Sea Control - Sea Control 195 - Japanese Maritime Realism with Takuya Matsuda

Episode Date: August 16, 2020

Links:1. Explaining Japan's post-Cold War security policy trajectory: maritime realism by Tokuya Matsuda, Australian Journal of International Affairs, June 20, 20202. Navies and Foreign Policy by Ken Booth3. Dragon Against the Sun: Chinese Views of Japanese Seapower, by Toshi Yoshihara, Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments4. Geopolitics Redux: Explaining the Japanese-Korea Dispute and Its Implications for Great Power Competion by Takuya Matsuda and Jaehan Park, War on the Rocks, November 7, 2019

Hey folks, Jared here. This week we are back in East Asia talking to Takuya Matsuda about his paper, Japan's Post-Cold War Security Policy Trajectory, Maritime Realism. We're also rapidly closing in on the submission deadline for the next phase of Project Trident. This is your opportunity to shape the future of maritime security. Our next theme is regional strategies and we partnered with the Okuska Council for Asia-Pacific Studies, Dominican Naval Command and Staff College, and the Institute for Zichaitz Politik in Kiel, Germany. Submissions are due August 31st, so get those in now. You can find more information on our website at simsec.org. We're also seeking volunteers to assist with the back-end production of Sea Control.

Volunteers would be sitting in on interviews, assisting with sound editing and production, and helping transcribe episodes. Contact Sea Control at simsec.org if you're interested. Finally, just want to advertise one more time for SimSec Podcast Network and our second podcast feed, The Bilge Bumps. You can find them on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, and wherever else you download your podcast. It's a more low-key, slightly less serious approach to current events in the maritime domain and naval history by three historians. This week's episode was on small navies. Check them out wherever you download your podcast. With that, I'll turn it over to Kimber's men.

Hello Hashimates and welcome back aboard Sea Control. Today my guest is Takuya Matsuda. Takuya is a PhD candidate in War Studies at King's College London. We'll be discussing his recent paper, Explaining Japan's Post-Cold War Security Policy Trajectory, Maritime Realism. Takuya, thank you so much for joining us. I mentioned you were a PhD candidate at King's College London, but would you mind sharing a little bit more of your background with our listeners? Thanks so much for having me, Gerald. It's a great honor to be on your podcast.

This is actually my first podcast appearance, so I hope I do well today. As you kindly mentioned, I'm working on my dissertation that looks into great power of relations and alliance politics at King's College London's War Studies Department. So in my research, I try to explain the driving forces of great power of competition and the role that alliance relations play in those dynamics. I'm usually based in London, United Kingdom, but I'm talking to you today from Tokyo, Japan, where I have been well into the pandemic since March. I was also based in Washington, D.C. for a couple of years for master's studies at

Johns Hopkins SAIS. Nice. Well, thank you for sharing and for joining us today. Just a reminder, all of our opinions are personal opinions and not representative of any institutions with which we may be otherwise associated. So, Takuya, we use realism and a host of other terms here that may be unfamiliar unless you have some background with international relations theory. I want to start by asking you to define a few of the terms for the listeners, but specifically liberalism and realism. Sure, Gerald. There's actually a lot of cover when it comes to IR theory, but I'll try to keep it as simple as possible here. So, first of all, realism basically sees the world as an R&D. So, states strive for their own survival under a

different international system, which is basically a self-help system. So, according to realism, the main mechanism that informs the international system is the balance of power. I'm sure that some folks in the audience know this term, but what the balance of power system is is that states seeks to pursue a power equilibrium by developing its own power, including both military and economic power, or seek alliances to balance against a stronger state. When you talk about power, one thing that probably comes to mind is military power. But I think it's worth mentioning that economic power is also a major component of power and the balance of power dynamics. Because first of all, to begin with, a state cannot invest in its military without possessing the wealth to do

