Sea Control - Sea Control 269 - USMC Commandant General David Berger On Force Design

Episode Date: August 20, 2021

1. The 38th Commandant's Planning Guidance, by Gen. David H. Berger, July 20192. General David H. Berger official biography.3. The Courage to Change: Modernizing U.S. Marine Corps Human Capital Investment and Retention, by Eric Reid, The Brookings Institution, June 2021.4.Force Design 2030, by Gen. David H. Berger, March 26, 2020. 5. "Bring Back the Seaplane," by David Alman, War on the Rocks, July 1, 2020.6. "Extend Air Wing Range with Seaplane Tankers," by Second Lieutenant David Alman, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2021.7. "Marines Will Help Fight Submarines," by Gen. David H. Berger, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2020.8. "EABO Needs a New Naval Command and Control Structure," by Captain Nick Oltman, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2019. 9. "Marines Break Ground on New War Game Center," by Todd South, Marine Corps Times, May 15, 2021.10. "Redefine Readiness or Lose," by Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Jr. and Gen. David H. Berger, War on the Rocks, March 15, 2021.11. Commandant of the Marine Corps Professional Reading Program 2020.

Hey folks, Jared here. Today we have the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Berger. Interviewed him yesterday and our Ace Editor, Keegan Ingersoll, turned this around for publication today. So it's a wide-ranging conversation that I think you're going to enjoy. Don't miss everything going on over at the website simsec.org. The final iteration for Project Triton is live now. We partnered with Lockheed Martin and the Naval Warfare Studies Institute at the Naval Postgraduate School for the topic Emerging Technologies. We got so many submissions, we had to expand topic week to encompass two weeks. We've also officially put out our call for articles for the end-of-the-year fiction contest,

so go over to SimSec.org for full details. Finally, I want to take the opportunity to recommend our partners in the SimSec Podcast Network, The Bilge Pumps. You can find Alex, Jamie, Drack, and a pile of empty iron brew bottles wherever you download your podcasts. On that note, I'll turn it over to Kimber's men. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Aloha, shipmates, and welcome back aboard Sea Control. My guest today is the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Berger. General, thanks so much for joining us today.

Glad to be here. First, sir, I want to say thanks for including us on your 2020 reading list. It was a very big deal for our team. As I told your staff, there have been enough changes in the two years of your tenure that I could ask 12 initial questions on different topics and probably 10 follow-up questions based on any of your answers. So rather than going through your lengthy bio, which is available online, and we'll include a link to it in our show notes, we'll just jump right into the questions here, sir.

So in your Commandant's planning guidance, you wrote, our manpower system was designed in the industrial area to produce mass, not quality. And I quote, we have not adapted to the needs of the current battlefield regarding manpower and personnel policies. A recent report from the Brookings Institution concluded the existing manpower system is incapable of providing the more skilled and experienced force required to meet the 38th Commandant's planning guidance and force design 2030 goals. Absent a fundamental paradigm shift, transformation efforts will fail. So Sarah, first question to you then, do you agree with the author's assessment and transformation that transformation efforts could fail without a fundamental paradigm shift?

And if so, can we expect a manpower component of the Force Design 2030 initiative? Two questions there, and the answer to both is yes. The transformation, the redesign of the Marine Corps hinges, will hinge on our ability to match it with some kind of talent management process or something that meets what we're going to need in the future. If not, then we'll end up with a structure or equipment that we can't We can't match with the right human beings. So I agree with the first premise.

Will you see something in consonance with force design that addresses talent management? Yes. First thing you'll see is probably in about 30 days, maybe less, something that I'll publish that addresses the more detailed part of that answer. But it first defines why we can't just make minor adjustments to the system that we have. but i have to put in there i mean i have to say that this is not a lack of effort or a lack of people not trying or uh obstinance on the part of people they're lazy they don't want to change it's none of that it's just that the system that we have is designed for numbers to put x number

of people in x number of positions and recruit x number of people and discharge x number of people but going forward the battlefield that i'm talking about obviously is a metaphor it's not it's not the battlefield literally it's a battlefield of the competition for human for talent i think is very different than it was 10 15 years ago and if we're going to retain what the services need including the marine corps we can't do it the way we have done it in the past it's just we won't be able to keep the right marines that we need in uniform and last part is part of that are of changes in law or changes in the demographics that maybe we didn't foresee, but even things like the change in the retirement system fundamentally change how we have to approach

