Sea Control - Sea Control 193 - Stable Seas: Gulf of Guinea with Dr. Ifesinachi Yarwood-Okafor and Maisie Pigeon

Episode Date: August 9, 2020

Link: Stable Seas: Gulf of Guinea, April 16th 2020 by Dr. Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwod, Maisie Pigeon, Alex Amling, Charles Ridgway, Ibukun Adewumi, Lydelle Joubert

Hey folks, Jared here. This week we are in the Gulf of Guinea with our friends from Stable Seas, Dr. Ife Sanachi Okafor-Yarwood and Maisie Pidgeon. We've recently concluded our Ocean Governance Topic Weeks in collaboration with Stable Seas. You can find all the submissions on our website under the Project Trident header. We've also announced the next phase of Project Trident. This is your opportunity to shape the future of maritime security. Our next theme is Regional Strategies and we partnered with the Okuska Council for Asia-Pacific Studies, the Dominican Naval Command and Staff College, and the Institut für Zickheitspolitik in Kiel, Germany.

Submissions are due August 31st, and you can find more information on our website at simsec.org. Finally, we just want to advertise for the SimSec Podcast Network and our second podcast feed, The Bilge Pumps. Find them on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, and wherever else you download your podcasts. It's a more low-key, slightly less serious approach to current events in the maritime domain

and naval history by three historians. Check them out wherever you download your podcasts. With that, I'll turn it over to Kimber's men. Aloha, Shoemates, and welcome back aboard Sea Control. Today is our second episode with our friends at Stable Seas. We are headed to the Gulf of Guinea today with the Gulf of Guinea Report's co-authors, Dr. Ife Sinachi Okafor-Yarwood and Maisie Pidgeon. Ladies, welcome and thank you for agreeing to join us.

Thank you for having me. Happy to be here. So before we get into questions, would you mind introducing yourselves and telling us a little bit about your background? Ife, why don't we start with you? Okay, well, thank you so much for having me. My name is Ife, or Ife Sinachi, but you can call me Ife, and I am a social scientist by training and currently a lecturer in sustainable development at the School of Geography and

Sustainable Development at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. I am also a visiting fellow at the Centre for Strategic Research and Studies at the National Defence College in Abuja, Nigeria. My work or research to date is at the intersection between environmental conservation and maritime governance and security. Through my research, I am continuing to advance the understanding of sustainability as a question of resource management, environmental justice, and the disproportionate effect of depleting resources on maritime security, poverty, and inequality in the African continent. So thank you for having me. Thank you so much for being here. And Maisie, how about you? Thanks again for having us. I'm delighted to be here. So for the last couple years,

I've been in the role of Africa Program Manager for Stable Seas, which is part of the One Earth Future Foundation. At Stable Seas, we explore the ways illicit maritime crimes contribute to political violence and how insecurity on shore translates to maritime insecurity. Prior to Stable Seas, I spent about seven years as part of the Oceans Beyond Piracy program, also at One Earth Future, where my focus was exclusively on global piracy and armed robbery. And I've also spent some time as a consultant for the Global Maritime Crime Program at the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, exploring illicit maritime activity in the Bay of Bengal. My professional life before maritime security was more focused on health and development

in Sub-Saharan Africa, but I've been working in this space for about 10 years. Well, thank you both again for being here. And now is as good a time as any to remind our listeners that any opinions expressed are our own and not necessarily reflective of any institutions with which we may otherwise be associated. Ladies, let's start with how would you define the Gulf of Guinea? So what we refer to as the broader Gulf of Guinea region encompasses 19 countries in West and Central Africa. So while the geographic Gulf of Guinea only actually touches a handful of countries, we felt it was important to expand the geographic scope of the report in order to include all of the countries who are cooperating to counter maritime crime in this

region. So the Gulf of Guinea, as we defined it in the report, spans from Senegal to the north to Angola in the south. And we also include the island nations of Cabo Verde and Sao Tome and Presipi. Thanks. Would you characterize the Gulf's location as a help or a hindrance given its location between Europe and South America? That's a good question. So like in other parts of the world, lots of the factors that facilitate economic growth in the region, like established ports or a wealth of natural resources, are also really attractive to criminals and criminal networks. So there is dense vessel traffic through the area. And as we know, access to vessels is pretty essential to crimes like piracy and armed robbery, for instance. The Gulf's location is