So, so realism does portray a little bit of a pessimistic view of the world where states have to like, you know, compete for their own survivals. But on the other hand, liberalism seeks to portray a much more optimistic picture of the world. So liberalism emphasizes more, you know, roles of institution, their shared values, and how they could sort of, you know, construct a better world order. Thanks. So why has it been difficult to apply liberalism and realism to the Indo-Pacific? So, in fact, to be a bit more accurate here, it's not that realism is not applicable to the Indo-Pacific. Japan has been pretty responsive to changes in the balance of power, and Japanese foreign policy has been shaped by a change in international systems. So, in other words, Japan as a state behaves in a realist manner. However, what's unique about the Indo-Pacific is the way the balance of power dynamics manifests itself. Of course, it's a bit different from, say, Canada or Europe, just because it's basically animated by a maritime space. So, international relations theory has been heavily reliant on empirical examples derived

from continental Europes. So, a lot of concepts we use in international relations have been formed by cases where land powers play a larger role. So, in a continental sphere, expansion of power is often done through the conquest of land, which actually makes it zero-sum in nature. So, as a result, like in a continental domain, states may balance against this power that emerging or rising or trying to become dominant in a given system. However, in the Pacific, the main contest of powers is occurring in a maritime space. So first of all, if you're a

maritime state, you enjoy what we call the stopping power of waters. So if you're a country like Japan, which is an island country, you're not necessarily concerned about territorial conflicts that may jeopardize homeland defense, like in kind of Europe. Obviously, yes, Japan does care about defending islands such as the Senkaku Islands, but these concerns rather stem from a much broader security interest or concern over sea lines and communications or sea control. And also, in addition, the sea line communication is actually vital for common trade, and these are actually global public goods. So they're actually not necessarily a deal-sum-based system.

So it's actually rather an interest of all concerned parties to collaborate and invest in you know defending and developing a stable maritime order so as a result um states you know that are concerned of access to sea lines and communications align instead of balance against the dominant naval power and that kind of that explains how the u.s japan alliance works you know because like if you just simply follow the prediction of realism like you know powers bounce against the dominant power but here you can see how japan is actually closely aligning with the dominant naval power, that is the United States here in the Western Pacific. So we're actually not fully equipped with a useful theory to explain state behavior

in a maritime-centric order, even though it is increasingly becoming one of the main theories of great power competition of our times. So my paper is about an attempt to tackle these challenges in the literature. Thanks. And your paper is really about post-Cold War Japan. So during the Cold War, Japanese foreign policy was really based on the Yoshida doctrine. Can you explain what the Yoshida Doctrine was? So the Yoshida Doctrine is basically Japan's Cold War strategy where Tokyo focused on post-war economic reconstruction while relying on the United States for national defense.

So this allowed Japan to focus more on preserving economic prosperity instead of spending too much in bolstering its defense culture. So this is named after Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who also signed the San Francisco Treaty, which allowed Japan to regain independence after the war. and he's one of the first prime ministers of independent post-war japan so this doctrine actually resonates with economic statecraft which informed the containment strategy during the early stage of the cold war the more specific before the korean war so if you take the marshal plan for example like marshal plan was designed to assist western european nations to reconstruct economies so that they can develop their own resilience again to resist soviet expansionism in europe so this is like you know this is like the economic power component of battle for power

The United States adopted a similar strategy toward Japan, which we call a reverse course. So as the name reverse course suggests, it reversed the original occupation plan, a policy that focused more on demilitarization and democratization of Japan's political and social climate system. So Primacy Yoshida took advantage of these two trends, like first, the economic stakeback component, America's earlier Cold War strategy, and also legacy of the earlier stage of the occupation where they focused more on democratization. So he set up a strategy where Japan can continue to focus on economic development while investing not too much in military spending. Since the Ishida Doctrine prioritizes economic prosperity over national defense, a lot of observers tend to associate this doctrine with pacifism that has animated Japan's security policy. So as a result, there's been a lot of debates whether Japan's increasingly proactive security policies in the past decade or so are consistent or whether it's an aberration from the Ishida Doctrine. However, I argue that this doctrine has been a guiding principle for Japan's overall national strategy that portrays itself as a trading nation and hence a maritime state, which has endured the end of the Cold War. In that sense, the Ushidu doctrine is still relevant in explaining Japan's foreign policy.

And what actually changed was the fact that relative stability under bipolarity during the Cold War came to an end. After the end of the Cold War, the Western Pacific increasingly became contested space, and Japan has been urged to focus more on national defense, especially its naval power, to maintain its position as a trading or slash maritime state. However, some of you, especially from the U.S. perspective, you should often might simply sound like example free-riding. So while these views are to a certain degree valid, I would say, but I would rather argue that relative stability under a bipolar system during the Cold War allowed Japan's focus to be on economic development and only maintain a military force that's sufficient so as not to create a power vacuum in itself. So there was an interesting article in the Wall Street Journal last week, which highlighted how Japan's geostrategic shift, you know, how it shifted from the north, namely the Soviet Union, to the south, which is the maritime space, as the Cold War came to an end. So the Shida option sounds like a food-riding sort of policy, but this was, you know, it kind of does illuminate how the bipolar system under the Cold War was relatively stable, at least in East Asia, and it afforded Japan's underinvestment in its armed forces. Thanks. You start your paper by describing some of the elements of Japan's increasingly assertive foreign policy, to include the establishment of a National Security Council and the publication of a national security strategy for the first time in December 2013. Why are those important steps and what do they allow Japan to do?

