Sea Control - Sea Control 359 - Maritime Radiological & Nuclear Trafficking with Jay Benson

Episode Date: July 3, 2022

Link:Maritime Radiological and Nuclear Trafficking by Small, Traditional, and Unregulated Vessels by Jay Benson, Stable Seas, March 29, 2022. 

Hey folks, it's Jared. StableSeas' Jay Benson returns to the podcast today to discuss maritime trafficking of radiological and nuclear material. This episode was edited and produced by Jonathan Selling. I'd like to pause here to highlight some of our local chapters. Whether you're in South Korea, Egypt, France, New York, India, or the Caribbean, chances are there's a local SimSec chapter near you. You can find a full listing of our chapters and contact information on our website at simsec.org, so if you're interested, please reach out and get involved. Finally, I want to take the opportunity to recommend our partners in the SimSec Podcast Network, The Bilge Pumps. You can find Alex, Jamie, Drack, and Apollo of Iron Brew Bottles

wherever you download your podcasts. And with that, Kimber's Men. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Aloha, Shoemates, and welcome back aboard Sea Control. My guest today is Jay Benson from Stable Seas, and we're going to be discussing his report, Maritime, Radiological, and Nuclear Trafficking by Small, Traditional, and Unregulated Vessels. So Jay, welcome back. It's been probably close to two years now. You're one of the first guests when we restarted the podcast. I think we were probably still recording via Skype at that point. So do you reintroduce yourself to the listeners again and tell us maybe a little bit about what you've been doing in the interim?

Sure. Yeah, thanks, Jared. Thanks for having me. It's a pleasure to speak with you and be back on Sea Control again. My name is Jay Benson. I'm part of a non-profit research organization, as you mentioned, called Stable Seas, which engages with international stakeholders in the maritime community on a variety of maritime security issues. We try and take a somewhat comprehensive approach that includes research on a variety of issue areas impacting maritime security. Our work includes things like the development of the Maritime Security Index, as well as region-specific reports on areas such as the Sulu and Selba Seas or the Western Indian Ocean. We also do issue-specific analysis on subjects like piracy and armed robbery,

illicit maritime trades, and the use of the maritime space by violent non-state actors, as well as more kind of fine-grained technical assistance to international maritime stakeholders. Yeah, this report was produced in partnership with the UNODC's Global Maritime Crime Program, And as the title implies, it really tries to explore the potential risk of maritime, nuclear, and radiological trafficking by small, traditional, and unregulated vessels in particular. Well, thanks again for joining us, Jay. As a reminder, all opinions are our own and not reflective of any institution with which we might be otherwise associated. So, Jay, you chose to focus on four specific regions around Brazil, the South Atlantic, if you will, West Africa, the Red Sea, and Indonesia. Why did you choose those four? Sure.

So the specific choice of the countries and the regions examined in the report was really an offshoot of feedback we received from the stakeholders involved during the process of, you know, scoping out and developing the report itself. These were maritime regions in which they had a specific interest in better understanding the risks posed by trafficking via these small, traditional, and unregulated vessels. We were particularly interested, obviously, in the risk of maritime nuclear and radiological trafficking, but also the broader maritime trafficking risk and maritime domain awareness challenges around this category of vessels and the risk they pose in these areas. And while I think there's really valid arguments for including a whole host of other regions in this kind of study, I think in the end, the four the report chose to focus on do provide an interesting cross section. They cover a diverse set of regions around the world and really diverse maritime security context, which allowed us to look at what this very specific form of maritime security risk looks like across significantly different maritime domains. Well, as we talk about risk, how would you describe the risk associated with this type of smuggling? Yeah, I think the risk of radiological and nuclear trafficking by these kinds of vessels could be fairly categorized as low probability, but very high consequence. According to the best open source data available put out by the IAEA, it appears that known instances of radiological and nuclear material outside of regulatory control is fairly rare.

