Sea Control - Sea Control 277 - Chinese Escalation in Maritime Disputes with Dr. Hye Ryeon Jang

Episode Date: September 19, 2021

Links1. “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?”, by Graham Allison, The Atlantic, September 24, 20152. “Tribunal Rejects Beijing’s Claims in South China Sea,” by Jane Perlez, The New York Times, July 12, 20163. Dr. Hye Ryeon Jang’s website

Hey folks, Jared here. Today we have Walker Mills hosting and he's joined by Dr. Hai Rian Zhang to discuss her doctoral thesis on Chinese Escalation and Maritime Disputes. This episode was edited and produced by Marie Williams. We just launched the call for submissions for the SimSec Forum for authors and readers over at the main website. If there was a particular piece that you enjoyed this year, nominate it and if it gets enough votes, you can hear the author present his or her work. We've also officially put out our call for articles for the end of year fiction contest, so go over to simsec.org for full details. Finally, I want to take the opportunity to recommend our partners in the SimSec Podcast Network, the Bilge Pumps. You can find Alex, Jamie, Drack, and a pile of our own brew bottles wherever you download your podcasts. On that note, I'll turn it over to Kimbersman.

You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Welcome back aboard the Sea Control Podcast from the Center for International Maritime Security. Today, we're talking with Dr. Hai-Rian Zhang, who is a brand new PhD from the University of Florida. Today, we're going to be talking about her dissertation on Chinese escalation in the South China Sea. Helen, welcome aboard. Can you go ahead and introduce yourself a little bit more formally to our listeners? Hello, everyone. Thank you for inviting me to a Sea Control podcast. I just defended my PhD dissertation this morning. I became a PhD from the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida. My research focuses on international security, resource insecurity, Chinese foreign policy, political methodology, and specifically maritime conflict between China and its South China Sea and its Chinese neighbors. And before we start, I'd like to remind our listeners that the opinions presented here are solely our own and should not be taken as representative of any of the institutions that we are associated with. The title of your thesis is quite a mouthful, Selective Escalation in the South China Sea, China's Energy Mercantilism, Asymmetric Trade Dependence, and Militarized Maritime Disputes.

So could you just start by kind of breaking that down and explaining to us what you wrote about? Sure. My research began from an interesting empirical puzzle. China has demonstrated inconsistent behavior in its maritime disputes. When there was a fishing confrontation between China and Japan near Senkaku Island in the East China Sea in 2010, China did not use any military force. On the other hand, when there is another fishing confrontation between China and the Philippines near Escobar Shore in 2012, China dispatched more than 100 vessels for more than a month and eventually took de facto control over the area. So my dissertation aims to explore this puzzle, why China escalates disputes in some regions but not others. I argue that when China suffers from high energy vulnerability, the Chinese government prioritizes energy mercantilism. As one of its energy mercantilist policies, China attempts to secure a stable flow of oil imports through the major oil shipping lanes and energy resources that are embedded in the South China Sea.

Therefore, China may escalate low-intensity military actions more in the South China Sea than in the East China Sea. Unlike South China Sea, the East China Sea doesn't have a large energy reserve and close proximity to the major shipping lanes. Moreover, China's anti-submarine capitalism may lead it to confront its neighboring countries, which heavily rely on bilateral trade with China. These neighboring countries cannot retaliate economically, and China can use economic coercion to force them to de-escalate after its military escalation in the disputed area, which is basically Southeast Asian countries, the claimant of the South China Sea disputes. They are very asymmetrically dependent on China, but for China, they are not the major trading partners. Therefore, China can target Southeast Asian neighbors rather than Japan or South Korea, which are the major claimant of the Southeast China dispute, which is a key trading partner of China. And can you give us, Helen, maybe some examples of the kind of disputes that you're talking about?

I think our audience is probably familiar with some of them, but just, you know, so we kind of know what we're talking about when we say maritime disputes. China is engaging mainly two maritime disputes right now. One is in South China Sea, one is in East China Sea. South China Sea, China is engaging with Vietnam, Philippine, Malaysia, Brunei. They are the major claimants, and then they're looking for their jurisdictions over the South China Sea. And in that regard, China used the low-intensity military, also paramilitary actions, and then gradually increases the military projections throughout the region.

