Sea Control - Sea Control 396- Russian Naval Dominance in the Black Sea with Dr. Daniel Fiott

Episode Date: December 11, 2022

Links1. "Relative Dominance: Russian Naval Power in the Black Sea," by Dr. Daniel Fiott, War on the Rocks, November 9, 2022.2. "The 2022 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation: Mobilization, Maritime Law, and Socio-Economic Warfare," by Olga R. Chiriac, CIMSEC, November 28, 2022.3. "Sea Control 392 - Russia's Arctic Strategy in a Changing Region with Katarzyna Zysk," by Zsófia Wolford, CIMSEC, November 22, 2022.4. "Sea Control 382 - Russian NOTAM Use Near Norway with Dr. Kristian Åtland," by Jared Samuelson, CIMSEC, September 22, 2022.

Hello, and welcome to the Sea Control Podcast. I'm Nathan Miller. Today, Jared has Dr. Daniel Fiat of the Free University of Brussels, Brussels School of Governance, and the Real Elcano Institute to discuss Russian naval dominance in the Black Sea. I edited and produced today's episode. At CIMSEC, we believe victory in the maritime domain starts with great ideas communicated compellingly. Write, fight, win. Please help us continue to fulfill our mission by donating and making SimSec your preferred non-profit on Amazon Smile. I'd like to pause here to highlight our local chapters. Whether you're in South Korea, Egypt, Singapore, France, New York, India, or the

Caribbean, chances are there's a SimSec local chapter near you. You can find a full listing of local chapters and contact information on our website at simsec.org. So if you're interested, please reach out. Finally, I want to take this opportunity to recommend our partners in the SimSec Podcast Network, The Bilge Pumps. You can find Alex, Jamie, Drack, and a pile of Iron Brew bottles wherever you download your podcasts. And with that, Kimber's Men. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Hello Hashimites and welcome back to Board Seat Control. My guest today is Dr. Daniel Fiat and we're going to be discussing his article in War on the Rocks

entitled Relative Dominance, Russian Naval Power in the Black Sea. So Daniel, welcome. Could you start by telling the listeners a little bit more about yourself, please? Well, thanks very much for having me on. And yeah, I guess my background is largely in academia, or at least in the kind of think tank academia world. So I'm currently an assistant professor at the Free University of Brussels. And I'm also a non-resident fellow at the Real Elcano Institute, which is a think tank based in Madrid as well. And at the university, I basically head up our program on defense and statecraft. So very much following closely the war on Ukraine, and I'm very happy to be able to join you today.

Well, thank you again for coming on. Just to timestamp this for the listeners, we are recording Sunday, November 27. So if there's something that's happened in the naval war that you think we should be commenting on, it's happened after that date. That's why we're not touching it. And then as a reminder to the listeners, all opinions are our own and not reflective of any institution with which we might be otherwise associated. So, Daniel, how would you characterize the naval war to date and how it's gone for the Russian Navy? Yeah, well, I guess a bit more generally in terms of how Russia has fared in Ukraine, and that is not very well at all. Although, as I point out in my article, I think the maritime dimension or the naval dimension is one area that we still can't write off completely. Now, if we look back over the last few months of the war, we can actually see, I think, firstly, the residue of the 2014 seizure of Crimea, where at least some of the studies I looked at calculated at least up to 75% of Ukraine's naval fleet and capacity was lost. So we already start off, I guess, at least on the Ukrainian side on the back foot. But then again, if you start looking at recent history from the war, you see that Ukraine have also nevertheless chalked up a few interesting and very symbolic victories, I would say, not just in terms of pushing the Russians out of so-called Snake Island as well, but also the sinking of the Moskva, the flagship back in April 2022.

