Sea Control - Sea Control 265 - Building Islands and Influence with Nitya Labh

Episode Date: July 25, 2021

“Building Islands and Influence: Chinese Land Reclamation in the Southwest Pacific,” by Nitya Labh, Australian Defense Magazine, May 6, 2021. 

Hi folks, Walker here. I'm stepping in to cover Jared for a few weeks. First, a reminder that there are two Sea Control podcast feeds. The one you want to be listening to is simply labeled Sea Control, and it includes the phrase Simsex Fladship Podcast in its description. It's important so you know that you're listening to the right one. And if you like it, please leave us a rating. Today we've got guest Nydia Lab talking with Jared about her recent article for Australian Defense Magazine on Chinese land reclamation in the southwest Pacific.

We're excited to have her on the show, and I hope you enjoy the discussion. And as always, a reminder that we've got lots of great articles and our sister podcast, Village Pumps, up on simsec.org. Now, on to the podcast. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Hello Hashimates and welcome back aboard Sea Control. Today I'm joined by Nydia Lab and we'll be discussing her article for Australian Defense Magazine, Building Islands and Influence, Chinese Land Reclamation in the South Pacific. As a reminder, all opinions are our own and not

representative of any institution with which we might be otherwise associated. Nydia, let's start with you, would you mind introducing yourself to the listeners? Sure. Hi, everyone. My name is Nidia Lab. I'm a senior at the College of William & Mary studying international relations and economics. Over the past year, I worked as a research fellow at the Project on International Peace and Security. Prior to that, I was a research assistant at a project at DARPA, which is the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, where I worked on some international supply chain security things. Thanks. So let's jump right in then. How and why did you decide to make this topic the focus of your research? I think I was always really interested in maritime

security. So when I had to begin brainstorming a research proposal for the project on international peace and security or PIPS, I started doing research in the maritime domain. And in that process, I ran across a lot of articles discussing how the U.S. is planning on fortifying our coastal bases against sea level rise. That concern was, I think, specific to the Pacific. So that automatically made a connection for me to two other ideas. First, that the Pacific island countries are also sinking, so to speak. And second, that China is building artificial islands in the South China Sea. So to me, it seemed like a natural connection to make, given the geographic proximity that appeared between China's land reclamation capabilities and the Pacific

Islands' needs. And so the project really took shape from there. The headline of the article would lead you to believe that it's all about China, but land reclamation, as you mentioned, it's happening quite a bit in the Pacific now. So which countries are involved and then why are they pursuing land reclamation? Yeah, so outside of China, countries like Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines have each undertaken their own land reclamation projects over time. In general, land reclamation projects serve many purposes. Land reclamation often serves for commercial and urban

development purposes, but increasingly is considered a solution to counteract coastal erosion in areas that are threatened by sea level rise. I would say Pacific Island countries have developed proposals or made calls for land reclamation projects, but they have yet to find any funding or operational support. Of all of the Pacific actors across the world though, China leads both in its dredging capabilities and its exportation of land reclamation services. So China's construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, it brought a new application of land reclamation into consideration, which is the use of land reclamation for geostrategic purposes. And that raises the specter of geography as something that's malleable and changeable in the scope

of geopolitical competition, I think. So why are the Pacific Island countries more interested in China than the U.S. or any of its friends and allies? Yeah, so I think first it's important to state that the Pacific Islands aren't interested in picking sides in the competition between the United States and China. And they've kind of come forward to say those things in Pacific Island forums and other public events. But Pacific Islands are interested in finding a development partner that can provide for their infrastructure needs. So when it comes to development aid, the United States places a particular emphasis on capacity building. And to that end, our aid to these nations doesn't really meet any infrastructure needs to help to adapt to

climate change and sea level rise. China, on the other hand, has land reclamation capabilities and is willing to provide infrastructure aid to these countries. We can see that through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative. So when it comes to land reclamation, even if Pacific Islands prefer to work with the U.S., we can't offer the services or capabilities that these states are interested in, and China can. Politically, when it comes to climate, China has more credibility in the Pacific Islands than the U.S. or Australia. So to the extent that land reclamation is a climate response policy, China also has more appeal on the climate part. What specific capabilities are required to quote unquote do land reclamation?