On the process, China has a conflict with the Philippine, Vietnam, mainly with those countries. For example, in 2012, the Philippine, I already mentioned briefly, in 2012, the Philippine engaged in a military, paramilitary confrontation with China. So that lasted more than a month because China basically blockaded the Scarborough Shore and then eventually Philippines withdrew from the region and then China took the area. Then now it became China's territory, so-called, internationally wrong, but China took the territory and now they are building another artificial island over Scarborough Shore. In Vietnam cases, for example, in 2014, when China started oil digging around the Paracel Islands, and China and Vietnam became very sensitive and sent more vessels over there, and China reacted to more vessels on it, that conflict also lasted more than a month. So oil and then protecting the sea lines of communication, those are the main key issues in the region between China and Southeast Asian neighbors. East China Sea conflict, it's between China, mainly China and Japan, over Senkaku Islands. But that area doesn't have that much natural resources.

There are some natural gas, but it's not major like South China Sea. So currently, Senkaku Islands is controlled by Japan, and China wants to challenge it. But so far, of course, China sent some Navy vessels, but there's no major military conflict between Japan and China so far. That's why I think it's interesting comparison between East China Sea and South China Sea, even though South China Sea is way farther than East China Sea in terms of China's perspective, but China shows more aggressions in the South China Sea. Yeah, I think that's really interesting. And that's part of the reason that we wanted to bring you on the podcast is to kind of parse out why they have this different reaction to disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. And I know you kind of hit on it already, but, you know, what's the big conclusion that you came to? You know, what is the difference between these two regions? So South China Sea has a way larger oil and natural gas reserve.

According to United States Energy Information Administration's data, they expect that 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas could be embedded in South China Sea that's quite a large amount of natural resources more than that when China imports oil from Middle East and or North Africa the those shipments passing through Indian Ocean and passing through the Strait of Malacca and the South China sea eventually ended up to mainland china on that train route south china sea uh located in a very critical position and then all the especially there are three main um trading routes and then those all passing through south china sea and then around a lot along the line with those islands

there are a lot of um there are a lot of islands which are under dispute so it's very important But on the other hand, East China Sea cases, East China Sea itself is very far from major shipping lane. We can also call the sea lines of communication, but it's very far from those major sea lines of communication because before reaching even to East China Sea, they can already reach it up on the mainland China. And then so far, there's not much oil reserve detected underneath of this China Sea. So in terms of those, and it's a mercantilistic perspective, South China Sea is much more valuable and much more critical for China's perspective than East China Sea. And I also want to ask, you talked some about China's own domestic perception of its dependence on foreign petroleum. And I was hoping you could talk a little bit more about that is what, you know, what does China think about its own dependence on foreign petroleum?

China has been sensitive to petroleum imports for a while. China needs more energy resources, a stable energy flow from the highly uncertain energy international market. And if insufficient energy supply significantly damage Chinese economy, which can damage Chinese regime survival. So as the level of China's oil import dependence increased in the early 1990s due to its rapid economic development, the Chinese government began to have concerns about its energy security. Because in 1993, China ultimately became a net oil importer, and since then, the gap between oil production and oil imports has widened. Interestingly, China is a top number five oil producing country in the world, but China consumes all of them. And then China needs more oil imports from the Middle East and Africa. So in 2009, China relied on imported oil more than half of its oil consumption.

So it's a really critical issue for China. Based on previous experience, the Chinese government believed that imported oil supplies are not really reliable. When China engaged in the Korean War in 1950, the United States embargoed oil shipments to China. Under the embargo, China had to rely on oil imports from the Soviet Union. But however, after the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, China heavily suffered from lack of oil and energy insecurity. Since then, they have this kind of a very critical historical legacy on how important it is about energy security. So the Chinese Communist Party elites made energy security as one of the top national interests officially, and edited in China's 10th five-year plan between 2001 and 2005 for the first time since then. Energy security is one of the top Chinese national security issues.

More than that, China's energy mercantilism is not simply driven by energy demand. It is also by its fear and mistrust of the United States. There is a widespread fear in the Chinese government of the possibility that the United States may blockade the South China Sea, specifically the Strait of Malacca. Since the Obama administration, the United States Navy has been sending its warships to South China Sea, which can trigger fear of the potential blockade of Strait of Malacca. It is hard to ignore that historical legacy and then the level of mistrust of the United States not really decreased, more increased dramatically, especially when Western media and then academia highlights more potential hegemonic competition between China and the United States. When I contacted some interview with American think tank personnel in Washington, D.C., no one really think that United States is capable or willing to blockade Australia and Malacca, but those facts are not that important once there's a discourse about the possibility of the United States blockade has been constructed. It does not matter whether the United States can actually do that or not.