really strategic for certain kinds of maritime crime, like, for instance, illicit trade and narcotics, which originate in South America, but are ultimately destined for markets in Europe. So interestingly, you see a lot of trade along linguistic lines, and that extends to illicit trades as well. For instance, there's a really well-known cocaine route that originates in Brazil and travels through Angola, which are both Lusophone countries. Traffickers use Angola as a transit point before shipments move on to destination markets in Europe. And transit points are really useful for traffickers because it makes it considerably harder for customs officials and law enforcement to detect illegal shipments.

So we also see a lot of illicit products employing shipping containers to reach destination markets because that's much cheaper than to fly. So to answer your question, both, basically what I'm saying is that the factors that make a region or a country desirable for multinational corporations or foreign nation investment are often the same factors that make these places attractive to criminals. Thank you. Now, is there a most important country to the region? The outsider's perspective is that if I'm picking a country to say, as this country

goes, so goes the Gulf of Guinea, I think I would lean towards Nigeria, but I wanted to see what your thoughts were. I'm definitely interested to hear Ife's take as well. But in my opinion, it's difficult to overstate the importance of Nigeria in the context of maritime security in this part of the world, because not only is the Niger Delta a hotspot for a lot of the kinds of maritime crimes that we talk about in the report, it's also hugely important economically and militarily, not only to the region, but to the entire continent. But as far as being the most important goes. One of the narratives that we've heard expressed for years, and our research

certainly reinforced, is that these kinds of crimes are kind of inherently transnational. And consequently, regional cooperation is absolutely essential to overcoming the maritime and security challenges faced by these countries. Thanks. Ife, did you have something to add on this one? Yeah, so I would just re-echo what Maisie said, but more or less add that you might be right, in part, to emphasize the importance of Nigeria with respect to the fact that practically almost all the maritime threats that is faced in the region primarily is very pervasive in Nigeria. But at the same time, to be able, for the region to be able to successfully stem the tide on those security threats. They need the cooperation and collaboration from Nigeria. So I wouldn't

necessarily say, like Maisie hinted, that Nigeria is the most important in that, although it is important for solving the issues as a collective. But unfortunately, a lot of the maritime security threats, and I dare pencil out piracy and Amrabriasi, for example, emerges from Nigeria. And so it means that turning the tide on that threat would require that Nigeria is actively engaged. So from that perspective, you're right to say Nigeria is most important. But solving the problem then means that there needs to be a collaborative synergy between the countries in the region for it to happen. Thanks. Now, your report repeatedly refers to the region's maritime affluence. What do you mean by that phrase?

So by the region's maritime affluence, we mean that the region is endowed by or with an abundant species of fisheries, for example, mineral resources, forestry, hydrocarbon and gas resources such as oil, diamond, gold, culvert and species of different fisheries. Some example, I mean, rosewood from the region in Serafta in Asia, culvert, as we speak, an estimated 60% of the global culvert resources come from DRC, fisheries. Countries in Europe and Asia rely on fishery species from the region for their food security. And in terms of hydrocarbon, more than 60% of Africa's oil production is concentrated in West Africa alone. With Nigeria and Angola, if you look at the West African and Central African aspect, being among the top five oil producing countries in Africa and top 15 in the world, new discoveries continue to be made. with Senegal set to join the list of oil producing countries by 2022, these are some of the examples of the resources without even counting the human resources and the endless possibility that they hold. And so this is some of the things we mean or some of the examples of what we mean when we say the region's maritime affluence, because it's just blessed with a lot of maritime or marine

resources. I don't know if Maisie wants to add anything to that. I think that's a really comprehensive answer. No, that was tremendous and really a perfect segue to our next question. Given oil's prominent place in the blue economy, what's been the impact of the fall in oil prices? So I think even now, it's too soon to say definitively what impact the fall in oil prices will ultimately have or how deeply the reverberations will be felt. But what you can say for sure right now is that these countries that are rich in oil and gas are facing several simultaneous crises and the government's attention is divided between the crash in oil as well as the COVID crisis and that's not even to mention the crises on land before all of this landed. So we