So, first of all, I mean, I think these steps demonstrate how Japan is increasingly becoming a proactive security player in the Pacific. So as some of you might be aware, Japan has this passives constitution, Article 9, which has long been a break on Japan's security policies. So it has a lot of legal – it puts a lot of legal constraint on Japan's use of force. And as I mentioned earlier, the Cold War actually allowed Japan to remain reactive to strategic environment out there. So these moves actually signify how Japan is moving towards addressing itself to become a proactive player instead of a reactive player. So first of all, I'll mention the NSC. So this bolsters Japan's national security decision-making apparatus for a whole-of-the-gun approach. And the national security strategy, which is the first of its kind that Japan actually published, signals Japan's policy orientation as a security player.

So one major takeaway of the National Security Strategy, for example, which was released in December 2013, is that it describes Japan as a maritime state that pursues open and stable seas. So the National Security Strategy highlights what sort of policy direction Japan is trying to move towards. And actually, lastly, I think another point that's worth mentioning is that Japan reinterpreted Article 9 of the Constitution to allow Japan to exercise the rights to collective self-defense in specific cases. So actually, Japan, you know, there were strict legal constraints on the use of force in Japan. So Japan was not even able to exercise rights to collective self-defense, though it's closed out of the United States. So that's, it's been a controversial reform, but Japan is slowly trying to untangle its legal constraints so that it could act as a proactive security player in the region and also, you know, transform the U.S.-Japan alliance into something that's more, you know, a genuine military alliance where we can collaborate and work together. in a better way. Are these changes driven by internal factors like the Abe administration, external factors, the rise of China, or some combination of both?

So, you know, my short answer will be that Japan's foreign policy has been mainly been shaped by external factors, such as changes in the regional balance of power. So, in particular, I would argue that end of bipolarity, end of the Cold War, has been a huge turning point for Japan. So, as I described in the paper, the end of the Cold War was a trigger for Japan to reconsider its role in the world and tokyo gradually adapted the new strategic environment over the years so you know an interesting example here is that during the first gulf war japan was not able to you know send its self-defense force troops to to the middle east but contributed billions of dollars to the war effort but they were not necessarily appreciated in a way that they

thought is appropriate so that's when japan started to realize that what we call the Czech diplomacy is no longer viable in the post-Cold War world. So Japan started to slowly adapt to the new strategic environment, reconsider its role in the world, and then, you know, that sort of culminated into Japan's proactive security posture. But, you know, it is true that there were some geostrategic shifts in the region as well. So the fact that China's borders are relatively secure, which allowed Beijing to expand its

seas, actually warranted major geopolitical shifts in the Indo-Pacific. So, you know, the Great Wall of China actually does reveal how China has been more concerned about its continental borders instead of its maritime space. Like, continental borders kept them busy from investing in the seas. But, you know, right now, like, their borders are relatively secure, though we had a bit of a skirmish with India, but basically secure. So they can afford to invest in the seas, and that has been a major game changer in the Pacific. So I would argue that Japan's foreign policy has been driven by the end of bipolarity, end of the Cold War, and also by this geostrategic shift in the Western Pacific. And a lot of people do tend to emphasize the role that personalities leaders play in shaping foreign policy. And a lot of people have attributed Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's nationalistic tendencies as a driver behind Japan's practice of security policies.

And I would say that to a certain degree it's true because all these security reforms are very controversial, and Prime Minister Abe had a political capital to push through all these reforms that are very hard to do if it's a short-term administration. However, like in the U.S., even between U.S. administrations, which has contrasting worldviews, there are a lot of continuity than people actually imagine. And like, you know, between President Carter and President Reagan, these are totally different to primary presidents. But when it comes to, you know, their approach to the Persian Gulf patrol, to Afghanistan, there's actually a lot of continuity than people imagine. So personalities matter, internal factors matter. But I would argue that external factors play a larger role as underlying sort of variable that change, that, you know, transform the past year policy in the course of the past three decades. You've introduced the term maritime realism to describe Japan's strategy. Why did you choose that term and how would you describe it? So the reason I chose this term is that it seeks to illustrate how the integration of strategic studies informed by geographical factors such as the role of navies could be useful in advancing existing international relations theory to enhance our understanding of how states behave under a predominantly maritime context.