retention because there's no need to stay till 20 years in now. So if we think we can keep doing business the same, I think we're way off the mark. So it's not minor adjustments to the system, it's a fundamental reload. Yes, sir. And will there be a technology component associated with the shift as well? Yes. And part of that is artificial intelligence on the front end to do a much better, not much better because we're working hard right now. We always have, but a more using tools to understand more about the applicant officer or enlisted than we know right now. Right now, there's a physical aspect of it. There's an ASVAB component to it, an interview. It's the basics, but we need to know a lot more about a person to make sure they're going to be

a good fit for the service because I think so far, it's been adequate to look at you. Let's say you were applying, thinking about applying. We're going to look at you in terms of trying to get you through bootcamp and maybe your first enlistment. In other words, the extent of what we want to know about you is what's the chances he's going to successfully complete boot camp and get through the first four years that's not that's not long enough but we have to we we need more pixels about you before we know if you're a good match for the marine corps so part of it is artificial intelligence on the front end yes sir so i'm hearing you say it sounds like you're anticipating some changes in your recruiting process as well is that accurate uh in terms of

Tools to use, yes. I think the fundamentals of the way the Marine Corps approaches recruiting is different than the other services. The fundamentals are not going to change, but the tools that we need to make available to the recruiter, absolutely yes. Thanks, sir. So I want to shift gears a little bit and ask a few questions about logistics, mobility, and sustainment. So in your Force Design Phase 1 and 2 report, you wrote, I'm not confident we've identified the additional structure required to provide tactical maneuver and logistical sustainment needed to execute distributed maritime operations, EABO, and contested littoral environments against our pacing threat. So what's the Marine Corps working on to solve the sustainment and logistics challenges associated with EABO and operations in the contact layer? Here again, I don't think it's a, it's not an arrogance, but it certainly is a 50 years of, we've not needed to protect our backside. It was always secure. So I don't think it was arrogance as much as it was just extreme confidence. It was an area we didn't have to dedicate, the Navy and Marine Corps didn't have to dedicate a lot of effort to. Your backside is secure. So all we had to worry about is being lethal. But now, for the first time, since arguably since World War II, somebody is threatening our backside. Okay, so now we're going to have to shift some of the level of effort, some of the focus to the sustainment part you're talking about, because our construct, our model since the end, arguably since the end of the Korean conflict is, if you look at the Pacific, we're going to get all our stuff from CONUS across the ocean securely, and then we're going to get it to there, and then we're going to distribute it, and that's how it's going to be, because no one was contesting, no one was challenging our supply lines. Now our supply lines go all the way to somebody's garage business in North Dakota because they produce the thing that's part of that thing that equals the weapon system or whatever it is.

So our supply lines aren't just stopping at a depot. They're actually going to some three-man operation in North Dakota. So the end-to-end part of that, we have a lot more learning to do. But the sustainment distribution part, tactically, if we're going to operate distributed, if we're going to operate spread out, and I believe we should, and I believe we're capable of it, then the challenge really at that point in terms of what are the functions of warfare are not the things like most people focus on, lethality, weapons systems, communications, all the aspects of warfare that we're comfortable with. I think are all still in play. But now the magic of it, the limiting factor, the driving force now is logistics. It's sustainment. Because the more spread out you are, obviously, the more challenging it is to keep all that resupplied. So we have to focus on that in a contested environment. So there's been a lot of interest in the light amphibious warship, including my service, the Navy. The Marine Corps and the Navy want to acquire to provide mobility for the Marine Littoral Regiment. And I also think there's some confusion, and you can see it in congressional testimony, about the purpose of law. Can you tell us a little bit more about why the Marine Corps needs the vessel and what the plans are to use it? One of the advantages that the Navy and Marine Corps team has, I think, is depending on the vernacular you want to use, the terminology is part of the contact layer, the blunt layer, or a stand-in force, or inside force, or whatever phrase people are comfortable with. Part of the reason the Navy and Marine Corps are so good at that is we have the organic lift to move those forces around.

