Sea Control - Sea Control 264 - Marine and Naval Aviation with Nate Lauterbach

Episode Date: July 18, 2021

“Marine Aviation Is Naval Aviation,” by Nathan Lauterbach, USNI Proceedings, April 2021.“Commandant’s Planning Guidance,” by David Berger, United States Marine Corps, July 2019.Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, by United States Marine Corps, 2021. “Marines Update Force Design After a Year of Experimentation in the Field,” Megan Eckstein, USNI News, April 26, 2021. 

Hey folks, Walker here. I'm stepping in to cover Jared for a few weeks. First, a reminder that there are two Sea Control podcast feeds. The one you want to be listening to is labeled simply Sea Control and it includes the phrase Simsex flagship podcast in its description. Please leave us a rating or review if you enjoy the podcast. Today we have guest Nate Lauderback discussing his recent article in the April 2021 issue of USNI Proceedings, Marine aviation is naval aviation. It's a great discussion. I'm sure you're going to enjoy it.

Also, I'd be remiss if I didn't encourage you to check out all the great articles we published as part of our Strategic Sealift Topic Week. You can check them out at simsec.org. Now, on to the podcast. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Technology. Guten Tag, shipmates, and welcome back to the Sea Control Podcast. Today, we will discuss a recent article published by the United States Naval Institute called Marine Aviation is Naval Aviation. Marine Corps and Naviation must team up for the maritime campaign.

Today, we are fortunate to be joined by the author of the article, Nate Lauderback. The article is published by USNI in April of 2021 and will be linked to the show notes on the SimSec website. This article struck an interest with me due to its discussion of naval campaigning, something I believe to currently be a void in U.S. doctrine. I was excited to read the article and explore some of the tangible frameworks to get after naval campaigning, specifically in the air domain. Before we begin, I'll remind the listener that all opinions expressed are our own and not reflective of any institutions with which we might otherwise be associated. Nate, in addition to a personal introduction, why did you decide to write about marine aviation and support of naval campaigns? As far as personal introduction goes, yes, my name is Nate Lauterbach. I'm a lieutenant colonel with Second Marine Aircraft Wing, currently working as a plans officer there. By MOS, by trade, I'm an air command and control officer. I've also served as a UH-1 Huey pilot and had a tour in an aviation-related acquisition program. I decided to write about marine aviation in support of the naval campaign because it's the new direction provided by the Commandant in the Commandant's planning guidance, and I got to start really working closely with the problem of marine aviation on the campaign, essentially as a result of my working on the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations Tentative Manual.

I had the pleasure of writing the aviation operations chapter of that manual. And in there we had in the manual, we had the to deal with the problem of what does marine aviation look like on a maritime campaign? In the past, over the past 70 years, the Marine Corps is really focused on operations ashore, essentially operating as a second land army. Since marine aviation is focused on its six functions that it provides, offensive air support, anti-air warfare, aerial reconnaissance, all those things, it's largely focused on trying to achieve success for the ground combat element marines who are operating ashore. The entire design of marine aviation, though, it's an unsustainable approach to marine aviation going into the future if we're going to be fighting with the fleet. So we need to address how marine aviation gets back to maritime campaigning. And in looking at that problem, I realized that marine aviation actually has a lot to offer the Navy, and Navy aviation has much to offer the Marine Corps. And we could provide a complementary approach to marine and Navy aviation working together or getting back to our naval roots, naval aviation.

So really, it's trying to get back to integrated naval aviation with Navy and Marines working together side by side, supporting the fleet and supporting Marines ashore. Thank you. And it's fascinating that you had the opportunity to be able to work on the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations tentative manual. I'll have to go back and reread myself the aviation chapter and see kind of the parallels between the article and the manual itself. In the article, you quickly address problems in the Marine Corps aviation community. Can you describe some of them and discuss why the Navy would still want support from the Marine Corps, despite all the problems that you identified? Yes, absolutely. The problem of marine aviation is that it's not postured well to support the fleet at the current moment. effectively operating as an air force in support of a land army, marine aviation supporting the ground combat element of the Marine Air Ground Task Force,

conducting traditional ground combat tasks. You know, it goes back to the very beginnings of marine aviation with Lieutenant Alfred Cunningham, the first marine aviator, arguing that the purpose of marine aviation is to support the marine on the ground. There's a lot of truth in that, and that's not going away. But we also need to find ways of supporting the fleet, especially as the fleet has to start to contend with denied areas from pure adversaries. So that's the essential organizational problem. There's a tactical problem, too. And the tactical problem is the Navy actually fights with a different command and control arrangement than the Marine Corps fights for its aviation.

