Sea Control - Sea Control 395 - Russia's New Maritime Doctrine with Samuel Bendett

Episode Date: December 8, 2022

Links:1. “To Robot or Not to Robot? Past analysis of Russian Military Robotics and Today’s War in Ukraine,” by Sam Bendett, War on the Rocks (June 30, 2022). 2. CNA Webpage for Sam Bendett.

Hey folks, it's Jared. Walker Mills is back hosting today. He's joined by CNA's Samuel Bendit to discuss Russia's new maritime doctrine. This episode was edited and produced by Nathan Miller. It's that time of year again for SimSec's holiday fundraising drive. At SimSec, we believe victory in the maritime domain starts with great ideas communicated compellingly. Write, fight, win. Please help us continue to fulfill our mission by donating and making SimSec your preferred non-profit on Amazon Smile. I'd like to pause here to highlight our local chapters as well whether in south korea egypt singapore france new york india or the caribbean chances are there's a simsec local chapter near you you can find a full listing of our chapters and contact information

on the website at simsec.org so if you're interested please reach out finally i want to take the opportunity to recommend our partners in the simsec podcast network the bilge pumps you can find alex jamie drack and a pile of iron brew bottles wherever you download your podcast And with that, Kimber's men. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Welcome back aboard the Sea Control podcast from the Center for International Maritime Security. I'm your host, Walker Mills, and today we're talking with Sam Bendit, a research analyst at the Center for Naval Analysis Russia Studies Program,

and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. We're going to be talking about Russia's 2022 Maritime Doctrine that was just released this July. Sam, welcome aboard. Can you introduce yourself a bit more to the listeners? Thanks so much for having me. Great to be on this podcast. I am a researcher at the Center for Naval Analysis. I am part of the Russia Studies Program since around 2016. I'm also an adjunct senior fellow with the Center for New American Security. At CNA, I and my colleagues are studying the development of Russian military technology,

Russian military tactics, in other words, how and why Russia fights, what technologies and weapons it's using, and how is that related to Russia's foreign policy in its near abroad and around the world. Awesome. Well, we're excited to have you on the podcast. Glad to be here. And before we start, I'd like to remind our listeners that the opinions presented here are solely our own and should not be taken as representative of any of the institutions that

we're associated with. Sam, to start us off, can you tell us what Russia's maritime doctrine is? What is this document and how should we think about it? Is there an analog in the U.S. military or U.S. government? Well, the Russian military doctrine is the defining document that identifies the priorities and main directions for the development of the Russian Navy. It is a document that defines goals, sets specific criteria, identifies threats, identifies opportunities, identifies the area where Russian Navy should grow, should bolster, and how it should reallocate its resources. It is a document that addresses primary threats and challenges facing Russian Navy today and the Russian state in general. And of course, it is similar to the U.S. Naval

doctrine. It is similar to main documents within the U.S. Navy that define the priorities for the United States in the maritime domain in general. And Russian military doctrine is similar to documents that are published with other major naval powers that set out their priorities, their criteria, and identify new threats and opportunities facing those states. Same. To clarify, is the Russian maritime doctrine just focused on the Russian Navy, or does it also include pieces about the other elements of Russian sea power or in Russian commercial sea power and things like that? Well, this specific version is an expanded version and an upgrade to the earlier doctrine released in 2015. It identifies opportunities and national security interests for the Russian Navy. It identifies significant threats that the Russian Navy should address.

It also talks about the development not just of the military vessels and the military part of the Russian naval capabilities. It talks about bolstering the civilian fleet and specifically talks about bolstering the Russian Arctic and Antarctic presence. Specifically, the Arctic region is defined as part of Russia's key national security interests and essentially discussed as a region that Russia must guard and a region that Russia must address in greater detail as far as its naval presence, as far as basing, as far as Russia's role with the Northern Passage that runs across the Arctic, as well as it addresses other maritime domains where Russia has current interests or where Russia seeks to address the challenges presented to it. So some of the significant challenges that are identified in the maritime domain is Russia's dependence on other states for maritime passage, for global trade, and identifies sanctions as a challenge to be overcome. And the number one security threat identified in the document is the United States, U.S. global presence across

the maritime domain, as well as the military presence of NATO countries and NATO as a block near Russian borders. And so the maritime doctrine discusses the development and redevelopment of parts of the Russian military fleet, but also the role that the commercial fleet, as well as its scientific and technical vessels also play in bolstering Russia's economic and national security in the global oceans or the world ocean, as the Russian doctrine calls it. Fascinating. Can you talk a little bit about how the Russian military and the Russian state and maybe Putin specifically understand the role of sea power to Russia, right? Because I think some other nations that maybe the listeners are more familiar with the United States or the United