And there have been also follow on reports as well about, you know, attacks on at least four other vessels. And we saw very recently in October, at the end of October, got a lot of press, of course. And that was the use of unmanned surface vehicles to take the fight to Russia at Sevastopol as well, and to create quite a lot of havoc there. On the other hand, as well, you've seen Ukraine, I think, using the Black Sea space quite interestingly. There was, of course, the explosion at the Kerch Bridge as well, which, again, may not necessarily have had an overt maritime or naval dimension to it. But I think symbolically about Ukraine's fight in the Black Sea, I think that was also quite important. It should also be stated, I guess, that right at the beginning of the war, I think the Russians themselves thought that they were in for a pretty quick victory. If you look, for example, at how they positioned themselves with amphibious landing vessels as well in places like Odessa, I think the Russian fleet thought that they were in for a relatively easy victory there to land forces on Ukraine and then push into Odessa as part of their overall offensive. But we saw there that Ukraine actually operated quite an effective mine warfare strategy there in pushing the Russians

back from there. That's not to say, of course, that the Russians weren't still able to blockade Ukraine. And that, of course, as we know, had a big impact in terms of grain and fertilizer exports, with then the knock-on effect as well to the Ukrainian economy. So I think overall, it's slightly mixed. Of course, the Ukrainians are focusing predominantly on seizing land. But as I say in the article, I think we've got to now be a bit careful that as Russians are pushed back from Ukrainian territory, that they may fall back or have to fall back on the naval dimension of their war. You started your article noting that Russia still retained critical advantages in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. What are those advantages? Yeah, I think, I mean, one of the first things to keep in mind is, of course, the existing size of the Black Sea Fleet as well. So I already mentioned that the Russians have had some notable casualties in terms of the size of their fleet and on flagships and let's say symbolic vessels that they hold.

But I think if you start to look at some of the numbers and there is, of course, a dispute over the precise numbers. but if you start to dig down you still see that of course their submarine fleet is still pretty much in place the same with the the number of frigates as well that they hold it's a vestibule and then there are still a range of corvettes which they can still use I think to great effect and there are also amphibious vessels as well and of course we don't know if Russia will be able to use those amphibious vessels anytime soon given the fact that they're losing the war on land but I think from a, let's say, in terms of the size of mass of the Black Sea Fleet, it's still a threat. And we have to be also mindful of the fact that the Bosporus is currently closed. I mean, under

the Montreux Convention, Turkey has exercised that right, which means that the Russians have been able to lock in, I guess, their relative naval dominance vis-a-vis the Ukrainians, which have suffered great losses over the intervening years, but also because NATO vessels, especially in Romania, Bulgaria, not going to get involved, Turkey and not going to get involved in this war. So it's been able to lock in, I guess, Russia's naval relative dominance here. Another thing that we've got to keep in mind, of course, is the enablers that those naval vessels allow for, which is, of course, the ability to launch cruise missile attacks, missile attacks. And also to keep in mind as well that the Russians have, I think, very effectively set up a coastal bastion, as it

were within the Black Sea to also deter, I guess, Ukrainian attacks or to deter Ukraine a bit more generally. So I think in terms of conventional balance, naval balance, the Russians still, of course, hold that. But of course, we also see that the Russians have become much more cautious, hubbled up in Sevastopol, not willing to really exercise or demonstrate their naval maneuverability for fear of the fact, of course, that Ukraine will strike in many of the innovative ways that they have done. So they maintain that balance. I still think for the long term, that is something for Ukraine and for those countries supporting Ukraine to be relatively worried about. I think we'll get onto that a bit later. But I think in terms of conventional

balance, the Russians still hold the numbers, as it were. You noted Russia largely has command of the sea due to destruction of the ukrainian navy but sea control needs to come with it in order to affect so what is russia attempting to do with its sea control yeah i think this is the this is the critical point and one of the things that i try to stress in the article is also we've got to think of this as an interlinking between what happens on land so the land war and then what could happen at sea as well and i think they're as we know even from history intimately linked. So one of the things I state in the War on the Rocks piece is in fact this, that the more and more Russia gets pushed back to the sea, as it were, the more and more

