Sea Control - Sea Control 392 - Russia's Arctic Strategy in a Changing Region with Katarzyna Zysk

Episode Date: November 22, 2022

Links1.  “Russia in the Arctic: Gauging How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Will Alter Regional Dynamics,”by Andrea Kendall-Taylor et al.,  Center for New American Security, September 15, 2022.2. “Russia Assumes Arctic Council Chairmanship amid Regional Tensions,” by Mary Chesnut and Anya Fink, Center for Naval Analyses, May 26, 2021.3. “The Arctic Ice between Russia and The US Is Melting. What’s at Stake at The Top of The World?”, by Sherryn Groch, The Age, October 21, 2022.

Hello, and welcome to the Sea Control Podcast. I'm Nathan Miller. Today, your host, Sophia Wolford, discusses Arctic security trends and Russia's strategy in the region with Katashina Zisk of the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies. Sophia edited this episode. I'd like to pause here to highlight our local chapters. Whether you're in South Korea, Egypt, Singapore, France, New York, India, or in the Caribbean, chances are there's a SimSec local chapter near you. You can find a full listing of local chapters and contact information on our website, SimSec.org. So if you're interested, please reach out. Finally, I wanted to take this opportunity to recommend our partners in the SimSec podcast

network, The Bilge Pumps. You can find Alex, Jamie, Drack, and a pile of iron brew bottles wherever you download your podcasts. And with that, Kimber's Men. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Welcome, everyone. My name is Sofia Wolfholt, your host of the Sea Control podcast. My guest today is Dr. Katarzyna Ziz, who is a professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies in Oslo, where she also served as deputy director and director of research. In the past, she has worked as a visiting scholar at Stanford University and as a research fellow at Oxford University, at the U.S. Naval War College, and most recently at Sciences Po in France.

Her research focuses on security, defense, and strategic study, including Russian military and nuclear strategy, defense innovation, geopolitics, and security in the Arctic. Welcome, Katarzyna. Thank you so much for joining us today. Thank you for having me. Today we are going to discuss the geopolitics of the Arctic, focusing on the Russian strategy there, and we will also touch on some developments in the war in Ukraine. Recent reports indicate that the Arctic is warming almost four times faster than the rest of the world, and with the rapid melting of the polar ice cap, competition between Arctic states in the high north has also increased.

increase. Katarzyna, could you tell us what trends you are monitoring in the region and why the high north has become another theater for geopolitical competition? So there is a multi-layered changes and developments that are being stimulated by the climate change, the rapid climate change, which is, as you have mentioned in the introduction, are occurring much faster than we actually expected so when i started working um on the arctic like for 15 years ago i joined an international research program on arctic security there was this recurrent warning from climate scientists that the arctic was warming twice as fast as the rest of the planet and as you said that actually it seems that this has been a significant underestimate of of how fast the region is

actually warming uh some hot spots in the bering sea and siberia they are heating up even seven times faster than the global average and of course this has a number of important implications that are occurring in the region both in the commercial uh private sector in the natural environment but also in the in the security and defense realm which are related to this uh opening basically of the arctic ocean which happens much faster i think the arctic summer seas could virtually disappear as early as 2035 so and this has of course a number of of implications this development uh in the arctic has has stimulated commercial and state interests uh for one globally significant and so after biological and mineral resources energy resources not least

but there are of course also the strategically important potentially strategically important signals of communication, both for commercial and for military use. So the Northern Sea Route is, of course, one of the most important ones, the one, the route that is going along the Russian-Siberian coast and is the first one that is being commercially developed and used. And there are, of course, other routes, the Trans-Pacific Route, there is the Northwest Passage through the Canadian archipelago. But if the economic potential is realized, the strategic significance

of the region will increase further, with implications for world trade, for international relations, and for international security. So there is still a host of factors that are affecting the pace and trajectory of the Arctic development, which I am following. For instance, if we look at the energy aspect, so the offshore, especially the offshore development, but also onshore development, of course, this has slowed down, especially the offshore part. And this is due to factors such as low oil price in recent years.

We see that the dynamics on the global markets spill over from tensions, political tensions between, for instance, Russia and the West. They also impacted the regional development. So we see the spillover effects in both in the commercial sphere, but obviously also in the security and defense dimension of the regional developments, which we can talk about. So, for instance, the Northern Sea Route has been affected. It's affected by a number of factors which we are trying to understand better. Of course, the environmental factors, the operational problems, such as there is still unpredictability of sea ice conditions, even if we see that there is year after year generally less ice,

which also slows down the economic development in the region. This poses also high risks to navigation, lower commodity prices, and also Russia's foreign policies have reduced international interest for transit shipping along the Northern Sea Route. Especially now, perhaps during the war, the Russian reinvasion of Ukraine, one Russian newspaper put it aptly that there is this feeling among international shippers and traders that everything that goes through Russia right now is like acid.

