Sea Control - Sea Control 321 - France's Changing Relations with China (French Version)

Episode Date: February 24, 2022

Links1. "L’éveil de la France au défi chinois," by Pierre Morcos, le Rubicon, January 11, 2022.2. "France's Shifting Relations with China," by Pierre Morcos, War on the Rocks, January 4, 2022.3. Livre Blanc sur la Défense et sécurité nationale 2013 ( French White book on National Defense and Security 2013).4. Actualisation stratégique 2021 (French strategic update 2021).

If I've shared here, Alexia Boulaghi is back as host and editor supreme this week. We have another episode published in both French and English, so choose whichever one suits you. But Alexia is joined by Pierre Morkos to discuss France's changing relationship with China. We are still looking for audio editors to add to our team, so if you're interested, please email us. The address is ccontrol at simsec.org with your resume. I want to highlight a couple of developments over at the main website. In the last two months, we've launched the Flotilla, SimSec's warfighting society focused on tactics. And just in the last couple of weeks, we launched our Naval Wargaming Discord.

You can find more information at SimSec.org. Finally, I want to take the opportunity to recommend our partners in the SimSec podcast network, the Bilge Pumps. You can find Alex, Jamie, Drack, and a pile of iron brew bottles wherever you download your podcast. On that note, I'll turn it over to Kimber's men. You're listening to Sea Control, posted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Aloha camarades de bord et bienvenue à bord de Sea Control. Aujourd'hui je suis rejoint par Pierre Morcos et nous allons discuter de son dernier article pour War on the Rocks, France's Shifting Relations with China.

Pierre Morcos, bienvenue. Could you introduce yourself to our audience and tell us a little bit more about your journey? Hello Alexia, thank you very much for the invitation. My name is Pierre Morcos, I am a French diplomat, currently associate researcher at the Europe, Russia and Eurasia Programme of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, one of the main think tanks in Washington on the issues of security and defence. Previously, I worked for the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs,

and more specifically in the direction of strategic affairs, where I will cover the issues of European security and defence. Thank you very much and as a reminder, all the opinions expressed belong to us and are not representative of any institution to which we could be otherwise associated. To start this interview, I would like to ask you how your reflection on the subject was formed and what was the genesis of this article? The starting point of this article was the announcement of the trilatéral entre les États-Unis, l'Australie et le Royaume-Uni, dénommé AUKUS, en septembre dernier. C'était pour moi un moment assez frappant, puisqu'il a révélé que Washington était

finalement peu consciente des enjeux et des intérêts qu'avait la France dans la région Indo-Pacifique, et a mis en valeur les nombreuses erreurs d'appréciation qu'avaient les États-Unis à l'égard de la France lorsqu'il s'agit de son approche à l'égard de la Chine. Donc c'était un moment assez fort et pour moi il me semblait important d'écrire un article expliquant qu'en réalité, derrière ces désaccords de façade, il y a une grande convergence d'intérêts entre Washington et Paris lorsqu'il s'agit de l'Indo-Pacifique en général et de la Chine en particulier. L'objectif de mon article est de revenir sur certains des mythes qui ont été véhiculés lors de la crise qui a suivi AUKUS et d'expliquer en quoi nos deux pays, en réalité, ont des approches tout à fait convergentes lorsqu'il s'agit de faire face à Pékin. Merci beaucoup. Pour tenter d'analyser les relations franco-chinoises, j'ai envie de vous demander quels sont les principaux facteurs qui ont influencé les changements stratégiques opérés que vous décrivez dans votre article par la France dans ses relations avec la Chine.

To begin with, I would like to come back to the approach defended by France a decade ago, which was very different. When you read the White Paper of 2013, you can see that France hoped to feed a global partnership with China, covering all of the main issues and supported by high-level commitments between their authorities. Less than 10 years after this document, when you read the strategic update of 2021, China is presented by France above all as a systemic rival and then as a strategic competitor and on certain issues as a diplomatic partner. So there is really a change of tone, a change of perception which is very strong in France and which is explained by a certain number of factors.

