Sea Control - Sea Control 386 - Tanks in the Surf with Matt Graham

Episode Date: October 13, 2022

1. "Tanks in the Surf – Maintaining the Joint Combined Arms Landing Team," by Major Matthew W. Graham, Association of the United States Army, Land Warfare Paper 147, July 2022.2. Sea Control 181 – The “Amphibious” 8th in the Pacific War, by Jared Samuelson with Major General Pat Donahoe and Don Chisholm, CIMSEC, June 7, 2020.3. Sea Control 198 – Australian Amphibious Capability with Colonel Kim Gilfillan, by Jared Samuelson, CIMSEC, September 6, 2020.

Hello, I'm Nathan. I'm filling in again for Jared this week. On the program today, we have Major Matt Graham joining Jared to discuss amphibious doctrine, historical case studies of Army-led amphibious operations, and a future role for the Army in the maritime domain. I edited and produced today's podcast. I'd like to pause here to highlight our local chapters. Whether you're in South Korea, Egypt, Singapore, France, New York, India, or the Caribbean, chances are there's a SimSec local chapter near you. You can find a full listing of local chapters and contact information on our website at simsec.org. So if you're interested, please reach out. Finally, I wanted to take this opportunity to recommend our partners in the SimSec podcast

network, The Bilge Pumps. You can find Alex, Jamie, Drack, and a pile of Iron Brew bottles wherever you download your podcasts. And on that note, Kimber's Men. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Aloha, Shoemates, and welcome back aboard Sea Control. My guest today is Major Matt Graham, and we're going to be discussing his land warfare paper for the Association of the United States Army. It's titled, Tanks in the Surf, Maintaining the Joint Combined Arms Landing Team. So, Matt, welcome aboard. Could you tell the listeners a little bit about your background, please?

Thanks, Jared, and thanks for inviting me to come and speak on this. So, I'm a Southern California native by birth. I'm an active duty Army armor officer. Been in the Army about 12 years now, so most of the time serving at the tactical level in both armor and cavalry formations. deployed Iraq, Afghanistan, and currently attending the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Longworth, Kansas. And before that, I was an art of war scholar at the Command General Staff College. I hold an MA from the University of Texas, El Paso in Defense and Strategic Studies and a BA in International Studies from the Virginia Military Institute. And probably most important for some of your listeners, I'm the grandson of a Marine. So I'm no stranger to the

Naval Service. All right. Your family is already, you know, navally integrated. Thank you. As a reminder to the listeners, all opinions are our own and not reflective of any institution with which we might be otherwise associated. I'll just timestamp this too. We're recording on Sunday, September 11th. So there's something that comes up in the course of our conversation that subsequently happens most likely over in Ukraine. And you and I are for whatever reason, not talking about it. That's the reason it hasn't happened yet. But you started with the observation that, and I quote, in the popular imagination, amphibious operations are dominated by the initial assault or landing. However, this limited focus runs contrary to the U.S. Army's historical

experience, end quote. So is what you're describing there at the start a doctrinal difference, or is it just really a mindset difference between the Marine Corps and the Army? So it's a little bit of both, Jared. From a historical experience, the Army, basically from pre-World War II going into the Second World War and on to Korea, saw amphibious operations in very similar, the same way the Marine Corps did, kind of seeing the sea as maneuver space. But after, say, about Korea kind of going into the late 70s and 80s, the Army kind of moves away from seeing amphibious operations as this thing. And the Marine Corps really takes dominance in the amphibious operations space. That's in terms of doctrine, in terms of what programming and material for it, just because

of their integrated ordering of the naval service. Now, from a doctrinal perspective, the Army currently lacks any type of specific amphibious doctrine. Our last manual dealing with amphibious operations was published in 1961, and it went out of print in the late 1990s. And so since then, we've been relying on joint doctrine, and the proponent for joint doctrine is the Marine Corps. So in that way, we've been modeling or basically following what the Marine Corps says for amphibious

operations doctrine. How are tanks addressed by doctrine and amphibious operations? And maybe you could use this as a springboard too to talk about what doctrine exists for amphibious operations. You mentioned the joint pubs. Yeah. So you got joint pub 02, which is joint amphibious operations. Most of the doctrine on the Army side addresses it very similarly in its FM 3-99, which is airborne air assault units, addressing it kind of in the joint forcible entry regards. In the joint doctrine, it is a passing reference talking about getting stuff over the shore. Historically, though, tanks have played a much larger role in doctrine. So going back to, say, 1933 in the Joint Overseas Expeditionary Manual, which is a joint Army-Navy