So in general, land reclamation is the process of creating new land from the sea. And the simplest method of that is filling an area with large amounts of heavy rock and cement and then filling that with clay and soil until you reach the desired height. In that form, land reclamation capabilities include having dredging ships or, to scale, having a dredging fleet. You then need on-the-ground construction equipment to make the land usable. You also need to be able to finance these operations as you undertake them. So when it comes to dredging operations in the ships, domestically, the U.S. has spent approximately $11 billion from 2003 to 2012. Over the past few years, China has poured billions into the expansion of its dredging fleets and the manufacturing of dredging ships. So all that to say, land reclamation capabilities are expensive, and that's what makes them hard to access for small island states.

So you kind of hinted at the answer to this in your last question. what is China's land reclamation capability and then how is it using that capability to gain or exert influence? Yeah, so I like to say that China has a comparative advantage in land reclamation here. It conducts one third of all global land reclamation projects in Shanghai alone. China is the world's largest dredging fleet and continues to invest billions in these capabilities, like I mentioned. And China has also exported its land reclamation services abroad and projects like Sri Lanka, Cambodia, and Malaysia, they all have Chinese land reclamation projects provided by Chinese state-owned enterprises. As I mentioned, land reclamation is also expensive and that gives

China economic leverage to build influence in Pacific Island countries. China can exercise this type of leverage through corruption, restrictive lending practices, and Pacific Islands already struggle with debt. Countries like Tonga, Samoa, and Vanuatu are among the most indebted countries to China in the world already. So Chinese land reclamation creates or could create conditions for serious debt sustainability problems in the future. And that kind of leverage and expansionism allows China to limit U.S. power projection in the first and second island chain. So by increasing their influence in the Pacific Islands, China can build its power production capabilities and gain support for its political agenda among Pacific

Island leaders. And that's where I think the threat or the risk really lies. Now, you raised the specter of increased Chinese intelligence or military presence in the Southwest Pacific based specifically on the land reclamation capability. Have we actually seen that yet anywhere? I think we might be starting to see it. So not exactly seen it yet, but China has made attempts to expand its dual-use infrastructure to gain some type of territorial presence through land reclamation. I'd say the best case is in Kiribati, where over the past few years, China has grown increasingly close. Kiribati has renounced its diplomatic ties with Taiwan and turned back to Beijing. In that process, it has agreed in its Kiribati 20-year

vision to conduct some land reclamation projects and then agreed to cement that into China's Belt and Road. So China has one official land reclamation project in the Pacific Islands and it's in Kiribati so far. A few weeks ago, China announced that it was going to revive a strategic airstrip in Kiribati that was previously used by the U.S. in some of its missile tracking in World War II. That used to be something that was of strategic significance and used to the U.S. and now potentially China will be reviving that for its own purposes. Do you have any insight into how China picks and chooses which projects it takes on? When it comes to Chinese land reclamation, I think we're going to have to see over the next few years how China approaches the Pacific Islands

and which projects it actually implements, but I do think it's notable that Beijing has pursued various forms of infrastructure development across the Pacific Islands in trying to gain strategic advantages. So I just described an example of Kiribati, but there are a few others where China has tried to offer artificial islands to Tuvalu. It has tried to purchase the territory of Tulagi in the Solomon Islands. So I think there's some evidence that it's trying to gain some type of strategic posture, but we'll have to see what that really looks like in the coming years. Now, what other countries would have the capability to step in and do land reclamation diplomacy, if you will? I think the main development partners outside of the U.S. in

this region are Japan, Taiwan, and Australia. When it comes to Japan, there was an example of a Japanese firm that was proposing and potentially implementing a land reclamation project in Tuvalu to combat sea level rise. That eventually was thrown out the door. So I think there's a potential for Japan to have these capabilities and to extend them. Taiwan does a lot of its own land reclamation, and it also invests heavily in the Pacific Islands. Potentially, Taiwan also has these capabilities, but no one has yet gone through and measured between Taiwan, Japan, and Australia, what level of capability they have and how far they could extend it. And like I mentioned, there's also Australia who has domestic land reclamation. And a lot of that takes place

in Northern Australia. So I think that's also something that could be extended outwards to the Pacific islands. But like I said, even if there are these capabilities, no one has measured it. No one has measured how that could be extended outwards yet. I would assume also, and you correct me if I'm wrong, but that capability is not necessarily a government capability. It's all private. Is that correct? Yes. Okay. You outlined a strategy in your paper then for Australia and the US to sort of combat the Chinese here. I probably should have chosen a word other than combat, but could you explain what the strategy is? Yeah, so I'd say our two main approaches that the U.S. and its allies and partners can take.