In my paper, I mention three in particular. Le premier, ce sont les violations des droits de l'homme par la Chine à l'égard de la communauté des Ouïghours ou à Hong Kong, qui ont été rapidement dénoncées par les autorités françaises et ont conduit les autorités françaises et européennes à adopter des sanctions à l'égard de Pékin, une première depuis les événements de Tiananmen, donc vraiment un geste fort de la part de l'Europe, en coordination avec les États-Unis d'ailleurs. The second factor is the increasingly aggressive diplomatic tone from Beijing

towards France in particular, but in general towards Western countries. With this diplomacy that we qualify as wolf-warrior, in France, the Chinese embassy in Paris is extremely virulent towards French authorities, French experts, French politicians, when they take positions in Taiwan or Hong Kong, or when France was at the heart of the COVID-19 epidemic. This led the French minister to call on the Chinese ambassador to Paris twice last year to explain to him that this attitude was unacceptable on a diplomatic level.

Finally, the third factor that seemed interesting to me to highlight is the fact that France, due to its presence in the Pacific Ocean with its overseas territories, is directly confronted with the increasing aggressiveness of China on a military level. Already in our territories in the Pacific, whether it's in French Polynesia or New Caledonia, we note that China is increasingly active and has a growing interest when it comes to our natural resources. But more generally, when France deploy warships in the South China Sea, We see that the Chinese navy is more and more present and prevents a free circulation of our boats. All of these factors have led France to change its position and harden its position towards Beijing.

We would like to establish categories to try to see more clearly. So what are the elements of continuity and rupture, according to you, in the relations between France and China? and on this point, in the face of the suffocating strategy and hybrid tactics of China, what are the immediate and long-term challenges for France in order to protect its strategic interests? I think that the element of continuity, the fact that France is attached to not limiting its relationship with China to a single dimension. As we mentioned earlier, for Paris,

China is both a rival, a competitor and a partner. And none of these dimensions must be forgotten. So that's a very important element of the French approach. That being said, where there is a shift, I wouldn't say a break, but a shift, it's in the balance to establish between these three dimensions. Where France put more emphasis on dialogue, cooperation, a decade ago, today we insist more on the need to no longer be naive about Beijing and to prepare us for a long-term competition

vis-à-vis China on a certain number of issues. Clearly, I think that's really the change of paradigm. When it comes to the suffocating strategy, the suffocating strategy of Beijing, it's an expression used by the French Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Vendier, in an interview with Le Monde a few months ago. He explained that when we deployed warships in the South China Sea,

nous étions confrontés à une stratégie de fait accompli de la Chine qui suivait systématiquement nos vaisseaux, qui forçait nos navires à manœuvrer pour éviter toute collision. Il s'agissait vraiment d'une attitude allant à l'encontre de la liberté de navigation et de notre conception du droit de la mer. Et c'est un point particulièrement important pour la France qui est à la deuxième zone économique exclusive du monde en raison de ses territoires d'outre-mer, après les États-Unis.

So France is a maritime power that is very attached to these principles, very attached to this right. And clearly, the Chinese strategy goes against our vision of the right to the sea. So here we come to what you say, a tension, a paradox between competition and collaboration, cooperation. How does France intend to find a balance between these two aspects, competition and collaboration with Beijing, which is both a systemic rival and an important diplomatic partner? Qu'est-ce que ce paradoxe implique ? Est-ce une stratégie réaliste pour la France ? C'est une question centrale. Clairement, l'objectif aujourd'hui, la grande priorité, c'est d'établir le bon équilibre

entre notre engagement à l'égard de Pékin et la nécessaire compétition que nous devons avoir avec ce pays. Et selon moi, il n'y a pas de réponse toute faite. C'est vraiment un équilibre en construction, en permanence construction, qui dépend de notre évaluation du comportement chinois, where we insisted more on collaboration a few years ago, today it is necessary to be more firm on issues of competition or systemic rivalry. I would like to add that we should not believe

that there is a competition or a contradiction between these different dimensions. Quite the contrary. When we have disagreements with strategic actors, we need dialogue, we need diplomacy. And we could establish a parallel in this regard with Russia, with which we know of great tensions currently, whether it be the situation in Ukraine, but on other issues as well.

And despite these tensions, or because of these tensions, we have never spoken as much to Russia, at the level of NATO, of the ECU, or in a bilateral way, because we need dialogue to highlight our disagreements and find diplomatic solutions to these disagreements. So the same thing is valid for China, even if we are in competition, or because we are in competition, en rivalité, nous avons besoin d'une forme de transparence, nous avons besoin d'un dialogue

pour obtenir une forme de stabilité dans notre relation. Merci beaucoup, et nous allons maintenant nous tourner vers un autre acteur majeur des relations internationales que vous citez dans votre article et que vous analysez. Les Etats-Unis, comment la relation France-Etats-Unis a-t-elle été affectée par le problème chinois ? Comment se fait-il qu'il y ait, comme vous le dites dans votre article, plus de terrain d'entente qu'il n'y paraît ? It's a key point. I think that under the Trump administration, there were clearly disagreements between France and the United States on this issue. And France, like other actors in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Australia, Japan or India, was worried about the emphasis put on military confrontation in the strategy of the Trump administration.

