I guess for lack of a better term, the military liaison between our international Fisheries Campaign and the wider national security and maritime security community. Before Pew, I was at the Department of Defense. I spent five years there as a staff officer, and then I did a brief stint in the Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness in the Secretary of the Navy's office. Greg, would you mind introducing yourself to the listeners? Sure. So I'm a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, where I run both our Southeast Asia program and what's called the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, which mostly focuses on the South China Sea. But we also dabble on Indian Ocean, East China Sea and Pacific Islands issues.

I came to CSIS out of grad school almost a decade ago, and my background was mostly in the international relations of Southeast Asia. I kind of migrated to the South China Sea from that angle and have accidentally expanded into broader maritime issues. And if my Twitter feed hasn't misled me, I think you recently got called to testify before Congress. Can you tell us what the testimony was regarding? Sure. It was the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Asia subcommittee, and they wanted to talk about China's maritime ambitions, which mostly meant the South China Sea. I was up there with Oriana Mastro and Andrew Erickson, and my focus was mostly on the evolution of U.S. interest in the South China Sea. We have actually been relatively consistent, and the changes in Chinese claims, the expansion

of China's claims over the last few years, and how the U.S. has really been caught flat-footed. Thank you. So we'll jump into our topic then. Gina, starting with you, can you tell us a little bit about illegal fishing? What does IUU stand for? How much illegal fishing is happening? And why does it matter? So IUU fishing stands for illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. And that's three different things. I think for the purposes of this, we'll kind of focus on the illegal fishing piece, because I think that's what most people are aware of. So illegal fishing at its core is the act of

taking fish out of the water. So in a way that's outside law and regulation. And on its most basic level, that could be a fishing vessel taking fish from an exclusive economic zone where it's not licensed to fish. It could be fishing over quota. It could be a vessel using fishing gear that's outlawed in that area. So that's the initial kind of illegal fishing piece. And then there's that whole secondary and tertiary sets of issues that kind of surround the initial act of fishing illegally. So for example, some vessels that fish illegally, they may be fishing with fake documents, they could be engaging in other types of illegal activity like trafficking in drugs or weapons or people, they can be misrepresenting their catch at port, trading species which are threatened like

Totowaba in Mexico or Abalone in South Africa. And then on top of all of that, and I think an issue that's becoming much more widely reported on is the issue of modern slavery at sea. And so together, because those crimes sort of overlap and intersect with specific crimes involving fish, we kind of call all of that convergence crimes. And so going to your question about how much is actually happening and why it matters. There are studies that estimate that up to one in five fish is caught and sold illegally. And when you do the math, that could be up to $23.5 billion worth of seafood every year. And so when you think about it, that's a resource and revenue that's taken out of the local community. So that's fish that's not sold in a local market by small scale fishers.

And so that's going to directly threaten that group's livelihood. But then on top of that, you're threatening the livelihood of everybody else who relies on that fisher. So the people who run the market or the company that sells the ice or repairs the fishing nets. Going beyond that, there's customs and taxes that are paid to the central government. So money that's not being contributed to GDP. And then for some countries where fish is a primary extractive resource, that's all lost revenue that's not going to be replaced. That is very much needed. Thanks. So, Greg, when we discuss fishing in the South China Sea, everybody knows China. We have discussed the militarization of the fishing fleet on past podcasts here.

But who are the other players in the South China Sea? Well, most of the boats in the South China Sea are smaller scale fishers, Vietnamese, Filipino, and to a lesser degree, Malaysian, who are actually operating on a commercial basis. They're fishing for their livelihoods or they're fishing to turn a profit, whereas the Chinese fishing fleet is much more heavily subsidized. It doesn't make a whole lot of commercial sense. And then beyond that, you have oil and gas operators, commercial ships, and the navies and law enforcement. So it's a pretty congested waterway on all fronts. Thanks. And Gina, we hear a lot about illegal fishing around the South China Sea, but are there other areas of the world where there's a particularly large amount of illegal fishing? There are. So there's illegal fishing happening all over the world. And many times we're going

