Sea Control - Sea Control 217 - First Fleet with Darshana Baruah & Blake Herzinger

Episode Date: December 13, 2020

Link:Time to Launch a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific, Eric Sayers, War on the Rocks, 1 June 2018. 

Hey, folks, Jared here. It's been a busy week for us here at SimSec. In case you missed it, we started the week by introducing our new team of podcast hosts. And then Tuesday, Andrea Howard hosted Julie Angus and Michael Brasseur to talk about the undersea Internet of Things. Thursday, Walker Mills interviewed the authors of the winning entry in our fiction contest, Michael Burke and Nick Nethery. Today, we've got Darshan Abarua and Blake Herzinger discussing a notional first fleet. As always, we want to advertise and strongly recommend our friends in the SimSec Podcast Network and our second podcast feed, The Bilge Pumps. and find Alex, Drack, Jamie, and a pile of empty iron brew bottles

on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, and wherever else you download your podcast. It's a more low-key, slightly less serious approach to current events in the maritime domain and naval history. Check them out wherever you download. Finally, from Sea Control to Bilge Pumps to Project Trident, 2020 has been a banner year for SimSec. We need your help to carry that momentum, supporting our Right Fight Win holiday donation campaign

via direct donations on our website or by making SimSec your preferred nonprofit on Amazon Smile so you can support us while you shop. With that, I'll turn it over to Kimber's men. Aloha, shipmates, and welcome back aboard Sea Control. Today, my guests are Darshana Barua and Blake Herzinger to discuss the announcement from SECNAV that they'd like to stand up a first fleet responsible for the Indian Ocean area.

All opinions expressed here are our own and not representative of any institution with which we might otherwise be associated. So welcome to both of you. Darshana, you're new to our listeners. Would you mind introducing yourself and telling us a bit about your background? Sure. Thanks, Jared. So my name is Darshana Barwa. I am currently based in Tokyo with the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. I'm writing a book on the Indian Ocean region and the islands, how they influence great power competition. I'm otherwise associated with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. I was with Carnegie India Center for about three years, and I've also spent some time in Australia. And I've been in Tokyo for about a year and a half working on this project, and I specifically

work on maritime security with a focus on the Indian Ocean region. And Blake, you previously appeared on Sea Control 167, Indonesia's Maritime Security Challenges. So first, welcome back. And then second, could you give the listeners a refresh on your background, please? Absolutely. And thanks, Jared. Very happy to be back. So I'm a career Navy intelligence officer. I left active duty, joined the U.S. Navy Reserve in 2017. So I've been in Asia since 2012 when I was in Okinawa. I now work primarily in theater security cooperation and building partner capacity across the Indo-Pacific region from the South Pacific all the way into the Indian Ocean. Well, thank you both again for joining us today. Blake, Sekhna Brathwaite's announcement sparked a long thread from you with a number of objections to his proposal.

So we'll start with those. And Darshan, I welcome your thoughts on any of these as well. And then I'd like to pivot to a 2018 article that Eric Sayers had written for War on the Rocks titled Time to Launch a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific as a potential alternative to the announcement. So, Blake, I don't think I'm mischaracterizing to say that you object to the announcement on principle. We'll start with span of operational control considerations. So who's responsible for the waters that a notional first fleet would patrol? And what are the operational issues with inserting first fleet there? Yeah, not at all, Jared.

Not at all mischaracterized. So right now, there are actually three fleets that have responsibilities in the Indian Ocean, the U.S. Fifth Fleet, the Sixth Fleet and the Seventh Fleet. And even before that, even the idea and the phrasing, and I realize that this is a bit maybe nitpicky, but the idea that we will create a first fleet is historically inaccurate. You know, the U.S. first fleet was disestablished in 1973. So if we if we brought it back, we are reestablishing a first fleet. This is not something completely revolutionary aside from where it's been proposed to operate. so so the u.s seventh fleet beneath the u.s pacific fleet is responsible for the indian ocean up to the border with pakistan basically north south line and then west of that we have

the fifth fleet and the sixth fleet which divide the waters at the southern border of somalia so when you add a new fleet in there this this hypothetical first fleet you're now creating a second seam where another fleet abuts the seventh the seventh fleet right so if this first fleet is somehow inserted into this jigsaw puzzle, you are creating now a new layer of bureaucracy and creating complications that already exist in some form and make things complicated. And the fleets have put a lot of energy into trying to solve that issue. So I see this as kind of multiplying an existing issue rather than really streamlining or making anything more effective. So that's my biggest problem. The whole concept between the rebrand from Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command was this recognition of the linkages across this Indo-Pacific region. And so dividing out, carving out another fleet in that space creates more division rather than encouraging the interlinked policy that we're shooting for.

Thanks. Darshana, there's a lot of focus on China, India, U.S. tensions, but could you explain the other dynamics in the region and how the other countries that would be affected by the establishment of a first fleet view an enhanced or increased U.S. presence? sure things the one of the issues with the indian ocean region and i and i think it's true for most of the players in the region including india is that we tend to look at the indian ocean region a little divided because simply because there's so many important sub-regions to it you have the middle east you have the persian gulf you have b of bengal you have the eastern coast of patrica you have uh and the eastern indian ocean which is your east uh coast uh straits of malacca And one of the, I think, challenges of that is because of the way we look at the Indian Ocean in silos, we tend to oversee the overall development or trends in the region. So you get caught up in the Middle East issues or you get up in the South Asia issues or it's the Africa issues.

