Sea Control - Sea Control 382 - Russian NOTAM Use Near Norway with Dr. Kristian Åtland

Episode Date: September 22, 2022

Link:1. Military Muscle-Flexing as Interstate Communication: Russian NOTAM Warnings off the Coast of Norway, 2015-2021 , by Kristian Åtland, Thomas Nilsen & Torbjørn Pedersen, Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies, 14 Jun 2022.2. Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)

Hey folks, it's Jared. I'm joined today by Dr. Christian O'Connor. He's going to explain how Russia has used notices to airmen as a messaging tool directed at Norway and NATO. This episode was edited and produced by David Zahida. I'd like to pause here to highlight our local chapters, whether you're in South Korea, Egypt, Singapore, France, New York, India, or the Caribbean. Chances are there's a SimSec local chapter near you. You can find a full listing of our chapters and contact information on the website at simsec.org. So if you're interested, please reach out. Finally, I want to take the opportunity to recommend to our partners in the SimSec Podcast Network, The Bilge Pumps. You can find Alex, Jamie, Drack, and Apollo Bar and Brew Bottles wherever

you download your podcasts. And with that, Kimber's Men. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Aloha, Seamates, and welcome aboard Sea Control. My guest today is Dr. Christian O'Hunt, And we're going to be discussing his contribution to the Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies entitled Military Muscle Flexing is Interstate Communication, Russian NOTAM Warnings Off the Coast of Norway, 2015 to 2021. So, Christian, thank you for joining us. Could you tell the listeners a little bit about your background, please? Thanks for having me on the podcast, Jared. I appreciate your interest in our research. My background is that of a political scientist and security policy analyst. I work as a Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, or FFI,

which is the main institution responsible for defence-related R&D in Norway. I have been working at FFI for more than 20 years, and much of my research has centred on military developments in the Arctic, particularly the European Arctic, generally referred to in Norway as the High North. Within FFI's analysis division, we have a small team of specialists on Russia who do research on topics of relevance to our national security policy and long-term defense planning. We rely for the most part on open sources,

and we produce research reports and articles in peer-reviewed journals. And most of our publications are unclassified, and we're not part of the defense intelligence apparatus. Well, thank you again for coming aboard today. And as a reminder to the listeners, all opinions are our own and not reflective of any institution with which we might be otherwise associated. So, Christian, why did you think this topic merited study? Having followed Russia's military activity in the high north for quite some time,

I was intrigued by the growing number of media reports about Russian live fire exercises in the international waters and airspace off Norway's west coast. Some four or five years ago, such activities were reported pretty far south in the Norwegian Sea. and at a considerable distance from the Northern Fleet's traditional exercise and weapon testing areas, which are found in the Barents Sea and off the coast of the Kola Peninsula. Another thing that I found intriguing was that many of Russia's military activity in the Norwegian Sea seemed to coincide in time with Norwegian and or NATO exercises, often in the same areas. And this became particularly evident during the Trident Juncture exercise in November 2018,

when Russia announced a naval exercise area overlapping with NATO's exercise area right off the coast of western Norway. And this was obviously politically motivated and it was meant to send some sort of signal to Norway and its allies. And at that time, Russia's increasingly numerous air and naval exercises in the Norwegian Sea and the western part of the Barents Sea had not been properly analyzed. There had been no academic studies on the topic, at least none that I was aware of, and political and military decision makers in Norway had a quite rudimentary and anecdotal knowledge about this activity. So we wanted to do something about this and find out more about the Russian activity, where, when and why it took place and so on. So what I did was to team up with Professor Torbjörn Pedersen at Nord University, which is located in northern Norway, and Thomas Nilsson, who is the editor of Barron's Observer, which is an online newspaper in Kirkenes, right on the Russian border. And we put together a detailed project outline and applied for funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Defense.

