Sea Control - Sea Control 351 - Don't Buy Warships (Yet) with David Alman

Episode Date: June 5, 2022

Links1. "Don't Buy Warships (Yet)," by David Alman, Proceedings, June 2022.2. Sea Control 303: The Case for Seaplanes with David Alman, CIMSEC, December 19, 2021.3. “The Navy Needs More Firepower,��� by T.X. Hammes, USNI Proceedings, January 20214. “From Sea to Sky,” by David Alman, CIMSEC December 10, 2019.5. Sea Control 219: USCG Commandant Admiral Karl Schultz, CIMSEC, December 27, 2020.6. “DARPA Unveils Liberty Lifter Seaplane Concept,” Naval News, May 19, 2022.

Hey folks, it's Jared. Walker Mills is your host today. He's joined by David Allman. David's most recent essay, Don't Buy Warships Yet, won first prize in USNI's general essay contest, and he's here today to discuss it with Walker. We are still looking for additional audio editors. We're happy to provide you some very basic training materials and instruction in a low-stress environment. So if you're interested in finding a way to contribute to SimSec and add to your resume and personal skill set, please send us an email with your resume to ccontrol at simsec.org. Finally, I want to take the opportunity to recommend our partners in the SimSec Podcast Network, The Bilge Pumps. You can find Alex, Jamie, Drack, and a pile of

iron brew bottles wherever you download your podcast. On that note, I'll turn it over to Kimbersman. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Welcome back aboard the Sea Control Podcast from the Center for International Maritime Security. Today, we're talking with David Allman, an officer in the Air National Guard and author of an alternative maritime strategy, Don't Buy Warships Yet, which was selected as the winner of the US&I Proceedings General Essay Contest. It hasn't been published yet, but am I correct in saying it's going to come out in the June issue? Yeah. Yeah. And so it should be published by the time we get this podcast out. So, David, congratulations. Welcome back. Some of our listeners probably remember you from the episode we recorded about seaplanes. I'd recommend it to them if they haven't listened to it. But can you reintroduce yourself to our listeners?

yeah happy to and it's great to be back as a brief introduction my name is david allman and unlike our host i did not do an aquathon or triathlon this morning so our hosts already make me feel bad about myself um professionally i'm an officer in the air national guard where i'm currently lucky enough to get paid to fly the f-16 i hold a bs and ms and aerospace engineering from georgia tech and i'm interested in a lot of different things including seaplanes and maritime strategy in the civilian sector i work as a management consultant. And again, before we start, I'd like to remind our listeners that the opinions presented here are solely our own and should not be taken as representative of any of the institutions that

we're associated with. All right, so David, happy to have you back on the podcast. Congratulations again on winning the essay contest. Can you start by talking about what inspired your essay? And we talked about this a little bit before we started recording, but what brings a lieutenant in the Air National Guard to write about maritime strategy. Yeah, happy to explain that. And as a little bit of context, I just want to be very clear that, you know, I've had family serving the Navy. I grew up wanting to go to Navy. I've always been a big believer in the importance of the United States Navy to our national defense. And so I want to be very clear that although this essay might sound like some Air Force dude bashing the Navy's strategy, it's really not intended that way.

So this essay was really born out of reading the debates over Navy shipbuilding numbers and naval strategy. This is some of it's through Congress, especially the 2021 budget hearings and especially some of Representative Luria's initiatives and through commentators like Matthew Hipple, a lot of Navy Twitter, etc. And basically, I felt like a lot of the debate was missing something. I thought there was an overemphasis on ship numbers and an underemphasis on how those ship numbers do or don't make a difference to our national objectives. Additionally, there was a failure, at least as I read it, of many commentators to understand how Chinese shipbuilding capacity would prevent the United States Navy from ever again, barring some structural change in their economy, from having numerical superiority in Chinese home waters. So, and I think you can

appreciate this, given all of your writing, I set about to write what is admittedly an imperfect article trying to lay out all of these points and attempt to bring them more into the mainstream discussion. And so, you know, today, really, you know, I tried to answer the question of what is wrong with the Navy strategy and shipbuilding. And the headline for me is that it fails to consider time. Namely, it does not do enough to reduce risk this decade. It does not increase and in fact decreases the number of weapons the Navy can deliver, nor does it do enough to set up a Navy for maritime competition in the future. So the Navy's current strategy fails to adequately prioritize revitalizing our shipbuilding infrastructure to a point where we