But together, it's actually the trends have been a little different and been consistent in the recent years. The most common division of the Indian Ocean is the Eastern Indian Ocean and the Western Indian Ocean. And traditionally, there have been kind of two key players that also U.S. and its partners rely on. It's India and the Eastern Indian Ocean and it's France and the Western Indian Ocean that, you know, you're for day to day or for more integrated relationships. These are the two countries, along with the U.K. and of course, the European Union and France, of course, to look into it. But the problem is both India and France have very complicated history in the Indian Ocean region. France has colonial history in the Indian Ocean region in the sense that Madagascar, Comoros, they still have territorial disputes with France that has lingered on from their independence.

So it's a very complicated history. And if you've seen recent events, you will see similar sentiments within Sri Lanka and Maldives, where the governments in the recent past have actually very publicly taken anti-India stance to the effect that they have come to power on the notion that they will not just work with India. So the trend or kind of the thread that runs along most of the smaller nations in the Indian Ocean region and the islands is that they want to go beyond the traditional security partners, whether it's India, whether it's France, whether it's UK. So they want to work with more than one partner, which is normal for any sovereign nation. right so they're looking for other security partners and providers that they can work with

so they're not entangled with the one partner with whom they have territorial disputes or have sort of you know diaspora as far as India is concerned and and and kind of cultural links so they look to Australia, Japan, anybody really to to come in and become that third partner but in Australia and Japan has limited limited presence and US being the you know the superpower or the navy the the charm and the aura that it carries they don't have they don't interact that much with the u.s navy so it's actually very welcome to u.s presence in the indian ocean region has been mostly in the last couple of decades really have been in for for the middle east especially with diego garcia even if there is a base it has essentially been for the purpose

of middle east and its engagements in afghanistan indopaycom has a sharp divide with maldives and India, which means you've left out pretty much 70 percent of the Indian Ocean region west of Maldives. So you are not really engaging with the Indian Ocean region per se. And it's not just the military. I have seen this even in Tokyo with the foreign affairs departments, whether it's MEA or state, they tend to look at the countries of the Indian Ocean region through the continental desks, like it would be through the South Asia desk or the Africa desk or kind of, you know south central asia so you are looking at maritime countries with big maritime concerns and challenges but from a continental point of view and in that there those challenges get

diluted so if you actually look through most of the island nations in the indian ocean region they have adopted a new identity which is they now constantly they don't say we're south asian we're african nation they say we're an indian ocean nation because when you say you're an Indian Ocean nation, your ability or your chance or your opportunity to engage with other countries increases much more than by just saying South Asia or Africa or kind of Southeast Asia. So U.S. presence is actually going to be welcome because even port calls in the Western Indian Ocean, barring the exercises that go on through AFRICOM, is quite limited in terms of engagements in the region but i take blake's um comments in terms of the um in terms of kind of the

uh challenges and and and and and technical kind of challenges and problems in it i don't think it was a thought through probably announcement but i do see that there is a need for kind of a u.s a presence in the region in the sense you don't need more presence it's just you need to maybe redistribute the existing presence in the way that you engage beyond just India and maybe beyond just the Middle East. Thank you. I was not expecting you to bring up France there. So I'm tracking Reunion Island. Is there any other islands that France owns in that region? No. So they have Reunion Island and then they have islands on the southwest Indian Ocean, but then which falls into their uh from a management point of view it falls into the

under the pacific but france says if you look at france's indo-pacific strategy they basically say they have a million french residents in the indian ocean region france is also part of the indian ocean council which is the council of five islands which is your uh mauritius seychelles madagascar comoros and france and france is a part of it through reunion so that is france's you know has been the effort or kind of existence or foothold into the Indian Ocean region. And France is pretty big. In fact, France is a key partner for India. India's logistic exchange agreement with France has allowed India

to be able to deploy its PH-2 reunion and operate in the eastern coast of Africa. Until that, we didn't have an option. We didn't have any, because India doesn't have overseas bases. We don't have military facilities, so we have to work through partner facilities. And Diego Garcia is up in the air right now with all the complications. So if you have Andamans on the east and if you have Union on the west, it kind of takes care of access into both the Straits of Malacca and the Mozambique Channel. And if I can also just add, France also has territories, disputed territories in the Mozambique Channel, which is called the Scattered Islands. It's disputed between Madagascar, Comoros, and France.

Blake, did you have something? Go ahead. I did. So France is also involved in supporting the information fusion center that was stood up in Madagascar a few years ago. So that's another aspect of, you know, not necessarily projecting power, but supporting maritime domain awareness in the Indian Ocean. And, you know, this all ties back to, you know, these disparate Indo-Pacific strategies that everyone's been sort of racing to put out. And everyone sort of defines the region a little bit differently or has a different focus for what the Indo-Pacific means to them. Right. And so the Indian Ocean ends up, you know, it's either a highway kind of for what you're looking to achieve or it's a it's a primary theater for operations. It really just depends on where you sit, you know, what kind of pops out is important. But I absolutely agree with Darshana that our engagement has been very limited. And we need to probably de-emphasize a lot of what we do with the Middle East and emphasize those countries that are asking for support and asking for increased engagement across the Indian Ocean region. because from a very cynical point of view you know if it's not the U.S. and our allies doing it then it's going to be someone else and that's not going to be positive for us or anyone else in my

opinion. So I just want to add to what Blake said it's true you know if it's not U.S. or its partners it's somebody else doing it and that somebody else at this point happens to be China. I mean just to quickly kind of briefly to say China is the only country that has an embassy across all the six islands in the indian ocean region it's not india it's not it's not france it's not uk you know resident indian ocean powers the u.s has two embassies that commands the entire indian ocean region islands which is all six and you have one defense attache that covers four islands so you don't get there enough to know what is actually happening how much is going on china is the only one who has who's there and even in terms of training you know like officers training

going to kind of you know military education it's especially on the eastern coast of africa madagascar commerce it's all going to china i was in madagascar before the pandemic for my for my book and when you speak to them you do realize that that unclass interpretation as we all know every country interprets differently but when you have your training in a particular country you're also interpreting laws and treaties a particular way which did not necessarily be good for US and its partners or even for India or France or UK for anybody for that matter and when you have your smaller nations with votes at the UN opposing your idea or kind of your interpretation then you have you struggle right I mean India and US can figure out a way to operate in the Indian