And sharing our interest in the topic, the MOD was happy to fund the study. And that's essentially how it all started back in December 2020. Well, that's a good segue. You mentioned Trident Juncture 2018 and the overlapping exercise areas, both for NATO and then for Russia in the area off the Russian and the Norwegian coast. How does Russia view the area off its own northern coast and the Norwegian coast? This is something that we touch on in our article. The Kola Peninsula has traditionally been and still remains Russia's most important basing area for naval forces, including ballistic missile submarines, of which the Northern Fleet currently has six units that are more or less active.

Despite the high latitude, the naval bases on the Kola Peninsula are ice-free all year, as is most of the Barents Sea and all of the Norwegian Sea due to the warming effects of the Gulf Stream. Russia sees the Barents and Norwegian Seas as integral to its so-called Bastion defense strategy. And in order to ensure the safe operation of the Northern Fleet's boomers in the inner part of the Bastion, that is the Barents Sea, Russia must be able to control the gap between North Cape and Bear Island, which is located slightly south of the archipelago of Svalbard. Controlling this gap, the Northern Fleet's surface forces, attack submarines, naval strike aircraft and maritime patrol aircraft can also conduct sea denial operations in the maritime areas further south. And by areas further south, I essentially mean the Norwegian Sea, which extends all the way to the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap, which is again the gateway to the North Atlantic. russia's strategic thinking as relates to this area is partly defensive that is related to

the ambition they are related to the defense of the northern fleets ssbn patrol areas in the barren sea and partly offensive that is related to the ambition of being in a position to threaten nato's transatlantic sea lines of communication and nato's ability to transfer reinforcements to Norway in the event of a crisis or conflict. And the latter point is also the main reason why Norway and its allies devote so much attention to the Norwegian Sea. What is a NOTAM? What does it allow a country to do? And then are there any quote-unquote limitations on what a country can do with a NOTAM? So, for example, what are a country's obligations regardless of what warning they've chosen to issue?

until recently the acronym stood for notice to airmen then in december last year the international civil aviation organization and the u.s federal aviation administration slightly redefined the meaning of the acronym which now stands for notice to air missions and the purpose of this adjustment was essentially to make the acronym gender neutral other than that a no time is still a no time it is a standardized type of notification that is being issued by a country's civil aviation authorities and its primary purpose is to alert aircraft pilots and others about potential hazards that may affect the safety of flight operations. A typical example of such a hazard would be a military exercise in international waters or airspace for instance one involving the launch

of missiles or other weapon systems. Such activities are to be notified well in advance so that those affected by them can take all necessary precautions and navigate around temporarily restricted areas and so on. Under international law, states may legally conduct such activities in and over international waters, including in and over the exclusive economic zones of other states, a coastal state's territorial waters and airspace that is areas closer than 12 nautical miles from the coast are, of course, off-limits for this kind of activity. Regardless of whether the activity takes place on the high seas or in the EEZ of another state, the state that conducts the activity is required to give due regard to other

users of the sea and airspace and take all necessary safety precautions before and during the activity. And at the same time, civilian users of the sea and airspace are to respect area restrictions imposed by the no-time issuing state, regardless of whether they are flying the flag of the coastal states or a third state. So the general principle that applies here is essentially one of mutual regard. Why did you have to examine the time period 2015 to 2021? It's a good question. One of the things we did as we started working on this study

was to extract and systematize data from Russian NOTAM messages issued in our area of interest. That is north of 60 degrees northern latitude and between 0 and 33 degrees eastern longitude. And the further back we went in time, the more difficult it became, as NOTAM messages are not stored for all eternity. In short, we were not able to recover NOTAM messages older than five years. But in close cooperation with Avinor Air Navigation Services,

which is the primary Norwegian recipient of Russian NOTAM messages, we were able to generate a list of all relevant Russian NOTAMs received since January of 2015, and our data set was continually updated throughout the period of research, and using this methodology, we were able to gather detailed information about 27 Russian NOTAM events in our area of interest. Where in the high north were the Russian NOTAM areas located during this period? Well, the picture that emerged when we started plotting the Russian NOTAM data on the map was very interesting. The Russian NOTAM areas were found pretty much all over the region, from the waters north of Svalbard in the north to the southern

