Sea Control - Sea Control 321 - France's Changing Relationship with China (English Version)

Episode Date: February 24, 2022

Links1. "L’éveil de la France au défi chinois," by Pierre Morcos, le Rubicon, January 11, 2022.2. "France's Shifting Relations with China," by Pierre Morcos, War on the Rocks, January 4, 2022.3. Livre Blanc sur la Défense et sécurité nationale 2013 ( French White book on National Defense and Security 2013).4. Actualisation stratégique 2021 (French strategic update 2021).

If I've shared here, Alexia Bulagi is back as host and editor supreme this week. We have another episode published in both French and English, so choose whichever one suits you. But Alexia is joined by Pierre Morkos to discuss France's changing relationship with China. We are still looking for audio editors to add to our team, so if you're interested, please email us. The address is ccontrol at simsec.org with your resume. I want to highlight a couple of developments over at the main website. In the last two months, we've launched the Flotilla, SimSec's warfighting society focused on tactics. And just in the last couple of weeks, we launched our Naval Wargaming Discord.

You can find more information at SimSec.org. Finally, I want to take the opportunity to recommend our partners in the SimSec Podcast Network, the Village Pumps. You can find Alex, Jamie, Drack, and Apollo of Iron Brew Bottles wherever you download your podcast. On that note, I'll turn it over to Kimbers now. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Aloha shipmates, and welcome back aboard Sea Control. Today, I'm joined by Pierre Morcos, and we are going to be discussing his latest piece for War on the Rocks, France's shifting relations with China.

Pierre Morcos, welcome. Could you please introduce yourself to our audience? Hi Alexia, and thank you for having me. So my name is Pierre Marcos, I'm a French diplomat and currently visiting fellow with the Europe, Russia and Eurasia Programme at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, one of the leading institutions in Washington DC on national security issues. And before joining CSIS in 2020, I was working for the French government, the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, where I covered notably European security and defence issues.

Thank you very much. And as a reminder, all opinions are our own and not reflective of any institution with which we may be associated. So Pierre, first, how have you formed your thinking on the subject and what was the genesis of this article? Well, the genesis of my article is quite straightforward. It was the announcement last September of the AUKUS partnership between the US, Australia and the UK. And I must say that this announcement was quite a shock for me and for many French experts, because we believed that Washington was aware of France's interests in the Indo-Pacific region, but actually this partnership revealed that there were still many misunderstandings in Washington about

the French approach in the Indo-Pacific and vis-a-vis China in particular. So I think that the main goal of my piece for Wonder Rocks was to debunk some myths about the French approach and to explain that the French and the U.S. attitudes towards China are not at odds, but actually are converging, and that there is space for cooperation between both countries. What could you say are the main factors affecting France's shifting relations with China nowadays? First of all, I should say that 10 years ago, the French approach towards China was quite different. When you read the French White Paper of 2013, you can see that France was hoping to maintain and develop a global partnership with Beijing on all issues and based on high-level contacts. Ten years after, and not only when you look at the latest French strategic documents, which is called the Strategic Update, which was released one year ago, the tone is completely different.

China is first and foremost described as a systemic competitor for France and then as an economic competitor and sometimes on certain issues as a diplomatic partner. So clearly there has been quite an important shift in the perception of China in France. And there are a series of factors explaining that shift. In my piece, I highlight three of them. The first is the repeated and increasing violations of human rights by Beijing against the Uyghur community or in Hong Kong. And these violations were not unnoticed in France. And the French government has been increasingly vocal about these violations

and was supporting the adoption last year of sanctions by the European Union against Chinese officials. And these sanctions were the first since the Tiananmen events, so it was clearly also a shift in Europe's approach towards Beijing. The second factor is the growing use of what we call the wolf-wire diplomacy by China against France in particular, but more largely against Western countries. The tone of the Chinese diplomacy towards France has been increasingly aggressive towards the French government, French experts, French politicians, notably in the context of the pandemic, where the Chinese government was criticizing publicly and directly the French government in the way it managed the crisis, the health crisis. And it led the French government to summon the Chinese ambassador to Paris, to France, to explain to him that his turn was not acceptable. The third factor is linked to France's presence in the Indo-Pacific region. Contrary to its European partners, France has overseas territories across the region, with islands in the Indian Ocean and also archipelagos in the Pacific. And in these regions, France is directly witnessing the Chinese growing influence and its attempt to notably capture resources, the raw materials of these territories.