And only a subset of those known cases have been deemed likely to be linked to trafficking. um given the scope of the report if we narrow down further to uh radiological and nuclear trafficking attempts that take place at sea rather than exclusively on shore and focus in on the kind of small traditional and unregulated vessels that are the subject of the study i think it's fair to say that we arrive at a fairly rare event all of that however is not to say that we don't still need to be aware of the risk. As with all potential pathways to nuclear and radiological proliferation, even one successful trafficking attempt has the potential to have obviously tragic and far-reaching consequences. That said, I hope what comes

across in the report, and what makes this a very complex question, is that there are many different factors that can contribute to the risk of this kind of trafficking via this subset of vessels. There are common risks across regions, of course, but preventing this kind of activity requires attention to a variety of different risk factors. You know, this includes things such as maritime enforcement capacity and maritime domain awareness, the prevalence of existing maritime trafficking networks in a host of illicit goods, a region's role in and the security around the nuclear and radiological material supply chains, the presence of non-state actors potentially seeking to acquire this type of material, the monitoring and registration

regimes around small traditional and unregulated vessels, perceived levels of corruption in the maritime and port sector, and the socio-economic conditions in coastal regions that might facilitate maritime trafficking of this nature. All of these different components can contribute to the potential risk of this kind of smuggling via these type of vessels. It's extremely multifaceted. And really, there's a need to approach the issue in a holistic manner. All of the improvements in the world in one of these areas I mentioned, while certainly valuable, may not be as effective as they could be if other risk factors are not given the necessary policy attention and resourcing. So in the end, I suppose it's a difficult question to answer.

But I'd say that there are a host of different factors that need to be considered when assessing the level of risk. And while on aggregate, it's not as common a risk as many others that maritime security practitioners come across on a daily basis, it needs to be something that's part of the maritime security field's collective awareness. What I'll also say is that this very specific form of maritime security risk is not off on its own on an island. Many of the ways to mitigate the risk, which I'm sure we'll discuss in more detail, are equally applicable to combating the whole diverse array of other maritime security challenges that practitioners might face on a much more frequent basis thanks if you'll permit me a follow-up to that question here that's a little bit off script but you're saying the iaea says that this is happening it says some of this trafficking is happening albeit not large scale but did they give you any specifics about what

they believe or what they know is being moved as far as are we talking about raw materials are we talking about component parts of something or are we talking about yeah fuel it's it's a little bit of everything you know i think it can be um fuel to um radiological and nuclear material that might be used in medical devices and things of that nature so it's a really broad scope um and the data that's publicly available isn't broken down um by case but um to give an idea of the scope Um, there were, I believe there was 27 years of available data that's available most recently. And I think, um, on average per year, there were a hundred and, uh, 130 ish, um, incidents of, um, material being reported as outside of regulatory control. Um, but a lot of that is,

not nefarious by any means. And they estimated that a subset of about less than 10% of those cases they could deem as likely linked to trafficking activity. So it's a fairly small known number. Now, obviously there's information that's not in the public domain and there's There's, you know, cases that likely go unreported, but just to provide an idea of scope, that's the kind of thing we're looking at. So why is the use of smaller vessels such a problem here? Sure. I think there's a couple of factors that play into that. The first of that, I think, makes understanding the risks of trafficking by these kinds of vessels difficult is the sheer number of small, traditional, unregulated vessels out on the world's oceans. You know, in many coastal areas from the Niger Delta to archipelagic Southeast Asia and everywhere in between, these types of vessels are central to many aspects of daily life, from fishing to local trade to passenger transportation.

So there are really a vast number of vessels operating every day for these purposes. um in addition their kind of um ubiquity makes means that any trafficking via these types of vessels could quite easily blend into the the normal pattern of everyday life in addition uh across much of the world there are fairly limited registration and monitoring regimes for these kinds of smaller vessels in particular making tracking their activities at sea a significant challenge. And then finally, small traditional and unregulated vessels have the ability to bypass major port infrastructure. You know, there's been significant progress in improving nuclear and radiological screening capabilities in much of the world, but much of this investment

has understandably been focused on large formal ports. However, small traditional and unregulated vessels by their very nature are able to bypass these points of security because they're not tied to modern port infrastructure. You know, a DAO can utilize many remote stretches of shoreline for loading and offloading. Small fishing vessels and informal passenger vessels often utilize informal landing sites, which have little to no security measures, much less nuclear and radiological screening. And it's really this ability to bypass the security choke points in our maritime transportation system that pose such a complex challenge when trying to mitigate the risk of trafficking of all kinds by these types of vessels.