So for the Marines to repartner with the Navy, we're going to have to embrace the Navy's composite warfare doctrine, which is the Navy's tactical warfighting doctrine. The good news is that Marine aviation is very well postured to support the fleet if only we rethink who our customer is. And if we rethink who our customer is, we can bring the Marine Corps back into or bring the Marine Corps into the composite warfare concept. Marine aviation really needs to just sort of adjust its mindset. It does support the Marine on the ground, but it's also an adjunct to the fleet. And Marine aviators, we wear a Naval aviation insignia. That's our roots. And it's the way we fought back in World War II during the last time we fought against a Naval peer adversary.

The problem is how do we restore those Naval linkages so that we can succeed against whoever our peer adversaries actually are? that's an interesting perspective particularly suggesting that it's in large part also a mindset switch that needs to happen and occur despite the actual functional tactical elements i also need to change the u.s navy and currently campaigns i would argue without much contribution from the marine corps on a daily basis what do you think the marine corps can uniquely offer that isn't currently being executed by the Navy? We offer a lot. Perhaps the biggest thing we offer is how to employ aviation in support of our own theory of success. That might sound really esoteric, but it's not. It all goes back to command and control of aviation. Who is marine aviation

supporting? What do they need, and how are we going to do it? As of right now, the Navy doesn't really operate that way. The Navy has been, because of 70 years of assured sea control, the Navy has been able to essentially park an aircraft carrier off the coast of another country and generate sorties largely for the Air Force. So you're using the Air Force's theory of success, whatever it happens to be at that time. Where this changes, though, is once you get into a maritime theater and we start having to deal with maritime problems, at that point, the Navy's not going to be able to generate enough sorties for itself. And at that point, the Marine Corps is going to have to find ways of contributing to that theory of success. So the thing that the

Marine Corps does provide, though, is a way of thinking about theory of success, like what are our objectives? How do we accomplish those objectives with aviation? That's not something that's organic to the way the Navy fights and how they staff up their Navy aviation headquarters. Additionally, the Marine Corps offers a lot of aircraft. We have F-35s, FAA-18s, V-22 Ospreys, and a host of helicopters. In the future, we're going to have Group 5 unmanned aerial systems as well. And the Commandant recently just published within the last couple of weeks a note saying that we're going to be aiming for a 60 to 40 proportion of unmanned to manned systems. So that is the future, and we're going to – and we're resourcing that acquisition strategy to support that.

We also offer really persistent C2 capabilities. We have land-based capabilities to command and control airspace in real time. We'll have new sensors that you can establish ashore that augment that capability, and we can liaise with partner nation air traffic control and network with shore-based sensors and command and control agencies that directly support the fleet and the fleet's theory of success. We also offer a shore-based logistics to aviation support, So the ability to establish air bases and forward arming and refueling points. And we're able to conduct maintenance actions and aircraft thereby distributing naval air power across the fleet and the entirety of the maritime domain in the theater.

All that adds up to offering combat power to protect the fleet. The Marine Corps aviation, when integrated with the aviation of the Navy, has the ability to project incredible amounts of combat power and lethality in support of that maritime commander. We can also protect the fleet. Remember that a single aircraft carrier can only conduct operations for 12 hours at a time. So if we're going to operate a carrier within a contested area of the sea, we're going to need at least several carriers just so they can provide services for their own protection for the other 12 hours during the day. An alternative to that is provide marine aviation or generate marine aviation ashore and then coordinate the actions of the carrier strike group and marine aviation to work together so that the carriers can be protected and also provide for a theory of victory for the carrier as well as all the marine aviation.

Nate, thank you. That certainly is a laundry list of different opportunities that the Marine Corps can provide to the Navy. I'd like to explore one additional one that you had discussed in your article, and that's regarding the echelons of command. You identified that there's a unique and distinct difference between the echelons of command that the Marine Corps employs to command aviation and that in comparison to what the Navy uses to command aviation. Can you expand upon that? In terms of echelon of command, yes, the Marine Corps offers a lot. Every Marine Expeditionary Force has a two-star-led Marine aircraft wing. That Marine aircraft wing is a general officer-led staff with the ability to generate air tasking orders, the ability to plan aviation operations, and the ability to think in terms of broad campaign as well as within the next 96, 72, 48 hours, what have you, for aviation. purposes. And that Marine Aircraft Wing is postured to support the rest of the Marine

