Sea Control - Sea Control 300 - A New Planning Model for Lower-Threshold Maritime Operations

Episode Date: December 9, 2021

Links: 1. A New U.S. Planning Model for Lower-threshold Maritime Security Operations, Part 1, by Andrew Norris, CIMSEC, July 2021.2. A New U.S. Planning Model for Lower-threshold Maritime Security Operations, Part 2, by Andrew Norris, CIMSEC, July 2021.

Hey folks, Sherrod here. John Frerichs is your host today, and he's joined by SIMSEC contributor Andrew Norris to discuss the new Navy planning model for low-intensity operations. This episode was edited and produced by Joshua Gruver. Speaking of editors, we're looking for some additional editors to add to our team. If you're interested, please email us at ccontrol at simsec.org with your resume. SIMSEC, we believe victory in the maritime domain starts with great ideas communicated compellingly. write, fight, win. Beginning with Giving Tuesday going through December, we're holding our annual Write, Fight, Win holiday donation campaign to support SimSec into the new year. SimSec's proud to say since our founding, our content has been free and always will be. Especially as more

websites build paywalls or pursue intrusive advertising, we hope those in the SimSec community who value our free no-ad model will consider supporting us with monthly donations. Finally, I want to take the opportunity to recommend our partners in the SimSec podcast network, The Bilge Pumps. You can find Alex, Jamie, Drack, and a pile of Iron Brew bottles wherever you download your podcasts. On that note, I'll turn it over to Kimbersman. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Guten Tag, shipmates, and welcome back. Today, we will discuss a pair of recent articles published by SimSec that proposes an alternative planning model for lower threshold maritime security

operations. Today as our guest, we have the author, Andy Norris, who is a retired captain in the U.S. Coast Guard, a regular contributor to both CIMSEC as well as several other naval-focused organizations. Andy, can you please give us a brief personal introduction? Yes, first of all, good morning, and I very much appreciate the opportunity to participate in this podcast here today. As you mentioned, I'm a retired Coast Guard captain, served from 1994 until 2016. I'm a JAG, or I'm a lawyer, so I served as a JAG, but in the Coast Guard, we're actually just line officers, so I can move in and out of legal billets, but most of my billets were, my jobs were in the legal realm, either teaching or in the operations side. Before going to law school

in the 80s. I was a U.S. Navy surface warfare officer, so I did four years as a surface line officer and served aboard the USS Kidd, deployed to the Persian Gulf during the tanker wars in 1987. Other than that, since retiring from the Coast Guard in 2016, I've worked principally as a maritime consultant, but in the last two years have been employed at the Naval War College as a contractor to put together a brand new five-month course for mid-level international officers. The course will be called Maritime Security and Governance Staff Course. So it's really a Coast Guard-ish focused course that will first be offered next January, so January 2022. And then if all goes well, it'll be offered twice a year in the years following that, so

beginning in 2023. So that's what I've been doing, and that's where I'm working full-time these days. Andy, thank you for that, and I look forward to seeing how that course develops. The article we're going to focus on today is titled, A New U.S. Navy Planning Model for Lower Threshold Maritime Security Operations. It was published as a two-part series on the CIMSEC website in July and August of 2021. While each service has their own planning process, in addition of the joint planning process, sometimes the processes do not quite seem to fit the problem they're trying to solve. When I came across this article, I really appreciated that the proposal of an alternative planning model that was still nested with the Navy planning process. It was

both complementary and not contradictory. It was not asking planners to simply apply a new process, but recognize that the process could be improved for lower threshold maritime security operations. Before we begin, I'll remind the listeners that all opinions expressed are our own and not reflective of any institutions with which we might be otherwise associated. Andy, within the Naval Service, I briefly just addressed it, but between the Navy, the Coast Guard, and the Marine Corps, there are already three different planning processes, not to mention the joint planning process. Why did you decide to write about revising or improving the Navy planning process? Really, what was the problem you were trying to solve? You actually stated it very well in your