can also say for sure that there are fewer maritime enforcement assets at sea and a reduction in international support as international navies have called back crews. And the final thing I'll say here is that one of the factors that locations with piracy and armed robbery have in common is a lack of viable economic alternatives. So given the importance of the oil and gas industry in this region and the impacts that COVID has had already, I think it's really likely that more people are driven to illicit activities like piracy and armed robbery or trafficking and drugs or wildlife products just to merely survive the crisis and provide for their families. Unfortunately, that creates a bit of a vicious cycle because it's obviously

quite difficult to develop a thriving blue economy without a dependably secure maritime space. Thanks. So why have the states in the region been unable to capitalize on their maritime affluence to date? I think you've covered some of the answer in your previous responses, but maybe you have something more comprehensive. Okay. So I don't really think it's so much about a failure to capitalize on their maritime affluence, but the lack of preparedness to do so effectively and failure to recognize the important contribution the resources in their maritime domain can make. With the discovery of oil by most states, other industries have been abandoned or were abandoned, and the revenue

generated from the oil sector in those countries were not equitably distributed. And by that, I mean, Niger Delta is a classic example. And if we also look at Cabinda in Angola, that's another example. On the issue of lack of preparedness, we can talk about countries that allow the exploitation of their fisheries resources, for example, by distant water fishing nations and other commercial fleets without having the right tools to monitor the activities of those vessels, thereby indirectly encouraging the culture of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and the resorting plunder of their fisheries resources. There are also countries that are yet to develop their fisheries sector. This lack of development through investment and lack of

monitoring surveillance and control mechanism have resulted in the blunder of their fisheries stock by distant water fishing fleets and commercial vessels with access to fish in neighboring countries. Again, I can give an example of Nigeria, which even though it does not currently have an agreement with distant water fishing nations, there are evidence of illegal fishing by foreign vessels and commercial vessels from neighboring countries. Other sectors have not been developed as much as they could, such as tourism, blue power generation, which would encompass harnessing the power of wind energy for power generation, have not been developed as much as they should due to security threats at sea, which inhibits the countries in the region from capitalizing on

their maritime affluence, as investors would not risk losing their investment to come to an unstable region. Take maritime transport and shipping sector as an example. There is a lot of investment around the region. Nigeria, for example, is building a port infrastructure in Lekki. Côte d'Ivoire is improving their port infrastructure by expanding the Vridi Canal and Cameroon, the Cledi Port. But Paris and Amroby at sea will no doubt affect the extent to which they are able to benefit from these investments. So to reiterate, it is not so much about the failure to capitalize on their maritime affluence, but the ill-preparedness and giving too much priority on one sector over the other. What are some of the rule of law challenges in the region?

So I'm definitely interested to hear what Ife has to say here as well. But in my opinion, the biggest rule of law challenge is the pervasiveness of corruption, because it's a challenge from which several other challenges stem. It touches the public sector, it runs through multinational corporations, and it takes lots of different forms. Corruption of officials might mean protecting criminals or criminal networks or taking bribes from recognized criminal groups. And both of these things undermine regional stability. Demand for bribes in ports can lead to shipping delays. Countries and companies doing business in these places might ultimately choose to relocate their business operations to ports in neighboring states

and that has an obvious impact on the local economy left behind. Law enforcement looking the other way on illicit goods not only undercuts the formal economy in these places, but certain illicit goods that flow into a country, should a port official look the other way, might pose safety or security risks to people in the quote-unquote importing country, like narcotics or arms come to mind. Those substances can fuel insecurity nearby, and you run the risk of locals getting hooked on a new substance, which poses a significant burden on the health system that wasn't even there before. So yeah, I would say corruption. Ife, anything to add to that? Just to add to that, I guess I do agree, but I don't. Obviously, corruption is an issue, but there is also other factors. So I would say that I agree with Maisie in pointing out corruption.

And then I would add that some of the other rule of law challenges include socioeconomic injustice. But I guess you can make an argument that this socioeconomic injustice is sometimes a sort of result of the issues of corruption. And also, obviously, it's manifest in the form of unusual, unequal distribution of resources. corruption, as you already mentioned, have resulted in increasing distrust of and animosity for the central government and have allowed criminal networks to operate almost freely in selected countries in the region. The absence of competent legal processes to gather all these factors undermine effort to suppress illicit activities in the region. So, example, in terms of talking about the legal provision.