to find that happening in areas where there's a lower ability to enforce the regulations within a country's EEZ. We'll see larger problems with illegal fishing there. So for example, illegal fishing is happening coasts of both East and West Africa, where enforcement is a major challenge. For example, there's a, I believe it's Global Fishing Watch, who has just started reporting on a group of illegal Iranian fishing vessels that are fishing illegally in the Somali EEZ. So that's something that we're just hearing about now. On top of all of that, there's also areas in Latin America where illegal fishing is a problem. And I mean, an area, those are areas where there's just a better ability to patrol waters, but it's still very difficult. So for

example, off the coast of Argentina, according to recent news reports, Chinese fishing vessels have been found fishing for squid just inside the Argentine EZ, but when confronted will escape into the high seas area and will kind of elude interdiction. So I'll come right back to you then is that I think enforcement is a really difficult problem here. Is that enforcement customarily a local Navy or a Coast Guard function? And then how are countries sort of working together to fight against illegal fishing? So in my experience, each country will have at least one organization or agency that's responsible for enforcement. But a lot of times there's multiple agencies that are responsible or have different different equities.

But the more agencies you have, the more complicated information sharing and delineation of who does what becomes. So, and Greg, correct me if I'm wrong, but Indonesia has at least four different agencies at last count that all have some control over monitoring and surveillance of the EEZ. And then in Malaysia, their air forces started to get involved in monitoring, controlling, and surveilling the area because they know they may not necessarily have the vessels needed to patrol their waters. But when we think about these, the real test is going to be how all of these agencies are kind of working together and sharing information to see if more cooks in the kitchen, so to speak, is actually working for them. And we talk about countries that are working together. That can be two countries agreeing to share information.

That can be a small regional network, a large regional fishery management organization. But then obviously the larger your organization gets, the harder it's going to be to agree on what those information sharing protocols should be and then be consistently sharing that information. So an example of a regional information sharing group is something called Fish Eye Africa. That's a collection of eight countries on the eastern coast of Africa that have basic information sharing protocols for fishing vessels in place. And as part of that coalition, they know who to call when they need to confirm the identity and documentation of the fishing vessels and their EZ. They know what information to ask for. They know what person to talk to. So those countries, that network has allowed those eight countries to block vessels from their waters, from their ports. And they've actually been involved in some very, for IUU fishing, some very high-profile vessel interdictions, including the, I guess, now notorious STS-50 case.

One thing that I've noticed, though, is that there does seem to be very intense interest and awareness of IUU fishing that I have not noticed in the last two decades of just being a person who goes to sea. So is it fair to say that there is significantly more interest now than there has been in the past? I think there is. I've been working in this space for five years. And even in the last five years, we've seen a growing interest in the different groups, especially maritime security groups, national security groups that are taking an interest in illegal fishing. because I think people are beginning to realize that fish are, in fact, a finite resource. They're so important to so many different countries and different groups of people. And that IUU and illegal fishing, on top of things like climate change, we're really beginning to create a situation where we're really going to,

we're starting to feel the effects of fish disappearing and not being replenished as fast as I think people assume, you know, fish come back. Thanks. So, Greg, let's go back to some more specifics of the South China Sea area. So specific to those states, what are the different enforcement mechanisms and entities in use by the different countries there? As Gina pointed out, one of the problems that goes well beyond the South China Sea, but certainly applies to most of these countries, is the lack of a single lead enforcement agency in most cases. So Gina talked about the Indonesian example where Bakamla is notionally their equivalent of a Coast Guard, but it has to share a lot of these authorities with other agencies, including the Navy. You have much the same in Malaysia with MMA, which is their equivalent to a Coast Guard and their Navy.