In other words, I separate the tactical kind of organic tactical mobility from StratLift. StratLift equals black bottom boats and C-17s and commercial aircraft and commercial ships, all that StratLift. But the magic of what the Marine Corps and Navy, when they're operating together in this forward kind of stance are, is the organic tactical mobility. Laws are, laws are part of that, have to be part of that. So that plus connectors, plus 53s, plus MV-22s, all this is the ability to maneuver that force around, maneuver that force around within an adversary's weapons range. Law is essential. We don't have that vessel right now. We don't have a means to move 100 people around every other day, and there's stuff so that we're inside now an adversaries collection and decision making cycle. We need something with shallow draft, we need something that can get into places that we need L class amphibious ships to. That's not enough. Now we need the ability where you can move 100 people over there, and then tomorrow move them over there.

there's we're going to have to work our way through the conversation of they're not sustainable they're too slow they don't have missiles on them okay we're going to have to work our way through all of that and there are answers to all of that me that meant to l class amphibious ships that equals your ability if you're the if you're the maritime component commander to to maneuver that force if you don't have laws then you're then you you don't have the you don't have all the tools you need to maneuver that force we just say yes sir so the army keeps trying to uh offload their watercraft fleet are you looking at using any of those vessels to help meet the law requirement either in the interim or long term uh to meet those requirements i'm comfortable with the

process that the navy has in looking at alternatives and in this process that we're at right now we've defined what the what the requirement is now industry's job is what can you what can you meet that requirement with it could be it could be the army vessel it could be something else but i think at this stage although we have to move quickly it's really important for the folks like in n95 and the navy and marine corps staff to say this keep focused on the requirement. Allow industry and everyone else to say, we have something close to that. So there's been a lot of things spilled on both unmanned systems and seaplanes as a means of providing some of the long-range logistical support to the distributed force. Have there

been any internal discussions about an eventual role for seaplanes, and what's the latest on your efforts to integrate unmanned systems for logistics? I think this is probably, aside from collections aside from isr logistics is the first place we ought to plow into why because we we actually have been doing it in afghanistan for a decade with helicopters unmanned but there wasn't a driving factor there it was just hey let's try this and see how it works so we i first saw them in 2010 2011 in afghanistan unmanned i said this wow this is amazing thing lands strap on cargo to it or it's got an external uh hoist elevates through a stair step up to an altitude goes to position b offloads cargo why would we put a human being in that helicopter so i think absolutely yes

both fixed wing in other words seaplane perhaps something like that and also rotary wing we should try it all because we need to move around this naval force we need to move supplies people cargo like you're talking about munitions fuel water yeah absolutely and part of it i know some people focus exclusively on the unmanned equals don't put a human being at risk there certainly is an aspect of that but there's also an aspect of generating sorties in other words you're not limited anymore by the few you and me being fatigued there's no crew rest for an unmanned system other than the maintainers, et cetera. So we can actually move faster, generate more sorties per 24-hour period if it's unmanned. Yes, sir. Now, you surprised a lot of Navy

officers with a proceedings article entitled Marines Will Help Fight Submarines. How are your efforts to develop an ASW capability proceeding from a systems perspective to include both sensors and weapons? And then have you been able to establish any sort of training an exercise regime with the Navy? Yes. First step, I think, was in just a discussion within the Marine Corps and the Navy that in a contested environment, who's forward? Okay. So it's submarines, it's special operations forces, it's some collection things, Marines. But none of them are connected right now, really, at all. They're not connected. In other words, they're not disconnected, but they're not habitually working together. There's no reason if you're the soft

debt commander, there's no real reason for me to work together with you right now, unless somebody gives us a task. But in my view, shoot, those are the forces that are there all the time. They're right in front of us. We just can't see them. So if we're operating in the first island chain in a very distributed manner, why would we not work with soft and the submarines? And if that's the case, what's a real challenging task for the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, ASW? Okay, now what can the Marines do to support that? So my effort isn't about how we can kill a submarine. That's way oversimplistic.

