Sea Control - Sea Control 218 - Coastal Insecurity, Ansar al-Sunnah & Women in Maritime Security with Kelly Moss & Lexie Van Buskirk

Episode Date: December 20, 2020

Links:1. “Crippled Capacity: How Weak Maritime Enforcement Emboldened Ansar Al-Sunna,” by Kelly Moss, CIMSEC, October 2, 2020.2. “A Hop, Skip and A Jump: Ansar Al-Sunna’s Island-Hopping” by Kelly Moss, Stable Seas, October 13, 2020.3. “Soft Targets & Black Markets: Terrorist Activities in the Maritime Domain,” by Meghan Curran, Stable Seas, May 23, 2019.4. “Violence at Sea: How Terrorists, Insurgents and Other Extremists Exploit the Maritime Domain,” by Meghan Curran, Christopher Faulkner, Curtis Bell, Tyler Lycan, Michael Van Ginkel and Jay Benson, August 11, 2020.5. “Charting a New Course: Women, Peace and Security, and the Maritime Domain,” by Lexie Van Buskirk, Sahana Dharmapuri, Pamela Tansey, Our Secure Future, August 12, 2020. 

Hey folks, Jared here. Today we've got Walker Mills on the mic and he's speaking with Kelly Moss and Lexi Van Buskirk from Stable Seas about Ansar Alsuna's activities in Mozambique, the Mozambican response, coastal insecurity, and finally they'll finish with a discussion on the importance of women in maritime security and conflict resolution. As always, we want to advertise and strongly recommend our friends in the SimSec Podcast Network and our second podcast feed, The Bilge Pumps. You can find Alex, Drack, Jamie, and a pile of empty iron brew bottles on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, and wherever else you download your podcasts. It's a more low-key, slightly less serious approach to current events in the maritime domain and naval history. Check them out wherever you download your podcasts. Finally, from Sea Control to Bilge Pumps to Project Trident, 2020 has been a banner year for SimSec. We need your help to carry that momentum supporting our Right Fight Win holiday donation campaign via direct donations on our website or by making SimSec your preferred non-profit on Amazon Smile

so you can support us while you shop. With that, I'll turn it over to Kimber's men. Aloha, shipmates, and welcome back aboard Sea Control. This week, we're tackling the Cod Wars, that mid-20th century showdown between the mighty Royal Navy and some of the Icelandic cod fishermen. So joining me today are Walker Mills, author of The Cod Wars and Today, Lessons from an Almos War. Walker's article appeared on SimSec as part of the recently concluded Ocean Governance

Week. You can find it at simsec.org or at the link in our show notes. Walker, thank you for joining us. Would you mind introducing yourself to our listeners and telling us a bit about your background? welcome back aboard the sea control podcast the center for international maritime security i'm your host today walker mills this week we're talking to kelly moss and lexi van buskirk from stable seas about some of their recent work on maritime insecurity in africa and women in

maritime security lexi can you please introduce yourself to our listeners sure thing thanks for having us um as walker said i'm lexi van buskirk and i'm a project manager with the stable seas team. And in my role, I manage StableSea's research and engagement with stakeholders working within the U.S. counterterrorism community to identify and address the maritime dimensions of terrorist activities around the world. I'm one of the newest members of our team, having just joined in July. And before that, for three years, I was with another One Earth Future department called Our Secure Future, which works to strengthen the women, peace, and security agenda and community of practice. Prior to my career with OEF, I worked as a

researcher for Wikistrat and at the Hudson Institute Center for Political Military Analysis, where I analyzed hard security issues. And it's been a hot minute now, but I also received my master's degree from the Department of War Studies at King's College London. Awesome. Thank you for joining us. Kelly, same to you. Can you introduce yourself to our listeners? Happy to. So I am Kelly Moss, and I am an African maritime security researcher at Stable Seas, where I cover maritime terrorism and general criminality across the African continent. I'm also a relatively new team member, having started in April, but my research expertise has really centered for a long time on terrorism and political violence, with a specific focus on

sub-Saharan Africa. Prior to OEF, I worked at three U.S. federal agencies, including the Department of Transportation and the Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs, doing critical infrastructure resiliency and counterterrorism in Central Africa. I also recently just graduated with my master's degree in security studies from Georgetown earlier this year. So I have to give a Hoya Saxa there. Awesome. We're super excited to have you guys on a podcast. Let's get started. Lexi, in your role at Stable Seas, can you kind of introduce our listeners to what the types of work that you all are doing over there with Stable Seas and what are kind of the goals of some of these projects? Absolutely, yeah. Stable Seas is a program of the Colorado-based One Earth