The Philippines, you have the Bureau of Fisheries Resources, as well as the Coast Guard. In Vietnam, you've got the same. And so nobody has an undisputed mandate, and nobody has the platforms or the sensing capabilities to actually keep an eye on their exclusive economic zone. So for all of these countries, fisheries enforcement in the South Tennessee is a game of whack-a-mole. If you're lucky, you might catch 1% or one-tenth of 1% of the bad actors. This is a big challenge for parties like the U.S. who want to help provide assistance for maritime domain awareness capacity building because there is no amount of patrol vessels and patrol craft that you're going to transfer to Southeast Asian partners who are going to allow them to effectively monitor these vast EECs. The future really seems to lie with remote sensing capabilities, especially the commercial sector. The Thais have been a good vanguard for this. The Indonesians are starting to onboard some of it, but we're still basically trying to transfer legacy capabilities to these countries, teaching them 20th century ways to solve 21st century problems, and it's just not going to work. Can you tell us a little bit more about what the Thais have done?

Because that's the first time I've heard them mentioned specifically as being leaders in this field. So Thailand got slapped with a yellow card by the European Union some years ago. It was 2017, Gina can correct me, for growth violations on a whole bunch of issues in the fishing sector. So they were threatened with a ban on exports of seafood to the European market. And that really kicked Thailand into high gear when it came to revamping domestic regulations and also getting a better handle on the activity of its fishing fleet. So they massively expanded their vessel monitoring system, their AIS capabilities. They teamed up with OceanMind, which is a UK-based commercial outfit to help crunch the numbers, basically collate all of this commercial remote sensing data, along with their domestic capabilities, the radar, the BMS, their AIS. It's kind of a big data approach, and it only is a start, but it puts them far ahead of the rest of the region when it comes to using commercial remote sensing technologies for fisheries monitoring.

Most of the rest of these countries, they basically have AIS, often provided through sea vision, which they get from the U.S. Navy, and they've got some coastal radar, and that's about the extent of what they can use to monitor. And so they're missing the vast majority of vessels operating in their waters. Do you have any more specifics about what you mean by remote sensing where the ties are concerned, or are you just referring to radar? No. When I say remote sensing, I mean VMS, which would be the transponders that all of our fishing vessels are now required to carry, which transmit by satellite back to TIMEC, which is their Maritime Enforcement Coordinating Center. They changed the name, I think, from Command Center to Coordinating Center. And anyway, AIS, the automatic identification system that all the commercial vessels over 300 tons have to use, as well as some optical imagery that they buy commercially, some SAR, synthetic aperture radar that they buy commercially, they may or may not be tinkering with RF detection, radio frequency detection by low Earth orbit satellites. So it's an entire web of mostly low-Earth orbit commercial options that you get that help shine a light on what's happening in your EEC, you know, far beyond the range of coastal radar.

Thanks. So the largest international organization that I can think of there, and you correct me if there's another one, is ASEAN. Is there an articulated ASEAN position on illegal fishing, or do the conflicting claims prevent them from having a coherent position? ASEAN hasn't played much role in the fishery space. The most active agency and international agency on this point would actually be the Southeast Asia Fishery Development Council based in Bangkok, which is mostly about self-reporting catches by the coastal states. It doesn't really seek to tackle illegal fishing. It more seeks to tackle sustainable catch and research issues. But no, ASEAN itself doesn't tackle this. I mean, ASEAN doesn't even have an agreement that what goes on in the South China Sea is illegal fishing. And let's keep in mind, we can't really – when we're talking about IUU fishing in the context of the South China Sea, we're mostly talking about the unregulated, unreported part because it's hard to agree on what exactly is illegal.