would even have the option of competing with Chinese shipbuilding. So one of the things that jumped out at me early on in the essays. You say you're not worried about the PLA and progress in shipbuilding, right? And I think for a lot of us who are kind of paying attention to what's going on, that's a primary driver of people feeling like we got to do something that maybe needs a strategy. We got to build more ships. We got to do X, Y, and Z. So why are you not worried about it? Yeah, so it's a great question. So I am worried about it, but it's not an insurmountable problem. And I have to thank the editorial staff at the Naval Institute for removing some of my snarkier comments and softening some of my language there where I'd otherwise get myself

in trouble. So again, I am worried about it, but it's not an end-of-world problem. So I think we have to divide the problem of Chinese numbers into two sets. There are the numbers they're going to use to have the option of invading Taiwan and protecting the mainland. This is all kind of within First Island chain stuff. And then there are the numbers they're using to go outside of the First Island chain and project power abroad. And obviously, ships are fungible. So a warship that can be used to project power abroad, show the flag during peacetime, could

also be used to defend an invasion force in wartime. But there's two points on this. The use of ships to support an invasion of Taiwan is, in my opinion, a tactical or operational level effort. The ships here are not an end in that invasion. They're a means. Second, the use of ships to go outside the first island chain is much more of a strategic issue in my mind. It's about Chinese influence. It's about economic power, basing abroad, protecting commerce. And so I am very much worried about the second point, this Chinese ships over the world. I'm worried about a Chinese

great white fleet equivalent one day. I'm worried about Chinese ships protecting their commerce all over the world. But that's not a today problem in my mind. That's a decade from now problem. They're currently in wartime constrained by the first island chain. They haven't built up the support vessels or the experience to really do more than their anti-piracy patrols. They're not sending their carrier battle groups into the Atlantic. They're currently operating near their home waters. So in summary, I think that to this point about Chinese numbers and their global influence, I think we have time to solve that problem. I'm also worried about that first point, the tactical or operational level issue of how do Chinese numbers impact or not impact their

ability to support an invasion force in the event of conflict. But I think that this is a very solvable problem. The kicker, though, is that we don't necessarily have a lot of time to solve it. it's a problem that is manifest, you know, maybe not now, but I think surely in the next five years in that kind of ubiquitous Davidson window. David, before we move on, can you quickly clarify what the Davidson window is? I'm sure most of the listeners are familiar with the term, but just so we're all on the same page. Yeah, happy to. So in March of 2021, Admiral Phil Davidson, who's the now former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, stated, I think the threat to Taiwan is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six

years. So you basically have this, you know, combatant commander testifying before Congress saying, hey, you know, in my opinion, and really the suspicion is that his opinion is based on, you know, intelligence community reporting, you know, best military assessment, et cetera, is that this next six years, so out to 2027, is a period we really need to be concerned about. So then getting to the crux here, what do you propose the Navy should do? Yeah, so we can get more in the specifics of like the exact measures for each time frame. But I basically propose the Navy and really the joint force more broadly, since the paper is about maritime strategy of which the Navy is just one component. But I propose that we need to pursue a strategy of mitigating risk in the near term while

developing the foundation for a longer term maritime competition. And so to try to put some more specifics on the timing of what is near term, what is long term, I come up with this framework where I lay out three different time periods. Kind of the first one is this kind of tactical or operational one of the next five years, again, kind of coinciding with the Davidson window. a midterm window which i kind of more arbitrarily define as six to ten years right it's after the near term um and then a longer term strategic window after that which i put you know outside of 10 years where you have the ability to kind of do more structural changes to industry and whatnot

and so that near-term window five years is for kind of two reasons one it coincides with that davidson window kind of that period of maximum danger in my mind um you know where we'll kind of have the greatest imbalance of forces um but also and this is really what inspired this essay it also coincides with approximately the amount of time it takes to build a traditional warship an arlie burke of virginia etc and so in this time frame uh we cannot build warships that will impact the balance of power it's just physics even if we got unlimited money today we don't have the shipbuilding base to do anything about it um you know no matter what we may want or what we may desire we're not going to meaningfully change the number of ships the united states navy has