hub, they talk about tanks, but it's also, again, in passing. That kind of changes, though, in historically in 1941, with FM 3-5, Navy Manual FTP-167 from 1938, which specifically talk about how conventional tanks are to be used in the amphibious assault. I get them on the beach, help them support the assault infantry, and then move them inland. That, though, doctrinally evolves throughout World War II. So you get that public, that comes out in 1941. By 44, you see an increasing change as technology has advanced and the doctrine reflects that. You now have amphibious tractors or amphibious tanks, and then you have the conventional tanks as well. So by 44, when the manual gets republished, you see the tank not only in its initial role of supporting the assault infantry and joint operations, but also its importance for actions beyond the beach, which I think arguably that's where armor really shows its strengths. You know, shock, mobility, and firepower are really the keystones of the quality of tanks, and it's in the ability to not just get on the beach, but then use the shock generated from that amphibious landing to exploit the initiative and gain ground and land.

And the doctrine kind of touches on that. That doctrine that solidifies in 44, it kind of stays the same through Korea. It gets codified in 1961 in that manual I already mentioned. And that kind of stays the same all the way up into the 1990s when the army basically drops its amphibious doctrine. And I think a lot of that plays into your first question of how does the popular imagination of amphibious operations conceptualize? And I think in a lot of either doctrine writers, soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, as they think about amphibious operations, it's always the landing. In the popular imagination, you think of St. Private Ryan or other movies, it's always the landing that's the most important. They forget that there's a huge land campaign that follows typically most of those landings. You look at any of the big landings of World War II, Normandy, Okinawa, even Iwo Jima or Sicily, for example, like one of the case studies we look at, there's a significant land campaign that lasts for 30, 40, 60 odd days, you know, the rest of the war, in some cases, after that landing. So it's just that small piece. And I think the idea that it was just the landings, or it's more than just the landings, kind of gets lost after World War II.

And I'll put my Navy hat on, too, and say that I think the other piece that frequently gets lost there is the 500 to thousands of miles transit that has to occur for the amphibious forces before they get there, often through contested water space. Absolutely. You opted to explore campaigns on Sicily, Leyte, and Luzon from World War II. Why did you choose those campaigns in particular? Okay. Yeah. Great, great question, Jared. So history doesn't, you know, the saying goes, history doesn't repeat, but it rhymes. So I wanted to look at campaigns that had a lot of similarities historically to situations or the operational environment that the joint force might find in today's operational environment, whether that's in the Indo-Pacific or in the European theater, honestly. And I wanted to pull out from each of those operations the lessons that the Army could take from those three case studies and these OEs that we could encounter, you know, today. Basically, that breaks down to three real reasons, like, why I really wanted to look at. One, they're Army-specific operations. So you have, like, joint operations in the Pacific, particularly.

Like, Okinawa really comes to mind. It's a joint Marine Corps Army land component advance. But I really wanted to just look at Army-specific lessons, because we're the ones that have lost the amphibious heritage. You know, the Marine Corps is still a very big proponent. Even with everything coming out of Force Design 2030, the Marine Corps is still the amphibious warriors for the Joint Force. And the Army kind of lost that one to look at something that says, hey, this is a time when the Army did amphibious operations from on the beach to the conclusion of the campaign in its totality. and so with that i also kind of wanted to stay away from the larger amphibious operations you know everybody looks at normandy and i've mentioned okinawa a couple times iwo jima

but the landing forces again from a navy side the landing forces that are generated to conduct those operations are massive and those are just i think in today's nuclear environment those are not practical things so the three campaigns that we looked at are smaller operations smaller forces smaller fleets, smaller landings, that maybe not, wouldn't reach the threshold for perhaps nuclear targeting. Second, each of these case studies has a specific thing that I want to draw out of them. For Sicily, it's the counterattack by the Axis armored forces on B-plus-1, which is one of the few times like the Axis actually, or the few times in history that a armored counterattack occurred against a beachhead insignificant force after the landing. So when the landing is most