So it's politically extremely sensitive. So in general, I think I would say that the Arctic development has been non-linear, making it harder for decision makers to plan long-term, to allocate budgets for infrastructure, for capabilities. But I think what is important to keep in mind is that when we think about these kind of different factors that are influencing the Arctic development, the implications of climate change, it is important to differentiate between what are the short-term fluctuations and what are the long-term trends.

since you mentioned the commercial activity along northern trade routes do you actually see a reduction in international shipping or commercial activity since the start of the war in ukraine yes i think there is um there has been less interest in the northern sea route and again as i mentioned it has been influenced by a number of factors both environmental factors Russian regulations have been a problem, but also the Russian policies, foreign policy, especially that has affected relations with Western countries. So Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea led to imposition of sanctions, including technological and other sanctions, which curbed the Russian ambitions actually in the Arctic.

So, for instance, one of these ambitions has been to develop, to transform the Arctic into Russia's foremost base for natural resources. Russia cannot do that without foreign investments, Western know-how, in particular when it comes to offshore development. So this has slowed down the development. Technological sanctions have slowed down development. And of course, the sanctions that have been imposed recently put limitations, also political limitations on how much cooperation can be going on in the Arctic.

and what kind of capability Russia can actually employ in the region. China, of course, has been one of the most important partners for Russia in that respect. The Arctic has been an area of growing Russian and Chinese cooperation. You may remember that President Putin and Xi, they issued a joint statement in February this year, where they declared that the sides agreed to continue consistently intensifying practical cooperation for the sustainable development of the Arctic. This is one of the expressions of the interest both countries have to develop the Arctic. Russia as the provider, for instance, of LNG gas that is being developed onshore on the Yamal Peninsula, where China plays a very big role.

China has become Russia's main foreign partner on the development and production of liquefied natural gas, which is operated in the Arctic by Novotek. And China has also been a major user of the Northern Sea Route, but we haven't seen that much development in that respect during the war in Ukraine. There has been a decline in the use. So, for instance, for the first time in several years, China's state shipping company, Costco, is not sailing on the Northern Sea Route. We are already seeing diminishing Western investments in the region because of poor relations with Russia. But do you see any room for diplomatic talks between Russia and the seven Arctic countries? Do you see any room for cooperation, for instance, on environmental protection? I think it's a complicated matter because we've seen the spillover effects that deeply affected the Arctic cooperation in different matters.

Actually, since the war crimes have been discovered, committed by the Russian armed forces in Ukraine, and also the way Russia is leading the world, the World War of Attrition, which is targeting civilians as a part of the strategy, and of course the genocidal intent, which is very clearly voiced by the Russian authorities. This also influences what happens in the Arctic. Now, a long, long time there has been a discussion about Arctic exceptionalism, basically saying that the Arctic

is a special geopolitical space where there is a broad spectrum of governance and cooperation, and that the Arctic in that respect could be, to a high degree, protected from negative impacts from other conflicts and crisis situations. But as annexation of Crimea has shown, and also this war this year, it's impossible to really insulate the Arctic. And Russia is not somehow a different actor. That on the political level, for instance, the Arctic Council

has been now in pause mode as seven of the eight member states have condemned the Russian war and none of the other member states will travel to Russia for meetings in the Arctic Council. And as you know, the Arctic Council is chaired by now

by Russia until 2023. Also, the Nordic countries have suspended activities involving Russia, including in the Barents Euro, Arctic cooperation. There has been a number of other aspects or impacts, let's say, from the war, from the tensions that Russian invasions have generated,

including the fact that Russia has declined an invitation to observe NATO exercises called response that were conducted earlier this year. And of course, again, on the economic level, we have many examples showing that the direct and indirect impact of actually Russia's own foreign and security policies impacts Russia's economic ambitions negatively. So we already touched on the war in Ukraine, but do you see any change to Russia's strategy in the Arctic because of the war in Ukraine?