Ocean region but if you fail to engage with the region itself then what really are you operating there for what is the end goal in there if the region itself is not welcoming so I think it has to go deeper into just having aircraft carriers there. And it has to happen in two phases. One is to have it bilaterally and at a regional level. And that regional level has to move beyond Maldives. Thank you. Blake, go ahead. As an anecdotal aside, I had a port visit in the Seychelles earlier this year, actually, before the pandemic. And our drivers could all point out the new PRC embassy that had been built in the Seychelles. And it was not a inconsequential building. It was compared to everything else

that's been built in the Seychelles in the last 20 years. I mean, the PRC's embassy is considerable. And also following those comments from Darshana, I just want to say if we do end up with a first fleet with Indian Ocean responsibilities, I just hope you know I'm going to advocate pretty strongly for you to be the pole lad to the fleet. So you can look for that in your mailbox thanks so on that note uh darshana your your first act is pull at it what would based on what you've described what would be your recommendations for setting the dividing lines for that fleet then i mean i think the reason that we are even talking about or when there's a discussion about an indian ocean fleet essentially was because of the dividing line right

because paycom ended with kind of india and maldives then you have centcom and then you have african so essentially indian ocean region falls under three combined commands and i don't know how much of it works and each region by the way has very different security challenges very different threat challenges very different cultural kind of an environment it's it's all quite different so i think for indian ocean region it has to be the indian ocean i think the lack is that the challenge has been that we haven't looked at the indian ocean region as one region especially after the after the cold war right you know it has been broken down and we and for a lot of countries it essentially even in japan when i asked about you know why is the indian ocean

important to you it's essentially because of trade to the middle east right it's a transit route and but then the problem is that instability in the indian ocean affects a lot of countries in the pacific you have very prominent powers you know bigger powers and smaller powers and indian ocean you have too many powers you have a lot of powers and that ranges across different uh kind of different levels and i think for indian ocean region it has to be from the coast of malacca to the eastern coast of africa and from kind of the persian gulf and to the southern indian ocean and and and that is what will i mean it's a big area it's the indian navy's area of responsibility but even for a country like india which is like you know an indian ocean resident country in

ocean resident player and where the entire indian ocean is its area of responsibility we barely go i mean our strengths and our capabilities in the western indian ocean is very limited so it is a massive area and that has to be worked in partnership but then in terms of dividing line i think there shouldn't be a dividing line in the indian ocean region it has to be looked at as one. Blake, any thoughts on like where you would set the boundaries between the fleets? Yeah, absolutely. And I think there's some value in kind of digging into the secretary's remarks well, because this has come up now publicly twice. And the first one was at the Naval Submarine League's annual symposium. You know, we talked about this hypothetical first fleet,

quote unquote, if not in Singapore, then, you know, an expeditionary capability, the, you know, talking about that, which was, which was not great staff work, I think. And then on a follow up during the Halifax International Security Forum, though, I was misquoted, which I don't think is really the case, having read the quote several times. But in that, Secretary Braithwaite actually says that he was talking about an expeditionary fleet in the Southwest Pacific with the ability to pivot into the Indian Ocean, which in some ways, I think makes more sense, but then it doesn't address the immediate issue of we are not treating the Indian Ocean as a cohesive area. You know, we're splitting it even further and we have this strange Southwest

Pacific pivot force. So we still don't get to this point where we have an effective presence in the Indian Ocean, I think. But I think Darshan is exactly right. You know, having the existing seams in the indian ocean region is not effective the the sixth fleet portion of that is not getting sufficient attention because most of the six fleets efforts are in europe uh the fifth fleet parts of it are not getting really any at all because the the major thrust there is inside inside the arabian gulf so then yeah you're dealing with now anything east of pakistan and and our and our experience is thin right because most of the seventh fleet is is spending their effort in in east asia so yeah i think a logical boundary is is including from

from the the uh the east coast of africa through to malacca but then uh the problems that i think that starts to create become fairly significant from a logistical standpoint and from a resource standpoint. So let's talk about the resource considerations and what are the resource considerations for creating a new fleet? You know, the U.S. recently stood up second fleet again back in Norfolk, Virginia, but a lot of that staff could be sourced from NATO partners. I don't anticipate the same level of staffing coming for a nominal first fleet. And the second fleet was only disestablished for, you know, what, eight years? And I'm not saying that it was easy to just turned the lights back on, and they were back in business. But there were people who still

remembered second fleet, you know, we did this before, creating an Indian Ocean fleet from the ground up. The first question, obviously, because it's a fleet, you know, what what ships do we envision putting in the Indian Ocean that aren't otherwise occupied right now, you know, you, you can't take them out of the seventh fleet. Because, as we discussed, we're barely getting seventh fleet ships into the indian ocean as is trying to get a combatant into the indian ocean to do to do much is is very difficult because we're already over to pass the issue of locating a headquarters finding the right place for that you know that that discussion is a closed doors discussion with allies and partners not a open discussion held you know in a in a conference