Future Foundation, which is a non-profit organization that incubates programs designed to undermine the root causes of conflict. Under that umbrella, Stable Seas' mission is to work with militaries, governments, and other partners around the world to eliminate the maritime activities that both finance and facilitate organized political violence. Our work focuses on how activities at sea, such as piracy and armed robbery, trafficking and smuggling in persons, illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing, and illicit trades in weapons, drugs, and other contraband are mutually reinforcing and perpetuate terrorism on land. We are lucky to engage with partners around the world in the Caribbean, West and East Africa, South and Southeast Asia,

and right here in the U.S. to help inform and tailor our research to each specific context in which we work. We frequently host workshops on regional maritime security issues in conjunction with our partner organizations. We publish reports and policy briefs based on these conversations and we highlight key takeaways and best practices and make actionable recommendations for maritime security decision makers and practitioners alike. Most recently, we just updated our annual Maritime Security Index, which measures and maps nine issues which are central to achieving sustainable maritime security and good maritime governance. This year, we expanded the index to include Australia, which brings our grand country total up to 71 countries across Africa, the Middle

East, and the Indo-Pacific. Ultimately, we seek to shed light on the interconnected nature of maritime security challenges around the world and provide potential areas of policy prioritization which might help stakeholders to more effectively address those challenges moving forward. I think some of our listeners and definitely myself are familiar with some of the reports that you've been putting out and some of the events that you all have been hosting. So it's really great stuff. And we'll make sure that there's some links to those resources when we post the podcast online.

Kelly, is there anything that you'd want to add to that? Lexi, you gave a great summary. So nothing to add on my end. Okay, then we'll get right into the other question. So, Kelly, you've written in your recent SIMSEC piece about, and I may be mispronouncing this, Ansar al-Suna, a terrorist group operating out of Mozambique. So can you give us a little bit of background on the group and what kind of stuff they're doing? Yes. So Ansar al-Suna, which is also known by the acronym ASWJ, formed as a religious sect around 2007. but the group really took form in 2015 and then carried out its first attack in October 2017,

two years later. Again, security forces in the town of Mozambique, which is located in Mozambique's northernmost province and the insurgency's epicenter, Cabo Delgado. So since then, Ansar al-Suna has significantly escalated in terms of its capabilities and operational tempo, both on land and at sea. And this really became abundantly clear in August 2020, So earlier this year, after Ansar al-Suna attacked Mosemboa de Praia again, and actually successfully gained control over the town this time, which, as we speak, they're continuing to occupy. Another concerning escalation has been Ansar al-Suna's expansion into southern Tanzania,

particularly in the past month, actually, resulting in multiple attacks along the Mozambique-Tanzania border in the Mtuara region. Now, these attacks, coupled with the insurgencies, strategic blockade of roads and other transportation corridors in northern Mozambique has had major impacts on civilians and created a really dire humanitarian crisis in Cabo Delgado. And so current estimates suggest that more than 330,000 individuals have been internally displaced, which is a staggering 2,000 percent increase within the past two years. In addition to that, there have been more than a thousand civilian casualties and food insecurity has worsened to what the Famine Early Warning Systems Network actually calls crisis level food security. And unfortunately, based on what we're seeing right now, the situation is really unlikely to improve in the near term. And just the last thing that I'll say is about the group's strategic goal and origin. So Ansar al-Suna has made pretty clear that its primary aim is the establishment of an Islamic state governed by Sharia law.

Now, this goal is obviously aligned with the Islamic state, which has resulted in the group becoming an affiliate of the Islamic state's Central Africa province known as ISCAP, which also encompasses the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, you know, it's important to make the distinction that Ansar Alsuna really has local roots owing in part to socioeconomic and political grievances that stem from the emerging liquefied natural gas industry, as well as perceived in actual political and economic marginalization against and by the state. So particularly among youths, among a lot of other things. So while there is an international dimension at its root, Ansar Alsuna is fundamentally a Mozambican insurgency.