And France also, when it deploys vessels in the region, notably in the South China Sea, is experiencing China's growing assertiveness and a strategy of imposing fait accompli. So clearly, France is concerned about China's aggressivity from a military standpoint, and it has also had an impact on France's posture toward China. Thanks a lot for your answer. To do some categories here, what do you think are the elements of continuity and rupture in France's relations with China? regarding, for example, China's associating strategy, as you quote, and hybrid tactics? What are the immediate and long-term challenges for France to protect its strategic interests? I think that the main element of continuity in the French approach is the fact that Paris is attached to maintain a multidimensional, multifaceted approach towards China. France does not want to limit its relation with China to a single dimension, but wants to have an approach encompassing the three main dimensions of China,

which is at the same time a rival, a competitor, and a diplomatic partner. And these three elements are key for the French approach. Now, I think there has been a change in the French attitude when it comes to the balance. between these three dimensions i wouldn't use the term of rupture but rather of shift or or as i said change in balance and clay as i said 10 years ago france was more focusing on engaging with china now clearly france is not naive anymore about beijing's growing assertiveness diplomatically militarily and is vocal more and more vocal about this so clearly now the focus is more on how to challenge how to balance china's growing aggressivity what now when it comes to the

succeeding strategy of china from a military standpoint this is an expression used by the french chief of navy admiral vendier in an interview a few months ago where he explained that French vessels, when they are deployed in the South China Sea, are systematically followed by Chinese vessels and are sometimes forced to maneuver to avoid a collision. And he denounced that strategy of China. And clearly, that's a trend which is concerning for France. This attitude of China, which is challenging key principles for France, notably the rule of the sea, the freedom of navigation.

these challenges are clearly in contradiction in opposition to France's vision of the rules-based order. So clearly this is a key concern for France, notably because France has the second maritime zone of the world after the US. So France is very much attached to these rules, to these principles, and that's why we have repeatedly deployed vessels, not only frigates but also submarines our aircraft carrier sometimes also our amphibious group to display our commitments to these rules and principles indeed so we sense here a paradox or tension between competition and collaboration and how does france intend to find a balance between competition and collaboration with beijing who is at the same time as you said a systemic rival

and important diplomatic partner? What does that involve? And is it realistic for France to adopt such a strategy? Well, that's an excellent question. There is no definitive answer to it because the balance between competition and collaboration vis-à-vis China is clearly, I would say, a moving target. As I said 10 years ago,

clearly the attention was more on how to better collaborate with Beijing on issues of shared interests. Now, clearly, the focus and the energy we spend is more on how to compete to balance China on other areas. I think that this is critical to thread the needle between these to dimensions and avoid a situation where we would have either or strategy, because clearly, China is at the same time, as you said, a rival, a partner and a competitor. So we should not renounce to a dimension for the benefit of another one. Another point I would make is that these dimensions are not necessarily in contradiction. Actually, the more you are in disagreement with strategic actor, the more you need diplomacy, the more you need dialogue to convey actually

your disagreements, to convey your concerns. You need diplomacy, you need venues of engagement. And we could make a parallel actually with Russia. Currently, we have huge tensions with Moscow vis-a-vis Ukraine. And the US, together with its European partners, have been active diplomatically to engage with Moscow, to find compromises, to find ways of solving this crisis. So even in periods of high tensions, we need dialogue, we need engagements. And that's, I think, the same regarding China. Competition requires also engagement and dialogue. Thanks a lot.

And moving now to a major actor in international relations, the US. So how has the France-U.S. relationship been affected by the China problem? How come there is more common ground than it may seem, as you explain in your article? Well, I think that there is a misconception that France and the U.S. are in some way at odds regarding China. It was maybe the truth under the Trump administration, because the previous administration was advocating clearly, I would say, confrontational approach toward Beijing, which was a bit in contradiction with the French approach, but also the approach promoted by the main actors

of the Indo-Pacific region, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, or India. But actually, under the Biden administration, as I explained in my piece, there is a lot of common ground between France and the U.S. And actually, when the French foreign minister visited Washington last July, his first visit under the Biden administration, he delivered a speech at Carnegie, and he explained that there was a lot of room of cooperation between the U.S. and France,

and that our approaches were converging. Of course, AUKUS happened in the meantime. It revealed some tensions, some misconceptions from both sides. But fortunately, both Paris and Washington managed to turn the tide to repair their relationship. And the presidents of France and the U.S. met in Rome last October and adopted quite a robust declaration on the margins of the G7. And in this declaration, France and the U.S. explained that they need to foster their cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. And in that same declaration, Washington acknowledges that France's contribution to the stability of the region is crucial. So I think now there is an appetite, both in France and in the U.S., to cooperate more, to do more together in the region. but to be fruitful I think that this cooperation needs to also acknowledge some principles in the

French approach and there are three tenets I highlight in my piece the first one as I said earlier is the importance for France not to limit its relationship with China to a single dimension we need not only to compete with China but also to engage with China the second dimension is the European one. For France, it's critical to engage with Europe at large in that region because Europe has a lot of assets to value and to put forward, notably in the connectivity domain or to promote the rule of law and good governance. And the third principle is to avoid a polarization of the region And not to target directly Beijing on certain issues, but at the contrary, to promote an alternative model based on the rule of law of transparency, sustainable development. I think these three tenets are key. And actually, the Biden administration is sharing much of this approach.