part of the Norwegian Sea in the south. The highest number of NOTAMs, 13, were found in the western Barents Sea between North Cape and Bear Island. And many of these were recurrent NOTAM areas in the sense that they were reused with varying intervals, and sometimes with slight amendments. Another area with many Russian NOTAMs was found in the Norwegian Sea, northwest of the Lofoten Islands. Further south in the Norwegian Sea, off the coast of Møre, which is slightly south of Norway, we found four NOTAMs, and these were all unique rather than recurring. And we also found the largest of them all in this area. That was one that was announced during the Trident Juncture exercise in 2018. Can you tell me anything about the size

and duration of the Russian NOTAM areas and then the impact on civilian activity? They vary greatly in size. Smallest one covered an area of slightly less than 350 square miles, or twice the size of the municipality of Oslo, where I live. The largest NOTAM area located off the coast of mid-Norway was enormous in size, 28,800 square miles, roughly comparable to the size of Norway's northernmost and largest county, Tromsø and Finnmark, which is larger than the state of West Virginia. Average size was around 3,600 square miles. In terms of duration, it seems like the duration increased throughout the period from approximately 1.7 days on average in 2015 to approximately 4.7 days in 2021.

The shortest lasting NOTAM area lasted only one and a half hours, and the longest lasting one announced in February of 2021 lasted seven days. When it comes to the issue of consequences for civilian activity at sea and in the air, there are many variables to consider, such as the location, size and duration of the area that is affected by the restrictions. Another important variable is the length of the warning time. Short notice area closures in regions of heavy traffic or extensive civilian activity can sometimes be a real challenge for aviators, for ship captains and fishermen. And the circumnavigation of restricted areas can take extra time and lead to increased fuel costs and economic losses for airlines and shipping companies. The Norwegian Fishermen's Organization has on a number of occasions called for a reduction in the number and size of Russia's military activity, Russia's military exercises in the high north, at least during the peak season for fisheries. And they have also called for longer warning times so that they can plan operations better and avoid unnecessary inconveniences. Sorry, I should have asked this earlier when we were talking about the definition of a NOTAM.

But did Russia also issue corresponding notice to mariners in conjunction with all the NOTAMs or these separate events? Notice to mariners are usually issued for the coastal regions around the Kola Peninsula, not off the coast of Norway. What information do you have about the actual military activity that was taking place inside the NOTAM areas off the coast of Norway? Do you have any indications about what types of weapons are being tested or are these just sort of nuisance NOTAMs? Given that our study is based on open sources rather than on intelligence reports, The information that we have on the type of activity being conducted during the Russian NOTAM events is somewhat sketchy. The text of the Russian NOTAM warnings contains some information, at least on a generic level. Information from other sources, such as media reports and press releases from the Northern Fleet,

indicate that a variety of weapon systems are being used or tested during the NOTAM events, including surface-to-air, air-to-surface, and surface-to-surface missiles. Sometimes Russian defense authorities or the Norwegian Joint Headquarters provide additional information about the weapons being launched or the types or names of vessels involved in the exercises. For instance, the aging Udaloy-class destroyers of the Northern Fleet are often involved in the activity, along with new classes of frigates. Submarines and aircraft are also often involved in the events.

And some of the events are space-related. For instance, a downfall of debris from rockets launched from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome. What are quote-unquote unused NOTAM areas, and why do you think they're significant? This is an interesting phenomenon that we came across when we started comparing the contents of the Russian no-time warnings with the information that we were able to piece together about the actual events. By unused no-time areas, we mean areas that were announced in accordance with established procedures due to potential hazards associated with planned missile launches or other military activity, but where no such activity took place within the announced time frame. Interestingly, a significant number of the Russian no-time areas were never used for the designated purpose. There may, of course, be several possible explanations for these events, or rather non-events, as we chose to call them. One possible explanation could be unforeseen technical issues, such as weapon malfunction.

