Sea Control - Sea Control 373 - A Coercive Quarantine of Taiwan with Dr. Bradley Martin & Kristen Gunness

Episode Date: August 21, 2022

Links:1. Implications of a Coercive Quarantine of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China, by Bradley Martin, Kristen Gunness, Paul DeLuca & Melissa Shostak, RAND Corporation, 2022. 2. National Security Supply Chain Institute 

Hey folks, it's Jared. My guests today are Kristen Gunness and Bradley Martin, and we're going to discuss their paper for RAND on a possible coercive quarantine of Taiwan, what it might look like, and its implications. This episode was edited and produced by Marie Williams. I'd like to pause here to highlight our local chapters, whether you're in South Korea, Egypt, Singapore, France, New York, India, or the Caribbean. Chances are there's a SimSec local chapter near you. You can find a full listing of local chapters and contact information on our website at simsec.org. So if you're interested, please reach out. Finally, I want to take the opportunity to recommend our partners in the SimSec Podcast Network, the Bilge Pumps.

You can find Alex, Jamie, Drack, and a pot of Iron Brew bottles wherever you download your podcasts. With that, Kimber Smith. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Aloha, shipmates, and welcome back aboard Sea Control. My guests today are Brad Martin and Kristen Gunness, and we'll be discussing their report for RAND entitled Implications of a Coercive Quarantine of Taiwan by the People's Republic of China. Co-authors include Paul DeLuca and Melissa Shostak.

So Brad, Kristen, welcome aboard. Kristen, could you start by introducing yourself to the listeners a little bit, please? I'm sure. Thank you for having me. My name is Kristen Gunness. I am a senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, and my background is in Chinese military modernization, looking at trends in particular in the maritime domain, but I also work on broader issues related to China's security and foreign affairs concerns relating to the

Indo-Pacific region, as well as issues of escalation and deterrence. Well, thank you for joining us. Brad, could you tell the listeners a little bit about your background, please? Sure. I'm Brad Martin. I am a senior policy analyst at RAN. I've been here for 10 years. I'm also the director of the Supply Chain Security Research Institute. I am a retired Navy captain, and I served in the Navy for 30 years. I have a doctorate in political science from the University of Michigan, which I got before I joined the Navy. There's a story there, which is very interesting. Well, thanks, Brad. As a reminder to the listeners, all opinions are our own and not representative of any institution with which we might be otherwise associated. Brad, I'm going to start with you.

So why are you using quarantine in this instance, and is there a substantive difference in this case between quarantine on a blockade? That's an excellent question. Quarantine implies that a nation already has sovereignty over the area that it's attempting to influence. And in this case, what we were talking about is China attempting to exercise sovereignty over Taiwan and really treating Taiwan as being a province as opposed to another country. Blockade implies that you're in the context of a usually of a wartime scenario. The country is another country is trying to keep goods from flowing into another. Here, China is not asserting that. China is saying we have a perfect right to exercise the flow of commerce in and out of Taiwan, and we're doing that in a way that we choose. One thing that does do is it gives them a lot of flexibility as far as what they might choose to allow to flow.

And Kristen will talk more about how China views this. But the fundamental thing is that this is a way to allow China to exert authority, to exert sovereignty, and do it in a way that is consistent with it being the power that already controls the area. And it remains for everybody else to challenge it. So, Kristen, how do you believe the PRC would implement a quarantine? And do you believe it's possible to do so without it immediately becoming a shooting war? And for the listeners, I'm just going to timestamp this. We're recording this on Sunday, 31 July. So there's been a developments that are happening since this recording. That's why we're not talking about. So, Kristen, please. Yeah, thank you. To piggyback on Brad's comments, the goal from China's perspective of a quarantine would be to demonstrate de facto sovereignty by controlling the air and maritime space around the island, as well as looking, you know, being able to control which deliveries, imports, ships, aircraft, and people might have access to Taiwan without having to resort to high level force right from the get go. So China would likely see a quarantine as a potentially lower cost or lower risk means of coercing Taipei than an outright invasion because it exploits Taiwan's economic vulnerability, but it also puts the pressure on the United States and our allies to figure out how to respond. So while avoiding direct military confrontation, this type of quarantine in Beijing's mind could offer a way through which China can assert sovereignty around Taiwan without starting immediately at high levels of force, as it would with any of the PLA's wartime campaigns. So it would allow it to show resolve and establish a precedent of imposing its will, but would not necessarily provoke the United States into reacting the same way as if Taiwan had been directly attacked.

So to implement the quarantine, these are all potential steps, obviously, but China might potentially first establish maritime and aerospace control around Taiwan. And to do this, it would likely start by declaring something like an economic, exclusive economic zone or EEZ around Taiwan, as it has tried to do around disputed areas in the South China Sea, for example. The Chinese Coast Guard would enforce the EEZ through things like patrols and interdiction, and then stop and search of ships entering into the maritime space around Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. And in addition to that, the Air Force, the PLA Air Force, would also conduct patrols in the airspace around Taiwan in order to screen aircraft attempting to reach the island, intercept them,

and potentially divert them to an airport in mainland China for screening or some other place for screening. And then those ships and aircraft that were interdicted would either be let through, depending on what they are carrying their cargo and where they came from, or turned around and prevented from reaching Taiwan altogether. And then simultaneously, because China's trying to really maintain control over the air and maritime space around Taiwan, China would potentially conduct large-scale maritime and air operations to really establish this baseline de facto presence in the area, and also as a signal to deter Taiwan, the United States, and other responses. So some examples of this is, you know, the Chinese Coast Guard would probably frequently patrol the area around Taiwan, as well as China would likely send in the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia, which we've seen them do.