where it's going to be quoted and get back to those partners that we've just suggested based the fleet in their country um uh we have to talk about regional talent uh right now uh that regional talent that we would be looking for you know they're probably scattered across three different fleet staffs uh between uh seventh fleet sixth fleet and fifth fleet with some at uh at pacific fleet so uh if we also then want to kind of be prepared for a china angle you're talking about diluting the navy's china experience um taking them out of the seventh fleet and and spreading them also into uh into into this first fleet and then the idea of creating a whole staff is just a vast manpower suck from staffs that you know we're already pretty heavy on this staff side

do we really need to create more staffs to get at this problem or can we keep can we attack it with more effective use of operational assets and maybe some creative redrawing of some lines. Thanks. Darshana, the most contentious discussion that I've seen online has been about where First Fleet would be located. And Blake alluded to this just a second ago. So I'd like to walk through some of the suggestions to discuss the issues, whether positive or negative. And I'd like to start with Singapore. Sure. I was really surprised to hear Singapore as even kind of the first option. First of all, I think, as Blake said, this is a conversation between America and its allies and partners. It has to happen between them and not

coming, I think, coming from a public point of view. But as for research and discussion point of view, I mean, an Indian Ocean fleet, if there is an Indian Ocean fleet, it should be headquartered in the Indian Ocean region, right? I mean, you know, that's particularly given that the Indian ocean region is so big why would you not first think about a fleet in the indian ocean region and singapore has its i mean asean is it's a very important southeast asia is a very important area asean has its own challenges complications singapore has its you know has its own considerations uh i don't think so singapore is going to be you know get kind of get involved in the indian ocean part of the complications they have enough on their plate and and i don't know i i mean for me

point of view from for me it's on the it's it's on the other side of the malacca it's it's a great great great geographical location but it's not really in the notion region so i would say if there is a fleet it should be somewhere in the indian ocean region blake did you have anything to add on singapore you are there on the ground i don't know how it was received well i have some idea of how it was received there but you probably know a little bit more about it well so um if you read kind of between the lines from the announcement from singapore responding to the you know the hubbub that that arose after this announcement it's it's pretty terse right i don't think singapore was particularly impressed by this announcement i don't think that they felt consulted i think they

were probably unpleasantly surprised i assume that the embassy uh the u.s embassy had a really great day, the day after this announcement, I'm sure they got a pretty annoyed phone call or two or 10. See, you know, you don't put a strategic partner on the spot like this. You just don't, you don't do that. It was, it was not good staffing. It was just, you know, kind of freewheeling. And I think that damages a relationship. Luckily, you know, our partners here in Singapore, they're good friends they're understanding i think they've um you know there's enough invested in that relationship this is not going to derail it by any means but it's just not good uh partnership management um and as far as using it as a a fleet base you know i can see some upsides it would give

you you know if you were talking about it in the way that the second have second round of announcements when you would have kind of a location for a pivot force right you could have forces available in the South China Sea and at least slightly closer to the Southwest Pacific. And you could also get into the Indian Ocean from there. Because I mean, the Southeast Asia is also an area of, you know, it's an area of emphasis for the US Navy, but it is still difficult to get ships down there that are just very busy in East Asia. So yeah, I can see some logic there. And it might have even been a realistic option. You know, the Singaporeans have been very gracious, and they took in Commander Task Force 73, Commander Logistics

Western Pacific, after the US Navy was leaving the Philippines in the early 90s. That relationship progressed to the point where they agreed to have four rotationally deployed littoral combat ships in Singapore. We've never reached four, of course, but the fact that that agreement is there and is significant singapore provides an operational base for for p8s that's that's great so yeah maybe on some trajectory singapore would have been a realistic option but i think the way that this was executed and the way that this announcement was just kind of you know this trial balloon was sent up i think that's made the issue pretty radioactive for the near future i can't see singapore getting on board with that after they were kind of blindsided by it so well let me

Let me ask a purely infrastructural question. Is there infrastructure there to support a fleet in Singapore? It seems like a pretty limited area geographically as far as what you're going to have available for peer space. Yeah, I think there would be some peer space limitations. I mean, that would all have to be part of the subsequent agreement, you know, how much peer space is going to be allotted. Singapore supports a number of U.S. Navy port visits yearly. that is something that we do you know day in and day out but uh yeah if you wanted to have a significant number of ships and a lot more people here um you know we would have to be talking about support arrangements and and i don't know how much appetite there is in singapore for that

because singapore you know has staked their reputation on kind of being this honest broker right the u.s has ships that are rotationally deployed here they are not based here those those sailors on those ships don't live ashore they live on the ship and the people's liberation army navy does port visits here the russian navy does port visits here you know this is um this is not a u.s base by any means we you know we talk about it as a place not a base right so um and that's very very intentional on the singaporean side so this would this would have been i think a long-term goal that if it is still a goal is now further away than it was two weeks ago that's fair enough darshana and how about diego garcia interesting because diego garcia is in the

middle of a very complicated and very challenging and political political situation between uk us and mauritius you know because there's been the whole diego garcia you uh case at the un and where there's been ruling against uh london uh so there is some mauritius has really kind of stepped up its case at the international forums, at the international kind of community, at IORA, at kind of UN, to say that, look, you know, this was done wrong,

the courts have ruled in favor of us, and then it has to be corrected, basically, that it's a wrongdoing of the colonial era, and it has to be corrected. But at the same time, Mauritius has said over and over again that we do not seek to dismantle the U.S. base

