Sea Control - Sea Control 355 - The War at Sea with Dr. Seth Cropsey

Episode Date: June 19, 2022

Links1. "The War at Sea," by Dr. Seth Cropsey, RealClearDefense, April 18, 2022. 

Hey, it's Jared. I'm joined today by Dr. Seth Cropsey, and we'll be discussing his article on the War at Sea and the Black Sea. This episode was edited and produced by David Zahida. I would like to pause here to highlight our local chapters. So whether you're in Singapore, Lagos, Nigeria, Germany, Chicago, or Newport, chances are there's a SimSec local chapter near you. You can find a full listing of our local chapters and contact information on our website at simsec.org. So if you're interested, please reach out. Finally, I want to take the opportunity to recommend to our partners in the SimSec Podcast Network, The Bilge Pumps. You can find Alex, Jamie, Drack, and a pile of iron brew bottles wherever you download your podcasts.

And with that, Kimber's Men. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Aloha, shipmates, and welcome back aboard Sea Control. My guest today is Dr. Seth Cropsey, and we'll be discussing his article for Real Clear Defense, The War at Sea. So, Dr. Cropsey, thank you for joining us. Could you tell the listeners a bit about your background, please? I was Deputy Undersecretary of Navy a long time ago in the previous century, millennium. Since then, I've been a department chair at the Marshall Center in Germany,

a senior fellow at hudson institute for the past 15 years and uh this past january i started up york county institute which is devoted exclusively to national security um great power competition emerging threats the changing geo-strategic world that we uh have the misfortune to be living in I should say we're going to be discussing Russia-Ukraine here. We are recording this on May 1st, so if something occurs between now and when this is actually published, that's why we're not talking about it. So May 1st is the recording date for the listeners. You can set your calendar accordingly as you listen. But thank you again for joining us, sir.

As a reminder to the audience, all opinions are our own and not reflective of any of the institutions with which we might be otherwise associated. So Sir, you had written that you believe naval considerations are what motivated the Russian intervention. Why did you say that? I think they're very important. It's important to look at the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and Suez, Red Sea connected bodies of water as a unitary theater. The most important of them is clearly the central one, Eastern Mediterranean, extending to the Central and Western Mediterranean. And Russia has both sizable air and naval bases in Syria. One is a result of their involvement in Assad's war against the Syrian people. So protecting those is vital because it reinforces Russia's position as the major external power in the Middle East. And so from Syria, Russians can protect both air power and sea power in any direction.

Well, for air in any direction to the west by sea. And that in the long term is important for Russia's interests in Libya, for what Churchill probably would have called the soft underbelly of Europe, which is the southern Mediterranean, northern coast of the Mediterranean, South Europe. You can't get to the East Med if you don't have access to the Black Sea. And if your access to the Black Sea is hindered and pinged or otherwise obstructed, then you have a strategic problem. And to that extent, Russia remains very interested in a land corridor between the separatist Donbass and the Crimea, which they took in 2014 by force. Extending that would be moving on Odessa, and that would give Russia complete control of what is now Ukraine's access to the Black Sea. And for the reasons I just mentioned, Russia wants to do that and sees its ability to do that and to continue achieving strategic goals in the Eastern Mediterranean at risk from Ukraine. We'll talk a little bit more about the sinking of the Moskva in just a minute, but how would Russia use its naval forces to limit Ukrainian freedom of action prior to the sinking of Moskva? As a threat to Ukraine, especially an amphibious one, and also to mine large sections of the western part of the Black Sea, making it difficult for countries like Romania and Bulgaria on the Black Sea to communicate with Ukraine.