Kingdom have a different, perhaps different relationship with sea power than Russia? We tend to think of Russia as primarily a land power. It is, of course, the largest land state in the world. And a lot of challenges that Russia faces are, in fact, near its borders on land, such as the war that Russia is fighting in Ukraine, such as its near abroad, Central Asia, and the NATO countries as well. So these are identified and essentially viewed in Russia as as the problems of the land domain. But Russia views itself as a maritime superpower. The doctrine spells out that Russia is bordered by the Arctic Ocean, Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean. It identifies Russia's interests in the Indian Ocean. It identifies Russia's interests in the

Mediterranean Sea as a key area for protection of Russian interests. It even discusses the fact that Russia should have a presence in the Red Sea as well. Russia has maintained naval presence historically. Russia has had a significant presence in the Atlantic and the Pacific. Of course, it was much smaller by comparison than the U.S. naval presence. But during the Cold War, Soviet Union had a very significant military fleet. This fleet and its vessels were more than enough of a challenge for the United States and NATO. Today, Russian military may not have as many ships as the United States or even China for that matter, but Russia maintains lead in specific maritime technologies like the construction of nuclear submarines, ballistic missiles, and other

significant advantages that the Russian Navy still has today. So Russia views itself as a maritime superpower. And this document essentially identifies it and reinforces that belief that Russian Navy will meet the challenges presented by the United States. It will essentially gather the resources from its military, its military industrial sector, from the civilian sector, from scientific sector, to meet the challenge to develop new technologies. And it will be present essentially in every major maritime domain across every major region of the world ocean, as the Russian Maritime Doctrine calls it. And it will define allies, it will engage its allies, build relationship with countries that Russia views are important to it today or important

for its future maritime development. But again, it actually identifies the United States as a major national security challenge, along with NATO. And so this document spells out Russian attempts to meet the challenge and to address the United States on equal terms. Sam, does the document have a prioritization? You know, it seems like the Arctic featured kind of prominently, but is there a ranking or is there a specific focus for where the Russian Navy and Russian maritime power is prioritizing?

It prioritizes the Arctic Ocean. It prioritizes the Kuril Islands. It prioritizes the Baltic Sea, and it specifically prioritizes the Mediterranean Sea as well as the area where Russia has key interests. And then sort of emanating from that, there's the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, where Russia must meet the challenges and address and essentially meet opportunities, along with the larger Atlantic Ocean and other, again, other parts of the global maritime domain. But the immediate area to address for the Russian Navy is, of course, the area most adjacent to Russia specifically. And again, as you mentioned, the Arctic Ocean occupies a very significant part of the challenges and the opportunities that must be addressed by the Russian state. You mentioned the northern sea route and the idea that cargo ships, if there's less sea ice, could transit through the Arctic Ocean. Do you think that that's realistically something that's going to happen? And would Russia, would they try to control that trade? What are some of the opportunities, as you put it, that they see up in controlling the maritime space in the Arctic? Well, prior to the Ukraine war, Russia identified this northern passage as a key area for rapid growth, rapid economic growth. And because this passage essentially goes right next to the Russian territory, it is viewed by the Russian state as a significant area of concern and a significant area of opportunity.

This is why prior to the war, Russian Navy and the Russian military were upgrading or building new Arctic bases. They were upgrading their Arctic presence. The trade that could potentially flow from Europe to Asia across the northern sea route is much shorter and much faster than the regular trade that has to pass through the Suez Canal and through the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca. And so even before the war, Russian Navy and the Russian state were preparing to designate that specific passage as a key national security interest. Also, this area features a significant amount of oil, natural gas, and other minerals, which are located on the Arctic seabed. And so Russian state, Russian industry, and the Russian government were very interested in extracting those minerals, as well as those energy resources, for the health of the Russian economy and for the national security of the Russian state in general.