Expeditionary Force. So we have a great deal of planning capacity that is resident within the Marine Aircraft Wing. Additionally, with the Marine Air Control Group, we have aviation command and control expertise inside of that wing with an ability to integrate with the rest of the Joint Force, with the Air Force, and with the rest of the Navy as well. For the Navy, it's a much different scenario. They have within the carrier strike group, they have a single carrier air wing. That's an 06 level command. And it does have a small staff associated with it, but it lacks the ability to conduct long range planning and the planning of an air campaign. So there's a huge gulf of difference between the planning and command and control capabilities of

what is resident within the Marine aircraft wing and what is embarked aboard an aircraft carrier. It presents an opportunity for marine aviation to provide additional planning expertise to the naval aviation enterprise in a tactical environment. That is a fascinating opportunity. Additionally, you proposed a new concept called the Maritime Air Combat Element, or the MACE. In the Marine Corps, I was familiar with another MACE, the Martial Arts Center of Excellence, but I was happy to see something other than that MACE identified and discussed. So in addition to discussing the concept to our listeners who have not read your article, can you additionally describe the etymology of your proposal? Yes, absolutely.

It all goes back to a simple problem that goes all the way back to World War I is how do you employ air power? It really gets back to economics. It's always about supply and demand. There's never enough supply to go around, and there's always too much demand. And so the best practice in dealing with that problem has been to pile all your aviation together into a single unit under a single commander, run a planning process that apportions all those aircraft sorties against the most pressing problems at the time. So in doing so, you create an aviation task organization. The Marine Corps has that. For a Marine Expeditionary Force, it's the Marine Aircraft Wing.

And within that MAPH, we refer to it as an ACE, an air combat element. Every Marine Air Ground Task Force has one. For the MACE, though, this is not a marine air combat element. It's a maritime air combat element. It also has the nice ring of it also being a weapon, too. So as such, it provides a good offensive sort of a moniker for articulating what Navy and Marine Corps aviation together can be. But remember that a MACE, it's maritime, and that means there's the Navy fighting in it as well. And as such, it's a general officer or flag officer-led unit in support of a Navy commander, whereby we pile up all the Navy and Marine aviation under that single commander.

And as such, we can approach aviation problems that support the fleet in a much more integrated way. So, for example, if we're trying to operate anti-submarine warfare aircraft in a contested area, we can also task F-35s and F-18s with providing defensive counterair combat air patrol in support of those aircraft. Or additionally, we can provide United States Marine Corps tactical recovery aircraft and personnel type aircraft to support downed aviators that happen to be within a maritime area. So we have a great deal to offer if only we address the command and control problems that we have. And the task organization that I recommend that we use is the MACE,

whereby we just pile up all the Navy and Marine aviation units in support of that maritime campaign under a single commander, give him or her a purpose and run a planning cycle to apportion all those Navy and Marine Corps aircraft together in support of the maritime campaign. Nate, it would be hard to find, I think, a counter-argument in terms of why the Navy and Marine Corps should not pursue such a concept, particularly as we continue to move forward with our naval integration efforts. You discussed the roles of maritime aviation in framing your argument. Can you discuss the importance of these roles and why they matter? Yes, this part's critical. Marine aviation as it approaches aviation in a functional way,

we have six functions of marine aviation, aerial reconnaissance, offensive air support, anti-air warfare, control of aircraft and missiles, electronic warfare, and assault support. All those six functions are oriented on supporting ground marines in a land domain type of operations. So if we're conducting operations ashore, for the last 70 years, marine aviation has essentially been postured to support those six functions. And in fact, we task marine aviation that way. So it'll actually look, when you see an air tasking order that tells marine aviators to go fly somewhere, it'll actually specify the type of mission, whether it's assault support or close air support or deep air support, what have you, by those functions. Those functions

are critical to how we think about the employment of marine aviation. For the functions of maritime aviation, though, we probably need to open the aperture a little bit. There is literally not a way that I can task a Marine Corps aircraft with supporting the destruction of an enemy ship. It's just not a function of ours. We do not conduct surface warfare. We do not conduct anti-submarine warfare. We do not conduct intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance type missions. We conduct, particularly of airspace, we do some reconnaissance missions, but we don't do air surveillance, at least from aircraft. So we need to probably rethink the employment options of what marine aviation would be and open the aperture a little bit. Not saying that marine aviation needs to necessarily jump into the anti-submarine warfare role.