While most countries in the region have rectified relevant international conventions criminalizing maritime crimes, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Arts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, the Suwa Convention of 1988,

and its Protocol of 1988 and 2005, and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on talk of 22, there is still serious deficiencies in the domestication of some of these provisions. And then you could say that there has been limited progress in combating piracy and in the region because countries have implemented, whilst they have implemented, for example, Article 101 of UNCLOS with respect to implementing a strong definition of crimes of piracy, The domestication of Article 105, which is vital for enforcing jurisdiction on the high seas, still lags behind in most of the countries in the region. States can choose how to integrate international provisions in their domestic laws, obviously, but they haven't necessarily done this as much as they should.

Even though select countries like Togo, Liberia, Senegal, and others have embedded this in their manual code, Nigeria is the only country that have actually had a separate or standalone maritime piracy act. And then if you're talking about beyond piracy, looking at threats like illegal, unregulated fishing, drug trafficking, illegal migration, weapons trafficking, have not also seen much improvement in the region in terms of the harmonization of the framework on these issues. And so these are just, I feel, some of the rule of law issues that are inhibiting, I guess, if you could say, that is sort of undermining maritime governance and security in the Gulf of Guinea. Thank you. So in addition to rule of law challenges, there's a lot of outright conflict, rebel groups, internal strife that goes beyond criminality. What's the primary driver for conflict in the region? The rule of law, the lack of rule of law, as we've already discussed, leads to bad governance, which obviously allows corruption to thrive. Corruption and the resultant implication is lack of social development or socioeconomic development, including a sense of social and political exclusion. inclusion, these together are some of the main drivers of conflict in the region, from the Niger Delta to Cabinda to Ambarzonia. There's Niger Delta in Nigeria, Cabinda in Angola, Ambarzonia in Cameroon.

But I believe that the main issue, and this is highlighted quite clearly in the Stegosi's Gulf of Guinea report, that the main issue in the region is a lack of economic inclusion, or socioeconomic inclusion, especially in natural resource-rich countries. This is driving the residents of these communities in these countries who feel that they are not reaping the dividends of the resources that is extracted from their communities to rebel against the state. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is also the countries with natural resources in the region that have seen the rise in rebellion

against the state, either from secessionist movement or through militancy, from the Niger Delta to Biafra, but in Nigeria, to Kabinda in Angola, to Ambarzonia in Cameroon, to Casamance in Senegal, the narrative is the same. Groups of people who feel disenfranchised from the central government are taking up arms or saying we need to go our separate ways to earn our rights to socioeconomic development. What they are calling for is socioeconomic freedom and nothing else. It means if you address the issue of rule of law in these countries, some of this rebellion could stop because the grievance would have been addressed. And so for me, I feel that these are some of the most important rule of law challenges that are leading to internal strife and instability

in selected Gulf of Guinea countries. Thank you. Maisie, anything to add on that subject? The only thing I'll add is that lots of those conflicts have lasted for decades at this point, and they've yet to be alleviated. So they're pretty entrenched. So my next question was going to be resource-related, but Ife, I think you've given us a very comprehensive overview of what exactly the resources are in the region, why countries have had some difficulty capitalizing on the abundance of resources. So I want to shift now to piracy, and the world is starting to associate the Gulf of Guinea with piracy. While its reputation is comparable to the Gulf of Aden, the world's navy has really flocked to the Gulf of Aden to address piracy off of Somalia. Why haven't we seen a similar

international response in the Gulf of Guinea? So in my opinion, the biggest factor is that at the peak of piracy in the Horn of Africa, piracy was emanating from Somalia, which was one of the world's most notorious failed states and had been for decades. It completely lacked capacity to govern its maritime domain and neighboring countries lacked the capacity to assist. But the situation in the Gulf of Guinea is almost the opposite. There was not just one function in government. There were and are several. So the problem was fundamentally different. There are also issues of jurisdiction that simply weren't present on the other side of the continent. A qualifier here that I am by no means an expert in maritime law, but most of the incidents we see in West African waters are not actually acts of piracy as defined in the UN law of the sea.