So what maritime realism explains Japan's security policy is that, you know, it basically argues that Japan's security policy is best understood as a realist policy approach drawing upon a maritime strategy. This concept illuminates Japan's version of realpolitik, where it infuses responses to geopolitical realities and its focus as a trading nation concerned with stable access to the seas. So that's why I introduced two independent variables in my paper, balance of power calculations, the realist part, and also the secure access to the global commons, namely the sea lines of documentation, and how these two variables have shaped Japan's security policy trajectory. So what a maritime realism-based strategy does is that it aims to both support a status quo in the Western Pacific related to American naval primacy and distribution, and also practically promote a maritime order based on adherence to core principles of the rule of law at sea. So Japan's security policy has been, first of all, to facilitate U.S. commitment to the region in order to preserve the balance of power favorable to Washington and also Tokyo. And also, through this, it assures Japan's undisrupted access to maritime commons, given its unique geographic situation as a maritime state. And also, in addition, I think that maritime realism also illuminates how access to global public goods is one of the major sources that drive great power competition. So I think this ongoing pandemic here has, in fact, highlighted how global public goods, like sea lines and communications and also supply chains, are increasingly being contested.

So in other words, maritime realism may be useful in clarifying the source and mechanism of great power competition, which has become an organizing principle in international politics. What initially led the Japanese to begin investing more heavily in its navy and maritime security? So when you look at post-1945 Japanese security policy, it's actually in the 1980s when Japan started to focus on defending sea lives and communication. So this happened more through the context of burden-sharing in the United States during the Reagan administration. But still, we had the pacifist constitution that restrained Japan from using force, but burden-sharing through defending the sea lines of communication resonated pretty well with Japan's national strategy to focus on trade. So it was pretty compatible with the Yoshida doctrine back then. But still, as I mentioned a bit earlier, Japan's defense culture during the Cold War was mainly geared towards the Soviets in the north. So maritime security was not necessarily the main focus of Japan's security policy back then.

But at the end of the Cold War, namely at the end of bipolarity, it seems to have shifted focus to the seas, along with China's maritime expansion. And also, you know, as, you know, the Western Pacific, the Indo-Pacific becomes more contested and U.S. naval primacy is, you know, unfortunately being a bit contested nowadays. You know, Japan is, you know, taking maritime security a lot more seriously in order to, you know, maintain access to global public goods, which is the access to the United States' permutations. You made an argument that maritime realism contains aspects of governance and then referenced Ken Booth's Trinity of Naval Roles. I don't think most of our listeners are familiar with Booth's work. What are those roles and what function do they play in your argument for maritime realism? So Ken Booth argues that navies have three main functions, which are diplomatic, policing, and military roles. So diplomatic and security roles include sea control, power projection, and deterrence.

And on the other hand, the policing role involves law enforcement and governance. So when we talk about great power competition in the Pacific, we naturally think of the military roles such as power projection and deterrence. however when you recall the nature of you know the problems in the eastern side of china seas you can see how it is actually a matter of good governance so it's about you know like you know enforcing the rules of law in these oceans and um so actually the role of navies are not limited to military roles but actually you know they have a very important role which is first policing roles, which focuses more on peacekeeping and fostering governance.

So, given these multiple functions, navies are a crucial tool of statecraft, shaping a country's contribution to national security and place in the world. So, actually for Japan, navies are a relatively pacifist sort of entity. So,

for Japan, it's been the best way for Japan for deterrence, and both deterrence and also express to foster governance and promote liberal internationalist values for good governance in the seas. So since rural navies involve both military and policing roles, which are pretty contrasting, that's the reason realist and liberal internationalist languages can easily coexist

when discussing great power competition in the Pacific. So when you talk about great power in the Pacific, you hear a lot of discussion about great power competition, obviously, But you hear a lot of, you know, observers talking about ways to defend the liberal national order. And these are very, you know, contrasting concepts, but they can easily coexist because, you know, Canada's trinity of naval roles sort of, you know, offers comprehensive picture of how navies function. And that also, you know, this particular, you know, nature of the role of navies does inform my theory of maritime realism. So how does Japan view the regional balance of power and how does it view its place in that balance? So if I were to talk chronologically since the end of the Cold War, I mean, Japan was actually concerned about potential U.S. retrenchment for the region in the early 1990s.