or ask the U.S. to leave, but But but without sorting out this, without solving this issue of the whole sovereignty issue of the whole whatever is standing to suggest creating a new fleet based out of Diego Garcia, I think it's going to create a lot of problematic issues, not just for U.S.'s relationship with Mauritius or U.K.'s relationship with Mauritius, but also of U.S.'s relationship with Indian Ocean partners, because, you know, a lot of the countries like India have a colonial history. and politically it cannot take a stand which is in favor of something that is seen as a leftover of the colonial era it just politically it cannot and and i think there are multiple ways of as ways of handling the diego garcia issue in the sense that diego garcia is almost a thousand

miles away from mauritius so mauritius very well knows that it doesn't have the security it doesn't have the capacity to actually secure it from a security point of view but then it's really about economic gains you know opening the exclusive economic zone if not to the entire chagos archipelago just to a part of it um france is doing something similar in the in the west in the mozambique channel uh uh in that but also i'm not sure if diego garcia has the like the kind of the infrastructure and the logistics for for a uh kind of it absolutely i mean because diego garcia if you look at it it has developed a part of the island saving that the entire archipelago is empty it hasn't really expanded to it and i think there will be

need for more infrastructure perhaps to host a whole whole new fleet addition to whatever exists there right now and that would need clearing of land and that would mean clear again getting more space and i think that is going to be much more complicated and and i don't think so it will be seen in a positive light from other island nations who already kind of feared this uh you know a bigger power whether it's u.s whether it's china whether it's india coming in and getting on getting a port or turning any of the facilities into a military uh military facility and for u.s to set up a new fleet headquarter in diego garcia in the middle of a very contentious political um uh case i think it it just would be it would complicate indian ocean dynamics to a

great deal so blake i'm going to ask you about the last suggestion that i've seen online that's australia is that the most realistic suggestion to me it is uh and now again i i don't want to be counted in that team of like yeah well now blake herzinger was on uh on the simset podcast telling australia that they should host a u.s base of being guilty of exactly what uh you know we've already kind of put our foot in it a couple weeks ago um but i think it does offer some really interesting partnership options um the royal australian navy's fleet based west is in perth uh i think that uh with the right agreement in place you know might be an attractive operating location uh there might be a space available there or an agreement uh possible to create some space

or to expand a bit for a minimal staff you know i i would hate to see this uh this first fleet idea become a bloated staff with no operational capability i think that would be among the worst case options um so if it were to have a real headquarters element to make that streamlined make it effective uh you know as small as possible in my mind but i i think perth would be a great option you know it is right there it is in the region and it is you know hand in hand with an indo-pacific middle power ally that has been you know our uh one of our closest friends for 100 years you know that's i think the key in doing anything like this is consultation with our allies and partners and and not getting it too far ahead of where everyone else is on this idea um because

The worst thing I think we could do would be to just pull ahead with this idea and steamroller existing initiatives, existing plans, you know, trampling in the backyard of, you know, our allies in Australia, our partners in India, you know, countries that already have their own strategies for addressing the Indo-Pacific and particularly the Indian Ocean region. You know, we don't want to cannonball into the middle of that and tell everyone how to do business, you know, kind of this check feeding. first fleet is here you know we've got this swagger we're ready to show everyone how it's done you know the the best thing we could do is do this in partnership consult with our partners and allies and and work at the speed that everyone else is ready to work at and support the things that already exist support people that you know that live there um rather than try to necessarily impose our will on several existing strategies darshana you had something to add on that topic yeah I completely agree with Blake

I think it should not we shouldn't get blown away by this whole idea I mean it's great ideas always sometimes you know especially something new it always is very attractive but if US does in fact figure out the logistics of it and how to really be

effective have the resource and the capabilities and really an Indian Ocean strategy and not kind of a spin off of a specific strategy because it would need to understand the region i think better um australia definitely is is one of the most um attractive places especially in the eastern coast port but from a geographical point of view um again i'm not i'm not suggesting this i'm just saying from a geographical point of view and from indian ocean

dynamics uh point of view i think basing it in somewhere in europe would also make a lot of sense and i would i would say france or or germany with both of whom who have who has an indo-pacific strategy but france is actually a really big player in the indian ocean region with the right amount of kind of resources and engagements in the region and and i know u.s and france relationship at times especially in the 60s and 70s have been complicated especially in that region and and even now even if it's a long-standing um ally france and u.s have differences um in it but i think i think europe somewhere in europe actually perfect example in terms of geography would actually be reunion if you if you look at it from that point of view as an island

which would give me access both in the western indian ocean to the eastern it's easily reachable i've visited the uh base in reunion i've been to reunion and i think it would have the uh space for infrastructure to host it um i don't want to upset my french friends so i'm saying i'm not suggesting this is an idea i'm just completely saying from a geographical uh geographical point to be. I think Europe wouldn't be a bad idea to be considered. I mean, again, that depends on America's partnerships and its friends in the region and where it might be willing to host it. But I think a headquarter somewhere there would make a lot of geographical sense. Thank you. That suggestion was not what I was anticipating, and it's really interesting.

Blake, do you have any thoughts about reunion? I should caveat all this discussion by saying none of us are in any policymaking position to make this happen whatsoever. So, yeah, Blake. Yeah, I'm glad you added that caveat. I was I was about to. From a, from a strictly practical standpoint, I would lean away from that, I suppose, just like I would lean away from Diego Garcia. Not that they are not strategically advantageous places to put it. But thinking from a fleet headquarters standpoint, places that are not necessarily on a main logistics line or with a very, very regular air travel, places that are not as accessible as we might like. I think complicate matters, um, putting another fleet staff, putting a fleet staff in Diego Garcia, uh, actually gives me like, puts me in a cold sweat thinking of like the poor jag, uh, who has to deal with a fleet staff in Diego Garcia, um, where there's not anything for a fleet staff to do when they're not at work. I think people would start to go crazy.