And this is identified in the doctrine. In fact, the science and technology development bolstering Russia's ability to explore the global maritime domain, to explore various parts of the global ocean seabed are enshrined in this new maritime doctrine. So bolstering the Russian scientific exploration fleet is absolutely an essential part of this new maritime doctrine. And of course, this involves increasing the capabilities of the Arctic fleet, the Antarctic fleet, and other Russian scientific vessels to conduct such operations around the world in a way where they would not be interfered with by other maritime powers like the United States. Do you think that the Arctic in that way, if you mentioned the bases and the new ships and the resources getting put in that direction from the Russian state, do you see that as a potential zone of more conflict? Quite possibly. Look, before the war, Russia was part of the Arctic Council, where it was one of several nations that agreed to discuss significant problems that arise within the Arctic domain or jointly address some of the challenges and the opportunities. Of course, the question remains whether Russia will remain part of the Arctic Council following its involvement in the war in Ukraine. Russia designated the Arctic region specifically as its national security interest from the military standpoint, from the defense standpoint, from the economic standpoint.

The wealth that is supposedly located on the Arctic seabed is something that Russia definitely wants to tap. And because the Northern Sea Route, for example, passes next to the Russian territory, Russia views, for example, the passage of military ships along the Northern Sea Route as something that must be addressed directly with Russia, and the states that want to direct their military vessels there must get permission from Russia to do so in the near future. And so controlling this significant economic flow, controlling the flow of vessels and materiel through this very significant aquatic territory, again, is something that is repeatedly addressed throughout the Russian maritime domain. Arctic shows up multiple times and is viewed as a significant area for the Russian state and that Russian Navy to address. And then thinking about, you know, their objectives, not just in the Arctic, but generally with their maritime doctrine, do you assess that they have the resources to kind of carry out this plan and meet these objectives? Or is it more of a kind of aspirational document, especially with, you know, all the Western sanctions that we've seen since the invasion of Ukraine? I think that's a great question. And I think we will be looking at how Russia tries to fulfill its goals set out in the maritime doctrine for a number of years. Look, Russia does have a designated naval budget. It is constructing ships and submarines. The funding has already been designated to many of the efforts which are actually spelled out in the maritime doctrine. There could be potentially a reallocation of some of the naval resources from one area to another.

Some of the Russian commentators are saying that there would be a potential reallocation of resources to meet some of the goals set out in the Maritime Doctrine. Others are saying that there are actually enough funds to address all of the challenges. And most importantly, it doesn't look like this Maritime Doctrine will be fulfilled all at once. In other words, it is very likely that the goals spelled out in the doctrine would be accomplished in stages. And each stage, which will have its own area of responsibility in the Russian government and the Navy, will have its own people designated to accomplish it. And again, doing so in stages can stretch out the fulfillment of the doctrine over a number of years and decades. Many of the goals spelled out are long term. It isn't something that Russia is going to accomplish tomorrow or even next year or maybe not even in the next five years.

And so there would be an incremental reallocation of resources to meet the goals and to address the challenges spelled out in a doctrine. But at least for now, the Russian government feels confident that it does have enough resources. How that's going to actually play out if the war in Ukraine drags on, if the sanctions continue to hammer the Russian economy, or if the Russian economy starts showing significant stress under sanctions in a number of months from now, if the war continues, I think this is something that we'll have to consider. But again, at least for now, the Russian government feels that the long-term goals spelled out in the doctrine can be met with the resources that

Russian state has already. I do want to talk about Ukraine a little bit. Before we get there, I want to ask specifically about the technology piece. Are there specific technologies that are emphasized in this doctrine? One of the things that some of the listeners might have seen in the news is these, forgetting the name, but these nuclear torpedoes that they're parading out and perhaps submarine cables. I think before the invasion, there was some indication that maybe they were hanging out near submarine cables going across the Atlantic or off the coast of Norway and things like that. The doctrine specifically identifies a number of information, communication and digital technologies that the Russian Navy should have in order to have independent comms

and a faster communication between its vessels and fleets. It talks about the development of different types of robotic systems and the development of unmanned aerial vehicles specifically that could be used for both military and scientific research and developments. It talks about AI-enabled systems that can aid the Russian fleet, but it also discusses the ability of the Russian naval industry to construct ships that are able to address challenges presented in the maritime domain, such as the aircraft carriers and other heavy ships.