I think that under the Biden administration, there is a real agreement and a real convergence between our two countries. et c'est d'ailleurs un point qui avait été souligné par le ministre des Affaires étrangères français, Le Drian, lors de sa visite à Washington en juillet dernier, sa première visite sous l'administration Biden, et il avait à cette occasion donné un discours public dans lequel il insistait sur la convergence des approches entre la France et les États-Unis, s'agissant de l'Indo-Pacifique et de la Chine en particulier. Alors, bien évidemment, l'annonce d'Aucus et la crise diplomatique

qui a été provoquée par cela a un peu mis en suspens cette convergence. Mais les deux pays sont parvenus à rétablir et à réparer leurs relations diplomatiques, notamment à travers une déclaration conjointe adoptée à Rome en octobre dernier, à l'occasion de la rencontre entre les présidents Biden et Macron. Et dans cette déclaration, les deux pays assistent sur le besoin de renforcer leur collaboration en Indo-Pacifique. And more specifically, the United States recognizes the importance of the French contribution to the stability of the region. Clearly, there is today a political appetite for more cooperation. For this cooperation to be fruitful, I think that Washington must be well aware of three great principles of the French approach that I evoke in my article.

The first, I already mentioned it quite long ago, France does not want to limit its relationship with China to a single dimension. I consider that dialogue is also an integral part of any relationship with Pekin. The second principle is the European dimension. For France, it is essential that Europe is fully engaged in this Indo-Pacific strategy, because Europe has many assets to play a role in this competition. Finally, a third important dimension is the fact that France wants to avoid any polarization of the region and create or feed a dual rivalry between Pekin and Washington. On the contrary, France is trying to promote an alternative model to that of Beijing,

based on the rule of law, on transparency, on sustainable development, to offer an alternative to the countries of the region in the face of the Chinese model. We will continue on this theme. And as far as the OCCUS and the relationship between France and the United States are concerned, you write in a simple but I find it very pertinent and to be highlighted in these times of international crisis, often recognize where the political misunderstanding is, facilitates cooperation. Could you elaborate on this point? Yes, I think it's a central element because the AUKUS crisis revealed that there were

still big errors of appreciation, misunderstandings, ideas received from other parts of the Atlantic and such errors of perception could lead to major diplomatic incidents. major. To return to AUKUS, I find that AUKUS has revealed in an erroneous way that the French approach was perceived by Canberra and Washington as too weak, conciliating with regard to Beijing and that France would not have been ready to support, in particular Canberra, in its iron arm with Beijing on a certain number of issues. And that finally led Washington and Canberra to make a a strategic choice that has been at the expense of French interests, at the expense of their partnership with France.

So, in my opinion, AUKUS must serve as a lesson and push us to have a frank dialogue with our closest allies, because even if we share the same story, the same interests, the same values, there can sometimes be errors of appreciation, misunderstandings that can have major consequences. And so it is essential to have more consultation, of transparency at the level of governments, at the level of researchers, to avoid these diagnostic errors and ensure that we make decisions consistent with our strategic interests.

You have already touched on this subject, but if I can ask you the main domains in which France and the United States could be effective partners, could you, for example, give us examples of what has been done so far and areas of work for the future? Yes, there are many very promising areas in the French-American cooperation, but I would take one in particular, which is military cooperation. Before AUKUS, we had noted a certain number of very interesting exercises between our two armies in the Indo-Pacific, which were, I find, revealing the high level of integration

and ambition of our two armies in this region. To take the example of a particular exercise, And last year, there was a trilateral exercise between France, Japan and the United States on the Japanese territory, with an interesting exercise scenario, which was to seize and then defend a remote island. It was an amphibious exercise on a scenario that could very well occur in hot spots in the Indo-Pacific, such as the Senkaku Islands. C'est donc très révélateur du très haut niveau d'intégration et de planification de nos armées sur de tels scénarios.