It's how do we support what's already happening in terms of anti-submarine warfare? And that may mean collection. It may mean a weapon system. it could mean just the fusion of intelligence and passing it in other words a node so it could be could be logistics how do we rearm refuel uh submarines so i'm open to i'm not fixated on a weapon system that will sync us up i'm thinking if how can we support the seventh fleet the third fleet the fifth fleet how do we support the the fleet commanders in a really challenging role especially as the adversary builds numbers of submarines they may not be better than ours

they're not but they're building a lot of them so what is it that we can do to contribute to that aspect of the fight it's really to to generate a convert to generate thinking if that makes sense i don't have the answers i need us to think yes sir and this kind of leads directly my next question is this is the one that concerns me the most i think about marines operating forward and all the different systems and units operating together and how they're going to work with one another. So one of your Marines advocated for a new command and control concept specific to expeditionary advanced base operations.

Do you think a new concept is necessary, or do you see a place for, for example, the Marine Littoral Regiment or some component of the Littoral Regiment, a company-sized unit on a small island in the Navy's composite warfare commander concept? We need to be open-minded enough that if there's a construct that exists right now and it fits and we're comfortable with it, use it. If somebody has a better idea, let's try it. Let's experiment with it and see if it's better than what we have today. Composite warfare, we should be, as Marines, we should be comfortable operating inside

a composite warfare construct. And if MLR, if an expeditionary advanced base sort of element fits into that, why we don't need to create something new but but we should always be open to some some commander some major says hey i got a better idea let's try this okay we should not poo-poo that we should say all right when's the next time we can test drive that thing and then we try it out and see is it better than a composite warfare construct let's let's say so we should have our ear open to good ideas from the bottom up and test drive them we should also as marines be very comfortable inside a composite warfare construct. I know there's some frustration in the other services, how watching

everything that's happening inside the Marine Corps and the pace of innovation that the rest of us see going on there. To what extent do you feel like the Marine Corps has an advantage overcoming obstacles with, you know, the commandant from one exception with one exception comes from a single warfighting community. Plus you have the every Marine or rifleman ethos is imbued at boot camp. Do you feel like that gives you an advantage when you talk about the ability to pivot the force quickly in one direction or another? It's never easy, of course, no matter who. It's never this amount of change in this pace is not easy. I think we have a couple things going for us. One, my predecessor recognized that we were in a low state of readiness coming out of OIF and

oef and we needed to rebuild our readiness because we had run the machine hard so he focused hard for three years on getting the resources from congress and rebuilding our readiness that set us up for what we can do if we were not if he hadn't done that we'd have been rebuilding readiness this afternoon so we would not have been able to move he enabled that to happen second i think we are smaller. If we can't move faster than a bigger thing, okay, shame on us. So we should be size matters here. We're a smaller force, smaller budget, smaller focus. So we should be able to move. I think third, because we have a marine air, we have an air ground sort of mentality anyway. We have all the parts. We're built as a joint force by nature. So it's, I think for us to pivot,

for us to turn hard, we already are comfortable operating in a very joint sort of way because that's how we're built, and we operate with the Navy anyway. Now, all that said, not easy. Even elements of the Marine Corps, active duty, retired, for all the right reasons question, are we going too fast? Are we too narrowly focused? Are we abandoning our strengths? Those are good cautionary sort of things. They don't slow us down, but they are absolutely valid questions that we should be able to respond with. We are taking any kind of change at this scale and this speed inherently has risk associated with it. I know what that risk is. I've communicated that risk to the Secretary of Navy and Secretary of Defense said this does not come without risk. We are fundamentally changing things. We're taking near term risk here. So as long as they're familiar, as long as they're aware of what that risk is and they own it. Okay, then I'm not out on a limb by myself. But it but it is not without, not without challenge and friction like you point out, and there is, there's going to be an element of risk if you're going to move this quickly.

so the marine corps broke ground may 12th for a new war gaming facility down in quantico so we talked about the evolution the pivot of the marine corps that's ongoing what role has war gaming played in the changes that you've implemented to date it's central to it i mean all of us no matter if you were to come up with a new idea you have a premise you have a theory it's it's just that until you figure out a way you can you can test it out. The wargaming, the experimentation is central. We took a timeframe 10 years out, and that has been my horizon since day one, 10 years out. So if you pick a horizon that's 10 years out and try to envision what the world will look like and what your organization ought to look