There is no clear set of rules here. So everything that, for instance, the Indonesians would argue is illegal in the case of Chinese fishing, China would argue is perfectly legal. So this is not a case of bad actors purposely, say, fishing inside of an MPA or in the exclusive economic zone of a coastal state and then running for the hills. These are sovereign states who disagree on where the zones are to begin with. Thank you. Jean, I'm going to come back to you for the next one. And we'll say, not specific to the South China Sea, but more globally in addressing IUU fishing. Is there a role for the U.S. to play here? And is the Coast Guard involved? so i think the u.s has a direct and indirect role but it's going to depend on which service branch you're talking about so the u.s coast guard where they have the authority to they will directly interdict or they can directly interdict vessels that are fishing illegally that's part of their mission and then both the coast guard and the u.s navy have something called the shipwriter agreement with multiple countries where they act as a platform for that third country um that third

that partner countries uh law enforcement officers um the navy does this in the pacific where they participate in something called the ocean maritime security initiative um see and then the coast guard will participate in joint operations with the foreign fisheries Agency. FFA is a management organization amongst the Pacific Island nations. That joint operation is called Operation Kuru Kuru. They have shipwriters from Pacific Island countries on their vessels while they're doing their boardings. And then on top of that sort of direct participation, both the Navy and the Coast Guard, they have a number of secondary roles that they play. That's mainly in the areas of security cooperation and partnership engagement. So Greg

mentioned Seavision, which was a joint program between the Department of Transportation and the offices in the U.S. Navy. They also lead large-scale exercises around the world, and some of those exercises incorporate illegal fishing and fisheries enforcement into their scenarios. So, for example, IUU Fishing has become part of the annual SEACAT multilateral exercise in Asia that I believe started happening a couple of years ago and that will be carried over into whatever iteration of SEACAT is able to go forward this year. And then off the southeast coast of Africa is Cutlass Express, which is another multilateral exercise that is more focused on IAU fishing, fisheries enforcement, and then just a better overall focus on maritime governance. Greg, did you have anything to add on that question? I don't – so in the context of the South China Sea in particular, there's a clear role for capacity building, best practices, training, and provision of platforms, all of which Gina addressed. I would just highlight again that these things help around the margins, but, you know, the Coast Guard is underfunded and has enough trouble monitoring the U.S. EEZ.

They don't have the capacity to kind of ride in over the horizon and help monitor or, you know, protect fisheries in Southeast Asia. At best, they can help, I think, point Southeast Asian countries in the right direction, but Southeast Asia is going to have to turn to mostly the commercial sector for the solutions they need. Greg, let me ask you a follow-up and a policy question. Are there countries around the South China Sea that align on their fishing policies? Traditionally, no. That's starting to change. There is a recognition in, say, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, that the South can see the semi-enclosed sea, that if fish stocks collapse in one area, it's going to lead to a cascade of stock collapses across the whole fishery, and that they either have to hang together or hang alone here. That is only now starting to bleed into actual enforcement capabilities, where there's a bit more information sharing. It's still difficult to get these countries to share real-time intelligence to help combat IU fishing, but I think we're starting to see the ice crack. Some of that's driven by other arenas, for instance, the trilateral anti-piracy patrols in the Sioux of the Seas, the Malacca Strait patrols.

Previously, they're bleeding over into habits of cooperation and information sharing. ASEAN is in the middle of discussions to set up an ASEAN single point of contact for navies, and then it could lead into Coast Guards to help provide a single way that you can kind of know who to contact if things go south So we don't have so many run-ins between law enforcement agencies. And just a couple months ago, there was an interesting example where a Vietnamese illegal fishing boat that everybody agreed was illegally fishing was ran and sunk in Indonesian waters during a law enforcement operation. And the Vietnamese Coast Guard called the Indonesians and asked, can we please come out and rescue you? And they did. And that, I mean, it seems like a simple thing, but that would have been impossible a few years ago.

The biggest hurdle here, of course, is that none of these cooperative mechanisms are developing with China involved. China remains on the outside looking in, of all of them, by its own choice. So are some of these lessons learned, just people are recognizing organically, or are they taking lessons from other areas? I'm thinking specifically of the Bay of Bengal and the large dead zone in the center of the bay that seems to be expanding somewhat here as fish stocks die out there. Are people sort of seeing that as a harbinger of things to come for the South China Sea, and that is what's driving them to work together more? You know, most of what I hear in the region is that they don't need to look beyond the South China Sea, for example. They have already watched a lot of stocks collapse. Stocks, depending on species, are estimated to be down by as much as 90% over the last several decades.