in this time period except in a negative direction you know through retirements etc um So, yeah, so three timeframes, a near-term one, kind of that one to five, mid-term, you know, after that, out to about 10 years, and then long-term from then on. Going back to your three timescales, specifically in the near-term, which you kind of loosely defined as the next five years, and you want to mitigate, you know, tactical and operational risk, specifically in a Taiwan scenario, What should we be doing if we can't build more ships and fast enough to affect that time window? Yes, there's kind of an assumption here that I'm making and that our objective is to deter Chinese aggression towards Taiwan or, if necessary, defeat an invasion. And so, you know, if our objective is different than what I propose is suboptimal. And in fact, people would probably some people would definitely say that what I propose is suboptimal regardless. But so this strategy is very much geared towards defending, deterring aggression towards Taiwan and then defending Taiwan, you know, if necessary.

And so I'm really trying to reduce the risk to this objective. And so how do we mitigate that risk? I argue that to defeat this massive increase in Chinese ship numbers, we do not need to build equivalent ships. their ships are to escort an invasion force and form part of the IADs protecting the mainland, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. But fundamentally, we are not trying to escort an equivalent invasion force. We are, if we choose to be, on the right side of the cost curve for once. Basically, we need to buy lots of anti-ship weapons, missiles, mines, torpedoes, and the platforms to deliver them in quantity. And I'll just say briefly, I say torpedoes with a little bit of a caveat, considering how expensive submarines are, limited magazine size and the other missions

they're performing. But obviously, a submarine looking at a warship is one of the worst things for a warship. So definitely, you know, for that. But all to say, right, if you're talking about missiles, mines and torpedoes, and the platforms to deliver them, traditional surface warships are one of the most cost ineffective options here. They have to devote a large portion of their VLS cells or weight, et cetera, to the spending themselves. And so you don't really get a ton of offensive firepower given the amount of money you're spending. And so to summarize there, we want to buy a lot of anti-ship weapons, and then we need to focus on the platforms that we need to deliver them. And so to deliver these weapons in quantity,

I believe we need to focus on three pillars or the three A's, the interim management consultant in me says. And those three A's are air power, allies, and asymmetric capabilities. So naturally as an air guard officer, the first pillar is air power. So I really like this quote. I loved it when I first read it, but Colin Gray wrote that air power is the sharpest of America's swords. And, you know, well, air power surely has its problems, like basing, but hey, that's why, you know, I write about seaplanes. Air power does a lot of things really well. And one of the things that it does extremely well is deliver a lot of weapons over time. So that B-1 with 24 LRAP has to give the Chinese maybe some worry. The Air Force is accelerating B-21 development and

and hopes to have it uh you know operationally capable by you know the middle of the decade and so you know we have a good chunk of bombers we're building a brand new bomber that's stealthy that's going to be able to deliver weapons um and so i believe we need to continue to do these things we need to continue to procure the b-21 in numbers we need to hold off on retiring our current bombers and perhaps most importantly we need to have the stockpile of weapons so that we can continue to have those bombers fly with full payloads and deliver you know standoff precision guided munitions to target ships in the event of conflict um and i just you know i'll make a quick side point here but you know that b21 with 21 or 24l rasmus rather you you really start to

see the utility of that not on day one but when you talk about you know a 30-day time frame or something. If that B-21 can fly every other day, or to make the math easy, every third day, then you're going to have 10 sorties out of that plane, each with 24 LRASMs. You're delivering 240 anti-ship weapons from one plane over that 30-day period. That's a lot of weapons, right? You're quickly getting to the point where with enough of these aircraft, if you can get them in range, if you can have the stockpiled weapons, they can do really meaningful damage to an adversary's Navy. So the first point, air power, right? Air power is very lethal. The second pillar is allies. So I'll spend less time on this one, but really the cheapest way to defend Taiwan

is up to Taiwan. They're the closest to the hypothetical fight. We need the Taiwanese to, as they've been doing, develop, build, and or buy as many anti-ship weapons as possible. We should also, and this is kind of in line with what Congress has recently announced interest in doing, explore financial support along these lines. It costs $3 million for Taiwan to buy an anti-ship missile and put it in range of a notional Chinese invasion force. It costs us $3 million to the missile but it also costs us 200 million dollars to buy the tanker and 700 million dollars to buy the new bomber to get that missile there so the taiwanese just have this huge cost advantage um if they do you know what in my opinion is the right thing and buy the weapons that you know we