However, from the U.S. side, there was a lot of talks about this uncertainty over U.S. commitment. So the U.S. actually, you know, reaffirmed its commitment in 1995, Joseph's Nine Initiative, and also in 2000, Richard Armitage sent a report which actually reaffirmed U.S. commitment, but also at the same time encouraged Japan to do more in its defense. So actually, the right to collective self-defense forum argument discussion that I mentioned earlier in 2015, that reform was, you know, is a culmination of the reports that came out in the U.S. So it's not an exaggeration to argue that Japan's territory policy in the earlier half of the past three decades were shaped by the perceived need to, you know, facilitate U.S. commitments to the region. And you can see that in, you know, Japan's decision to send the self-defense ground forces to Iraq in the 2000s. In the past three decades, China has started to expand militarily and started to rise, and Tokyo started to view China's rise as transforming the regional balance of power in an unfavorable manner. So that is why Japan has started to become a proactive security player in itself. And, you know, while Japan has been embracing this identity as a maritime state, which I argue has been consistent since 1945, it is still actually very ambiguous what sort of security actor Japan has to become.

Japan's recent cancellation of the Aegis Ashore Plan and filtration with strike capabilities against foreign adversaries underscores this uncertainty where Japan is headed. But in overall, I would argue that the best course of action for Japan is probably to stick with the maritime state sort of route. So yeah, and also in terms of the US-Japan alliance, so in Japan's case, the rise of China, especially, you know, conservative over Beijing's maritime expansion, has made it easier for the US and Japan's strategic priorities to be compatible, which resulted in the steady development of this alliance relationship

over the past three decades. So, you know, military alliances are basically about, you know, joint war playing. So for Japan and the U.S., they both have concerns over access to the global commons, to the alliance communications in the region. So their defense priorities, potential war plans are easily compatible.

And so, you know, these changes in the regional balance of power, you know, urge Japan to align closely with the U.S. and make the necessary strategic efforts to strengthen the alliance over the years. So maritime realism actually offered a sound explanation on development of this bilateral alliance in the past couple of decades. And also in terms of regional balance of power, I would probably highlight Dr. Toshio Chao's CSBA report,

Dragging Against the Sun, Chinese Views of Japanese Sea Power. And this actually does offer a pretty concerning trend in the shifting naval imbalance between China and Japan. Japan, like, you know, there's a lot to probably think about when it comes to naval balance of power in the region. And that leads directly into my next question. Is Japan trying to contain China? So the short answer is no.

The concept of maritime realism tries to do is that it tries to underscore how Japan's proactive security posture does not necessarily transform Japan as an aggressive player or Japan's intentions are not actually to contain China. I mean, it is understandable to a certain degree that China sees things this way Because, first of all, the Japanese archipelago is a natural barrier for China's maritime expansion. And initially, Beijing welcomed the fact that US-Japan alliance endured the end of the Cold War. So China, given its wartime memory, views Japan as a potential aggressor. And so actually, interestingly, Beijing saw Japan's alliance with the US as placing a lid on Japan for becoming a militaristic power that might threaten China once again, which is like the way European powers view Germany and Europe.

Europe. And also for the U.S. side as well, like, you know, Justice Knife, who initiated one of the major security policy in the 1990s, which reaffirmed U.S. commitments to the region, also articulates that there was no intention to contain China back then when he reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the region. Nevertheless, like China does, you know, argue that U.S.-Japan alliance, a company where Japan's, Tokyo's upgraded defense culture has been, is a demonstration of Washington's alleged zero-sum and, you know, it's a cold, they call it, Beijing calls, you know, strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S. alliance system in the region itself as zero-sum sort of Cold War mentality-based strategy that's aimed towards contained or either China. So,

you know, there's, you know, even though the U.S. and Japan doesn't, you know, really argue that they are trying to contain China, the Chinese side see it a bit differently, which is, which we call a security dilemma in international relations jury terms where you know when one side tries to enhance its jury posture you know it automatically threatens your opponent and then both sides you know keep on upgrading capabilities and there's a spiral where both sides feel insecure so that's basically what is kind of going on in in the pacific right now but actually i mean one important thing i think is uh one important thing that's important to bear in mind i think is the fact that china's rise has been facilitated by japan and also by the u.s um in the 1970s and 80s where