Piracy, by definition, takes place in international waters, whereas many of the incidents we observe in this part of the world fall within territorial waters. The crime of piracy is open to universal jurisdiction, meaning that any state has the right to prosecute an incident, regardless if it has a so-called nexus to the crime. But universal jurisdiction does not apply to incidents of armed robbery at sea, which do not take place on the high seas. Rather, only the coastal state has the authority to arrest accused robbers and prosecute them. But to reiterate my first point, the lack of governing capacity in Somalia ultimately resulted in international naval forces being invited to the region to help get the situation under control, which is an important point. That never happened in the Gulf of Guinea in the same way, and I don't feel it's likely to. Thanks. Before I ask Ife if she has any additional thoughts on this, I want to ask one follow-up question. I think one of the key factors that made the response off Somalia so robust was the willingness of Kenya to serve as a place to bring pirates and try their cases. Is there anything similar in the Gulf of Guinea? That's a good question and not one that I have an obvious answer ready for. Ife, do you have any comment on that? Okay, yeah, I probably might give a brief insight. But before I do, I'd like to say that, sort of add to your response to the initial question, which is that I don't think it's so much about why haven't we seen similar international response to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, for example.

Rather, it's a question of why aren't the region allowing a Somali-style response? Because I know that a lot of people, especially those in the international shipping sector, are lobbying for this. At least this is something they'd like to see. Obviously, along with what Maisie has highlighted in terms of the definitions of piracy and what constitutes a dam robbery at sea, and sort of making it clear. I know that, for instance, the idea of a maritime security transit corridor, that is MSTC, which allows international naval partners to focus their presence and surveillance effort along an identified corridor, and thus are able to monitor and provide swift assistance to vessels in distress in that route, similar to what they had in the Gulf of Aden and other areas, has been floated. But this is something that, for now, and based on what I know, is not something that stakeholders in the region, that is in the Gulf of Guinea, would want to do, especially when it means that it's going to allow for international presence in the region. Also, I feel that the region already has structure in place that can allow them to actually stem the tide on Paris and Amrabri at sea and other issues. The problem, however, is enhancing the capability of the respective agencies in individual countries to be able to come together and sort of enforce security.

Importantly, in talking about why countries in the region might not necessarily want a Somali-style response and why I think that this is obviously something that they should think carefully about in terms of enhancing the capacities of their navies and doing what they can to ensure that the joint patrols can happen quickly now than ever is that if the pandemic has taught us anything, it has taught us that for whatever reason, international partners might leave temporary to maybe reinforce. And whilst they are not there, the onus remains on the region to enforce security in their respective waters, And which is why I feel that ensuring that they are able to enhance the capability of their respective agencies to do the work as, I mean, we'll discuss later when we talk about the architecture will be a better route than going the Gulf of Aden route.

In terms of your question about whether any country in the region would be willing to be used as a place for trying the pirates, I think it's fair to say that a lot of, I mean, I could say a lot, if not all, incidents of pirates in Amuriasi have its links to Nigeria. So perhaps, I don't know, but perhaps with what's happening, given that Nigeria is currently trying the first set of pirates using the anti-piracy law, this is them showing that they are actually able and willing to sort of try criminals. And perhaps this might be the beginning of something positive happening. Thanks. I'm going to rephrase this next question based on the way the conversation is developing here. Is there a regional legal framework that would help address piracy and other illicit activity? You've already mentioned the Yaoundé architecture, so now might be a good time to talk about that. Okay, so the Yaoundé architecture, basically the meeting, without barring everybody with the details, but the Yaoundé architecture started with the meeting of heads of states in 2013,