Um, and then I think that's going to become problems, uh, for, for every other aspect of, of our presence there. And, you know, I like the idea of partnering with the French. I think they do have a lot of important equities there. But in terms of, you know, alliances and Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific kind of overviews, I really lean towards Australia. I think if it were something that were a positive, if it were a concept that were positively received, I think that show of support to Australia would be appropriate. I think it is it would be well received to kind of defer to their experience and their their central location. You know, it's their neighborhood. While I absolutely recognize that, you know, France does have a presence in the region. They do have a lot of history. They do deploy to the Indian Ocean region and to the South Pacific. You know, it's Australia's backyard. I don't think something like this would be based in India.

Obviously, I don't think that's how India would perceive their interest. It would not necessarily be beneficial to them or possibly receive. um but i think australia i think that's a good option if it were uh if we came to the right agreement obviously darshana final word on this before we move along to eric sayer's article yes just quickly just to say that i wanted to come in and just to say that i think australia is an excellent idea i was just offering another one in terms of from a geographical point of view but australia is i mean it is really well placed with one coast on the pacific and one in the Indian Ocean region, and they are actually taking new steps. They're building up the

Cocos Island, and I think that gives you really great vantage points. It was used, it was critical during the Second World War. And I think Australia truly would be a great, which would keep you enough in the region, but not in the middle of it, and give you all the access to it. So I just want to come and say that Australia is always a great idea, if Australia wants it. Thanks. So Blake, I'm going to turn now to Eric Sayers' 2018 article. Again, it was titled Time to Launch a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific. It was in War on the Rocks, and we've linked it in the show notes. Then this is where

your thread ended up, sort of. So can you describe Eric's pitch a little bit and why you think that this is a better alternative to the First Fleet proposal? Yeah, you bet. So I think the Combined Maritime Task Force idea, there are a lot of great positives there. So it is linked to something that NATO has built, or built in the 60s, a permanent multinational naval unit that operated during peacetime. So a number of surface ships attached to a squadron for months at a time among the nations that agreed to participate, right? And it was an outgrowth of NATO's commitment at sea to show multilateral commitment to maintaining a naval presence uh and bringing naval power to bear um so it was a permanent construct which is great

and it's a steady state effort so states can add they can take away um we share command and those navies work together at sea during peacetime building in our operability i think that's great um so obviously um the the indo-pacific is not um the waters of europe so there is no nato kind of pushing this idea so my biggest problem uh with the idea in 2018 was that i didn't think it was time i thought that the problem was in the title 2018 wasn't the time i don't think the political will or the capability was there um so creating this um this proposed task force in in the indo-pacific that had you know multiple nations participating um and and reaching out and inviting Vietnam and Singapore to participate and Australia and the United Kingdom and France in 2018, you weren't going to get there.

And I think still today, the idea is still a bit too broad for me. I think conceptually, yes, it's excellent to invite Vietnam and Singapore to something like that. But I don't think they would want to. I don't think they would perceive that as in their interest in balancing in the region. I don't, you know, I see that kind of as inviting them to, to put their neck in a noose, right? And I think that's how they would perceive it as well. They define their own national interests, and I don't think it would be defined in joining something that could very easily be construed as countering China. You know, regardless of the multilateral format, I don't think they would want to put themselves in that position. And again, that's just my thought. But in 2021, moving forward, we have a Royal Navy that is sending their new aircraft carrier into the Indo-Pacific. France will be stepping up deployments. I believe the Germans wanted to send a ship attached to the aircraft carrier, to the British carrier. I think that's excellent. So so a standing task force of some sort creates a structure for those ships to plug into. I think that's excellent. So I think the moment is ripe for that, with Europe pushing to be more active in the Indo-Pacific after many years away. So this in the original pitch, you know, is kind of the Swiss army knife group available for exercises, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief port calls.

But I think that's a bit broad and a bit undefined and probably too many things for this desperate theoretical task force to do. A lot of the theater security cooperation events in the region aren't necessarily open for business for a multilateral task force. They're bilateral events. Yes, there are a few multilateral events, but I don't know if they're multilateral to the point where they would want seven other nations, navies participating. These are usually two or three ship events and having a whole multinational task force show up might not be right. But, you know, you could detach task units from that task force to participate in these events. So I think that's great. And I don't think it would be attractive for most countries in Southeast Asia to join, as I mentioned. I think India might. I don't think the Quad should necessarily be the core of it, but it would be something that maybe the Quad could support. um and uh i i'll add that i don't know if we're capitalizing the whole quad as if it's an acronym that no one knows what the four letters stand for uh or if it's you know if we're just reviewing referring to it with a capital q but um you know the quad much ink has been spilled obviously

um far more than uh than we could use to describe its outputs but the fact that it exists you know might give us um something that could contribute to something like this but i think that one of the big sensitivities if you do want to create this standing multinational task force is that that messaging is right um you know like i said uh most country is i know or balancing between the united states and china uh they're not going to be keen to join that because they're going to be punished for doing so um portraying the group as something like CTF 151, like a counter-piracy or counter-terrorism task force, that's also not going to be well-received, I think, by the countries in the region, because that implies