So that's my overview of it. Thank you for that. So I just want to want to clarify. So we're saying that this group recently is now holding territory ashore. They're transnational and they're affiliated with the regional Islamic State organization. Yes, yes. So they've held Mousombo to prize since August successfully, despite some government counteroffensive to take it back. Yes, we do have expanding attacks again into Tanzania. So they are transnational at this point. And yes, there are affiliations with the Islamic State and reports that have been emerging

and that have been there about foreign fighters that are involved in the group from a variety of states in Central Africa. So it's a concerning situation, to say the least. Certainly. And I was going to ask you next, why do you think that this is particularly deserving of our attention as a threat to maritime security? But I think you've pretty clearly made your case for why it is. So I would ask you a little bit more personally, what got you or perhaps what got Stable Seas interested in Ansar al-Suna specifically? Yeah. And I actually, I can, I can chat more about the specific maritime security threat as well. But so the first time that I actually heard of Ansar al-Suna was actually after I started at Stable Seas in April. And I was asked to prepare an internal report about the group's current maritime capabilities to inform our Violence at Sea publication, which is out now

and looks at how violent non-state actors exploit the sea. And so that was right around the time that the group really picked up their attacks on islands in Northern Mozambique and their use of the sea more broadly, which prompted myself and then our team at Stable Seas to really start paying closer attention to this group. So that was my, I guess, introduction to the group. But in terms of maritime security, I actually have some more I want to say about this, and I'll break it down into current and potential future threats. So as it stands, Ansar al-Suna has become incredibly adept in the maritime domain and actively uses the sea for both operational and financial purposes. So operationally, the group uses ships to move fighters and supplies, transport new recruits, and then to carry out attacks on islands in the Carimbas Archipelago, which is right off the coast of northern Mozambique.

And so this grants them assets, food for tactical support, among other things. The insurgents have also attacked port infrastructure in Moçambó-Depralla, most notably, again, in that August attack that I've referenced a couple times earlier this year. And then financially, while Antaresuna hasn't fully tapped into illicit trades in the region that we know of, they do likely have control over at least some coastal landing sites, which allows them to potentially levy taxes on illicit goods. So the use of the sea is actively contributing to their sustainability and success on land. And it's also endangering fleeing civilians whose only route at this point to safety, given the road blockades that I mentioned earlier, is by sea to the provincial capital city of Pemba, which and other coastal towns located further south in Cabo Delgado. So that's the current threat we're facing. In future threats that really concern me, there's three things in particular, scenarios that I refer to, that could pose a significant problem if Ansar al-Suna is able to actually consolidate their control over coastal areas in northern Mozambique. So the first scenario is Anterosuna becomes able to tap into the numerous illicit trades that are operating in the region and liaise with criminal groups. And so this could really grant them financial support.

And in a worst case scenario, you know, intelligence on shit movements, potentially opening the door for piracy and armed robbery. And so these potential funding streams are definitely something that we need to be paying attention to and tracking, given the diversity of illicit trades that are available to the group. including things like rubies and heroin along the southern route in east africa now the second scenario it kind of piggybacks off the first and what i was saying but the group could potentially begin attacking commercial vessels for a myriad of reasons however this really depends on their ability to attack vessels number one as well as several external factors such as the availability of shipping traffic moving through the area and then the third scenario that concerns me is that answer, Alsuna could potentially, you know, leverage the sea to carry out attacks in southern

Tanzania. And so this raises concerns then about hostage shaking and the kidnapping of foreign nationals, especially given the close geographic proximity of these two countries. And so with all that being said, now these scenarios are by no means inevitable, but their potential is what really concerns me, given current developments on the ground. It seems like there's really several different ways this could unfold, and none of them look particularly good. And I want to follow up on something specific that was in the Stable Seas report. You all gave Mozambique a maritime security index of 31. Do you think you could explain what that number means and kind of how that scale works? Yes. So that number refers to Mozambique's maritime enforcement capacity,

which is essentially a state's ability to effectively patrol and then control its territorial waters. So states with effective maritime enforcement capacity can disrupt illicit trades and trafficking routes that occur by sea, respond in real time to attacks at sea, and then also enforce maritime related legislation. And so what this means is that Mozambique largely lacks these capabilities in part due to an underdeveloped Navy. So recent estimates put personnel around 200 individuals, give or take, as well as a lack of serviceable assets and also available fuel. It's also notable to mention that in the August attack, one of Mozambique's interceptor vessels was actually sunk by an RPG, further straining these limited capabilities.