Is there any indication that Moscow is prioritizing the final last in terms of military developments as it focuses on Ukraine now? Or is it now becoming a more important region amid the Kremlin's nuclear threat, especially considering that Russia's northern fleet and the submarine leg of nuclear trial is based there? Do you think Russia still has the resources and the partners to continue investing in infrastructures and military capabilities there? This is yet another example of how the war, Russian war in Ukraine, how it is influencing the high north, which is the European part of the Arctic, and the broader Arctic as such. And so, yes, I think there is definitely an impact. And the impact is, one, is the fact that Russia's conventional power has been weakened. Basically, Russian military is drowning in Ukraine. The polarization of the security situation in the Baltic and the Black Sea regions,

again, there was this speculation that this may lead actually Moscow to deprioritize the high north, especially the European part of the Arctic, where Russia has a lot of energy exploration, but also where they're the strongest part of the Russian Navy and one of the largest concentrations of Russian nuclear weapons is just across the border with Norway. It seems that the political will to prioritize the northern regions seem to stand very strong in Moscow, as it has been recently corroborated

on the doctrinal and practical policy implementation level. So, for instance, in July, Russia, Putin signed a maritime doctrine, an updated version of that document, which moved the Arctic to the top of the list of regional priorities, which is quite remarkable. And at the policy implementation level, we've seen that the Russian military, despite all the problems and weaknesses and troubles that Russia is running into in Ukraine, the military activity in the high north has remained relatively strong. And it has been indicated or illustrated, for instance, by a large military exercise that was conducted in August. There were 10 surface vessels involved, including the flagship of the Northern Fleet, the Pyotr Velikiy, submarines and coastal defences. And I've seen more military activity since the Northern Fleet, of course, also participated in the GROM nuclear strategic exercise that was conducted in October. I think the region is extremely important to Russia. And part of that is, of course, explained by nuclear weapons, because it has been a knee-jerk reflex in Russian strategic thinking when it comes to compensating for conventional asymmetry compared to other potential and actual competitors, such as the United States and NATO. So I think this highlights the importance of the High North as a base and operational area for the sea-based, but also air-based nuclear forces.

This region is also important as a testbed for nuclear and other new technologies, weapon systems that Russia is testing regularly, including hypersonic weapons. So regarding China, do you think that if China sees a decline in international commercial interest or activity in the Arctic, they will reduce their support for Russian developments in the region? Or do you think that it will still be an important part of China's foreign investments to support Russia? Do you see any change to that in the future? No, it seems that, well, China is still very much interested in Arctic resources. And, you know, the possibility is that as Russia is getting more dependent on China, Russia does not have many serious supporters. So Russia is getting economically more dependent on China in this situation, including, you know, to sell gas to China on much reduced price.

So China has been cashing on basically the fact that has not abandoned Russia in this precarious situation. So I think there is a possibility that it may also play out in the Arctic. I haven't seen it to date that China would use that leverage it has on Russia to get some better deals, to expand its presence in the Arctic. I haven't seen that, but that remains a potential and a possibility. I think you already mentioned Sweden and Finland's role in the region. We are aware that at this moment their accession to NATO is being halted by Turkey and Hungary. But do you think that the future accession of Sweden and Finland will change the security environment in the Arctic or influence Russian strategy there? Absolutely. It will both change the security situation in the region and will quite likely influence also Russia's military posture and behavior.

I think from the broader regional security perspective, I think it's a very positive move because it closes what has been a kind of security gap in Northern Europe. And as such, it will greatly enhance regional security and stability, I believe, which is very important, especially in time of Russia's increasingly aggressive behavior. So I think Sweden and Finland's membership in NATO opens a spectrum of new possibilities, including a more committed defence cooperation between Nordic countries in the region. Despite attempts to develop that Nordic defence cooperation since the early 2000s, the major key obstacle in the expansion of the cooperation was namely the lack of Article 5 and committed solidarity, committed agreement that they would actually be bound to help each other

in times of crisis and conflict. So this is taken off the table and the corporation will now be able to integrate more. A corporation, for instance, on air defenses and logistics and supply, joint exercises and training, use of air bases in the different countries, of course, intelligence exchanges and situational awareness, which can also encompass all kinds of security aspects. So I think NATO and the countries in that region will have a much better overview and understanding of the situation,

will be able to act much faster. This also, of course, concerns the Baltic region. Both countries, Sweden and Finland, they come with strong modern armed forces. Of course, it is also not without importance that both countries have been cooperating with NATO for a number of years. They are very well integrated and will be able to provide that security to contribute to this collective security very, very quickly. But, of course, we've seen from the Russian perspective, this means strengthening of NATO in that region. Also, it means that three NATO allies bordering the Russian Kola Peninsula will probably invite some moves in order to strengthen the security of the Russian bastion there, for instance, through all kinds of layered defences. So, as you mentioned, it is quite likely that Russia will aim to strengthen its ATAD in the region