introduction there to the question, which is that the NPP naval planning process is not ideally suited for planning operations at the lower end of the, referred to as the competition continuum. So lower threshold missions, the Navy planning process doesn't provide much guidance on how to plan for those operations. So that is the problem that was trying to solve. But actually it's a little bit, it goes a little bit further back than that because of that course that I'm working on. It's a maritime security and governance course, and we're touting it at the operational level. So really, it started with me thinking about, well, what exactly is the operational level of maritime security? It was that thinking that led to the model that we'll

talk about later. But it was really more with an academic focus. If we're going to do what we promised to do, which is to teach maritime security at the operational level, what exactly does that mean? It was that thought of thinking that led to the development of the model. And it was further thinking about how to operationalize the model that I came up with that led to the connection within the Navy planning process. Quick side question then, do you plan or do you see this, your planning proposal, or are you intending to integrate it into the course you're developing? To me, if one is going to talk about maritime security and do so at the operational level, the model is an essential component for any type of discussion of maritime security at

the operational level. So whether it's in an academic setting or whether it's an operational setting, I think, and I posit, that the model is an essential component of any discussion Because what it really does is it forces consideration of the full spectrum of things, and that's not a particularly artful way of saying it, but the full spectrum of things that need to be considered if you're going to talk about and teach or if you're going to be planning for such operations. So it has utility, I think, across the spectrum, regardless of what you're going, what one plans to do. If you're going to think at the operational level about maritime security, I think that the model is essential in that it is completely captures or encapsulates sort of all the particular variables and considerations that need to go into that thinking. So let's get into your actual thesis. What was your underlying thesis or premises that guided you in your thinking and ultimately led to the formation of your argument? Right. So it was initially, as we've said, it was trying to reconcile in my own mind, if we're going to teach at maritime security at the operational level, what that really meant. But the thesis, and then as it further morphed into consideration of how this could be operationalized, as it were, then the thesis or the precepts under which I operated were, first of all, the U.S. Navy is going to be called upon to more and more to conduct operations at the lower end of the competition continuum, so lower threshold constabulary type missions. That's premise number one. Premise number two, if the Navy is going, U.S. Navy, if it's going to increasingly be operating at that ground, those types of missions, then the Navy has to be able to plan to conduct operations, not just missions, not just in response to pop-up whack-a-mole type activities, but planning operations at that level.

That's premise number two. Premise number three, then, is that the Navy's planning process is focused on combat at sea, not on these types of missions. That's not really a premise. It's really an observation. But nonetheless, it is an underlying premise in the sense that my review of the Navy planning process demonstrated to me that the Navy planning process is not ideally suited for planning for these types of operations, lower threshold maritime security operations, and that the guidance to planners in utilizing the NPP for planning for such operations is sparse. So that was the next premise. And then finally, it is that, okay, so taking that all together, if the Navy is going to be doing these types of missions or operations more and more, if they need to plan at the operational level, if they're going to be using the NPP to do that, then it would be useful to provide guidance to those individuals, those people who are going to be using the NPP for such purposes, provide guidance on how better to think about these types of operations and thus to plan. for them. That's sort of the progress of thought that led to the development of this model, but really the operationalization of the model within the Navy planning process. So broadly, you characterize the operations as maritime security operations. How are maritime security operations unique? And more specifically, what about them triggers a need for more systematic thought and planning process? Yeah, maritime security operations, I use that term.