But so the big picture here is that this diminished maritime enforcement capacity has physically constrained the Mozambican government's ability to respond and deter to answer Alsuna's use of the sea, which is one of the main reasons that the group has increasingly turned to this domain for freedom of movement and operational support. Okay, so it's really creating an opportunity for the group because the maritime enforcement capability in Mozambique is not very much, I guess, even to the point that the group seems like it's almost outgunning some of the Mozambican forces. Yeah, absolutely. I mean, answer also at this point, they can function with almost impunity at sea. And so it incentivizes them to turn to this domain. I mean, it's strategic

in that sense, very strategic. Lexi, back to you. Could you give our listeners a little bit more of a zoomed out view of maritime security issues in Africa? I know Stable Seas has other projects that they're working on and issues that they're paying special attention to beyond Mozambique and East Africa? Yeah, so, you know, from a 30,000-foot view, the threats facing African littoral states vary quite widely across the continent. So, for example, in West Africa, we're now seeing a higher number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea, whereas in the East, piracy has been less common off the Horn of Africa ever since its peak in the early 2010s, although of course Somalia's reputation for piracy still persists today. In the north,

perhaps the biggest challenge is the dangerous and even deadly business of maritime mixed migration, while southern port cities like Durban and Kaun are known as major hubs in global black markets for drugs, wildlife products, and other contraband. To address this hodgepodge of challenges, there are several important regional security architectures which warrant a shout out here, I think, including the Yaoundé Code of Conduct in the Gulf of Guinea and the Djibouti Code of Conduct in the Western Indian Ocean, among others. In many cases, these frameworks either already do or can be adjusted in the future to provide a really fantastic starting point from which to coordinate and deploy effective responses to maritime threats, including insurgencies like

the one that we're now seeing with Ansar al-Suda. In terms of Mozambique's maritime security scores more broadly in the data 2020 Maritime Security Index, which should be live by the time this podcast comes out, can provide some really interesting insights into the conditions which have allowed this deadly insurgency to take root and really flourish over the past several months. Mozambique has the longest coastline in East Africa, and it's responsible for securing the enormous EEZ that comes with that. And as Kelly just mentioned, this can be really problematic then when maritime enforcement capacity is low as it is in Mozambique. However, the country's scores overall aren't terrible. In fact, the country ranks above average on issues such as

international cooperation, the strength of its blue economy largely due to its LNG, and the health of its fisheries as well. However, there are a few other issue areas where Mozambique didn't quite score so well in the 2020 index. For example, Mozambique received a score of just 36 out of 100 for coastal welfare, which measures the well-being of people living in coastal areas based on their economic as well as their physical security. Here, Mozambique's score is just a little bit over half of what the regional average is when it's compared with states parties to the Djibouti Code of Conduct, states in East Africa, and states as a part of the African Union. Mozambique scored even more poorly in illicit trades, receiving just 25 points out of 100, largely due to the

prevalence of cannabis, illicit opiates, and synthetic drugs which pass through the nation's waters. Again, this score is actually lower than half of what the regional averages are for Djibouti Code of Conduct states, East African states, and AU states. These two factors, high coastal insecurity and frequent illicit trades, indicate that the security environment along Mozambique's coast was already very unstable prior to the beginning of Ansar's deadly attacks. And this, especially when combined with Mozambique's really low maritime enforcement capacity, have basically created the perfect conditions for ANZAR to operate with relative impunity at sea. If I can kind of follow up on that, it seems like what you're saying is that there are these

underlying larger picture security issues and even economic issues that are really contributing to the maritime insecurity. And it's not just a lack of enforcement because the Mozambican government actually seem to have done kind of at average or above average in the region for their maritime enforcement capacity. Absolutely, yeah. I mean, I think it's really fascinating to, part of the reason that we developed the index to be the way that it is, is that it provides really clear information and a way to compare these various interconnected and mutually reinforcing maritime security dimensions to see where are the areas where we can improve, which specific pieces of this puzzle are pushing on other pieces of the puzzle and help to better

understand the security environment to assist in decreasing those threats moving forward. So just the fact that Mozambique's international cooperation score is high doesn't necessarily mean that the government is either capable or willing to enforce the agreements to which it is a party. And we see that with their maritime enforcement capacity being so low, we don't necessarily know whether the low maritime enforcement capacity is reinforcing coastal insecurity and illicit trades or vice versa. My guess is that it would be sort of an all-encompassing yes and situation where one is reinforcing the other and vice versa. So Kelly, back to you. So you said something specific in your essay that I'll quote here

for SimSec. And again, we'll post a link to that in the show notes for our listeners. you said that while acquiring assets is the easiest way to improve the operational dimension of maritime enforcement capacity, this is not feasible for certain states. So then what do you think, if you could make some specific recommendations for both Mozambique and perhaps the international community, if they're also involved here, for how to improve the maritime enforcement capacity in Mozambique? Or even is that the right approach? Or should some of these other underlying factors that Lexi is talking about be the best place to attack this issue. Yeah, I'm really glad you brought this up because procuring assets just really isn't a fix-all