Perhaps the Navy would be better postured to do that. But when we put together a MACE, a Marine Air Combat Element, there's going to be Navy aircraft that are going to be flying those functions of maritime aviation sorties, so anti-submarine warfare sorties. We're going to need marine aviation to be cognizant of the requirements of those so it can best support our Navy brethren on that maritime campaign. Nate, one of the things I really appreciated about your article was that you provided some tangible proposals for how we can get after and actually advance the problem. Can you share these proposals and share your ideas in terms of what the way ahead looks like for the Navy and the Marine Corps and the aviation community? Yes, I think this part is absolutely critical. We need to get after experimentation. We need to provide venues and opportunities for the Navy and Marine to experiment with an integrated Navy and Marine Corps aviation headquarters.

And what is that? That's the MACE. We need to make the MACE responsive to the fleet commander. So we need to, we essentially need to at least experiment with the MACE and try to get what aviation planning inside of that MACE would look like with the functions of maritime aviation, with Navy and Marine Corps aircraft working together in support of that maritime campaign. We also need to develop a single integrated Navy Marine Corps approach to naval aviation doctrine. We need to codify those functions of maritime aviation so we can get the downstream effects of that doctrinal change on our organizations. We can get the aircraft procurement right. We can purchase the appropriate weapons and get the appropriate training and ranges, et cetera.

You can't just go ahead and task Marine Corps F-35s with potentially an anti-ship missile on them and have them go and fight an adversary destroyer. I mean, you could, but it probably wouldn't go very well. We need to really address the training piece. We need to address ranges. We need to address procurement and everything else. And all of that comes downstream of doctrine. So that gets back to the integrated Navy and Marine approach to aviation. And lastly, the Marine Corps really needs to fully embrace composite warfare doctrine.

That means the Marine Corps units should be tasked with supporting composite warfare commanders and letting go of many of the arrangements that Marines have become very comfortable with when working inside of a land campaign. So, for example, Marines are very used to the idea of having battle space and land. Well, there isn't really a battle space at sea in the same kind of way, and all the warfare commanders and a composite warfare construct support each other within the same territorial area. So we need to address the gap of understanding of what composite warfare means for the Marine Corps. And ideally, we need to get to the point where composite warfare is a dual sign document by both a Navy admiral and a Marine Corps general officer and have it be service doctrine with both of our services in it. I think your last proposal, particularly of the dual sign doctrine, is absolutely imperative to get after and solve some of the problems as we continue to move forward. We've seen it on the strategic side in terms of the tri-service service strategy, but I think we have really yet to see, particularly at the operational and tactical level, any

of the kind of co-signed equivalents. Nate, I'd like to ask you one question that's off script, but your response led me to want to see what your answer would be, and that's if you were the chief of naval operations for a day, what immediate changes would you put in place, particularly focused towards the aviation community to get after some of these problems that you've identified? As far as the chief of naval operations for a day, I think what I would do is I would direct Fleet Forces Command to do an exercise with a mace involved in it. And I would build that mace around a Marine aircraft wing staff and direct the Navy's

component squadrons and groups and wings to provide planners and attachments to that marine aircraft wing in support of a maritime campaign. And that would truly allow an experimental venue for us to see if this entire design works and if there's a way we can bring Navy and Marine Corps sorties of aircraft and aviation back to working for the fleet in support of that fleet's theory a victory. The biggest thing we need to do right now is get after the experimentation phase of this. And I would direct that that would happen if I were the chief of naval operations. That's a great response. And I would love to see that integrated into a future fleet battle problem. So I think particularly that that's a perfect venue and opportunity to conduct that

experimentation that you've identified. Nate, finally, as all the guests come to the program with different views and backgrounds. I ask you to help me expand my own perspective as I wrestle with the topic. I would ask you, how do you define maritime security? I define maritime security as protecting freedom of the seas or freedom of navigation. In a way, it sort of goes back all the way to when the first pirates set sail or maybe when the sea peoples invaded Egypt in the Bible. So maritime security is whatever we do to protect the way of life that we Americans depend on, but often take for granted. And that is protecting of everything that we get from the sea. So maritime security is that. That's a great, concise and quick answer. And I appreciate that.

Nate, where can listeners find you online and what are you working on next? I've got a couple articles in the works for both the Marine Corps Gazette and Proceedings. And I'm online. You can find, you can look up my name on Facebook. I'm happy to have a conversation there. And I also tweet fairly daily about naval aviation and military topics on Twitter. I am at YoungInThings on that social media platform. So I look forward to the discourse. Great. Well, Nate, my sincere appreciation for coming on the podcast today to discuss your article.

To the listeners, highly recommend that you check out his article, in addition to the a tentative manual for expeditionary advanced based operations as both offer several opportunities for future experimentation and exercise integration for naval air evolving into the future. Thank you for listening. And until next time, guten tag. © BF-WATCH TV 2021 © transcript Emily Beynon