that, you know, there's a problem at sea that they are not capable of dealing with. And I don't think that's the case. You know, you'll hear that in a number of events here or groups and conferences, you know, maybe shipping companies will suggest, well, why don't they create a multinational task force like they did in off the horn of africa and that you know frankly that's insulting to countries that are capable at varying levels but they are capable of policing their own uh maritime zones they don't want a multinational task force here running a counter piracy operation you know that's not that's not a win here that no one wants that um and it's offensive so that

messaging needs to be very very tight if you do want to create something like this exactly what does it exist to do um you know why is it here what are the ships doing you know and and that also is kind of the selling point for getting people to contribute ships like is it does it have a mission or are they just kind of sailing around is it this perpetual group sail and we all just attack ships when we feel like it and they sail around and they do port visits you know Eric uh in his article notes you know yeah it could do a group sail out to RIMPAC you know every other year and I think that's awesome that's absolutely true um you know having a multinational task force steaming from the Indo-Pacific over to RIMPAC that's excellent

it's a great opportunity and we do try to lash up ships that are going out to RIMPAC so they go out together and they can practice things and they can do exercises and they can communicate it's excellent um but like the way that this first fleet thing has gone thus far is exactly the opposite of the kind of messaging that you would want if you wanted to set up a task force like this you know it's it's quiet it is coordinated and when you bring it out into the light it is a finished product people have signed on no one is surprised and and no one's Cuddle Guard. Thanks. Darshana, I'm going to modify our next question a little bit here because Blake mentioned the standing near to maritime groups as a model for the task force. What do

you think of the idea of an organizing entity for that task force? Do you see it as more of a coalition of the willing or are we talking about like the quad countries, Australia, Japan, the U.S. in india um i think blake really hit the right uh right points uh with the issues uh in something like this especially for the indian ocean region as you uh as you outlined there is no one kind of you know we don't the indian ocean region doesn't really have um a regional structure the way southeast asia has or even the pacific as or or or kind of a nato kind of a standing you have you have the indian ocean um uh you have iora indian ocean room association but that includes a lot of countries that includes everybody kind of you know from you have iran you have

you know india you have uh you have australia you have so it's a big big uh big organization then you have the indian ocean commission uh commission which is the five islands in the western indian ocean that i uh mentioned before uh there are exercises that happens in terms of India hosts the IONS, which is Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. But there is no really kind of, you know, there's no sailing together across the Indian Ocean. It's more of a discussion, more of an interaction. There's also Milan, which is what India hosts in Andamans

this time for Southeast Asian countries. But I think talking about a multinational task force doing things together in the Indian Ocean region is like taking a huge leap without even creating the foundation uh i think we first need to really have the foundations everyone said that the pacific strategy like the quad has its in the pacific strategy but everyone has different strategies for pacific and indian ocean within that and everyone has different priority areas everyone has different capabilities everyone has different capacities and resources and challenges so do we even agree on how we view the indian

ocean region what is the geographical definition of the indian ocean what are the main priorities who are the key players who are the new players what are the challenges i don't think so we've had even conversations around it to to even jump to a point where we are sailing together sailing together to what end what are we really trying to oppose or challenge or or even create the need for i think i think there needs to be more of an understanding of the indian ocean region And that has to come by engaging with the Indian Ocean region, littorals, and the island nations. And it can't be just U.S., India, France, Australia,

the middle powers who have its own complicated histories with each other, with the region. It also has to have, you know, conversations with the countries, in smaller countries in the region. I actually had a piece about 12 days before the second kind of announcement. I had a piece, which is right now in kind of editing and review process, where I suggested an Indian Ocean deployment by the U.S. I took, I think, multiple steps backward from kind of a fleet, a base or a task force. And I said that, you know, create a deployment for Indian Ocean region where you are not transiting the Indian Ocean to get from A to B.

But you are going into the region to interact with the countries that you haven't made port calls in years and decades, actually. Go to the countries, make port calls to say that we are interested. Engage with their naval forces, their whatever maritime forces they have. All have different levels. See what the opportunities are. See what the challenges are. Are there convergences? Are there divergences? pick is my sense is that you were going to have a huge perspective gap in the sense that a lot of the primary concerns for these islands and littorals are non-traditional security issues and for the u.s navy it's not necessarily that so some of the things that could be done by bringing

in the coast guard uh something like what u.s does in the pacific if you really really talk about it some would be to kind of you know show up and show your flag to be present there i don't i i'm i'm told that and you know a coast guard deployment in the indian ocean hasn't been seen in like decades like you know i asked somebody in maldives is like in my time lifetime i haven't seen one right so you haven't had interactions i think interacting as a ship coming into the port as opposed to a dod delegation going to maldives or to kinds of say mauritius to talk about security issues are very different because it's you know having a chance to talk about or interact the interaction is very important so i thought i would at least for that i'm suggesting an indian ocean

deployment which is to kind of go into the region not just the bigger countries you have to of course interact with india and uk and france and all of that but also the littorals and the smaller nations to first show that now we are interested in this as a region and not just uh transit routes so here we are to understand what you need and what we can offer blake she's put up the uh coast guard bat signal for you. So now is your chance. Jump in. That is something near and dear to my heart. But I think Darshan is right on the money. So we do, as Darshan just mentioned, the Pacific Partnership mission in the Pacific Ocean. And that actually was an uh, an outspring of our response to the 2004 boxing day tsunami. Um, you know, a, a very large