solution. And even if you can get more assets, there are still impediments to their effective use, like the financial cost of keeping these boats serviceable and then training individuals to use them. But in resource-constrained states like Mozambique and others, I do think that actions can still be taken to boost maritime enforcement capacity. And I think they're important because, like she said, this is a yes and situation. So we can't just treat something at the expense of another. These have to be done in tandem. And I think that's really important. But so specific recommendations like you asked for, some things I can think of would be, you know, training land-based forces in amphibious warfare and basic port operations, leveraging intelligent

surveillance and reconnaissance to better understand these violent non-state actors, track their movements, and then actually disrupt their use of the sea before they ever leave the land, that is critical. And then potentially providing technical training to armed forces on available and serviceable assets to ensure that they actually stay functional. And so these actions don't require, you know, an increased number of assets, but instead they leverage existing structures and people within a state to strengthen maritime enforcement capacity domestically. I totally agree that I think often in security cooperation, it's as important to have serviceable assets as it is to have the assets themselves. But I want to, something you said,

you said that one of the focuses could be training land-based forces in amphibious warfare. So as a Marine, I got to ask a little more, what do you mean exactly by that? Yeah, so I'll just use an example from Mozambique. So the August attack that I continuously refer to Mosamboa de Praia was actually amphibious. So some fighters did come by sea in multiple boats and others came by land. Now the Mozambican military in a sense was not adequately prepared to address the amphibious aspect of this attack. And that's not where the Navy is stationed in the first place. So enhanced training in the sense to traditionally land-based counterinsurgency forces like we're seeing in Mozambique, I think could provide a benefit when countering groups like

Ansar Alsuna, who adeptly take advantage of the sea. So I think it would essentially be a benefit to the Mozambican government and other states that are constrained in this capacity to leverage these personnel, so that if a situation arises where groups, you know, attack, actually physically attack by sea, then they would be able to have some, you know, steps as to what to do in that scenario, instead of depending on perhaps a Navy that isn't necessarily fully staffed in terms of personnel or well-equipped in that sense. I think that makes a lot of sense, kind of a focus on training, almost a coastal defense, you could call it, or amphibious defense, or kind of giving the understanding of the

threats that they're going to face from the sea. And so I want to follow up. do you think there's a role that external actors might play in the region or either NGOs or United Nations or other states in the region or outside the region in kind of supporting the Mozambican government in this environment? Yeah, this is a difficult question, but Ansar Alsuna needs a Mozambican-driven solution. However, given the group's growing capabilities and geographic expansion, regional and international coordination is and support is going to be necessary at this point to support Mozambique. So yes, I think a coordinated

maritime response is viable in the sense and could really help deter an expansion of attacks up the coast of East Africa, could also potentially dissuade attacks on islands in the Carimbas archipelago. And it could also identify and potentially disrupt any funding streams that may be occurring via the sea. However, you know, just to be clear, though, any maritime response, whether it be bilateral or multilateral, is going to be supplementary, not an alternative to ongoing land-based counterterrorism operations against the group. And we just have to be very frank about that. That's just the reality. But so in terms of realistic actions that external actors could provide, two buckets come to mind just for me personally. So first, I think

external actors could really provide those necessary intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that I mentioned earlier through things like shipboard and UAVs and geospatial analysis, which would give more information on Ansar al-Sunnah and actually allow for the better placement of troops and other counterterrorism forces on land. The second thing is external support could really facilitate increased information sharing between domestic, regional, and international actors. So the Regional Maritime Infusion Center in Madagascar and other capacity building assistant programs in the region, including some affiliated with the European Union, like you mentioned, could be leveraged in this sense. Operation Copper,

a South African counter piracy mission that has been patrolling the Mozambican channel since 2010 is another viable maritime response, depending on Mozambique's willingness and the operations mandate. I'd have to see, you know, we'd have to see if the memorandum of understanding covers maritime terrorism or not. But depending on that, it's definitely a potential But again, in order for any counterinsurgency efforts, specifically those in the maritime domain, to be effective and sustainable, these actions need to be done in partnership with Mozambique. understanding that that like you're saying obviously this has to be a Mozambican and driven and and backed solution are you optimistic that outside agencies would would be willing to support or increase their support in terms of things like maritime domain awareness ISR satellite imagery and