To pursue on that subject regarding AUKUS and the French-US relationship, you write in your article Recognizing where political misunderstanding occurs makes cooperation easier It seems simple, but I found this very interesting and important to highlight And could you elaborate on that? Yes, of course I think that AUKUS was quite a striking moment for me personally because it revealed that there were still many misconceptions, both in France, in the US, or in Australia,

regarding our respective foreign policies. To give some examples, for Canberra, the choice of conceding its submarine contract with Paris was explained mainly because the French approach toward China was perceived, falsely perceived, as naive and too weak. And there was some concerns in Canberra that France was not willing to support Australia in its competition with China. Similarly, in Washington, there was a perception that the French approach towards China was too ambiguous and focusing more on dialogue, on engagement at the expense of the military or economic competition with Beijing. So I think that this moment in our relationship with Australia and the U.S. was quite a cautionary tale because it revealed that such misconceptions can lead to major diplomatic incidents and clearly could weaken our strategic partnerships.

And that's clearly a shame because we have the same values, common history, shared interests with the U.S. and with Australia, and we should not have such misunderstandings jeopardizing our partnerships. So before such a diplomatic crisis occurs, I think we need to have frank discussions, discuss our respective strategies, our respective approaches to make sure that we are on the same page and we avoid making, I would say, diplomatic mistakes or choices which would hinder our partnerships. So you already touched upon it, but what are the main areas where the US and France concretely could be successful partners? Could you give us some examples of what has been done so far and maybe some areas of work for the future? Sure. Actually, before AUKUS, the cooperation between the US and France was increasingly promising when it comes to the Indo-Pacific region. And I will take one specific example, which is the cooperation between our armed forces. For the past year, in 2021, we have noticed many interesting exercises between our navies, notably in the region, which were the testament of growing interoperability between our armed forces and also a shared desire to train on high-intensity scenarios. And let me take one example, which is the trilateral exercise between France, Japan, and the U.S. in the Kyushu Islands last year.

And this was an interesting exercise because the scenario was to seize and then hold a distant island. So it was an amphibious exercise, which is also illustrative of the high level of ambition shared between France, the U.S., and Japan. because such scenario is clearly a high-intensity scenario which could occur, notably in the Senkaku Island. So I think now that France and the US have managed to repair the relationship and to turn the page on AUKUS, we need to resume and even increase this operational cooperation.

I hope that our armed forces will share more intelligence about the Chinese threat in the region. We'll do more exercises together, also with partners of the region such as Australia, Japan, India but also the UK which is more and more present in the Indo-Pacific. I hope also that they will do more contingency planning on demanding scenarios to make sure that we are ready when crisis occurs in that part of the world. So my hope is that our armed forces increase their cooperation

now that our diplomatic leaders have recognized that we have shared agenda and shared interests in this region. Thanks a lot. And to conclude, I propose we finish on a EU note. So what momentum can be done to the French and European strategies for the Indo-Pacific by the French presidency of the European Council? And what are the main challenges to framing the Indo-Pacific as a security concern for the EU?

That's an excellent question because, as you know, France is now chairing the Council of the EU and it would have this presidency for the following six months until June 2022. And this is a key moment for France because the last time we had the presidency was in 2018, so 13 years ago. The Indo-Pacific will be one of the priorities of France under its presidency because the EU adopted actually the day after the announcement of AUKUS its first Indo-Pacific strategy, which is a key document because it was the testament of Europeans' shared willingness to be more engaged in the region and to harness the many tools the EU has

to better promote the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. And clearly, France was one of the driving forces with Germany and the Netherlands to advocate for this EU approach toward the region. Now, under the French presidency, the priority would be to implement this strategy and to have concrete deliverables in that area. And let me take again the example of maritime security. one of the goals of this strategy is to make sure that Europeans are more present in the Indo-Pacific region and deploy more vessels in that area. But not only deploy them, but also coordinate them better. And one outcome of the French presidency notably would be to create a coordinated maritime presence of European navies in the Indo-Pacific region, and more specifically

in the Western Indian Ocean, where Europeans have many missions ongoing, notably a general mission in the Strait of Hormuz, in the Atananta operation off the coast of Somalia. Now, the goal is to better coordinate these naval assets to make sure that we have more impact when it comes to the maritime security of the region. Now, you say that it might be complicated to frame the Indo-Pacific as a security concern in a European context. I think this was probably true a few years ago. It's less the case now. One interesting aspect of this EU Indo-Pacific strategy is the fact that security and defence are a key element of that document.

And even countries such as Germany, which are often reluctant to play a strong role on security and defense, are more and more mobilized on these issues, as witnessed by the deployment of German frigates in the Pacific a few months ago. And I think this example speaks a volume about how the German approach has also shifted in these questions. And Berlin is aware that it needs to play a more forceful role in these security and defense issues in the Indo-Pacific region. That's all the time we have for today. I'd like to thank my guest, Pierre Mokos. Pierre, where can we find you and what are you working on next? You can find me on the official website of CSIS where all my main writings are available. And I'm also quite active on Twitter when I try to explain what are the French views on security and defense issues. Currently, I'm working on quite a similar topic, which is how European navies are preparing for high intensity warfare.

I think this is a key concern for Washington and this is a shared also concern for European navies. They are aware that great power competition is affecting the stability of the maritime domain and they need to get prepared for such scenarios. So my next piece together with a colleague of CSIS is focusing on that question. Thanks a lot. We wish you the best and to our listeners, thanks for tuning in and we'll see you next time. I walked up to the powerhouse counter. Way, hey, put it in the alley. There I met with Greasy Annie.

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