25 heads of state of the coastal, that's 19 coastal states in the region and six landlocked countries in the region, and Western Central Africa, as they declared their support for collective security in the Gulf of Guinea, signing their own declaration and the memorandum of understanding to support the initiative. A code of conduct also adopted to guide and encourage member states to conform to one standard of conduct in combating transnational crime. And with this, by 2014, once they agreed, by 2014, the Yaoundé Interregional Coordination Centre in Yaoundé was set up, but operationalised in 2017. With this, there were two regions, two regional centers for maritime security in the economic communities of Central Africa, CRESMAC, and Western Africa, CRESMAO, and five multinational maritime coordination centers, or MMCCs, Zones A, which includes Angola, Congo, and DRC, Zone D, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe. Zone E, Bene, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo, Zone F, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Conakry, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and Zone G, Cabo Verde, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, and Senegal, all aimed at enhancing information sharing and coordination of collective response to maritime crime. However, just like any other novel initiatives, the regional strategies developed to deal with the crimes have encountered a lot of challenges. And obviously, we've already talked about how some of the provisions is yet to be operationalized. For example, with respect to joint patrols and also Zones A and G, which is supposed to be located in Angola and Cabo Verde, for example, are yet to be operationalized. and national activation of intelligence

in what Shum is still lacking in these two countries. So in a nutshell, I would say that the Andean architecture is a very, I mean, it's a good idea and it's a good starting point for ensuring regional collaboration and cooperation for enhancing maritime governance and security to the point to which it has been supported by member states and their partners.

The structure is great and has the potential to bring an end to security threats at sea in the region. However, unfortunately, member states do not seem to be walking the talk in terms of facilitating the operationalization by supporting their respective agencies to contribute towards the joint patrol, for example.

And so I feel that this needs to happen and all the things needs to happen for the Yawande Code of Conduct or the Yawande architecture to actually be able to start living up to the expectations. And Macy, I don't know if you want to add anything. I think that's a really good synthesis of the UN Day architecture.

To me, the legacy of the UN Day Code and the UN Day architecture is pretty undeniable. This initiative, though supported by some of the major international presences operating in the region, like the European Union or the United Nations, is regionally led. And I think that that's an important point. Before the Hyundai Code, many of us sitting in the United States, for instance, might have identified piracy and armed robbery as the major maritime security threat in the region. But the Hyundai Code connected the dots between piracy and a handful of other pertinent maritime security challenges like illicit trafficking or migration that we might not have arrived at without this document. And in addition to being regionally driven, the Yonde Code has definitely improved coordination and cooperation among these regional stakeholders. And one of the incidents that we often talk about when we talk about the success of the Yonde Code is the MT Maximus. And this was an oil tanker that was hijacked in 2016 off of the coast of Cote d'Ivoire.

And six countries coordinated tracking the vessel as it tried to escape, coordinating with other countries in the region over the better part of two weeks before authorities eventually boarded the vessel and freed the crew in the vessel. And this example is often noted in these conversations because it's a really commendable example of strong regional cooperation, I think. That said, you know, there are definitely still gaps, like Ife said, I agree with that. I don't think the Hyundai architecture has reached its full potential yet. Several of the zones aren't yet fully operational. Zone D is the only center that is currently conducting coordinated joint patrols. But I think it's also fair to say that information sharing between countries has not fully reached the point envisioned in the Code of Conduct.

But I really do believe that this architecture has given governments in the region a tool to address these maritime crimes, and it's certain to continue evolving. Thanks. I'd like to shift gears a little bit here and talk fisheries. What are the greatest challenges for fisheries in the Gulf of Guinea? Okay. So the greatest challenges, I would say, is a multitude. I would say three, three key challenges, because unfortunately, these are issues or factors that undermine fisheries sustainability and exacerbate the depletion of fisheries. So in no particular other, the greatest challenges for fisheries in the Gulf of Guinea are the threat of marine

pollution over fishing, including illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and the impact of climate change. So marine pollution, for example, from the oil sector and other extractive industries, including the maritime sector, undermine the sustainability of fisheries in the region. I unfortunately will talk about the Niger Delta. So take, for example, the Niger Delta, where since oil production started in 1958, an estimated 13 million barrels of crude oil has been spilled. The impact cuts across the Gulf of Guinea because the mangrove of Niger Delta is said to be a breeding ground for 60% of fishery species in the region. So if this much oil, for example, has been spilled in the environment,

what impact does it have? And then talk about illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, which also obviously is also part of overfishing. The extensiveness in West Africa alone is such that it accounts for between 40% to 65% of the fisheries caught in the region are caught illegally, with six countries losing an estimated $2.3 billion each year to the trend. And then with the impact of climate change, rising sea level is set to result in the decrease of fisheries production in West Africa by 2050

and potentially leading to up to a 50% drop in fisheries-related jobs, meaning that the standard of living and food purchasing power for most coastal communities is going to be seriously affected. And so these three factors together exacerbate the depletion of fisheries, which means that for every fisher folk in coastal communities across the region, each trip to sea means that they are catching less. And basically, they are less unsure of their ability to be able to meet the needs of their families. And so, yeah, these are the three challenges that exacerbate the depletion of fisheries in the region.