So perception and a discourse, we can also call it misperception, that's already making the real threat perception within the Chinese government and perpetuating. Then they made a foreign policy based on their perception. That's how I evaluate Chinese government's overall thinking about the imported oil and why they fear that much. Well, I think that's super interesting. And there's a lot in there that I want to follow up on. I did not know that China was a top five oil producer. And I definitely have seen, I think, some of the material you're referencing about in US think tanks and US defense apparatus, arguing that kind of a blockade strategy would be effective against China. So, you know, I kind of understand that mentality. Are there major energy, major Chinese energy projects that are looking to get petroleum over land? I mean, do they have pipelines coming in or is it all coming in through maritime routes? Because of this high energy vulnerability situation, they wanted to build more pipeline because it could be more stable than maritime shipment.

So China tried to make a pipeline from Kazakhstan, Russia, and Myanmar. But first of all, Myanmar's political situation has been not really stable. So that construction prolonged for a while. Russia, according to my interview with the Chinese think tank personnel in Beijing, they don't really trust Russia because the Russians' natural gas company, they are really running by, of course, Russia's own interests. And then when Russia needs more gas money, then they build more. But if they don't want, they just stop the construction or that's also an unreliable partner, according to China's perspective.

In Kazakhstan, there's the limitations of how much oil actually China can import through the pipelines. But still, the majority of China's oil imports comes through the maritime route. And China is also aware of this situation, of course, because the maritime route can be dangerous. So they used a lot of diversification strategies. Pipeline is one of them. They made a more big stockpiling. China can survive 120 days without any extra oil support from outside. that's because they build the extra stockpiles.

And China tried to diversify importing sources because if you solely rely on one country, Middle East, they cannot be trustable either. So China's doing a lot of diversification strategy, but still it's not, cannot really solve the fundamental issues because anyway, majority of oil comes through the maritime route.

And then if China's not really controlling the South China Sea, they don't think it's really safe. i'm really struck by the similarities between uh what you're describing in the situation prior to the second world war where japan the japanese government was really worried about oil and energy security do you see some kind of parallels there or did you look at the japanese example at all as you were doing your research thanks for a really interesting question actually it's relevant to my next step project when i started this project first i was thinking china is a very

unique case but uh once my research went through i realized that china is not really unique actor in that sense because once the great power wants to rise uh during the process they always need more energy resources and japan pre um world war the second world war a definitely good example that how energy driven a great power can be dangerous but uh that's another extreme case but definitely um rising great power needs more energy resources and they chronically suffer from there was a perception of a high energy vulnerability and china is one of one of those great power i believe and they wanted to secure energy resources and secure safe routes and that's China's ultimate one of our ultimate goals why China so much like assertive and aggressive

in the region I also think some similarity between the when of the you know over the United States in the 60s and 70s when United States more pay a lot of attention to Paris and Gulf so every great power I think definitely especially when they are developing rising pace they definitely need more energy resources and then China is following that step that's how I perceive it. And then I want to develop my theories in that regard further. I think that's a really interesting take, because obviously, you know, our listeners are familiar with things like the Thucydides trap, Graham Allison's work. But I think looking specifically at energy makes that a little bit less abstract. And you can look at cases like Japan, Germany,

I think is another case where they were very worried about energy security, even though it's not necessarily a maritime case. One of the things I want to follow up on is you mentioned that you got to interview people at think tanks, both in Washington, DC and in Beijing. And I just have to ask, you know, what, what was this, what was the difference there? I mean, what kind of, was there anything in particular that stood out perspective wise or any kind of unique insights that you felt like you got after interviewing both of those groups of people kind of side by side? Thank you for a good question so i that those interview process through my field work was very interesting and when i was interviewing american think tank personnel they are uh they have a they try to find

some big picture from my research project like what's the united states take and then how how china's uh china's assertive behavior in the region can affect uh east asia in general so like a regional security architect how it affects that and then how it can be spiral into bigger conflict they're more they're really interested in those those questions this is because currently China's initiating low intensity small incident but um if they're they also want me they also want me to look into like where whether there's any chance that those small incidents can have a chance to become a bigger conflict eventually become a competition between United States and China. When I'm talking to Chinese think tankers now, first of all,