vulnerable, you have this powerful counterattack. How does the joint force kind of work through that? For Leyte, it's the multi-domain fight and the weather. So Leyte, you have the Battle of Leyte Gulf. I'm sure a lot of your listeners would already know the naval history around that. Halsey goes chasing off after the Japanese carriers at Leyte. It leaves the ground forces basically kind of on their own without naval air support. They can't get the land air support based up because of the weather because of the terrain and so you end up having this armor infantry artillery fight that has to occur because of other things are going on and with the rest of the joint force and then luzon finally it's the urban fight in manila manila in 44 45 is one of those built up

developed cities in the far east and it turns into which is a slugging match and armor really shows its ability to have a substantial effect on the battlefield in that urban environment. You just touched on it. I'm going to give you a chance to expound a little bit more even, but what role did armor play in each of the campaigns that you mentioned? Yeah, so I kind of already touched on a little bit of it. So we can pick one of those case studies if one of them sounds like you really want to dig into it, or I can kind of talk each one in turn well i guess whichever uh one where the armor played a major role closest to the beach i think so maybe not manila but maybe late or maybe you know what sicily the counter

attack that you mentioned yeah absolutely so sicily is a really good case study too because so sicily if you're looking at the joint what could be the joint fight today right you have a force in 1943 that is essentially kind of, this is the really big first amphibious operation, contested amphibious operation the Joint Force is going to do. You've got the naval element, you've got a multinational element with the British Eighth Army landing around Syracuse, you've got the Americans on the Seventh and the Pat land at Gala. But this is the first time they're fighting a truly established defense. You had Operation

Torch in 1942 on the North African coast. There's some light opposition from the bc french forces but not a huge lot and you'll learn a lot of lessons from that but sicily is the time they come in they're like okay we we kind of critiqued with this let's take our doctrine and really apply it against the enemy that is going to fight on the beach and so you see a number of things first off sicily is the only time that you use an entire armored division like an entire armored division is afloat off the beach at gala and gets deployed but on D-Day, essentially, to land. They run into a number of technical issues

getting the tanks on the shore, from not having enough ship-to-shore connectors, with not having enough mats to get them. They have these things called Somerville mats, which are laid out on the beach, so the tanks can then, you know, these tracked vehicles can roll up on the beach. Those get tangled up in the armor,

so you have a lot of technical issues to keep the division from being the, it ends up being the 2nd Army Division, from really getting landed on the beach. But you see these pockets, like companies, like company here company here platoon here that get landed across the beachhead and because of the the shock from the initial bombardment and the shock of the the landing along with the airborne drop you really get the italians the german defenders you get inside the root loop and the

beach defense is not as strong as it was anticipated to be and because armor gets landed on the first day when they don't encounter this large defense right at the shoreline these armor forces are able to exploit and take advantage of that and drive inland so you end up having companies supporting like the third infantry division get to go ended up 20 kilometers inland on d-day essentially and d plus one you know they've there's lines on these maps that seventh army has where it's like okay we expect to reach this line this yellow line by d plus five and they're already there on d plus one and that's the strength that armor has when it's really employed in the shore in the surf and on the initial landing and the other thing that you get with

sicily is this counter-attack right so the germans and the italians they they realize that the beach is kind of they've they've failed to stop the allies at the shoreline and they've got to drive them back into the sea so they marshaled this armored counter-attack and it's a variety of armored units that hit the line hit the beachhead around i think like 12 o'clock on d plus one they're going at it and infantry have got anti-tank weapons with them in their in their table of authorization but they haven't landed yet because of various things that are coming onto the beach so these tanks end up being one of the few things that actually can you know toe to toe with this german armor when it counterattacks and essentially this platoon from the second

armored plays this big role in stopping the herman gary division from penetrating the first infantry division at the beach and it kind of gets marginalized because in addition to this tank you've got a lot of naval gunfire that occur that are causing attrition on the germans that they're attacking and they and they stop the counterattack and that's that's essentially it they haven't germans don't penetrate on d plus one they they fail to stop the landing and then the breakout occurs patton goes up to felina massena and then he cuts across to palermo and it's or excuse me He goes to Palermo and then cuts across to Messina, and it's good. And the thing that gets, I think, why Sicily in totality is cool about armor and why it's important to serve is that naval bombardment, having those naval forces right off the beach, is not something you're going to have in any future joint fight.