and unmanned aerial surveillance are you optimistic that that's in the offing or how do you see this going moving forward? So I am optimistic. I'm very optimistic, actually. There, you know, regional organizations, including SADC and even international entities have voiced their, you know, willingness to support Mozambique in numerous ways. And I think that, again, some of the international maritime-focused assistant programs that are already happening, including, you know, some of the ships that are deployed, like UNAFOR and whatnot could offer some of these capabilities especially in terms of ISR to support the Mozambique government and so I am really hopeful in the sense but what it comes down

to again is Mozambique's willingness to accept and ask for for assistance from the region and an international actor so it's there and they have agreed to certain you know assistance programs with the European Union and whatnot but we have yet to see anything floated in in the maritime domain in this sense. So yes, overall, I'm hopeful. And I think the maritime is a great way in terms of international cooperation for this conflict to actually improve. Good. And I think that's kind of a good note, an optimistic note that will shift gears a little bit. And so we'll have to keep paying attention to your work in Mozambique. Lexi, I want to switch gears a little bit and ask you about a publication that you recently co-authored, Charting a New

course, Women, Peace, and Security in the Maritime Domain. And we'll make sure to post a link to that in the show notes. But can you tell us a little bit about that report and kind of what brought it about? Of course, yeah. So as I mentioned earlier, before I pivoted into my career in maritime with Steve Luceys, I worked for another One Earth Future department called Our Secure Future, which works to strengthen the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. And essentially, in working with our partners and stakeholders around the world, particularly hard security partners from within the Defense Department, we found that while evidence of women's efficacy in countering and preventing violent extremism on land is fairly well established, the intersection of

the WPS agenda and the maritime is still fairly fuzzy. Specifically, in having conversations with my maritime colleagues, we started to recognize that while the literature around the positive effect of women's participation in the maritime domain is growing rapidly, there was perhaps still a need for a deeper exploration of the ways in which that participation can and already does transform the way maritime security decision-making is done. And so we wanted to do this research to start that conversation, take a first step in what we hope will be a continued effort to better understand the connectivities between gender equality and the maintenance of maritime security and charting a new course, which was informed both by a literature review, as well as a series

of interviews with experts in this space is our first step towards this goal. So going back to the Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace, and Security, do you think there's been progress made in the maritime space over the last 20 years or that we're kind of in the same place we were at least in the maritime domain as we were 20 years ago? Yeah, so just for a bit of background and context, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 from October of 2000 was the original foundational resolution on women, peace, and security. And that resolution, in conjunction with a suite of nine additional Security Council resolutions, all on women, peace and security, which is a total of 10, plus additional regional and national both legal and policy frameworks form what we now refer to as the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. And essentially, the WPS agenda calls for women's full and meaningful participation in peace and security decision making at every level. And it does so in a number of ways, including by requiring increased women's representation in decision making, as well as the implementation of a gender perspective. And so it is true that the maritime domain is still relatively male dominated. But the good news is that, yes, I do think some progress has indeed been made over the past two decades towards implementing WPS in the maritime domain.

So, for example, around 77 countries have now adopted national action plans on women, peace and security, which can and in my opinion, should be applied to the maritime domain. Some countries, we also have domestic legislation that includes the United States, which has the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 that mandates the implementation of the WPS agenda. And in cases like this, the U.S. in particular, that legislation applies to all relevant agencies, including the DOD and DHS. So in that particular case, WPS and the Maritime are very explicitly linked. Progress has also been made outside of government policy, including with various organizations such as the Women's International Shipping and Trading Association,

or WISTA, which is a global association which connects women executives and decision makers from within all sectors of the maritime industry. We also have Women in Maritime Associations, or WEMAs, which are regional partnerships set up with the IMO's gender program, which engage women working in the maritime across 152 different countries and territories. And we also have a number of additional awareness-raising campaigns that exist, such as last year, the theme of World Maritime Day was empowering women in the maritime community. So there's a lot of attention being paid to the intersection of gender and the maritime now. While at first glance, it might seem like progress on WPS in the maritime space has been pretty non-existent over the past two

decades, the fact that we can point to all of these legal and policy frameworks, as well as the formalization of women's associations and networks, support the argument that a considerable amount of progress has indeed been made. It just hasn't necessarily been labeled as women, peace and security up to this point. And in fact, one of our key findings from the report was that every single one of our interviewees reported that they had already used a gender perspective in their day-to-day work, which again, is a key tenant of the WPS agenda in action. Well, that's great. So it sounds like, yeah, you were not only able to provide some recommendations, but also able to take stock of some of the progress that's been made.