I should add NATO countries, Romania and Bulgaria. Yeah, absolutely. How has the loss of Moskva, in your opinion, changed the situation at sea and on the ground? Well, it's deprived Russia of the ability to conduct air defense operations that Moskva held, and those were considerable. I think they had eight tubes with missiles used for air defense containing about eight missiles each. That's important. Russia has also had a presence in the Eastern Mediterranean for decades, which you referenced before. How would an inability to defeat Ukraine affect its continued presence in the Eastern Mediterranean? I think it would have a large effect. It would put at risk Russian communications between Crimea and the Eastern Mediterranean.

That's the most important thing. As I say, for Russia, that's significant. If Russia wants to project power from Syria, it needs to be able to get it there from Russia. And Ukraine stands in the way. Part of Ukraine was taken in 2014. That helps Russia, but it doesn't give it unobstructed access. And that's what they're seeking. I guess a follow-up question then on that Eastern Mediterranean base, because you see a fairly large Russian surface force circling in the Eastern Mediterranean to include two Slava-class cruisers.

Is that base actually sufficient to sustain those forces for long periods of time? I don't think it is. Curious to hear your thoughts. For long periods of time, no. But the idea with ships is not to be in port for a long period of time. They'll do. They serve their purpose and they can and have been expanded. And for ships, you need all kinds of things, fuel, parts, repair facilities. Those have been there and useful for the Russian fleet. I think it's really serious, viewed seriously by Moscow. As the Turkish-Libya nexus develops, that enables Russia to play in that. But, you know, the situation has been somewhat changed because of the NATO members' greater attention to the security threat they're facing.

But Southern Europe is still not an area to be feared at sea by Russia. There's capability there, but it's not as great. It's not as important, not as powerful as it could be. and the Russians are perfectly aware of that. And that includes the United States as well. During the Cold War, the U.S. had an amphibious ready group, sometimes two in the Mediterranean, and two carrier strike groups in the Mediterranean.

That's all changed. Based there, or there on a permanent basis. And now the United States has four ballistic missile defense destroyers based in Rota. and the western end of the Mediterranean, which is relatively quiet compared to the east. I guess my concern, if I was a Russian naval planner, would be just the sustainability of those forces. And we've already seen the Black Sea. But there's a lot of speculation about the material condition of Moscow and what she was actually capable of doing. But if you have to

keep your forces at sea for a long time and then steam them all the way around continental Europe to get home to do regular repair activities. I don't know how sustainable that is long-term. Point is correct. It's not sustainable long-term. That's one reason for the emphasis on Syria. What are your recommendations for Ukraine and the U.S.? The single most important thing is

to get anti-ship missiles to Ukraine quickly and plentifully, like harpoons, for example. Put the Russian ships at risk. Ukrainians have developed this Neptune missile and it worked, but it's not enough. They only went into service recently. The United States has a very efficient, proven armed system in the harpoon and supplying that to Ukraine would be very helpful. Well, unfortunately, that's all that we have time for. I'd like to thank my guest, Dr. Seth Cropsey. Sir, where can we find you online and what are you working on next?

You can find me online at yorktowninstitute.org. Emails to there will get to me. And there's also seth.cropsey at yorktowninstitute.org. You asked what am I working on? Well, everything from the logistics problems that the United States ought to recognize coming out of Russia's experience in Ukraine. And those apply not just to the Mediterranean, but around the world, and in particular to the West Pacific. And I'm particularly interested in what happens here with the tactical situation in Ukraine, as it appears that the Russian effort in Donbass and Luhansk is, you may call it probing at this point, but whatever you call it, it's not succeeding famously. And it looks as though the failures there are an extension of the failures in taking major Ukrainian cities. So failures of communications, 12 generals killed, failures of logistics, failures of battle plans, failure of intelligence. And as that progresses, the chances that Putin will use weapons of mass destruction, I think, increase.

I am concerned that our planning and our public statements about that don't reflect the gravity or demonstrate the thinking that's necessary to deter Russia from using weapons of mass destruction. So that's something that's occupying me. well sir thank you again for joining us to the listeners thank you for tuning in we'll see you next time thank you Thank you. Oh, no.