just to protect their nuclear capabilities. But do you expect to see some more hostile activity from Russia in the Barents, the Norwegian and the Baltic Sea? In the past, we've seen several incursions into Swedish and Finnish territorial waters or airspaces. Do you expect those to continue from Russia? when it comes to incursions and the spoking of sweden and finland that russia has been doing over years both in wind aerospace and in sea domain and other domains i think part of that was actually the reason for that was that sweden and finland were not nato members and i think actually this kind of activities russia will have to be much more careful about but on the so that

that's this part then the other part is that when it comes to military activities and posturing and Of course, I think in general, I would say yes, that Russia should continue doing that. There already has been a lot of military activity of Russia in various domains over the years in the Barents Sea. But, of course, how much of the activity Russia will be able to generate will also depend on the Russian economic situation, on the military political situation in Ukraine. So, as I mentioned, we haven't really seen a significant impact on lowering the Russian military activity in the Barents Sea. But, of course, from what the economists say,

is that the sanctions on Biden and more and more, and we will see probably even stronger aspects and a stronger impact on the sanctions. And the question is how Russia will be able to handle that. and how they will be prioritizing, because, of course, the military exercises are also an expensive matter. Russia recently has published a state budget for next year, and it doesn't seem particularly optimistic. And there will be a deficit. Russia will be still prioritizing the military development, the military modernization, and they will be redirecting money from welfare to warfare.

So basically from posts such as education and health and social development to military development, which is, of course, also the question how much they can actually do that. There will be also taxing, increasing taxes. So the broader population, Russian population, will be paying for the consequences of that war, for the consequences of this strategic historical mistake. But the question is to what extent they will be actually able to patch the holes. in the state budget and how it will actually impact the military activity for the operations, actual operations, including in Ukraine, and exercises. And this is a big question mark because, you know, when the state budget is open and they are still opening,

saying there will be a deficit, I think probably the reality is more dire than what the Russian authorities are willing to present to the outside world. Recently, we've seen sabotage attacks on Nord Stream 1 and 2. European governments are still investigating these incidents, although it is quite likely that these incidents could be attributed to Russia. So these events raise significant questions about physical threats to undersea communication cables and offshore energy infrastructures, both in the high north and around Europe, including in the Baltic and the North Sea.

How did the war in Ukraine affect Russia's ability to threaten European infrastructures in the high north? And what options does NATO have to step up the deterrence and the protection of its infrastructures in the region? I think it's the questions about the intent and the capabilities. And so let me start with the intent. I think what is important to understand is that this whole group of, let's say, methods and means could be understood as forms of attacks under the threshold of Article 5 situations. I think this is also a way Russia has developed this kind of methods and means as a way to address, another way to address the asymmetry of power between Russia

and, for instance, the US and NATO. On the one hand, we have nuclear capability. On the other, we have the spectrum of non-military and indirect asymmetric methods and means that aim to undermine or bypass the opponent's military technological superiority and exploit its vulnerabilities, both in the military system, but also in the political and economic systems. And we've seen that Russia has been using a spectrum of measures over the, let's say, last decade.

And the spectrum of ways and means has been quite broad. So, for instance, the fake news and disinformation that Russia has been using on a number of occasions which have been aimed, for instance, at weakening the immune system of democratic societies. We've seen the interference in electoral processes, of course, cyber attacks. There's a very long list of quite significant cyber attacks on various international organizations, for instance, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which was investigating the use of chemical weapons in Syria with Russia's involvement, of course, and the circumstances surrounding, for instance, the poisoning of Sergei Skripal, the former Russian agent,

with weapons of mass destruction, the Novichok, in Britain. So targeted assassination is another example of this kind of means. But there are, of course, also paramilitary operations, such as we've seen in 2016. There was an attempt of state coup conducted by the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU, in Montenegro. So the sabotage of critical infrastructure is a part of this kind of groups of ways and means that can have different objectives. The objectives can be to undermine, for instance, the energy transfer, but it can also be about creating fear, creating confusion. And as in the case of Nord Stream, it could have been also aimed at basically further undermining and exacerbating the energy and economic crisis in Europe.

So the objectives behind that can be different. And Russia certainly has this kind of capabilities. Russia's main directorate for deep sea research is so-called Gugi, which operates from the Kola Peninsula, so in the high north and from the wide sea. They have a fleet of special purpose submarines and surface oceanographic vessels, which have different objectives. They can, for instance, research the seabed, but they can also both plant things on the seabed, but they can also take things from the seabed. They can manipulate what is there, which is, for instance, the energy infrastructure. It can be sensors and it can be fiber optic cables. In fact, over the years, we've seen reports of significantly increased Russian activity, Russian submarine activity, along subsea surface, including fiber optic cables.