this is my personal perception that some Chinese experts, they wanted to minimize their energy vulnerability level. When I directly talk to them, they think it's more efficiency issues. They're not really afraid of energy security issues. But I can sense that there's definitely some tensions going on and then i don't think i had really had an interview with open um environment so definitely uh when i visited especially china it was uh right after china defeated by the philippine in the international tribunal court so it was not really good timing so um but uh yeah when i when i talked to them and they wanted to uh they're more into like argue that it's because of United States because the United States tried to engage more so we are

more reacting that's more their perspective but at the time the United States didn't even send that much worships at the time to the to the region and then they did not say anything about officially about South China Sea so I think um there's a little how can I say I I think for chinese chinese think tank personnel and i had a little difficulties in in terms of get a true opinion for what they're thinking because of this closed um authoritarian political culture i just think that's super super fascinating both uh you know that you were able to kind of contrast the two perspectives but and also kind of think a little bit deeper about you know what what are they thinking but potentially not saying um and and kind of peek behind the curtain a

little bit. So Helen, I kind of want to roll it up here and say, well, what, based on your research, do you have recommendations for policymakers in the United States or in China? I mean, do you think that this is research that someone, that a practitioner or a policymaker can learn some lessons or kind of gain some valuable insights from? The current literature and media focuses on the assumption that China has an unlimited ambition and demonstrated a uniformly aggressive foreign policy behavior in its maritime disputes, especially recently. A lot of news focused on that.

However, after collecting data and testing multiple hypotheses using interdisciplinary methodologies, I'm confident to argue that China has a rather selective escalation strategy with a limited aim in the regional maritime disputes. disputes china's real vulnerability came comes from energy security china aimed to secure major shipping lanes energy resources china also does not want to sacrifice any important trading part partnership with the major trading partners so one of the good example is in 2010 when there's a conflict between china and japan in the east china sea china banned rare earth materials of

Of course, they didn't do anything officially, but allegedly. So they imposed a ban on rare earth exports to Japan. That was, for short term, that was effective. But Japan, in the long term, after 2010, they found alternative sources. So they gradually decreased the amount of rare earth material imports from China. So China doesn't want those sacrifices anymore, which can be harmful to economic development in the long term. So in my perspective, the American government also understood that China's aggression in the South China Sea has been developed from unlimited great power ambition from Trump administration, especially the United States Navy more often than dispatched its vessel to the South China Sea.

And Biden administration's policy is not so much different from that. So this kind of policy can be easily interpreted as a sign of beginning of great power competition. But instead, I think it is important to think back to the United States' previous experiences when the United States was rising, and then like how energy resources was better or better when trying to control, trying to project more foreign policy, foreign policy toward in the Middle East, that kind of at the time. So South China Sea is very essential for China in that regard. China wanted to secure energy resources, and then that's why China used energy mercantilism. Because of that, China tried to show assertive, aggressive behavior in the region. It's critical to understand China's limited aim and critical vulnerability in the South China Sea.

Then I believe this could be my one of biggest contribution to the field, because it's not everything is not about China's unilateral behavior and the like unlimited aims. It's more about China's limited goal, energy security around the South China Sea disputes. And before jumping into these disputes, I think any either United States or neighboring countries, it's very important to understand, like, what's really underlying aim and goal. And then how China wants to project in the region. It's very important to understand those things before executing any critical foreign policy into the region. helen i think we're just about out of time um but before we go i want to ask you uh what you're working on now kind of what what projects we might see from you in in the future um and then if anywhere where our listeners can uh can find you and follow you online i aim to expand my

dissertation to the dynamics between international oil politics trade security and great power politics so i'm collaborating with benjamin smith from my department and developing one paper about the dynamics of oil and interstate conflict within the context of evolving global oil market that is characterized by rising and falling great powers. So I constructed a new data set on the international oil trade network and conducted spatial network analysis. So since 2012, China became a center of the network. And overall, oil producing countries are not bellicose towards their neighbors, regardless of the alliance pattern. However, oil producing countries allied with the united states during cold war tend to be aggressive but this is interesting

finding and i'm we are going to develop this paper and then we'll submit to the one of our academic journals soon so um if you're interested in my work i'm currently in florida and i'm also actively on the job market right now um you please visit my website www.h-y-e-r-y-e-o-n-j-a-n-g.com or send me an email hrjang52 at ufledu thanks a lot thank you and you have to let us know when you publish so we can have you back on the podcast i'd like to thank my guest again hyrion jang for joining us today and talking about her thesis on chinese escalation and maritime disputes take care Put it on the shimbo now.

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