They adopt swarming tactics similar to those used around the Senkaku Islands that they've done before, as well as in the South China Sea, to basically further obstruct the passage of ships. And again, you know, the point of this is to really demonstrate de facto sovereignty over the air and maritime space and also to apply coercive pressure on Taipei in a way that's not a kinetic military operation. Now, the challenge comes in if Taiwan or the United States or allies challenge the quarantine, then the Chinese Coast Guard and the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia might start using things like ramming and obstruction actions, which we've also seen them do before, to harass incoming ships. And they could also potentially do things like fire warning shots to ships attempting to break through. In addition to that, I just wanted to mention that China would also probably use some non-conventional capabilities. So they would probably also use things like cyber attacks, EW jamming, things that we've seen them potentially use or discuss using in a situation like this, as well as potentially things like UAVs to conduct surveillance. So I just wanted to mention that they would also use those non-conventional capabilities. Absolutely. What difficulties would China face imposing a quarantine?

So I think in terms of the challenges, the first is the obvious one, and I know we'll talk more about this, on how to avoid the type of escalation that China presumably wants to avoid by pursuing a quarantine rather than something like an invasion or a joint blockade scenario. You know, a quarantine ends up, as Brad will discuss later, I think, a quarantine ends up not necessarily being a less escalatory option because to really have an effective response, the U.S. would have to apply direct pressure fairly quickly or risk Taiwan being economically strangled. So that's one challenge is sort of how to control the escalation. And

it's dangerous because from Beijing's perspective, again, it puts the onus on the United States and allies in terms of how to respond and not escalate it. So it's a little bit of a game of chicken. Another challenge is that a quarantine like this would require a large number of Chinese forces to sustain, paramilitary and military forces both. So the Chinese Coast Guard is very large, but they would likely need most of those ships as well as a large number of PLA aircraft, Air Force aircraft to enact a quarantine and to truly be able to control that air and maritime space around Taiwan and to maintain it over a longer period of time. So it really would be quite resource intensive for them. And then in addition to the resources for the quarantine,

And the PLA would also likely be increasing readiness in case of escalation and potentially the need to mobilize quickly. So we would potentially see some of that movement going on as well. It's important to make China understand that this is not a low-cost option. This is something that they're going to have to devote a lot of resources to. So to build on what Kristen was saying, it might look like it's just an assertion of sovereignty. But if other countries in Taiwan don't agree, then China is immediately faced with a situation where a lot of military force might be required. the actor that we haven't really talked about here though is taiwan from an escalation perspective because uh the moment that something like this would be imposed on them my assumption it is an

assumption is that they would do that as existential threat to them so how did go ahead it's an interesting question and we actually just did a tabletop exercise which i can't give you all the details about right now but we looked at what might happen if this were to occur and taiwan there's a couple of different things taiwan could do taiwan could just say well all right we we agree this is just something that's uh we have to live with and if that were to occur there's a lot of implications for the united states which it would have to work through as as far as uh you access to semiconductors primarily the big thing with taiwan is an economic thing would be dealing with would be semiconductors but if taiwan were to resist one thing that would become a real problem

is that immediately taiwan becomes very vulnerable because it really relies on trade to exist China is actually relatively able to absorb disruption, the United States and the Western world and its allies would have to face a situation where the disruption of exports from Taiwan and China would have an almost immediate effect on economies. So we could very rapidly end up in a situation where we're either, to be blunt, throwing Taiwan under the bus or capitulating to Chinese demands. So Taiwan's response is going to be critical, but in a couple of ways, they've made themselves very vulnerable by occupying such a monopoly position for semiconductors. because, on the one hand, that does make them critical to the rest of the world. On the other hand, it makes them a very attractive target for China. Kristen, anything to add on that before I transition to the next question? Yeah, I would say I agree with Brad.

I think Taiwan's response would also be calibrated to what a potential U.S. response would be also. And I mean, they would, you know, because they really are in the position of if they challenge the quarantine, you know, if they send their own ships out to challenge the quarantine or something like that, it does risk escalating into something that they don't want it to escalate in either. I mean, they don't want to get invaded either. I think there would be very close consultation with the United States in terms of what type of response to have. And I know I think Brad can talk a little more about the U.S. response and what that might be. So good transition to the next question, then. So if the U.S. and its partners and allies were to respond in the same way that they've responded in Ukraine, most notably with a heavy sanctions regime, what additional difficulties are they facing? Well, sanctions against China are almost useless.