as a collective need um so first pillar allies second pillar first pillar air power second pillar, allies. Third pillar is asymmetric capabilities. And so here, I really think the Air Force is a model of what we should be doing with their Rapid Dragon program, this whole idea of getting transport aircraft to shoot missiles. It's taking an existing asset, and it's making it lethal. And so basically, I think the Navy needs to emphasize in the near term, procuring or converting merchants into missile shooters, particularly those like the Maritime Security program, because they're already, you know, affiliated with the Navy, but also just buying secondhand ships. And so, you know, there are a lot of kind of negative points about this, like,

oh, they're not built to mil standard, they're maybe beat down if they're used merchant ships. But we really only need these to operate for five to 10 years, this will hopefully be a little, you know, small book one day and annals the Navy about the weird time where to reduce risk, the Navy had 20 old merchant ships cruising around the first island chain. And so there are a few reasons why I think this is a good idea. First, it's so cheap and so fast relative to anything else. And second, it complicates Chinese targeting a lot because now every thing is potentially a missile shooter. And third, you know, something kind of more near and dear to my heart as a junior officer, but it gives a ton of command and seamanship experience

to junior personnel. And I'll just give kind of briefly one example of how this could play out. So you can go online and search use merchant ships just on the Google machine. And so I did this last night before we talked and I found a 400 foot, 4,000 ton railroad that was selling for $3 million. So let's say it's not in great shape, whatever, you need to do some work on it. Let's say you have to put in $7 million into this $3 million asset. You've now spent $10 million, but you have a 400 foot long ship that can hold, you know, 20 plus, 40 plus, you know, connex boxes, missile batteries, whatever. So you put these containers on it. Maybe you literally put something on it, like the Marine Corps' nemesis. You literally just put it

on the ship. And now you can very easily have 80 to 100 offensive shots on this $10 million ship. You have a crew of 20. You have some lucky Lieutenant JG in command, an ensign a few months out of ROTC, two chiefs, various other radians, maybe an air guard exchange officer, whatever. And you tell them your mission, if you choose to accept it, is to go sail around the first island chain show the flag and be ready to fire off your hundred missiles if the time comes so that's their mission it'd be incredible for the people on board like the plot to mr roberts but less palm trees and more you know missiles but like this is very doable it's not like a crazy thing um and it would rapidly increase the number of shots we were able to take and or help offset

some of the the vlf um tube shortfall that the navy is expecting to experience through the retirement of their vessels so to summarize all that uh in the near term you want to buy weapons that kill ships you don't care where they come from but i believe we should focus on three pillars to deliver those weapons air power allies and asymmetric capabilities thanks for that i think I think that's kind of the core of part of your essay, and I'm really convinced by it. The first piece about air power and specifically the L-RASM for the B-1 or the B-21 is something that I came across and actually, I don't know, this is probably a year or two ago now, wrote a piece that never got published kind of saying, I think the Marine Corps is missing something. If they think that they're going to really tip the scales in the first island chain by putting a bunch of naval strike missiles out there because the weight of firepower that the other services can bring, whether it's the Army that has way more missile batteries than the Marine Corps intends to acquire, or the Navy that has ships full of missiles, or really the Air Force, which can put, you know, 24 of these L-RASMs on a bomber at a time. The Marine Corps, you know, there's a supporting role there, but this is partly why I think the Commandant has gone towards more of a, we're more interested in the recon and counter recon, because if you can improve the effectiveness of the rest of the joint force that's bringing those weapons to bear, you're going to do a lot better than, hey, let's put out, you know, single digit numbers or even, you know, two digit numbers worth of Marine Corps missiles is probably not a significant contribution.