force, uh, collected, sailed around, provided humanitarian assistance, um, and, and did those key pieces of, of diplomacy that really only navies can do just like, uh, just like we've already discussed, you know, seeing, uh, a ship flying the American flag pulling into port is, is a is a good thing you know it's it's an opportunity that you can only take advantage of if you put your navy where it should be at sea and uh visiting friends and and visiting new friends you know cementing partnerships so i think something along that line you know an annual military exercise um like pacific partnership i think that's that's great um and that actually gives us a great model because we do, as the U.S., we share command of that with our partners and

allies. It's multinational and we sail around and we do good. You know, we take doctors from place to place. We bring the seabees, we build things, we conduct naval diplomacy the way that it's supposed to be done. So a properly resourced, you know, Indian Ocean partnership mission, I think is, is a great idea. Getting the Coast Guard involved, you know, often Coast Guard that far from US borders gets criticized, right? In the South Pacific, I counter that with the fact that we have a number of actual national interests there and exclusive economic zones that we are in fact responsible for. And, but even in the Indian Ocean region, you know, you only have to look as far as the Arabian Gulf to find the US Coast Guard.

you know, the U.S. Coast Guard's been there in Bahrain since 2002. So this is not anything that's new. It just requires a bit of new thinking about an old problem and how to reposition ourselves to address the problems of today rather than, you know, a two decades old war. And I think the Coast Guard is an excellent instrument to use for that because they are an organization that understand the issues that so many Indian Ocean countries face, you know, they face issues of illegal migration, they face issues of narcotics trafficking, illegal fishing, littoral communities that are threatened, exercising effective law enforcement. And these are all things that, you know, and it doesn't even pain me to say that the Coast Guard is just so much

better at than the Navy. You know, the Navy isn't trained to do it, we're not authorized to do it, And the Coast Guard is and they do such an excellent job, but they are under resourced, you know, as the Coast Guard's commandant has testified multiple times. You know, we are not even funding them sufficiently to do their job today, let alone adding the Indian Ocean region as an additional responsibility. So, you know, talking about that with any without any commensurate lift in their funding bottom line is going to be unfortunately legless. But the Coast Guard, and I hope this is an emphasis in the upcoming Biden administration, increasing the Coast Guard's funding to do what we ask them to do, and to honestly take on some new missions, or at least doing old missions in new places, because they are such a great organization. And we can all benefit from their involvement here. Darshana, a final thought from you on that? yeah sure i absolutely agree with everything blake said and i think uh i i think on the question of you know u.s coast guard in the indian ocean region what if the region wants it what if the

region welcomes it right because if you look at the islands themselves most of them don't have a navy they have a coast guard which are tasked with both kind of sovereign defense as well as law enforcement so the main issues they they don't they don't deal with the issues of invasion or war fighting as much as they deal with illegal fishing and smuggling and drug trafficking and these are real issues of responding to disaster and cyclones right like hurricanes and cyclones they don't even they need training in that that part and i think the coast guard the u.s coast guard has done a phenomenal job in the pacific and i think there are some lessons that can be borrowed for the indian ocean region because from a geography from a maritime point of view the

challenges are same the politics might be different but the challenges from a maritime as the domain is pretty similar in terms of the non-traditional security issues. And I think the Coast Guard will also be less controversial than a full-blown, you know, sailing of countries coming in with their navies, right? Because Coast Guard is more about law enforcement. It's about, it's looked at more benign than the Navy. And of course, the U.S. Navy has to be present in the Indian Ocean region. That's not to negate it.

But I think if you're talking about practical collaboration, If you're talking about things providing to the region that they're interested in, I think the Coast Guard has a lot to play in that as the U.S. kind of fend its own understanding and also presence in the region through its middle power partners, which is Australia, India, kind of France and UK. But I think there's a whole lot to be played by the Coast Guard in it. Thank you. I'm pleasantly surprised that this is where we ended up because I did not anticipate this as we set out to do this podcast today. Unfortunately, that's all the time that we have for today. I'm going to add the caveat one more time. None of us are policy or decision makers on this. So we're not swaying any opinions on here.

Our opinions are our own and not representative of any of our respective institutions. But thank you both again for joining us. Blake, where can we find you online and what are you working on next? So I am active, probably overly so, on Twitter at B.D. Herzinger. I recently published the piece that you mentioned in Foreign Policy regarding Chinese illegal fishing and how the incoming Biden administration might deal with that issue going forward. As far as what's next, I'm actually thrilled to be co-authoring a maritime security primer

with John Bradford, Alessio Pappalano, and with Jonathan Odom. So three names that I've looked up to my whole career working in this field. So I am basically starstruck and excited to be working on that project. Now, those are big hitters, and I look forward to reading that. Darshana, where can we find you online and what's your next project uh thanks um well i'm i'm on twitter i just don't don't put out so much on twitter i i i actually like to read what everyone else is saying and what's going on i think it's a great way to kind of listen to different ideas and uh and and opinions i'm on twitter on on darshana barua uh and uh my email is there on my carnegie uh website uh and um in terms of work i'm i'm i'm waiting to for this piece that i wrote on the u.s maritime

forces in the indian ocean uh to come up hopefully uh sometime in the next couple of weeks i'm also doing another paper for a australian national university project on the indian ocean region but my priority and the biggest task is writing this book on the indian ocean region and it has been challenging um but uh yeah i've been writing on this and the dynamics of the indian ocean region in the 21st century and how islands would shape great power competition in the region. That's

excellent. I'll look forward to reading that as well. Thank you both for joining us. For our listeners, thank you for tuning in. We'll see you next time. Sea Control is edited and produced by King of Ingersoll, Ed Salo, and William McQuiston. © BF-WATCH TV 2021 All mine, believe me, I'll be

When I die, believe me, I'll be All mine, believe me, I'll be Put it on the ship, oh no