Another possible explanation could be unfavorable weather conditions. and in instances where the weapon platforms were present in or near the no-time areas at the announced time explanations such as these are certainly plausible but there is a third possible explanation that we found equally plausible and this one was mostly political it may well be that russia never really intended to launch weapons in these non-event areas and that their primary purpose was just to send a political signal. Do you believe the NOTAMs are related to NATO and Norwegian activity, and then why or why not? At least some of the Russian NOTAM events seem to have been triggered by, perhaps even intended to obstruct, Allied military training

activity in the High North. The Russian NOTAMs issued during and immediately after the Trident juncture exercise in 2018 are a good case in point. This was also a large exercise by Norwegian standards involving some 40,000 troops from 31 NATO member and partner nations. In other cases, such as the Russian NOTAMs issued in the Norwegian Sea after the dynamic Mongoose anti-submarine warfare exercise in the summer of 2019, a causal connection is likely, but more difficult to prove. One of the more recent no-time warnings issued in February 2021 coincided in time with the deployment of U.S. B-1 bombers to Erlan air base. And during this year's cold response exercise, which took place in March. The Russians issued a NOTAM in the Norwegian Sea. This one was

relatively small, short in duration, and located far from the exercise area. And then we have the many cases where Russian NOTAM events in the Norwegian and Barents Seas do not coincide in time with Allied activities. And the latter category includes, for instance, the space-related NOTAMs that we found southeast and north of Svalbard, these do not appear to have been prompted by or in any way related to Norwegian or NATO activity. So I guess you can say it is a mixed picture. I think that may answer my last question, but you tell me if you have any additional thoughts on this. Did you come to any definitive conclusions about the quote-unquote why of Russian NOTAM use? Well, studying the phenomenon of interstate signaling is not an

exact science. We cannot know for sure what, if any, political purpose a Russian NOTAM event was meant to serve. The best we can do is to speculate based on the information that we have about the size, time, and place of the Russian NOTAM areas and the political context in which they were announced. The general impression that this study left us with is that at least some of the Russian exercises and missile launches, particularly in areas adjacent to Norway's west coast, were primarily intended to obstruct Norwegian or NATO exercises. On a number of occasions, the Russian NODAM warnings appeared to have been tailored for the purpose of intimidating Norway and its allies, and communicating Russia's displeasure with the presence of American

and other NATO forces in the high north. Whether the signaling worked as intended is, of course, a whole other question. There are many indications that the Russian signaling may have been ineffective, perhaps even counterproductive. Despite the many Russian no-time events off the coast of Norway between 2015 and 2021, NATO's presence in this region has only increased. Well, if you'll permit me, I'm going to ask one more follow-up question as I was just thinking about this. Do you have any intention to continue this research, whether you're looking at,

continue to look at the way Russia uses NOTAMs as a signaling means to Norway in the high north, or transferring that research to look at another area, for example, the Black Sea and the NOTAMs that were issued prior to the Ukraine-Russia war there? yeah well the comparative dimension and all of this is very interesting i would love to do a comparative study we are planning a follow-up activity if we can get funding for it focusing on the norwegian sea and the barren sea it seems to me that still the biggest share of russia's weapon testing and exercise activity still takes place in the eastern part of the barren sea closer to the Northern Fleet's basis on the Kola Peninsula. But we would love to do a follow-up study, maybe also a comparative analysis.

But right now, Russia's war in Ukraine is the primary focus for our research group. But as soon as we get our head above water again, we will look into that. Well, unfortunately, that's all the time that we have for today. I'd like to thank my guest, Dr. Christian Udman. Christian, where can we find you online and what are you working on next? It was a pleasure to talk to you, Jared. Your listener will find more information about FFI's Russia project at ffi.no.en. And they may also follow me on Twitter at atlanchristian with a K. It was a real pleasure to talk to you. Thank you again for joining us, Christian. To the listeners, thanks for tuning in. We'll see you next time. We'll be right back.

© transcript Emily Beynon