Maisie, did you have anything to add before I ask about how the states are working together? I wouldn't dare add anything on to this fisheries expert's comments. No, no problem. I understand completely. So, Yves, let me ask a follow up then is how well are the states working together or are they working together to address some of the challenges that you've identified with fisheries? The states are working together. I mean, when it comes to maritime governance, generally, they are trying or they're improving because, as we highlighted, obviously, the Aonde architecture is not supposed to, I mean, the essence of it is to give a holistic solution to threats to maritime security. And so they are trying as much as they can, I guess, if you could say. And there is a bit of improvement in what they are doing. And so, for example, we know that through sub-regional advisory groups such as the Fisheries Committee for West Central Gulf of Guinea, and there is also the CRFP.

I don't actually know the full name of the acronym, but their headquarters is based in Senegal. So those sub-regional fisheries agencies or sub-regional fisheries advisory group are actually supporting states in the region to enhance their monitoring, surveillance and control capabilities and improve fisheries governance. And currently, in talking about how international support is helping states to improve fisheries governance, I know that through an EU-funded program, they have this PESCAL program, which is a five-year EU-funded project, which started in 2018 and is going to end in 2023, if my memory serves me right. And what they aim to achieve is basically to improve fisheries governance and combat threats like illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. So the extent to which the countries in the region are working together to improve fisheries governance is based on the support they're getting from these sub-regional groups, as an example. But as an individual country, a lot of them are, you could say, making some progress. But actually, when it comes to just like the challenges that the navies face with lack of capabilities or lack of assets, a lot of the fisheries agencies in these countries practically do not have that capacity to monitor the activities of fisheries that they license.

So individually, as a nation, selected countries in the region are not doing enough in terms of improving the capabilities of their respective fisheries agencies. But as a collective, the sub-regional advisory group are providing advice and providing guidance and helping them to improve fisheries governance and do better. Thanks. And I did want to end on a little bit of a lighter note. And that was some of the positive developments related to Togo, which was cited pretty regularly throughout your work. So what has Togo done both from a legal standpoint and a resource standpoint to address some of its maritime security concerns? So obviously, it's a very good note to end on. But obviously, I want to also say a disclaimer that, like everything else, they can improve. But they have done and continue to do tremendously in terms of improving the human capacity, training on intelligence gathering, harmonization of operations between maritime enforcement agencies, And most importantly, the interdiction capability of their navies have all improved, allowing for such actions to be successful. You know, working together as a collective makes it a lot more better. And this is something that in the report we credited or can be credited for some of the success. And so I feel that the improvement they've made in their legal standpoint or their legal framework.

And then what they've gone on to do to ensure that the improvement in legal framework is implemented adequately, and then harmonization of the way the relevant authorities work together is something that you can credit for the success that Togo have recorded so far. Unfortunately, that is all the time that we have for today. I'd like to thank my guests, Dr. Ife Sinache, Okafor Yarwood, and Maisie Pidgeon. Ife, where can we find you online? What are you working on now? So you can find me, obviously, in the Twitterverse. You can find me on Twitter using Diplomatic Ife. And what am I working on? Well, I am currently, as I said, a lecturer at the University of St. Andrews. And currently I'm working with some colleagues on a paper. And we're trying to sort of understand the threat or the impact of the secretization

or what we feel to be the securitization of the fishery sector in the African continent. So that's currently what we're working on. And obviously preparing to start the teaching, which will start in this academic year soon. And Maisie, how about you? Next up for me will be a report in the same vein as Stable Seas Gulf of Guinea, but focused on the Western Indian Ocean region, which will be launching in early 2021. and you can find me on twitter at mazypigeon well thank you both so much and to our listeners thank you for joining us we'll see you next time sea control is produced by keegan ingersoll

Thank you. We'll be right back.