First of all, it's not necessarily a term of art, and there's disagreement, or not disagreement necessarily, but there's a lot of different definitions out there about what maritime security operations are. So for the purposes of the article, I equate those to operations short of war, which is a term used by the new tri-service strategy advantage at sea. So operations short of war, for purposes of the article, equate to maritime security operations. Operations short of war are, well, operations short of war across the competition continuum. Lower end of that competition are more constabulary missions, law enforcement derivation, and at the upper end are, but still short of war. But the upper end are missions or operations that have an armed force

derivation, so for political and military purposes. But nonetheless, these are all operations short of war, which are collectively referred to as maritime security operations. And the idea here is that these types of missions and related operations are fundamentally different from naval warfare. They have different rule sets. They're much more complicated. They're much more unique. As another author who I used for inspiration, who proposes legitimacy as the ultimate guide for the lawfulness of operations short of war, who describes the array of legal regimes, treaties, and sources of authority that need to be fully appreciated, understood, and leveraged. So there's a lot more that goes into these operations short of war or maritime

security operations. Ultimately, there's a test of legitimacy. These operations have to be legitimate. And in order to be legitimate, they have to conform to and comply with a broad range of legal requirements that just aren't, don't come into play with planning for combat operations for which the naval planning process is optimized. I enjoy the aspects of legitimacy. And I think that's, you know, it's something that we've looked at particularly over the last two decades. And I agree with your point that that's not something that the traditional planning process at least addresses upfront. For your specific proposal, I also appreciate that you narrowed your focus even further and looked at an alternative framework to guide the development

specifically of staff estimates during an admission analysis step of the Navy planning process. Can you walk the listeners through your proposal and how you think it will help? Yes, and I have to, you know, a disclaimer up front is I'm not a planner and don't purport to be an expert on the Navy planning process. What I am is a maritime security expert, and it's in that realm that I think I have something to offer. But in looking at the Navy planning process and having already resolved in my mind what the essential considerations are, which is reflected in the model, in looking through the Navy planning process, the place where those considerations should be taken into account is at the mission analysis phase. So it's thinking about the

mission. Just again, if it's thinking about it from an academia or thinking about it in an operational sense, it's thinking about these missions through really the staff estimates, particularly the legal estimate, but other estimates come into play. But it is at that phase where it's critical that the proper thinking occurs. Because if aspects of a contemplated operation aren't thought through there, then at best, once later in the process, the realization arises, oh, we should have thought about this. Then you've got to revert back to the mission analysis phase, the staff estimates and revise them. And that's time consuming and tedious. But either way, and if you don't think about these types of things at all, some of these

considerations, and then you plan an operation and conduct an operation without having thought of these things, then it could cause the operation to fail. And the ultimate goal of operations, particularly in the constabulary realm, the lower threshold maritime security missions, the ultimate goal is to achieve a legal finish, to have some sort of concrete result. So really, if proper thinking isn't done, you jeopardize the whole purpose of the underlying operation, which is to achieve a concrete result, which is referred to as a legal finish, which could be arrest, seizure, and prosecution, either done by yourself, the U.S., or in assistance with other allies and partners. But either way, the success of the operation is jeopardized if there is not proper thinking, and the proper thinking needs to occur at the mission analysis phase as informed by staff estimates. So that's the proper place for that to occur, and that's where the model that I come up with provides guidance on how to do mission analysis for these types of operations. Andy, it was the, I think the practicality of how you framed that, that really struck me, you know, the staff estimates and really getting after from a planning perspective, the facts, assumptions and limitations, and how that feeds into everyone's understanding of the actual problem and what you were trying to solve, I think was really the proposal and the aspect of the proposal that struck me the most.

The only thing I would add on there is within the planning process, the importance to continually go back to those and validate them or invalidate them and see if you need to reframe or conduct a subsequent mission analysis based on a change within the operating environment. So, Andy, to dig into the actual model itself, we've talked through and looked at aspects of how to change the staff estimates and how they would contribute. but can you provide us a little bit more detail on the framework of the model that you're proposing and maybe provide some tangible examples of how they'd be applied? Proper thinking needs to occur at the mission analysis phase as informed by staff estimates of the Navy planning process. The Navy planning process itself and other ancillary documents do not provide much guidance on how to go about conducting mission analysis for these types of lower threshold maritime security operations. So that's what the model that I've proposed is intended to do.

It's to help guide the thinking that occurs at that phase. And the model is a four-part. So the four things, there's constraints, restraints, enablers, and imperatives. That's the model. And if you think about it, that's the full universe of the types of things that should be thought about. Constraints. Those are things that can't be done or aspects of operations that can't be done where there's prohibitions.