like, there's a lot of variables, a lot of unknowns. So the way you account for them, the way you offset for them is a lot of testing, a lot of experimentation, a lot of wargaming. And you're in my kind of terminology, we have an endpoint that's guiding us. But to get to that endpoint, there's, there's a lot of experimentation, a lot of wargaming that's, that's necessary for us to learn along the way. we don't have the 100 clear picture of exactly what the world's going to look like in 2030 a lot of assumptions and an aim point the rest the rest will be answered by war gaming and experimentation and bottom up sort of hey we tried that it didn't work do you consider yourself a war gamer sir and if so what do you play not in the sense of a teenager in front of the television set with the no not in that sense no i mean my war gaming

right now is limited to the software programs that the joint force the navy the marine corps has to test out i'm not a war gamer like a gamer if take the war part off i'm not a gamer no war gamer yeah but i focus very much in our war games on what were the assumptions that were fed in on the front end and who's playing the game because we a couple things I've learned the assumptions matter and the human beings matter because as long as you're playing one side and I'm playing another we both have biases we both have experiences okay that's going to influence the game somehow especially when you come to the adversary in a war game like who's playing the adversary and if they're playing Russia are they playing Russia or are they a U.S. guy playing

Russia. Or if you tell me, okay, Dave, okay, we have a war game in two weeks, and you're going to be the Chinese fleet commander. I'm like, okay, how do they think? So who plays the game really matters. Yes, sir. For that facility down in Quantico, how do you envision the link between that facility, its parent institution, and the Naval War College to continue to make progress on, for example the naval campaigning and how you want a naval campaign to unfold in the future the way you just sketched it out is exactly the way it has has to end up where this is linked stitched in together with other i would add places like norfolk as well where this last two weeks where this large-scale exercise that the navy and marine corps did okay there were multiple nodes

around the Norfolk area where they were virtual live constructive wargaming happening. The building that we're building in Quantico has to be able to tie in, stitch into those. The difference I would suppose is instead of modifying a building that exists to meet something that we're trying to do in the future, this is from the ground up built with the highest level of classification and comp pipes it's purpose built it's it's expensive but it's purpose built to go to the level of classification that you and i know you have to get to to really understand red and blue and all the factors there and and it's baked it built into it the ability to link into external stations otherwise if it's just an isolated on an island in quantico it's not going

to work. It has to be able to connect to external agencies. And I think that was some of the initial confusion. I hesitate to refer to it as pushback when people saw the price. And thank you for clarifying why that price is what it is, because it's not just a brick and mortar installation. It is a secure facility with all sorts of communications capabilities to link in and observe slash participate in some of these exercises. So I appreciate the background on that, You and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Brown, wrote on the need to better define readiness for War on the Rocks back in March. How do you approach the challenge of acquiring modern equipment while ensuring that equipment fits an expeditionary ethos? My example here that I always go back to is, you know, I had a college classmate who was a frog pilot, and he would talk about, hey, MB-22 gave us huge increased speed and range, but it's not really a quote-unquote expeditionary platform in the way that you could swap out a CH-46 engine in the desert with a toolkit and, you know, another aircraft bringing an engine in. You highlight a great point, because our acquisition system does not factor what you're talking about right now. It's built for cost and efficiency. It's not built for, my words, the way you described it, the ability to fix it forward without having to call a contractor with a specialty and send an x-ray back and all the other crap you got to do.

the machinery we buy the equipment that we field to your point in an expeditionary environment if we can't repair it forward don't bring it so either that means you know a skill set level in a repair marine or repair sail sailor or just a the ability to swap out a component you don't have to be an expert technician but pull that out put that in the the last part of this though is i think we've gotten spoiled in a contractors but he be the ability like an unlimited flow of parts that it's not going to happen in a contested environment if i if i were to contest us right now you don't have to kill us you just got to choke us off because if i can cut off their part supply their stuff ain't going to run if i can cut off their fuel so i think fixing it forward

foraging to your point all the way back into acquisition tell them we're not going to buy that radio we're not going to buy that truck if marines can't repair it in the field you got it and that means he's not going to buy we're not going to also bring another truckload of parts with us because we don't have we don't have room for that because you're not going to allow it on on your vessel you're like no can't do that so build it that can be repaired forward we can have swap out components. And by the way, because we're in smaller units, we're not going to have a technician in every Marine group. So it probably is going to be somebody that has four or five specialties, sort of think SEAL, soft sort of mentality where there's 10 of us and you're a