There's very little that we're going to be able to do to China that will cause them to change their behavior very much. if and if they expect a sanctions regime they will do things to get around that one of the points of the report is that taiwan is very vulnerable to chinese pressure but china is not particularly vulnerable to anybody else's pressure so we would be rapidly transitioning into a potential military confrontation which is something we really nobody wants china doesn't want it we don't want it but we would likely see if this were to start to escalate is the united states would probably have to start thinking about how it's going to resupply taiwan which could be very challenging it's also going to have to think

about how much it really values relationship now when i say that i don't mean to imply that the United States is going to abandon it. I do mean to imply that I don't think that the United States has exactly understood how precarious the situation might become. I think on the converse side of that, it's really important to make the point with China that this is not a low-cost option. By doing this, it immediately forces some existential choices by Taiwan, by the United states and by everybody else that may drive it to a level of escalation that it didn't anticipate that is a really a uh a position of mutual misunderstanding is a bad place to be that's how you get more nobody wants started and then what are your recommendations for the u.s to

first avoid this scenario and then second to prevail should this scenario occur well avoiding this scenario involves first convincing China that the U.S. would view such an assertion as being tantamount to a blockade. What it would amount to is the United States saying, if you attempt to assert sovereignty over Taiwan by any particular mechanism, we view this as being an unwarranted assertion of control over taiwan that we've said all along that we don't think is a uh is valid doesn't mean that we can't work this thing out you know if china and taiwan work something out that's a different matter but if it's a case of china using this to force taiwan to do something we view that as being wrong and we would react and i think it should be made very clear to china

and to Taiwan that we would react to that type of action so that's one thing that has to happen a second thing that would have to happen is that the U.S. would have to have some credible plan for resupplying Taiwan in the event of something like this occurring so it'd have to be made very clear to China and to Taiwan that if this were imposed the United States would continue to ensure that taiwan gets food gets energy gets all the essentials of life and i guess a a third and longer term thing is that the reliance on taiwan on the taiwan semiconductor manufacturing company for the export of high-end semiconductor chips and so forth that's an understandable thing, but it needs to be that supply chain has to be diversified. There has to

be production done in other places to include the United States and U.S. allies and so forth to make sure that the United States doesn't have to face a challenge that says, I'm going to deal with depression or abandoning an ally. If a quarantine were imposed and the United States were able to say well we're able to resupply ourselves with chips a lot of different places so taiwan however long you want to resist this is your decision i think if that were the the decision process that would be a much easier thing a much less escalatory situation than what we have now kristen any final thoughts on either of those two questions before we uh close out well i just Yeah, I think it speaks to the broader, in terms of how the United States and allies can react to something like that, it speaks to the broader issue of how to counter China's, you know, what we call gray zone operations.

And so China and the PLA have really, over the last 15 years, worked very hard to develop a range of what they would consider lower escalatory options for how to respond to various security challenges. And I think Brad's point about really conveying to China that something like this is not necessarily low risk and low escalatory is a very important point. But I think the United States doesn't always have, I don't want to say ability to respond, because that's not the case. But we haven't necessarily cracked the nut on how to respond to these types of gray zone operations in a way that isn't escalatory. And I think a lot of the things that we're doing in the region with our allies, you know, the AUKUS, the Quad, getting allies and partners together to send that signal of deterrence is a really good thing, and it needs to be continued. But I just wanted to hammer the point that Brad made, that this is not necessarily an escalatory option, and the gray zone operations are hard to respond to. Yeah. Trying to orient U.S. force structure such that it's able to do low-end stuff, I think it's an important thing to think about. But it's not really the case that we would be able to counter this by saying, well, we're going to escort ships into port or stuff like that, and we need forces to do that.

Once the escalation starts, it's going to go very high order very quickly, and I think that China understanding that is really a key part to this not becoming an entree into war. So the building of rungs in the ladder, which we typically would like to do for escalation, can't just be a matter of U.S. force structure. It has to be a matter of conveying to China that this is dangerous. Well, unfortunately, that's all that we have time for today. I'd like to thank my guests, Brad Martin and Kristen Gunness. Kristen, we'll start with you. Where can we find you online, and what are you working on next? um so you can find me online on the rand website at rand.org and uh i'm working on um several

studies right now as i said before related to escalation and deterrence in the indo-pacific region and in u.s force posture options and brad how about you where can we find you and what's your next project well i'm on a lot of different projects and they're all of having to do with supply chains we have a website national defense research institute supply chain institute which has got a bunch of articles on it that have to do with supply chain security which i would ask people or would encourage people to go take a look at because we've got a lot of different things on there we will be completing out brief for the ttx tabletop exercise i talked about and i would hope that people would be able to look at that once we publish it, because I think that really

has a lot of interesting information about how this type of economic warfare takes place. Absolutely. So once you publish the TTX outbrief, we'd love to have you and some of the other participants come on to talk about what was published, and then if anything didn't make it into publication that you want to speak to, happy to discuss that as well. And then I'll correspond with you offline and get the the website for the national defense research institute supply chain institute as well we'll include that in the show notes so listeners can go in there and take a look at at the work that you've done but thank you both for coming on today and to the listeners thanks for tuning in we'll see you next time thank you very much thank you for having us

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