So examples of that would be the rule that a flag state has exclusive jurisdiction over its vessels on the high seas. The constraint there would be then for if I were planning or we were planning or the U.S. is planning a maritime security operation, The constraint, related constraint there would be that law enforcement or other types of activities cannot be taken aboard a foreign vessel on the high seas because that's the exclusive domain of the flag state. Other constraints, which, again, are prohibitions, are the fact that, for example, that there's no criminal prosecutions in fisheries cases or the principle that a person can't be returned to a country if he or she would be subject to torture or persecution or otherwise. These are things that prohibit certain activities during an operation and they need to be thought about. Those are the constraints. Restraints are where this is where, well, an operation can occur or components of an operation can occur. But there are limitations. So, for example, limitation or restraint would be if there's reservations of authority at the higher levels in the Coast Guard. it's called, for example, a statement of no objection. Units on scene cannot take certain

actions without a buy or leave from a commander. And so that's a restraint. That is a restriction in operation. That one is a domestic command and control restriction. But there are restrictions that derive from international law. There's restrictions or restraints that derive from domestic law. So again, for example, the use of force in constabulary operations, it's limited. It's not the same as use of force for combat operations. There's a very, very restrictive use of force regime, and that has to be thought of and considered. That's a restraint. Other restraints would be, for example, the use of hot pursuit, when it can be initiated, by whom hot pursuit can be conducted, and when it has to end. Those are all restraints that have to be thought

of as part of the suite of considerations at the mission analysis phase. The third is enablers. Enablers are, again, where you can do something, but here these are things that promote mission accomplishment as opposed to a restraint that may limit them. And enablers are really the most important because ideally one would want to shape constraints, restraints, or as we'll see, imperatives, which is the fourth component of the model, but you want to shape as much as possible those things into enablers, because these are things that promote success of the mission or the operation. So, for example, flag state consent, that can be a standing or it can be ad hoc, but nonetheless, that is an enabler that helps you get past the constraint that I talked

about before that otherwise on the high seas, foreign vessels are off limits. However, consent by the flag state is an enabler that allows you to get past what would otherwise be a constraint. Also, any kind of bilateral agreements that allow for such thing as shipwriters, where a foreign law enforcement officer may ride on a U.S. vessel and the U.S. assists him or her in enforcing laws in maritime zones that were otherwise the U.S. would be unable to operate by law. Things like that enable operational success, and thus they're referred to as enablers. And finally, there's imperatives. So we've talked about constraints, restraints, enablers, and imperatives is the fourth. These are things that you must do. So constraints, things you can't do, restraints

you can do, but there's limitations, enablers, things you can do, but where there's things that promote mission success, and then imperatives. These are things that you have to do. And so, for example, the flag state has a duty under UNCLOS to oversee the administrative, technical, and social aspects of its fleet. There's duties to cooperate in UNCLOS and in other agreements for the suppression of piracy, for the suppression of drugs. These are imperatives, and these are all things that need to be considered. The full suite from constraints to restraints, enablers, and imperatives, that's the full suite of things that need to be considered when planning for these operations, and the consideration needs to occur at the

mission analysis phase as informed by staff estimates. I appreciate that breakdown and the aspects, you know, in the joint planning process, oftentimes at the higher level, at the operational level, I've seen all those just get lumped into and just be called, you know, limitations. But the way you've, you know, eloquently broke those down, it really forces the planner to look at different angles and aspects of limitations. And I think really, again, ensures an appropriate and thorough look to be able to inform it and move along within the planning process. Andy, not a question I had prepared you for. And if you need to take a minute, that's fine.

But I'd like to get your perspective based on your time, both within the Navy, as well as within the Marine Corps. We're in a kind of a dynamic and ever-changing environment right now within the security and maritime security. If you were CNO for the day, what changes would you implement and why? I'd like to be the CNO for more than a day. But no, that's an interesting question. I have long felt and believe it to be the case that the single naval service, so first of all, the advantage at sea, the tri-service strategy refers to a single naval service.