So with that progress in mind, can you give us some recommendations that the report had kind of for moving forward? So if we know where we are now, what does the international community need to do or even specific subgroups of the international community to kind of continue moving the ball forward in regards to women, peace and security in the maritime domain? Yeah, I think, you know, I'm sort of taking the cheater's way out. Instead of selecting just one of my favorites recommendation, I'm selecting one bucket of recommendations out of the three buckets of recommendations that we made. And that is to encourage, facilitate and formalize the collaboration and consultation among stakeholders interested in this issue. So in practice, this could look like empowering existing gender advisors or establishing new positions where gender advisors don't yet exist. Gender advisors, as used commonly by the DOD, also used by NATO, would help to serve as a focal point to help streamline communication and make sure that nothing falls through the cracks when implementing a gender perspective in your day-to-day work. It could also look like leveraging existing women's networks and associations like WISTA and the WEMAS to coordinate currently disparate maritime stakeholders and bring vital underrepresented voices to the table. Typically, these women's organizations have an incredible reach back into their communities and can help to provide vital information that otherwise would be lost. It could also look like something as simple as inviting a woman peace builder from a conflict zone to present to an audience of security decision makers about the underlying problems at hand.

So we spoke earlier about the coastal insecurity and high number of illicit trades that are happening right now in Mozambique. These underlying causes are situations that women peace builders typically have insights into that you don't necessarily get in traditional security decision making forums. And the reason that I select this bucket of consultation and dialogue as the number one action item to take away, even if people don't take any other recommendations on board, is because it's both a great and actionable recommendation for people who aren't sure yet how to do a gender analysis on their own. And it's also, I think, the most transformative. And what I mean by this is that it's one thing to recruit and retain more women into maritime roles or to have women at the table when maritime security-related decisions are being made, but the true transformation, and this doesn't sound terribly sexy at first glance, comes with good old-fashioned consultation and collaboration. It's when that woman's message is truly heard, when the information she provides is taken seriously and acted upon, and then when security decision-making changes as a result of her feedback, that's when the true transformation happens. We already know that when women are consulted and their ground truth informs CVE and PVE

policy and programming on land, those initiatives become more successful, more effective, more durable, and the same will inevitably be true in the maritime space. I just want to follow up. So you mentioned in that response, gender advisors. Is there an example of an organization or a group using gender advisors that you think is particularly good or kind of a role model for expanding that type of program? Yeah, I mean, I think that the gender advisor network that the Department of Defense has set up is particularly effective.

Gender advisors have been placed across the combatant commands to help streamline and focus the DOD's work on implementing gender in their day-to-day activities. And that includes across the strategic, the operational, and also the tactical level. More guidance is forthcoming on this because, as I mentioned earlier, the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 is now kind of up and running. Each of the agencies were required under the act to establish their own implementation plans. And those implementation plans are now being finalized. The agencies are getting them up and running. They're going to be implementing them across the board. So as DOD continues to implement the requirements of the WPS Act, it's going to be leaning quite

hard on that gender focal point, gender advisor network across the combatant commands, which has already been very successful in implementing gender across the board. Kelly, I want to shift back to you. And I know your work has been more narrowly focused on on Mozambique. But do you see the gender perspective as playing a role there? Or have you seen it involved in some of the issues with Ansar Al-Suna? Or do you have other thoughts that you want to add more generally to what we're talking about with Lexi? Yeah, I can add just some more general thoughts. So I mean, Lexi's overview for you was phenomenal on this. So the only thing I'm going to add is that everything that she was saying really applies

to whatever maritime counterinsurgency approach is taken in Mozambique. So historically, women's roles in terrorist and insurgent groups have really been treated as homogenous. And so they centered on women as victims and bystanders, which has really hindered effective counterinsurgency and de-radicalization efforts. And this has long been a critique by feminist national security scholars. And I think it really applies to the maritime domain as well, as Lexi was alluding to. And so in terms of Mozambique, we cannot have effective maritime counterinsurgency, whether it be against Ansar Alsuna or other violent non-state actors without including women in the planning and execution phases of these initiatives. So all of this to say, I think it

further solidifies Lexi's points about the criticality of gender mainstreaming and gender advisors in the maritime sector. Okay. And then back to Lexi and Kelly, you can weigh in here as well. Do we, and I think you've kind of already touched on it, but what do we think the risks would be if we don't continue to move this agenda forward and continue to include these perspectives, these gendered perspectives in counterinsurgency and specifically maritime counterinsurgency? Yeah, I'm really glad you asked this question because of the risk of sounding like an alarmist. I think that the risks incurred by not including women in maritime can't really be overstated. As I mentioned earlier, the research on women's