So for the Filipinos, if your father used to go out and fish for a few hours, the fill is hold. Now you have to go fish for a week or two. Nobody needs to tell you that the South China Sea is dying. The same applies to all the littoral states. So they recognize that the danger is imminent themselves without having to look beyond the regional borders. So is it a real concern or reasonable to think that we could see an actual shooting war develop at some point over fish stocks there? What seems likely is that dwindling stocks are going to continue to force regional fishers, especially the artisanal fishers who have no other options, into operations farther from shore in more and more contentious areas. You know, one good example is that Philippine bonkers, the wooden trimers that mostly fish the South China Sea that are not equipped for blue water transit, they used to fish closer to shore.

Now they're being towed out in large groups into the Spratlys because it's the only place they can catch fish. They're staying out longer. They're running risks. They're operating in close proximity, especially to Chinese law enforcement in a way that they know is dangerous, but they have no choice. And so as those incentives grow, they are going to increase the frequency of run-ins. between regional fishers and law enforcement and while i think they can more often than not be de-escalated in the southeast asian context eventually chinese enforcement and run-ins with china's own fishing militia are going to lead to a loss of lives and then you have the possibility that regional law enforcement or regional navies respond and political imperatives

make it too difficult to de-escalate and you end up with what is likely a small but still significant clash that neither side actually wanted that starts over efficient stocks and yeah there's a non-zero possibility that the u.s could get dragged in on the philippine side because of our mutual defense treaty and then i just had one quick follow-up and then i'll go back to gina for a couple questions here you said artisanal fishers can you define what that means for the listener so that would mean a fisher who fishes with traditional methods and traditional gear and generally is fishing for their own and their family's sustenance and a small amount of fish to sell in the local market.

So not large industrial fishers. All right. So more like, I guess, the land equivalent would be a subsistence farmer then? Yeah, a mom-and-pop fishing operation. Okay. Gina, what role can nongovernmental organizations play in this? So NGOs are a big player in the fight against illegal fishing. You know, while we're not directly interdicting vessels, there's still a lot of things that NGOs can do, and there's a lot of things they can do in some key secondary ways.

So, for example, NGOs, they raise awareness with the general public and different sectors that illegal fishing is a major problem that needs cooperation between all players. I had previously asked, you know, why are people recognizing this? Why have people started thinking about illegal fishing more? And it's in part because we see in the United States, there's been a large push from the NGOs for people to understand where their fish is coming from. On top of that, NGOs like Pew and other groups, we act as a bridge between civil society and governments. NGOs act as experts and advocate for policy change. They can help convene and fund trainings. And they develop programs and technologies that give support to governments as they ramp up their own efforts. So the OceanMine that was mentioned earlier, that was a joint effort between Pew and Satellite Applications Catapult.

That technology was created together. That's how OceanMine was put together, and OceanMine has been spun off into their own NGO at this point. Pew was also one of the groups that funded FishEye Africa, and then we've also done some work to support Interpol, for example. Yeah, I was going to ask, I know Pew has been working to address IUU fishing for quite a while. Can you tell us a little bit more about their company-specific efforts? Sure. So our program had started focused entirely on illegal fishing. But that line of efforts, we've been folded into a larger program that looks at international fisheries in general. So it attempts to transform fisheries management by setting out a system of rules

and then consequences for those individuals that don't follow the rules. And as that project has grown, we've expanded the groups that we work with. So, for example, for the last four years, we've worked to address the role that markets and large-scale buyers play in addressing illegal fishing. So how can they be responsible actors? What do they need to do to help us protect the ocean while also potentially protecting their bottom line and their reputation? And we've also expanded our work to incorporate the national security

and the maritime domain awareness sectors, because they both also have a vested interest in IE fishing and fighting it and knowing what's happening on the oceans. Fishing vessels are one of the most prolific types of vessels on the water. And there's just so many of them that it's relatively easy for a bad actor to slip through undetected if that's what they want to do. So my colleague likes to say there's nowhere better to hide on the water than in a fishing vessel. And he's probably right.