Mon espoir est que nos deux pays, avec les autres partenaires de la région, poursuivent sur cette lancée et accélèrent leur coopération dans le domaine militaire. Qu'il s'agisse du partage de renseignements vis-à-vis de la menace chinoise, d'exercices conjoints sur plan maritime, mais aussi aérien, terrestre, avec nos partenaires, mais aussi de planification à froid pour être sûr que nos armées seront prêtes face à d'éventuelles crises ou surprises stratégiques. Maintenant que nous avons un agenda politique davantage aligné, un mandat clair donné par nos deux présidents d'accélérer notre coopération, je pense que maintenant il faut passer à l'étape de la mise en œuvre concrète de cette ambition, notamment sur le plan militaire. Merci beaucoup. Et je vous propose de terminer sur une note européenne.

What is the impact of the French and European strategy for the Indo-Pacific by the French Presidency of the European Council? And what are the main challenges to be met to make the Indo-Pacific a real security concern for the EU? It's an excellent question, since in fact France took the presidency of the Council of the European Union on January 1st. There will be this function until the end of June. C'est un moment important pour la France, puisque notre dernière présidence a eu lieu en 2008, 13 ans auparavant, et c'est un moment au cours duquel la France peut jouer un rôle moteur dans l'agenda européen et pousser certaines de ses priorités. Et l'Indo-Pacifique fait partie des priorités de la France pour sa présidence de l'Union Européenne. Comme vous le savez certainement, l'Union Européenne, sous l'impulsion de la France, de l'Allemagne et des Pays-Bas,

a adopté en septembre dernier sa première stratégie pour l'Indo-Pacifique. And moreover, this strategy was announced the day after the announcement of AUKUS in September 2021. And it is therefore a central strategy since it is revealing the common will of Europeans to play a role in the Indo-Pacific region by mobilizing all the tools that the European Union has in terms of investment, trade, support for sustainable development, and commitment in terms of maritime security. I think that now the priority of France will be the concrete implementation of this strategy. It will be sure that it is followed by facts.

And one of the priority areas for France will be in particular that of maritime security. And the interest of this strategy is in particular to push Europeans to be more engaged in terms of maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, in particular by coordinating their maritime means more. And France will push for the Europeans to adopt, to put in place what we call a coordinated maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific, and more specifically in the west of the Indian Ocean, to maximize the impact of their maritime deployment. And it's a very interesting region, since the Europeans currently have many missions and operations in this region, with the Agenor mission in the Détroit d'Hormuz, or the Atalante operation towards the coasts of Somalia. Il y a de nombreux vaisseaux européens et cette présence maritime coordonnée permettra de davantage articuler ces différentes présences.

Enfin, vous évoquiez que présenter l'Indo-Pacifique comme un enjeu de sécurité pouvait constituer un défi à l'échelle européenne. Cela est vrai et cela a été notamment vrai, je pense, il y a quelques années. Je trouve que la stratégie européenne montre qu'il y a néanmoins un changement d'attitude parmi les Européens sur cette question. And countries like Germany, which always have a certain reserve to play a robust role on these issues of defense and security, accept today to be more mobilized on maritime security issues. I find that the deployment a few months ago of a German frigate in the Indo-Pacific is very revealing of this change of attitude in Germany and more broadly in Europe, and the end of this form of passivity of Europeans on these issues. So I am rather optimistic from this point of view on this European recruitment commitment on these issues of security and defense in the Indo-Pacific.

This is all the time we have today. I would like to warmly thank my guest Pierre Morcos. Pierre, where can we find you online and what are you working on at the moment? You can find me on the official website of the CSIS where my main work is available. Je tiens d'ailleurs à préciser que mon article pour Warner Rocks a été traduit en français pour la plateforme Le Rubicon, qui est une nouvelle plateforme créée en partenariat entre Warner Rocks, l'IRSEM, l'Institut Thucydide et le réseau d'analyse stratégique, qui est une sorte de Warner Rocks version française. Je vous invite à jeter un oeil à ce site très prometteur.

Je suis également actif sur Twitter, où j'essaie de relayer l'analyse française sur ces questions stratégiques. As for my next article, I'm currently working with a colleague of the CSIS on the question of high intensity in the maritime field and the way in which European marines prepare for such scenarios. And in my opinion, it's really a topic that is rising, especially in France, but not only. So it seems interesting to me to highlight the way in which Europeans prepare for this strategic competition on the sea. Merci encore, bonne chance pour la suite et à nos auditeurs, merci d'être à l'écoute

et à la prochaine ¶¶