You're going to be over the horizon, possibly riding indirect fire support with missiles or aircraft. But what you get onto the shore is what you got onto the shore. And if the enemy is able to hit you with something, like, you know, if we look at the South China Sea, the Chinese have combined arms brigades with tanks, with the Type 15 light tank. And so if you're only employing light infantry of anti-tank weapons, or heaven forbid something happens that can't bring those to shore, you're at a significant disadvantage if you don't have a comfortable platform, like an armored platform that can bring that shock mobility and firepower to the beach on the initial landing. so each of the campaigns you mentioned took place on where relatively large populated land masses when we compare them with the islands in the south china sea you did make a comment earlier too about force design 2030 is like being a a step away from the amphibious piece like i i i would argue i interpret differently and maybe like we can discuss this for a minute or two i think it's

actually more amphibious and less but the the focus now is less on the landing and the assault phase and more on like establishing these little enclaves on very small like very small footprint type places more distributed less contested in the landing and then those forces are now there as part of the isr counter isr uh fight rather than what we traditionally think about when we talk about that very first question is like our mindset is like oh this is the landing like we're going to put two battalions ashore side by side they're going to take out the pillbox xyz whatever whatever we all think of when we talk about saving Private Ryan, those other World War II battles that we have in our head. But do you think the argument for tanks holds

on those smaller islands as well? Or are we really talking about maybe two different fights occurring here and there's like no disagreement at all is, hey, the Marines are going to be doing that stuff. But at some point, we're going to want to see something that's held by a larger force and we're going to want our same larger force. And that's what you're talking about. I think it's a little bit of both. Force Design 2030 envisions, and the Commandant has kind of said this, the Commandant, you know, there's been the whole debate around Marine getting rid of armor.

And, you know, we kind of talked on the side about what particular retired individuals say about the Marine Corps getting rid of armor. How many tanks does the Army have? You caught me off guard. We got a lot. Like thousands and thousands, right? Yeah, thousands and thousands. Marines gave up like two battalions or something.

I mean, I may be off by a battalion or two, but yeah, they didn't give up that much. The Army's got plenty. So that's where my personal position is on that. But yeah, it's a good trade. You guys got plenty. And I agree with the Commandant. The Commandant came out and said, you know, in the paper talks about this, you know, Commandant Berger said, we need an Army with a lot of tanks. We don't need a Marine Corps with a lot of tanks.

And when you look at it from a cost-benefit analysis, I think he's spot on. If you're looking at the concept of the stand-in force and how you can deny naval maneuver with long-range fires from small islands in the South Pacific or in the First Island chain, yeah, absolutely. You know, for two battalions of tanks, I can get X number of HIMARS or X number of Marine Littoral Regiments for the same cost and all that. Yeah, I think that's a fair trade, especially if you've got another joint partner that is there that has those armor capabilities. That will enthusiastically provide those capabilities, I think. Yeah, like that wants this mission set that could see itself as like the Army is now the joint force provider for medium and heavy armor.

And like, there's a lot of other things that would need to happen to get us into the game for that, from naval build to platform-specific stuff to training and doctrine, which we can talk about. But yeah, you have an army that wants to and can fill that role. um but back to your kind of your question of like does this does this hold true is this like are we talking to different things apples and oranges you know an island like taiwan or luzon or a large populated island in the first island chain or second island chain compared to something like fiery cross reef or mischief reef small outposts or even smaller outposts that don't have a lot of buildup on them because i know those have been substantially expanded now i think it all comes down to what is the objective for that island right like what are we trying to do as the joint force what are we trying to do is the navy the marine the marine corps or the army if we're just

trying to deny that island's use let's take fiery cross reef for example you know maybe tanks aren't part of that equation maybe it's a it's a small island it can be neutralized with fires it can be can do a marine amphibious raid on it reduce the airfield there reduce the stuff and therefore it's no longer a threat or heck just just cut it off and then just cut off their sea lines and airlines communication and it just dies on the vine that's a huge part of the island hopping campaign in the south pacific that general carter did he just bypassed strong points it becomes a little bit different question if you're looking to hold that island so again fiery cross maybe you want to take and hold that piece of terrain for a long time not just come in put

some stuff on it use it to deny you know sea maneuver space to the opponent and then withdraw maybe you want to hold that build it up get your own air and naval forces there to use it as a springboard i think in that conversation or that objective i think tanks do you have a do you have a role in that particularly if the opponent has similar armor capabilities on that island so and i think it definitely has a role if you're looking at some place like taiwan what is fm30 and how do anticipated changing the way the army views amphibious operations okay so fm30 is operations so it is a cornerstone the army calls it a capstone i call it a cornerstone field manual fm30 is kind of the army's overall how it views warfare i would say kind of analogous to