This next question is pretty broad, so feel free to break this down however you would like to in order to get your hands around it. But what types of monitoring are already in place? Sure. So one way that was helpful for me, at least, to think about this during the research was to break the types of potential small, traditional, and unregulated vessel monitoring down into three broad and admittedly very imperfect categories. So those were registration of vessels, passive monitoring systems, and then more active monitoring systems. So, in many ways, registration of vessels is the first step. This at least makes authorities aware of a vessel's existence and ownership.

However, these registration practices vary significantly across the globe with different states setting different requirements as to the vessel types and minimum size requirements for registration, as well as what information is collected. These requirements can vary significantly, and in some cases leave large portions of what we would consider small, traditional, and unregulated vessels outside of registration regimes. Another type is passive monitoring of vessels out at sea. So this means that states move from knowing of a vessel's existence to having access to its reported location data. Examples of this would be things like AIS and state-run vessel monitoring systems for fishing fleets specifically. This means that states can potentially identify suspicious patterns of behavior that might be associated with trafficking. However, these systems also have significant gaps. For example, many of these systems can often be turned off or spoofed by vessels. In addition, they often have minimum size requirements that leave many small traditional and unregulated vessels outside of the system. AIS would probably be a good example of both of these challenges.

And then finally, the highest bar would be more active detection systems that allow a state to identify vessels, even when they aren't participating in the categories above or seeking to avoid detection. There's obviously a host of capabilities that might fall into this category, but they're often technologically advanced and require a level of investment, which can be prohibitively expensive, particularly in resource-constrained states. And what I mean to highlight by describing these categories is that there are significant gaps in the monitoring of small traditional and unregulated vessels in particular. And gaining a true maritime domain awareness around these types of vessels is really a very challenging endeavor that requires significant investment in both capabilities and human resources. so what commonalities did you observe across the four regions sure so I think that each region focused on in the report is presented with pretty unique challenges but but two commonalities do stand out the first is that while the specific type of vessels and goods moved vary by region small traditional and unregulated vessels play

critical role in established maritime trafficking networks across all regions we looked at in the report. You know, pleasure craft have been used in the transatlantic drug trade, as well as in the Red Sea. Passenger ferries and small traditional cargo vessels have been utilized for illicit wildlife trafficking in Indonesia. Small skiffs crisscross the Red Sea for a variety of trafficking purposes. And across all regions, small fishing vessels have been used opportunistically for trafficking of many different kinds. The second commonality, as I touched on before, is a lack of small traditional and unregulated vessels specific MDA. You know, this varies significantly from states like Brazil, which has a much more robust MDA capabilities, to some of the states in West

Africa and the southern end of the Red Sea, where there is much more work to be done. But all regions see some level of gaps in small traditional and unregulated vessel specific monitoring that have the potential to facilitate trafficking activity. Is there one region that's more concerning than the others? And if so, why is that the case? Well, it's probably a somewhat unsatisfying answer. But I think each region has challenges, though they might look significantly different from place to place. For example, in a place like Indonesia, which has made huge improvements in its MDA system in recent years. The sheer scope of small traditional and unregulated vessels at sea, the size of its maritime domain,

and the amount of informal landing sites and the length of coastline presents a tremendous challenge. In other states, the presence or proximity to violent non-state actors that might have motivations to acquire nuclear and radiological material is a significant risk factor. But if I had to pick a most concerning area, I might have to say some of the states in West Africa and the southern end of the Red Sea around the Babel Mendeb, simply because of a combination of the level of existing maritime trafficking, the presence of or proximity to violent non-state actors that might try to acquire nuclear and radiological material, and the significant resource limitations on maritime security capabilities.

And what are your recommendations for improving state capacity for monitoring this? Sure. So the report lays out a variety of potential areas of prioritization, but I'll try and highlight just a few. I think the first recommendation would be the continued development of small traditional and unregulated vessel registration and passive monitoring systems. As I mentioned before, many small traditional and unregulated vessels in many states fall outside of existing registration and monitoring systems, and improving coverage of those systems is a daunting but important step given the sheer numbers. However, progress in this area doesn't necessarily have to be extremely resource intensive or technologically advanced.