sniper and a corpsman and an electrician. You're all three. That's the mindset we have to be. But we have to drive it all the way back to the prime vendors, all the way back through the acquisition process to tell them we're not going to buy it if we can't fix it forward. Yes, sir. I think that gets back to your point about some of the changes you're looking for in recruiting as well. You're just going to have to start recruiting people who are going to be able to manage having five, six, seven, eight specialties and be able to perform all of them at a high level. But in the same article, you mentioned the tension inherent between demands of combatant commanders and service chiefs. Is there ongoing dialogue between the service chiefs and combatant commanders to moderate demand signal, allow the force to catch its breath? I'd imagine that's always ongoing, but just curious to hear your take on it. You are spot on. It happens every single day. There will be no moderation.

Anybody who believes that combatant commanders are going to moderate their requests don't understand the system that we have. If you and me work in SOUTHCOM or AFRICOM or CENTCOM or whatever COM, we're going to first fight to protect whatever assigned forces that we have, and then we're going to ask for more. Why? Because everything between what I have and what I need is risk. If I work for you, if you're the combatant commander, and we don't have enough of X aircraft carrier down to a squad, then that's risk that you own, right? you can't you you have that risk on your shoulders so you're naturally going to work there the system is built for them to ask for more and it's a short horizon this afternoon i need to buy down my wrist this afternoon but if you if you and i are working in the department of the navy we're thinking five six seven years down the road if you want to extend that ship for another 90 days it's going

to hurt us two years from now and i can tell you exactly what's going to happen or not exactly because we're actually going to find more maintenance, more problems when we crack that open that we didn't avail that we skip. I have no freaking clue what it's going to look like when we crack it open, but it ain't going to be pretty. So we're, our horizon is naturally longer. We're trying to build a force, maintain the force, have a ready force into the future. But the combatant commander, he's just trying to reduce his risk this afternoon. That's the tension. So sir, just two more questions. As you consider a future peer conflict, What campaigns do you personally prefer to study to prepare yourself for decision making in that kind of conflict?

One, I think we have a lot to learn about deterrence. There's a focus on the fight, as there should be, you know, the blue arrows and all the stuff that happens in a peer-to-peer fight scenario. But my understanding of our national defense strategy, which perhaps it will change, but I doubt the first aspect will change, the underpinnings of that is deterrence. So we should really study how we're going to conventionally and strategically and from a nuclear perspective, how are we going to deter, how are we going to prevent that fight from happening? and there's multiple ways to do that but the deterrence studying deterrence scenarios studying deterrence theories we should spend a lot of time on that because we haven't needed to as my point deter anybody for a long time not really now we neither this is the fight neither one of us wants but against an ad against a challenger like prc like the plan our way of

thinking deterrence by punishment like i'm just going to have the strongest force i have and if if you take the wrong move i'm going to punch you in the face okay that works against some adversaries but there is going to be a lot more nuanced than that going forward so we got to we got to study the theory and the scenarios around conventional deterrence as far as the fight itself against a peer adversary here i may be uh different than most but i can go back and read like captain Hughes stuff about the value of who gets the first shot what that means in a scenario now I'm overlaying on top of it today from space to cyber to information to the electronic spectrum now we're talking about first shot in a different more expanded way which most you know people are

familiar with today but the the premise of if you get the first shot you have a fundamental advantage Okay, so now I'm going back and rereading again his stuff, because there's value in that kind of tactics. He was looking at it maybe perhaps for a little bit different lens at a little bit different time, but the premise, the solid. If you're a SWO, like you're pointing out and you're in a SAG, you want the first shot. You want the first shot. You want to be in a positional advantage, you want an opportunity to take the first shot. Yes, sir. That is all the time that we have for today, sir. I'd like to thank my guest, General David Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Given everything that we've seen from you in the Marines the last two years, General, do you have any other major announcements planned for the next six months that you'd like to just get out of the way and air publicly here? You hit on the first one early on. There are two of my priorities for the next couple of years are talent management, human beings, and training, training and education, because the force design

that we're on a path to right now won't work unless those two parts are in place. Those are my two priorities. Thank you very much, sir. To our listeners, thanks for tuning in. We'll see you next time. Thank you. Chimborafilms.