unless they're in such a key place that nobody else can reach. And if you don't mind, I think like kind of just one follow up to that. And this is not really what I write about here, but it's something that I hope to write about. If you think about kind of the theoretical contribution of everyone, I made the point that air power delivers a ton of weight over time. I think to your point, the Marine Corps has an opportunity to be a really key player in the ISR component. I think the Navy, its really big contribution is the pulse of firepower on day

one, right? The ship with 100 missiles gives you more firepower day one than the beach one that has to fly back and forth five times to deliver the same weight. And so that's kind of why I think that, you know, the Navy does have a very big role to play, but it's in that day one firepower component. And then as you start to move farther into the campaign, when ships have slower cycle times back to port, when they're potentially more vulnerable during that cycle time, that's where air power can really pick up and ultimately surpass with the weight of fire. So not to put you on the spot here, but where does the carrier air wing fit in that model? Yeah, so I mean, this goes into kind of more philosophical sense. You know, I think fundamentally, the core purpose

of the Navy is sea control. And so, you know, I see the carrier air wing is playing a huge role in like defense of sea lines of communication from bombers, kind of the old Cold War model of the carrier battle groups protecting the convoy from a backfire raid or whatever, you know, kind of the Tom Clancy Red Storm Rising bit. You know, I think in the ideal world, you know, the air wing would have the range and the tanking support organic to it to contribute to this kind of firepower campaign. But, you know, there's a reason why the strategic bombardment of Germany and Japan never came from carrier air wings, right? Carrier-based aircraft fundamentally have trade-offs that make them less useful for delivering weight over time. And that's okay.

They have their own mission. But yeah, basically, I think the ultimate role for the carrier air wing is sea control. Strikes should be secondary. The air wing currently doesn't reflect that, but you have to hold another discussion. if we can all agree that the the chinese are making more or building more ships um and they're going to build more ships for the you know indefinite future is converting merchant ships to uh combatants a good thing for us to do if they could potentially do it even more than we could and and that may just tip the scales even more in their favor or is there some sort of you know we think we could do it quicker than they could do it and we just need you know a couple years yeah so there's a great um story about in world war ii when the british first used chaff like window you know as they called it to confuse and confound german radar

the germans knew immediately what it was because they had also had it and they had just not used it out of fear that the british would then learn about it and use it back against them um we're talking about two huge nations you know two superpowers neither side will have a monopoly on good ideas um so i think that the chinese have already thought about it um we should be worried about them doing it because i think it's a good idea um in fact you know i many years ago wrote about it in a sim sec you know fiction week piece about you know i'm worried about the chinese having some merchant ship on an off-axis point from Guam's defenses, and day one, it lobs off a ton of cruise missiles, and we're like, wow, that really sucked, right? So yeah, I am worried

about it, but I don't think that that should prevent us from doing it ourselves if we think that it meaningfully contributes to reducing the risk to our objectives or it gives the joint forest capability that we find useful. Have you gotten any feedback on the essay yet? I mean, I know it hasn't been published, but it was kind of unveiled by the Naval Institute and especially, you know, seeing as though it's perhaps a non-traditional winner winning the big essay prize contest for the Naval Institute. And thanks, you know, shout out to them because we're also potentially scooping them on the podcast here. They may have plans to invite you on their podcast later? No essay, in my opinion, is ever due to one person toiling alone. So this essay is born

out of discussions I've had with people. It's born out of many things that I've read. And then through the process of writing it, I solicited feedback from a variety of people just to get their thoughts on all of it or some of it. So I think that kind of high level, the feedback has been as follows. I think most people like the timing component, which I really think is the essay's major contribution, this idea of, you know, shipbuilding will not reduce risk in the next five, six, seven years, really in the 2020s. And so, you know, if you want to make an argument for shipbuilding, great, but reducing risk this decade is not it. I think most of the negative comments have kind of come from the more tactical aspects of it. It's been questions like, you know,

can air power really survive? You know, are the bases going to still be there? What are the complications of arming merchants? Stuff like that. And so I think that those are all kind of valid criticisms or questions. You know, as the writer of the essay, I believe air power can survive, especially the bombers. I'm less convinced about TAC Air. But I believe that all those kind of tactical or operational level criticisms are problems to be solved rather than deal breakers. And one thing I actually didn't see in your essay that's become a little bit of a trope in commentary about the Navy and the maritime strategy and on Naval Twitter is calls for the Navy to get a bigger piece of the budget pie than the other services, which I

thought was interesting. I mean, do you think that the Navy needs that or should get that or that the strategy is they can basically maintain a neutral budget? Yeah. So I mean, any neutral budget, I'm accounting for inflation, et cetera. But basically, I believe that the Navy, in order to execute this strategy that I'm proposing does not need a bigger budget. You know, I obviously believe as a Air Force dude that, you know, look, the Russian army is getting obliterated in Ukraine right now. I don't see why we wouldn't cut some of the army's funding to fund other things that might be more important to us in the Indo-Pacific.