the soviet union was our all our common you know um enemy um so in that regards i mean you know japan actually you know has tell me japan uh helped china build steel planet and all that So, you know, when you look at the rise of China, I think we need more of a nuanced approach in explaining how, you know, regional powers shifted their approach towards China's rise because there's a lot more story behind it and how this all happened. How is Japan working with its neighbors with like-minded interests? And I'm thinking specifically of Australia, India, South Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines. So, yeah, let me start with the Quad. So the Quad, as I mentioned, it's not an alliance, but it's like a security sort of like collaborative platform among the U.S., Japan, Australia and India. So actually, Japan, I mean, is probably one of the first countries among the four who, you know, started to promote this idea. And in the year 2007, in front of members of the Indian parliament, Prime Minister Abe unveiled this idea in a speech entitled As Confluence of the Two Seas, which are the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

This is probably the first occasion where a head of government eliminated a strategic framework that includes both the Indo-India and the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Oceans, which led to this term Indo-Pacific. And also in 2012, Parasabe also published a commentary entitled Asia's Democratic Stereo Diamond, which became the foundation of this multilateral collaboration. And also, you know, the Barabar exercise among Japan, the U.S., and India is also one of those platforms where these like-minded countries try to get together. They're not really sterilized, but I'm sure that there's a lot of things going on with China and Hong Kong and Taiwan. This might culminate into something in the future. And you also mentioned Vietnam and the Philippines. So for these two countries, Japan does more of a naval diplomacy, policing role type of thing, where Japan has provided vessels to the coast guards of these respective countries. And what Japan has been doing is mainly capacity building measures for these countries that have claims in the South China Sea.

And South Korea is a tricky one because South Korea does benefit a lot from the sea lines of communication, for sure. But it's just that their focus is not on maritime space. They're more focused on North Korea, obviously, and as a result, they're focused more on their relationship with continental powers, which is China. So actually, I wrote a War on the Rocks article on this dynamic between Japan and South Korea and how these different geopolitical orientations make it hard for these two countries to collaborate with a good friend of mine. So if you're interested, please check it out. Yeah, you've mentioned a number of different articles in the course of our recording today. And I will say for our listeners, there's going to be links to all those in the show notes. Go check them out. In fact, maybe we'll put a note in, you should check them out before you listen to the podcast, because it's great background information to have and informs this discussion. But to go back to what you were just talking about regarding the International Maritime Commons, does Japan have a legitimate reason to fear loss of access? Unfortunately, I would say yes, because, you know, China has been pretty, I would say, aggressive in the East China Seas. And, you know, when the second island is taken, Japan will fear, I mean, Japan, you know, China could actually go target towards Okinawa.

So actually, you know, China's maritime expansion is very, a huge concern that, there's a huge concern over China's maritime expansion that, you know, Japan, it might lead to Japan losing access to these kinds of communications. And especially like the South China Sea is like the Caribbean in the Western Hemisphere. So whoever dominates the South China Sea could literally control the entire region. So if you look at how China is expanding in these seas, I mean, I want to be – I hope to be more optimistic here. But, you know, if we look at a voice test scenario, I would argue that there is, you know, there's legitimate reasons for Japan's fear of access to these sea lines of communication. That's the reason Japan is working closely with the United States to make sure that, you know, these seas are open and free for all nations. Thanks. That's unfortunately all the time that we have for today. Takuya, where can we find you online and what are you working on next?

so i think the easiest way to find me online is to follow me on twitter at takuya matsuda one so takuya matsuda is actually a very common name in japan so that's why i put a number there to my twitter account and also what i'm working on right now is like um so post-pandemic world access to global public goods will most likely become one of the main spheres of competition among great powers so i'm hoping to build on my paper on american realism that we talked about today to consider ways to explain great power competition in a post-pandemic world

And most importantly, I'll keep on working on my dissertation that examines life strategies that great powers adopt in times of power shift. And, you know, in overall, I'll continue my research on ways to explain the ongoing great power competition in the Pacific. Thank you again for joining us. To our listeners, thanks for tuning in. We'll see you next week. Sea Control is produced by Keegan Ingersoll. © transcript Emily Beynon So help me, Bob, I'm bullying the alley.

Why, I'm bullying the alley. Help me, Bob, I'm bullying the alley. Bullying the alley, ship on out.