And, of course, this is the area where we will be watching very closely. Russia today has only one functioning aircraft carrier. It's undergoing significant long-term repairs. Whether or not Russia would be able to construct a lot of these ships to meet its goals, spelled out in the maritime doctrine, remains to be seen. You mentioned the Poseidon nuclear-armed unmanned underwater vehicle or nuclear torpedo. It is not exactly spelled out in the maritime doctrine, but it is a way in which Russia seeks to address both directly and asymmetrically challenges that are presented by the United States' global presence in the maritime domain. and a challenge by the United States and NATO as a military power in particular. So again, information communication, digital technologies, the development of different types of science and technology projects,

the bolstering of funding for science and technology fleet to explore both the surface and underwater domain across the global oceans is actually spelled out very directly. At CNA, I look at the development of Russian military autonomy and unmanned systems. And so I found it interesting that the development of military robotics and different types of unmanned vehicles, including UAVs, is actually spelled out very directly in the doctrine as a technology that can bolster Russian naval capabilities and would allow it to essentially have more control over surface and underwater domain across the global ocean. Does the Maritime Doctrine, and I'm not sure how often these documents are produced, does it show any major shifts or kind of realignments from previous iterations? And I'm specifically thinking about, you know, the impact of the war on Ukraine on some of the thinking. Well, this is an upgrade to the military doctrine that was unveiled in 2015. In 2015, the doctrine spelled out essentially Russian priorities, but didn't directly address some of the challenges that were facing the Russian state. And of course, the 2015 document was produced a year after Russia seized Crimea. It was the year that Russia was involved in Syria. And so some of these challenges and the opportunities weren't exactly clear in that version. This version isn't necessarily that much different from the 2015

version. All of the major areas where Russia wants to be active are also spelled out in this 2022 version, like the Arctic, for example, or the Mediterranean or the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans, the development of science and technology for Russian security and as well as other priorities. What is different in this version is the actual identification of a threat. So United States and NATO are actually singled out as a threat to the Russian state and the challenge to the Russian Navy. Also, the document addresses current challenges that the Russian Navy faces, such as its lack of control of the maritime domain, the dependence of its merchant marine fleet on the U.S. Navy, and all the main key points across the maritime domain. It actually identifies

sanctions as a challenge that must be overcome. And so it also identifies the national security interests for the Russian state, the economic and the maritime interests that must be addressed if Russia were to remain an independent naval power. Also, a lot of the Russian commentators are pointing out that it spells out that Russia is a significant naval power that must be addressed on an equal basis by other major maritime powers. And it actually establishes, at least on paper, that Russia can be a significant naval player across the entire maritime domain, that it can have a presence in every major ocean and every major sea where there are security and other challenges and opportunities which are presented to Russia. And it also bolsters once again the

importance of the Arctic to Russia's national security, to its economic security, and spells out a lot of the science, technology, and defense initiatives that must be undertaken in order for Russia to assume this role of a maritime superpower. The meta question here, Sam, is, I mean, do you agree with that analysis? I mean, especially based on what we saw with the sinking of the Moskova and some of the challenges that the Russian Navy has been facing in the invasion of Ukraine. Do you think that this is kind of a puffed up view of themselves or that the Russian Navy is a really serious Navy that the United States and NATO need to be wary of and pay attention to how it develops? It's a good question. On one hand, Russia does recognize the challenges

which it faced in Ukraine. The sinking of the Moskva is an outlier. It isn't something that will probably be repeated anytime soon. This is definitely a lesson learned for the Russian Navy. The sinking of that ship didn't necessarily change how Russia conducts its war in Ukraine, or it didn't necessarily change the way the war is going right now. What is, however, enshrined in the doctrine is the belief that Russia is a naval superpower. It draws on its historical presence in different, again, different oceans and different seas. It identifies area closest to Russia as key for its national security development. It draws on Russia's ongoing modernization of its fleet, construction of a new surface and underwater vessels.

And so, of course, Russia views itself as a naval superpower because it inherited that status from Soviet Union and the Soviet Union inherited that status from the Russian Empire. How that's actually going to play out is a different story. Of course, Russia isn't the only country that is seeking to challenge the United States across the maritime domain. China today is building its naval vessels at a pace which is absolutely eye-watering to many Russian government and military officials. And so Russia specifically spells out in its doctrine that it must forge new relationships with other maritime powers like India. In other words, it needs to improve certain relationships. It needs to look for new opportunities and forge such relationships. In fact, Iran and Saudi Arabia appear specifically in the maritime domain as the states of very specific interest to the Russian Navy. Today, despite the fact that Russian Navy is much smaller than the U.S. Navy, it is able to conduct operations far outside of its immediate maritime domain. So Russian vessels are traversing the global ocean.