So, yes, there are three naval services of the United States, but nonetheless, in terms of thinking, reflecting, of course, joint concepts and otherwise, but in terms of thinking, it's a single naval service with a single then mission. And again, while they are three separate services and while each has its own distinct and unique authorities and mindsets and all that sort of stuff, at least if the strategy is to be followed, there's going to be more unity of efforts and more, I hate to say it, but homogenization of the services, at least in terms of the mission focus. And what that translates to in concrete terms is that the Navy and Coast Guard, or excuse me, Navy and Marine Corps are doing sort of more Coast Guard-ish missions and the Coast Guard doing more naval missions. So, for example, the Coast Guard doing freedom of navigation operations, missions with more of a political slash military purpose than constabulary. But the converse of that is that if the Navy and the Marine Corps are going to be doing more of these missions at the lower end of the spectrum, that seems to be a conclusion that is inescapable. And I think that this has been the way it has been, whether we've realized it and actually put it in a document like this, a strategy like this, I think it's been the reality for quite some time. So the advantage that he talks in terms of prevailing in day to day competition, and that is a central pillar. And that is really kind of the essence, because, yes, we the United States and all military services have to be prepared for combat at sea against a peer or near peer competitor.

But on a daily basis, if we're going to prevail in day-to-day competition, then what that translates to is all these smaller things that we're doing in support of allies and partners or for our own purposes, but really activities to promote good maritime governance and to promote maritime security. So these lesser threshold types of operations are going to be, it's inescapable if we're going to prevail in day-to-day competition, which we have to do, then the other services doing these types of operations more and more, it's inescapable and it's an essential component of sort of carrying out that pillar of the strategy. So if I were CNO for a day, I would increase the, but it has to be done delicately, obviously, because we cannot lose our ability or diminish our ability to fight and win wars. But nonetheless, I would reorient, if that's the right word, the Navy's focus toward these lower threshold missions. They're vital to preserving maritime security and they're vital to us and they're vital to our friends and allies and they're vital to maintenance of the liberal order at sea, which everybody is a proponent of. and free utilization of the oceans and the like. So my answer would be I would reorient the services thinking and really operationalize that component of advantage of sea for the U.S. Navy

by focusing more on these lower threshold types of missions. Andy, thank you for that and appreciate the short notice question there. Thank you for taking the time to discuss today. But before we wrap, where can listeners connect with you on social media and what are you working next? Thank you. And I very much appreciate the opportunity to talk with you here today. We are in the final phases of preparation for that course.

So that's got most of my attention. I do have in mind an article. I've done the research for it. And it's a line of effort that I've gone down before, which is maritime legal history. So it's different from this here. But it's an article that looks at the 1909 London Naval Conference, where the 10 major maritime powers were brought together by Britain in an effort to codify the laws of naval warfare. And it was a it was a process that was initiated by Britain. It was hosted by Britain. Britain, the hegemon, the naval hegemon of the time, drafted the articles and shepherded the entire process.

But then at the end of it all, the British Parliament rejected the proposed agreement. And if Britain didn't go along with it, then nobody else did. So it died on the vine. It's fascinating to me, the process, and really it's parallel to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, which, of course, the U.S. has not ratified despite being a major player in that. So that's the article I think I'll work on next. As far as contacting me, anaris at tradewindmaritimeservices.com. I'm sorry that's very long, but that's my email address and that's the best means of contacting me and look forward to hearing from you and from listeners. And again, very much appreciate the opportunity to talk with you here today. Andy, thanks. And I look forward to that.

the next article. Again, my sincere appreciation for coming on the podcast today to discuss your articles. To the listeners, highly recommend you check out his proposal to modifying the Navy planning process. I believe it has a lot to offer, particularly at the operational level. Thank you for listening, and until next time, guten tag! © BF-WATCH TV 2021 We'll be right back.