So, one last question. Gina, I'll come back to you to answer first. Have either of you noticed any specific impact of fishing tied to coronavirus? So, I'm going to caveat this answer by saying it's very early, and things are constantly changing. It shouldn't come as a surprise, though. There does seem to be a decline in fishing in general. So Global Fishing Watch has detected a decline in global industrial fleet activity of approximately 6.5%. There have been other experts, for example, Brad Sewell from Ocean Mind. He's noticed that carrier vessels, large refrigerated vessels that are used in the process of transshipping, they've been staying out to sea longer, which would theoretically allow fishing vessels to pull more fish out of the ocean. On top of that, there have been some growing concerns that coronavirus is going to create an enforcement vacuum, specifically when we're talking about observers.

Observers on fishing vessels are a very large part of enforcement. And there has been concern that countries or specific companies are going to use the virus as an opportunity to pull or block observers from those vessels in the interest of safety. So recently, Pew, along with 18 other NGOs, sent letters to the major regional fishery management organizations to remind them that they have an obligation to enforce the existing fishing regulations within their boundaries. Outside of enforcement, I think recently, I think a couple of days ago, it was reported that China has blocked some specific Ecuadorian fishing company imports because they detected coronavirus on the packaging. And I believe that that has also happened with some EU-specific salmon. And then there's also the issue of fishing vessel subsidies. Those negotiations were halted at the WTO due to coronavirus, and those negotiations have started up again. Greg, same question to you.

So on fishing specifically, I mean, I think as June indicated, it's still a little early to tell. and a lot of the reports are anecdotal. They also seem to be, at times, contradictory, and the way it's hitting, say, distant water fishing fleets and coastal fleets is different. One of the things that we're seeing in South Asia, and I think probably globally, is for a lot of small-scale fishers in particular,

some hard times because of the breakdown in onshore transportation networks. And so it's difficult. Fish is a perishable commodity, and if you can't get it to market, then landing the catches is only the least of your problems. In the South China Sea, we haven't seen any, at least nothing I can quantify yet, on the scale of fishing effort. What we have seen is that the pace of run-ins between civilians and law enforcement slash Navy, especially on the Chinese side, is continuing at the same pace as it was before the coronavirus. But diplomatically, there's been a lot less interest in de-escalation. This seems to be tied to the hypersensitivity that we see from Beijing right now amid the coronavirus and the criticism it's getting from most of the U.S., but also other quarters.

And so things that previously fisheries run in that would have resulted in some pretty rapid de-escalation at high levels of government, now it's just being allowed to fester. And often it's being made worse by grandstanding and nationalist chest-sumping by officials. So this is not a uniquely South China Sea issue. We're seeing it in the East China Sea and the Strait of Taiwan and even the Indian border. But what we expect is that tensions are going to continue ramping up, at least rhetorically, for the foreseeable future. Thanks. And yeah, I probably should have said this up top for the listener, but we're recording this on the 11th of July. So if this goes up two to three weeks from now and there's been some sort of, quote unquote, major fishing news that we didn't talk about, that's the reason for it. But I'd like to thank my guests, Gina Fiore and Greg Poling, for appearing today. Gina, where can we find you online and what are you working on next?

So I have just started a long-term project looking at beneficial ownership in the industrial fishing fleets. You can find more information on Pew at pewtrust.org. Search for international fisheries. And then you can always find me on Twitter at MarsecGina. Thank you. and greg where can we find you online and do you have any ongoing projects you'd like to tell us about so i uh am at csis.org and anti that's csis.org and on twitter at greg poling i've got a lot of short-term work usually driven by whatever's popping off in the south china sea

or southeast asia but most of my weekends for the foreseeable future are spent trying to wrap up a book on the history of U.S. involvement in the South China Sea. Excellent. We look forward to that and probably reach out to you again once it's published. Thank you both again for your time. And to our listeners, thanks for tuning in. We'll see you next week. Thank you.

© transcript Emily Beynon