impact on maritime security is still emerging. So I anticipate that in the near future, we'll have more information on the specific risks we face, as well as the benefits to be gained by having women at the table and including a gender perspective in maritime security decision-making. In the meantime, however, I want to draw on a really wonderful example that we included in the report from Ambassador Donald Steinberg. Ambassador Steinberg served as President Clinton's Special Assistant for African Affairs, during which time he supported negotiations of the Lusaka Protocol, which attempted to end the Angolan Civil War. And after the protocol was signed, he told the president that, quote, not a single provision in the agreement discriminates

against women, and he declared the agreement to be gender neutral. And this backfired in a number of ways, mostly against women, most strikingly after international partners demined the roads and allowed 4 million displaced persons to return to their homes. Unfortunately, however, road clearance, which was a top priority as decided by local men, sometimes preceded the demining of fields, wells, and forests, and this led women to suffer disproportionately, losing their limbs as well as their lives, in a new rash of landmine accidents as soon as they returned back home. This example is really extreme, but I use it because it very clearly illustrates just how easy it is to fall victim to the risks of gender blindness, even as you're somebody who's actively

striving to be gender sensitive and incorporate a gender perspective throughout your work. I think that in the maritime space, the risks are potentially even higher because there are so many complex, interconnected, and mutually reinforcing factors at play, just like the ones that we've been discussing in Mozambique. For example, strong thriving blue economies and coastal welfare are key to driving down illicit activities at sea, and we know that women's organizations and the use of a gender perspective in policy and programming can help to create the conditions necessary for this to happen. Conversely, high levels of inequality, including the exclusion of women, coastal instability, and a lack of viable economic opportunities will inevitably

drive coastal populations to use the sea for nefarious means. As we discuss worst case scenarios and the potential risks involved with groups like Ansar Al-Sunnah, it's critical to remember that women must play a role in crafting the response and putting together a solution. This gets back to what Kelly mentioned earlier about the insurgency potentially requiring international involvement, but above all, needing a Mozambican-driven solution. Tapping into women civil society leaders is just one way to both sidestep further risk and also boost the chances that peace will last. I agree. And I think that's kind of a good place to stop us for today. And unless Kelly, you have anything else that you want to add? I think I'm okay for now. Thank you,

though. Certainly I do. And I know that our listeners at CIMSEC appreciate the work that you all are doing at Stable Seas, both in regards to maritime security and in Africa and Mozambique and especially related to gender perspectives. You know, I think I remember being kind of introduced, I think, to the term sea blindness from some of the work that you all are doing. And I think that goes hand in hand with gender blindness and kind of a similar perspective that is often unappreciated, but has a way of touching so many other, if not all other issues. But unfortunately, that's all the time we have for today. So I'd like to thank both of our guests, Kelly Moss and Lexi Van Busker. Before we go, I'll just go ahead and ask you what you're working on

and where our listeners can find you online. So Kelly, over to you first. Yeah, well, first, I just want to say thanks for having us on, Walker. This has really been a great conversation. And I think the maritime aspects of Ansar al-Suna and the maritime counter responses to the group warrant continued discussion. So always happy to chat about this. In terms of ongoing projects, I am one of the lead authors on a forthcoming Stable Seas report on the Western Indian Ocean, which actually includes Ansar al-Suna. So that is taking up a significant amount of my time. Contact wise, I can be found on Twitter at Kelly B. Moss, and listeners are more than welcome to reach out there or through my email on the Stable Seas website. So thanks again.

Thank you. And Lexi, same question over to you. Yeah, I mean, I just want to echo Kelly's sentiments. And thank you so much for having us here with you. It's been lovely to dig into these issues. And I particularly appreciate that you have been using this platform, not just in this podcast, but in others as well to highlight the importance of women in the maritime space, the issue area near and dear to my heart. So thank you for all of your work on that too. At Stable Seas, our team is currently working to expand our research on the connection between global counterterrorism efforts and the maritime domain. We also release a monthly maritime terrorism newsletter. So for any listeners

who might be interested in a concise compilation of key events on maritime terrorism, I recommend subscribing. It's a really great way to keep the conversation going. As for me, I can be found on twitter at lexi vb and by email on the stable c staff page okay thank you again uh to our guests uh for joining us and thank you to our listeners uh for tuning in we'll see you next week c control is produced and edited by keegan ingersoll ed sallow and william mcquiston Thank you. We'll be right back.