First, the U.S. and allies should consider highlighting and limiting problematic Chinese activity in the region. So that begins with regional monitoring and intelligence gathering. But the U.S. could also collaborate with its regional allies and Pacific Islands to share information and awareness about China's problematic activities. In addition to that, the U.S. could engage in public diplomacy campaigns to increase international scrutiny towards China's influence in the region. And that kind of monitoring will also allow the U.S. to provide effective legal assistance to Pacific Island countries when they negotiate contracts for land reclamation with China. Overall, the increased awareness will allow the U.S. to also better engage in its upcoming

renegotiations of the Compacts of Free Association, which are defensive agreements that we have with certain Pacific island states. And so that would help reinforce our commitments to the region. But overall, these measures would limit avenues for China to gain influence in the Pacific islands. It's not so much about preventing China from conducting these as much as it's managing the potential, the threat or risk that comes from it, but still trying to hopefully allow China to develop in the region in a way that's beneficial for everyone. And then the second kind of approach we could take is offering alternatives to land reclamation from China in the region. So the U.S. can offer its own land reclamation projects to Pacific

Island countries, but this would require expanding the U.S. dredging capacity both at home and abroad. So the United States could collaborate with regional development partners, like I mentioned, Australia, Japan, and Taiwan to create, you know, maybe a multilateral lending compact to finance these projects because of, I think, the quantity of aid that comes from all these countries to the region, but also because they do have potential capabilities to extend. So by working with allies and partners in some type of lending program, the U.S. can offer effective counter responses to China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which is another way that the PRC builds influence. In addition, the U.S. could act as a guarantor for alternative land reclamation contracts that it offers or that its partners and allies offer.

And those contract guarantees really build investor confidence to encourage private sector participation. And then lastly, U.S. construction already follows higher environmental and infrastructure standards. So U.S. land reclamation in the region would create minimum standards for all island building projects, against which China would have to compete. By acting as a standard setter in the region, we don't have to outspend or outcompete China, but we can kind of allow them to productively engage in the region without feeling like there's some type of potential risk there for us. So overall, it's about the U.S.'s ability to operate along a continuum of competition and address the climate needs of Pacific island states, but also regional security concerns. So let me ask a follow up question. What is the environmental impact of the land reclamation? Because I know I've seen a lot of press about the impact what the Chinese are doing has had on the destruction of coral reefs and other things. When the alternative is a country cease to exist because of the sea level rise, I understand why the countries are making the decision they are.

But is there a more environmentally responsible way to do this? That's kind of what the last part of your last answer sounded like to me. You correctly noted that dredging especially can be pretty damaging to the environment because it requires taking sand from the bottom of the ocean and that can be very disruptive to a lot of ecosystems. The way that China and a lot of South Asian dredging and land reclamation projects occur, it's usually through that process and so it is destructive. But as I mentioned, the U.S. has more sustainable practices. One of note is in some U.S. construction, there's the use of synthetic sand or artificial sand. There can be debates on what version to use and how much better it is. But I think that there's the potential there for some type of artificial sand or some process like that to take place. And if that becomes a norm in Southeast Asia in land reclamation, that could be better for the environment. But I think it comes down to economic sustainability as well. And for a lot of Pacific islands, like you mentioned, I think there was one scientist from the University of Hawaii you mentioned, they'd much rather destroy a little bit of coral reef if it prevents their country from going extinct.

thank you um that is all the time that we have for today i'd like to thank my guest nydia lab um nydia where can we find you online and what are you working on next you can find me through william and mary's project on international peace and security or via linkedin directly over the next few months i want to build on this research maybe exploring how certain countries weaponized dredging capabilities or how land reclamation is evolving and being used around the world. I look forward to seeing what the next step of your research is, and hopefully we'll be able to talk again.

But thank you again for joining us. To listeners, thanks for tuning in, and we'll see you next time. © BF-WATCH TV 2021 © transcript Emily Beynon