marine corps war fighting but not so much on the theoretical side much more kind of practical anyways in it there's a chapter called the army in the maritime environment and it's the first time that in any piece of doctrine since the late 90s that we've talked about what is the army's role in a maritime dominated environment and i think how it's going to change it it's going to re-inject this idea that the army can use the sea as the mover space and the army has a role in these maritime environments for too long the popular conversation has been well the army doesn't have a role in the pacific if it does it's only theater logistics getting the ports open supporting the rest of the joint force for a naval campaign no doubt the army

fills those roles you know it does but i think by getting a chapter on the army in the maritime environment into our fm it's going to start to revitalize this the thought process and army leaders and the rest of the organization about what is the what can the army do and what is the role of the Army in a maritime environment that it hasn't really thought about for a while. What other recommendations did you have then for addressing training and organizational shortfalls? Yeah, so kind of going back to our conversation around force design, Marine Corps force design 2030, if you have a joint force that, if you have the Army as a member of the joint force, and it has this capability that it can provide as part of the Combined Armed Planning Team,

you've got to look at three big things first off is training you know the army and the marine corps do some joint training but tank infantry integration just in just in the army itself is challenging try that with a joint partner if you have trained that if you haven't worked on that that's going to be something you don't want to do under first contact right so you've got to get army armor forces training with the marine corps with marine expeditionary units afloat or just like bases like Pendleton or Lejeune. The second is equipment. Critical in order to do the training

is hopefully getting the tanks onto an LHD or a landing dock ship. But you can't do that with the Army equipment right now. It's too heavy. You know, the Abrams, as it exists in the Army, the M1A2, except version three, give or take 70, 75 tons.

It just doesn't fit on Navy equipment. Like it doesn't. The Marine Corps' old M1A1s did. But you got to go back to the base of like, what was the Abrams designed to do? The Abrams first started out as a joint project between the Germans and the Americans in the 1970s to design a new main battle tank designed for the European theater, the fold-a-gap fight against the Soviet Red Army. That's a very different tank design and environment for that tank to operate than, say, expeditionarily in the South Pacific or in the first island chain. So you've got to look at different equipment, kind of like what the Chinese have. The Chinese have the Type 15, like light tank. We have the new, now I think it's a program of record, the new mold protected firepower system designed for our airborne and light infantry brigade combat teams.

if you're going to look at training you've got to get those to the force quickly and then use those to train with it because i don't think the abrams is the right platform for for doing this right now and third is organization the army has to harvest the lessons of the marine corps experience with armor right with the marine corps they had a lot of their tankers either get out or convert to different branches or have the opportunity to join the army if some of those guys came in over to the Army. We've got to get them under the Chief of Armor down at Fort Benning, Georgia, and capture those lessons learned and codify it in doctrine. We should not be learning the lessons that the Marine Corps has already learned and already pioneered again for ourselves. There's

no reason to reinvent the wheel here, right? We have the SMEs, we have the writings on it. Let's get it into what we call an Army Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures, or ATTP, that will allow us to see what that amphibious doctoring was or how you employ tanks in amphibious operations with a Marine Corps expector and get that out to the force. So then your basic lieutenant, your company commander can have that in their hip pocket, take a look at it and be like, okay, I understand, at least at a baseline,

what I'm supposed to be doing. So a couple of follow-up questions based on different things that you said here. In the vein of a sort of relearning old lessons, do you have any thoughts on reestablishing something along the lines of coastal defense battalions, coastal artillery battalions, stuff that we saw as part of the pre-war period, during the war period, when we talk about objective, a take-and-hold type objective, like we want to exploit the objective further. Do you have any thoughts about reestablishing some capability like that? Or is that a bridge too far? it's all about what you want to do with that i don't know because like from a historical perspective like coastal artillery battalions coastal defense battalion where their own like

branch so i don't think you need to go that far i don't think we need to bring back like the coastal defense branch and in the army you guys i guess i'm thinking more along the lines of like so the marines have brought out the mlr which has a specific mission but i don't think those marines are trained significantly differently than other fmf marines right they might have a different mission set, but people rotate in and out of those and other FMF units. It's just that the mission set is different. So I guess that's where I was going with that thought process as you were talking. Oh, okay. So do you look at, so the question more is like, do you look at units that are specifically trained for operations in that maritime environment? You know, I think