But I don't think that the Navy necessarily needs a larger budget. I think the Navy would benefit from a larger budget. I think that there are cases the Navy could make, particularly around, you know, I've written about this previously, but around kind of like convoy defense or defensive merchants, kind of the logistical piece, where it could make a very convincing case that we need more money to execute this mission. But I think that the kind of flip side of that would be, I think, you know, people could also argue, okay, but you could do that by cutting some of your other programs internally. So yeah, that's kind of the short answer. Basically, I think that the Navy doesn't need money to execute the strategy.

It could always benefit from more money. I probably wouldn't take that money away from the Air Force or the Coast Guard. I would probably take it away from the Army. Definitely not the Coast Guard. Conversations with them, had a podcast with a comrade of the Coast Guard, Admiral Schultz, and just I'll put it in the link below the podcast, but always blown away every time I get to talk to a Coast Guardsman about all that they're able to do with such a small budget. Kind of before we wrap up here, I want to throw another question, kind of shifting gears. Obviously, the last time we had you on, we talked about seaplanes and wing and ground effect vehicles. DARPA just released, I don't have a better way to describe it except a teaser video

of a new project that they're working on that looks to be an amphibious aircraft that's designed to fly a significant portion of the time in wing and ground effect. What do you think about it? One, I'm excited. As far as the analytical perspective of how it goes, I'm of two minds. So the aerospace engineer in me, the person who's interested in technology, who, you know, is always about you know technological edge if we can get it it is super excited yeah it's great right we're taking you know an idea that we haven't looked at in a while and we're trying to make it better to potentially deliver innovative capability to the force you know in the 2030s basically um that's all great however um a lot of my case for seaplanes um and you know seaplane

different than a wing and ground effect vehicle, but I'll just kind of use it, you know, a maritime focused aviation platform, whatever. A lot of my argument has been, we can use 1950s technology to solve operational problems today. And so I'm a bit worried that people are going to think that, oh we need to wait until the 2030s to get this new DARPA platform to come online to solve problems when I would say no you could solve you know if these things are problems you could solve them today with old technology without having technological risk programmatic risk etc and so you know yes excited I think that if we're trying to do things with demonstrating technology which is admittedly what DARPA's mission is, this is not bashing them, then I think this is a great

program. However, if we're trying to be more pragmatic and are looking to actually innovate this decade and get stuff out to the joint force to potentially meaningfully impact how we do things in peace and war, then I think we can still do better. I think we should still go out and do an exchange with the US2 in Japan. I think we should buy them. I think we should do kind of those easy things that will have impact now instead of just waiting for this thing that may or may not work seven years from now. Well, unfortunately, we're just about out of time for today, but before we go, I want to give you a chance to say what you're working on and where, if anywhere, our listeners can find you online. Yeah, so what I'm working on right now, trying to get more sleep,

uh trying to exercise more uh but in all seriousness there's a couple things i i want to write um some of it about kind of deterrence by denial and i'm really just not very convinced by it i think there are a lot of problems with that argument um and then uh there's kind of another piece about dependence in the military and it's kind of a more like you know some how we in my opinion kind of don't treat dependents right in the military especially just using the term dependent even though a lot of times spouses or significant others we in the service depend on them um so yeah those are just two things as far as where to find me online um you know linkedin twitter whatever kind of the usual round of online publications um or shoot me an email whatever you

probably ask the host here for it. So always happy to have discussion and learn more. All right. And we won't put your email at the bottom of the podcast, but we'll put your Twitter handle down there. Nice. So I'd like to thank again my guest, David Allman, for joining us today to talk about his recent prize-winning essay in USNI Proceedings. Another shout out to that team. Thanks again. And hopefully we will have you back to talk about that future work. Take care. Thanks, Walker. Appreciate it. I walked up to the far-oom counter. Hey, hey, put it in the alley.

There I met with Greasy Annie. Put it on the shimbo now. So help me, Bob, I'm putting it in the alley. Hey, hey, put it in the alley. Help me, Bob, I'm putting it in the alley. Put it on the shimbo now. A porter of a porter, you know. © BF-WATCH TV 2021