One good example from the study comes from Ghana, for example, which in recent years launched a registration drive for artisanal fishing canoes that includes application of unique serial numbers and barcoded ID cards for vessel operators. Even simple steps like this provide a degree of transparency, and while it could certainly be bypassed, it may be beneficial in allowing maritime law enforcement to identify vessels which are not participating and may be seeking to avoid regulation for illicit purposes such as trafficking. Another example from the study moving up the ladder of capabilities a run or two is Brazil, which has taken recent steps to improve monitoring of its fishing fleet, implementing a system that requires its

fishing vessels to use its vessel monitoring system, and then sharing that location data via Global Fishing Watches system, which is a huge step towards transparency. These efforts still have gaps in implementation, but they represent significant progress towards gaining a better understanding of small traditional and unregulated vessel activity. I think another important area, which the report puts forward as a recommendation, is the use of human intelligence in countering maritime crime. As I mentioned before, coastal seas are not empty spaces by any means. There are a plethora of vessels and civilians out at sea on a daily basis, the vast majority of whom are operating lawfully.

These civilian vessel operators and members of coastal communities have a really intimate knowledge of the normal pattern of life in their local waters. They know when a vessel is unfamiliar or operating in potentially suspicious ways, and tapping into that knowledge can be a wealth of information for maritime law enforcement. You know, doing that successfully requires building positive relationships with coastal communities and developing clear and easy channels for reporting information, but many states, you know, Indonesia, for example, have taken important steps towards utilizing this information through the use of tools like mobile apps for reporting. And then finally, the final recommendation in the report I'll highlight is the expanded use of

personal nuclear and radiological detection devices by maritime law enforcement. You know, such devices have been widely used by the U.S. Coast Guard, for example, for some time. These devices, such as human portable tripwires, and there may be many others out there on the market, can alert the user to the presence and location of radiological material. You know, in comparison to shore-based nuclear and radiological port screening, these devices are relatively inexpensive and could become ubiquitous with financial support from partner nations. They also serve as or have the potential to serve as a kind of force multiplier, essentially making every interaction between maritime law enforcement and a vessel a passive nuclear and radiological screening. You know, none of these recommendations on their own are a perfect solution by any means. It's a huge task and a complex one, and a perfect system would be extremely complex and expensive, but there are some realistic and cost-effective steps that could be taken in partnership with capacity builders in the near to medium term that could generate significant progress. and i just had one follow-up question before we close it out here but can you tell me anything else about brazil's vessel monitoring system how is that different from ais or are you just

referring to basically a brazilian ais monitoring system yeah so um this was a system that was specifically set up for Brazil's fishing fleet. So it's a location, a mandatory location beacon that provides information to the Brazilian government anytime Brazilian flag fishing vessels are out at sea. I think, and I may be, I may not have all the details here, but I think it was primarily implemented for vessels that are not part, are not required to be part of the AIS system, you know, and here, again, it highlights some of the challenges. I think there's been some hurdles in the implementation and that, you know, coverage is not by any means universal at this point. But what I think is important, why I think it's a good example, is trying to fill

those gaps that other more universal systems like AIS might have just because of AIS's minimum size requirements. Got it. Well, unfortunately, that is all the time that we have. I would like to thank Jay Benson for joining us today. Jay, where can we find you online and what else are you and the stable seas team working on? Sure. So, uh, we're working on a variety of projects right now. Um, you know, we are always, um, continuing to work on our maritime security index. Um, and that's something, you know, we'll be looking to continue to develop in the future. Uh, we've also come out with several reports recently. Um, you know, we have, uh, a new cost of Piracy Report, a new report on the maritime security dynamics in the Western Indian Ocean.

We have kind of a unique recent report that looks at the cost to Gulf of Guinea states from piracy and armed robbery, both direct and indirect. And we'll be, you know, developing more projects over the coming months. Best place to find me is our website at stableseas.org or on Twitter. It's letter J Benson underscore OEF. And yeah, happy to hear from any of your listeners and talk about our work here at Stable Seas. Thanks again for joining us. To listeners, Thanks for tuning in. We'll see you next time. © transcript Emily Beynon