If these kind of cables are affected, there is no way satellites can compensate fully for the damage. So we've seen that Russia has been testing it. It has taken also interest in NATO and NATO countries and their sea infrastructure over the past decade. And again, Russia has both intent and capabilities to manipulate, let's say, this kind of infrastructure. and there has actually been some incidents including this year in on january the 7th there was actually um there is a svalbard undersea cable system which is a twin sort of submarine fiber optic communication cup which is connecting longyearbyen which is the town on the svalbard archipelago the norwegian svalbard archipelago with northern norway and it was a part of the cable was damaged and it was not the first case and russia has been suspected also there is still

this plausible or almost plausible deniability of what actually has happened but again it's hard to we know that this has not happened for bad for for because of some kind of natural reasons or it has been manipulated by an outside actor again the reasons behind this kind of uh incident let's It may be very different, but I think an attack on this kind of infrastructure would be in accordance with the Russian military theory, which was also expressed by the Russian general staff and which states that the destruction of critical infrastructure can contribute to making life in the enemy's country unbearable, you know, create chaos, create confusion, create pressure from the society on the politicians, on the decision makers. So making it susceptible to accept the terms for ending the conflict dictated by Russia. I think in general, also, the Russian military theory says that distracting the adversary's military economic potential by hitting economic targets will be actually prioritized in crisis and conflict situations. Well, you mentioned the January attack, but even in recent weeks, we have seen several incidents to critical infrastructures in Europe. For instance, the cutting of communication cables between the Shetland Islands and the Faroe Islands

or the damage to the radio communication cables in northern Germany that disrupted train services for several hours. In some cases, officials were quick to state that these damages could be attributed to, for instance, fishing vessels. These incidents highlight the vulnerability of European infrastructures. But we have also seen some signs that Western governments might be expecting more sabotage attempts on critical infrastructures. So consider indeed what do you think NATO could do to enhance the protection of these infrastructures and what different measures are at their disposal? So, yes, there is actually a lot happening in that field. I think, first of all, I'd like to just respond that not all these cases are so, let's say, plausible and deniable. Some are suspected that, you know, you don't have certainty.

Maybe this was a commercial vessel or some natural reasons. But in other cases, it's very clear that you had actually much Russian activity around these cables, including commercial vessels. and then they get damaged and there is absolute certainty that they were not damaged by natural reasons. I think that there is a quite good awareness, including in NATO, that Russia has this kind of capability, that Russia has this kind of intent, that this is in line with Russia's military strategy. And this is nothing new in that sense.

I mean, if you go back basically the last decade, because of the activity observed around this kind of infrastructure. It has been suspicious, and that's why this has been discussed and analysed and examined in NATO. And I think monitoring is absolutely part of that, being aware of what is happening and also having a good, let's say, communication strategy. Should Russia decide to cut cables?

I think that it depends also, of course, on the impact of that, What would be the damage? And I think part of the Derren strategy is being clearly communicated that this would be considered an attack, an attack and a subject to Article 5. Of course, again, it will also depend on the situation, what it was. And I think, again, we can actually, in many cases, we can say whether these were possibly natural reasons what was happening. I mean, we have quite good, you know, maritime domain awareness.

But at the same time, of course, this infrastructure is expansive. It's huge. It's impossible to protect and survey everything. So this will be a question of making hard choices, but maybe also deploying some of the new technologies, including drones, including various sensors in a combined multi sort of domain awareness system that will help to have a better understanding of this environment and being able to react more appropriately and more quickly. So I know that there is a strong and serious focus in NATO on focusing on this development and pursuing of this new

and some of the risky, let's say, new technologies in order to keep the alliance up to date and be able also to offset some of the resources in order to, for instance, to have a good understanding of the sea and subsea domain, which is vast. And of course, when it comes to damaging this kind of infrastructure, Russia will also have to think twice about the also unintended consequences, right? I think it's also very important that there is a unified response. I think the talk about NATO's unity, keeping the unified front is not just some kind of lofty ideal. It has actually clear, very concrete political implications and impact.

And the impact is that if Russia can be relatively sure that there will be a response, and there will be likely a strong response from the alliance, that there will not be a discussion, debates, and some countries will be supporting it, some not, then I think the risk of such an incident happening is much lower. So this is actually keeping the front united and being able to react swiftly to these kind of situations. I think this is one of our best protections. Thank you, Katarzyna, for joining us today. Unfortunately, this is all the time we had. Thank you for our audience for joining us today. See you next time. © BF-WATCH TV 2021

We'll be right back.