we've already got that. We've got the 25th out of Hawaii, got a couple of units that are aligned and Indo-PACOM that pride themselves on being experts in that environment. So I don't know if you need to make that a larger thing. I think you just need to tailor those forces for what you think their mission set is. So if you've got like 25th ID out of Hawaii, right? Light infantry brigade, right? Light infantry division, two brigade combat teams there, both from our infantry centric. If you're able to equip them with the right tools and train them in the right way, I think they can do both mission sets of the traditional amphibious assault, supporting the joint force, or rapidly deploying to a point of contention and holding it against an amphibious assault or, you know, another opponent's joint forcible entry operation. all right i'm going to reference one more thing that uh and i'm trying to look up the uh the

podcast i talked with it about too is an australian army model army units that will be amphibious units for a period of time and i forget what exactly the time period was like i said as you're answering this question i will go and go back and look it up uh i cannot for the life of me remember uh the episode number who i did it with it was the army officer the australian army officer commanding it and like they rotate in they're amphibious for six months and they're going around they're on the amphibious ships and they're going to islands and doing different stuff a lot of it hater work of course here which has its own value but they're also just training to operate in the amphibious environment come on and off ships do ship to shore maneuver whether it's

through the air or over the water as that is a model that could be useful although like i'm not sure that we have the amphibious shipping to support it but uh yeah so yes and it's kind of a two-part yes to that answer so yes so i think i talk in the paper about using armor from say first armor division down in fort bliss texas or third infantry division out of fort stewart georgia using them particularly like if you look at using them as part of that amphibious training model embarking them with a mu like an element from them a small element you know maybe a company size element with a Mew on both coasts. I think that would be worthwhile if you can get the equipment to the right set, strip down the Abrams or give them a new platform. And then that just,

you know, rotate through. That way you have this experience that comes back into those two armor divisions that, well, an armor division and a very heavy infantry division of how to operate in that maritime environment. And yeah, secondly, to your point, like you kind of need the shipping to do that though right and that's where i think fm30 really helps too because it gets the army the army can lend its weight to the naval need to revitalize american shipbuilding we just do not have a lot of shipbuilding in this in the u.s anymore it's i've listened to a couple of the other speakers and they've spoken at length about the weakness of american shipbuilding if people weren't convinced by you now it's just like everyone you know there's it's going off in

Daedalus houses right now, now that you've just said that as an Army armor officer. But yeah, please continue to sing the praise of American shipbuilding and why we need more of it. Yeah, we do. Because you can't get the Army to the fight if you don't have the ships, right? The Army has its watercraft. We have a new one in the pipeline. I know the Marine Corps is looking at a new landing craft.

But you're talking volume at some level here. The idea that you're going to always use a port facility or roll-on, roll-off ships to to get your heavy combat power to the fight against particular like very very strong land powers if you look at our near peer competitors of russia and china you may not always have access to a developed port that can accommodate those vessels you have to have the ability to go over the shore with connectors with the ships that you can take risk with you can have all the best tanks you want but if you can't get into the fight it doesn't matter absolutely so a couple notes for the listener, if you want to hear a little bit more about this topic, Sea Control 181,

the Amphibious Eighth, with now-retired Major General Pat Donahoe, Professor Don Chisholm, talking about the Eighth Army's amphibious operations in the Philippines archipelago in the course of World War II. That's heavy on Army amphibious capabilities. And then Sea Control 198, Australian amphibious capabilities with Colonel Kim Gilfillan, talking about what we just got done discussing with the way the Australian Army and Australian Navy sort of generate amphibious capability. But other than that, that's all the time that we have for today. I'd like to thank my guest, Major Matt Graham. Matt, where can we find you online and what are you working on next? So you can find me on LinkedIn. Just look at my, try and find my name

on LinkedIn. And then I'm on the global, of course, if you have access to that and you want to shoot me an email. And if anyone out there is interested in the larger paper that this work was derived from. You can find the full thesis in all its glory at the Ike Skelton Combined Arms Library here at Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. And then currently, I'm working on some specific tactical lessons, particularly out of the Belati campaign for this, kind of looking at that and how we can, how junior leaders can learn from the experiences there. And then I'm writing also on war financing and its effect on operational art, looking at both World War I and Korea and how country pays for water skill combat operations and see if it affects how they conduct their

operations. Well, thank you again for joining us. To the listeners, thanks for tuning in. We'll see you next time. Thank you. We'll be right back.