There are port coals in the Red Sea, in the Mediterranean, in the Pacific, in the Caribbean, and in the Atlantic. And so Russia looks at itself as a country that can build on existing capabilities, meet the challenges, and invest in new technologies that can bolster its current capabilities. Again, it isn't clear 100% how that's going to be accomplished, whether there's current funding that's enough or whether some funding will have to be reallocated. But we have to look at it from Russia's standpoint. It views itself as a country that can rise to that challenge. A good question is whether this doctrine was written before Russia invaded Ukraine and before its economy and society are feeling the effects of the sanctions and before the development of these very massive sanctions against the Russian state. But no sanctions are ironclad. There are states which have been sanctioned as well, and they were able to develop in their own way rather rapidly and rather successfully. Countries like Iran and North Korea are constantly under U.S. and global sanctions, and yet they're able to not only develop new weapons and technologies, but even get success in the foreign policy domain. So sanctions, while they are identified in the maritime doctrine, isn't something that is viewed as a way to stop Russian development and Russian growth.

The doctrine points to a number of opportunities where Russia can reallocate its resources, again, that science and technology. Russia has been historically strong in the underwater domain. It is obviously one of the main powers capable of developing and fielding state-of-the-art nuclear submarines. Nuclear propulsion in particular is an area where Russia really stands alone. Perhaps this doctrine can build on Russia's current successes to meet the next set of challenges. But I think we do have to ask whether the war in Ukraine, however it concludes or however long it lasts, will have an impact on how Russia addresses its challenges, how the sanctions

will have an impact on the Russian economy and the society, and whether there will be changes in the document. And I do have to sort of restate again, this doctrine doesn't spell out something that Russia has to accomplish all at once. These are long-term goals, and they could be accomplished in stages. And even if some parts of the doctrine are not going to be accomplished for one way or another, there are other areas in the doctrine where the Russian industry, where Russian Navy and its military can meet rather successfully. So I'll leave you with one last question. How do you see the Russian Navy's role

in the continuation of the war in Ukraine? I mean, do you think they're going to play more of a role or less of a role? How do you see that going forward? It's likely that the Russian Navy has learned very hard and very significant lessons from the sinking of the Moskva, from its departure from Snake Island, from its attempts at different types of maritime landings. But Russia views Black Sea as a key area

and a key national security concern. And so bolstering the Black Sea fleet, allocating resources to the naval capabilities and addressing the challenges presented by Ukrainian defenses and Ukrainian capabilities like its long-range missiles and long-range UAVs is going to be an area where Russian Navy will concentrate its resources. Again, we do have to remind the listeners that despite Ukrainian successes, it has a very small Navy when compared to the Russian Naval fleet, and most of the Russian Black Sea fleet remains far sort of out of reach of the Ukrainian capability. So the Black Sea fleet can actually play a significant role if russia allocates a very specific task to its naval surface and and and other vessels in the area but

again russia maintains a significant presence in the black sea its black sea fleet it's one of its most advanced and it it is yet to play a significant role in the war unfortunately we're just about a time for today before we go sam i'd like to ask you you know what you're working on and where, if anywhere, our listeners can find you online? Me and my team are working on the analysis of Russian unmanned and robotic and autonomous capabilities in Ukraine. This is an area of rapid growth for both the Russian and the Ukrainian militaries. We have written several analyses that basically go over the technologies

and the tactics that both the Russians and the Ukrainians are using with respect to their unmanned and autonomous systems, specifically unmanned aerial vehicles, you can find our research as well as the research on Russian military in general on our website, cna.org, where we posted a lot of analyses and reports related to the Russian military, defense, and industrial capabilities. Awesome. And we'll make sure to put some of the links to some of that research below the show. I'd like to thank my guest again, Samuel Bendit, for talking to us about his work with Russia's Maritime Doctrine through his work at CNA and the Center for New American Security. Thank you. Take care.

Thank you. I don't know.