it will have to think about how its maritime dimension or its naval strategy will have to pick up the shortfalls of its losses on land. And what I say, I think, is really that they're trying to pursue a kind of bastion strategy where they can hold space, so they can hold the maritime space through a mixture of their naval vessels and also their ability to launch missile strikes as well. So they're going to try and install a bastion strategy there, very well defended, or at least in theory, very well defended from outside attacks to use those long range attack capabilities that they have, in particular, trying to hit where possible, very, very vulnerable, but also very important Ukrainian critical infrastructure,

as we've also seen in terms of you know maintaining electricity grids etc and then i think one of the other things i touch upon and it's important is by holding that space in the black sea the russians even if they're at a more conventional military disadvantage to the ukrainians could still try to use the continued threat of their naval dominance to either try and maintain a kind of military status quo, so not to give up the war completely, maybe even to lock in a frozen conflict with Ukraine as well, even if the Russians are pushed, even if the army is pushed from the territory. And then also, and I think this is probably the most important aspect, based on what we see happening on the ground as well, that is to buy enough time for future

rearmament of the Russian military. So I guess one of the running theories would be is that if Russia now receives a defeat on the battlefield, that it's not going to go away with its tail between its legs. It's going to want to rebuild its military, also learn the lessons from its failed campaign as well, and then to come back stronger in the future. And I think that the launching pad for that is really the naval fleet and also the maritime dimension in the Black Sea. So it's one of the reasons why I think politically we also need to be a bit careful about how we think about Russia's naval strategy and how it may evolve the relationship that it has to what's happening on land. And then also to think even in terms of our strategies countering the Russian threats, what more can we do to weaken the naval dimension in the Black Sea as part of an overall effort to weaken Russia and its resolve in Ukraine? Do you think Russia's use of its Navy for long range strikes is effective? Because I know you mentioned like the size of the Russian fleet comparatively. Just for me observing this as an outsider, it does not really seem like they have the mass necessary in that fleet to decisively affect anything on land.

they can throw some missiles up. But that missile battery is pretty limited as far as when you talk about precision guided munitions. And then all those vessels have to come back to port if you want to rearm them. Yeah, I think that's a really, really good point. I mean, at the moment, again, the figures we have are not definite. So it's a bit of a problem to really pin down. But at least the figures I've seen in reports have said that Russia still maintains at least 50% of its pre-war inventory when it comes to missiles in particular. And I think you're completely right that that's not enough in its own right to be able to launch decisive strikes against Ukraine. What we can see, however, and that's already been the case in the last few weeks and months,

are let's call them strikes on Ukraine's morale. So hitting cities indiscriminately, trying to hit civilian centers. Incidentally, we should say it doesn't seem to be having a morale effect on the ukrainian armed forces or the government or even the people they seem to be dusting themselves off as we know that they they usually do very very strong people strong morale so i'm not sure that strategy itself is is effective but it's still one that is open to the russians and i also think that in terms of being able to precision strike key infrastructure i think is really really important we saw even a few weeks ago or even a few days ago, the looming or continuous references to, you know, nuclear power plants

in Ukraine. And I'm thinking, of course, if you're in if you're in Russia, and you're desperate, and you're looking for a big effect, then you still have the power within your means to strike these types of infrastructure to cause damage, indiscriminate damage, shock factor, etc, etc. So it is still a risk. I think what's going to be very interesting, and that's what you asked in your question is the ability of the russians to replenish and that's a general point by the way that's a general issue that they have for their armed forces but i think also in terms of precision strike that's going to be critically important because they're wasting as they go their stocks and their inventories and of course with the sanctions that have already been imposed on them

it you know raises serious questions about the ability of the russian economy to replenish those types of strike capabilities, and especially without going into the details or the weeds of it all, you know, even constraints on, you know, semiconductors, chips, etc., all of the high-tech stuff that you need to put these capabilities in the air from naval vessels. I mean, that is going to become increasingly a struggle for the Russians, unless, of course, they start to do, as we've seen, buying off-the-shelf ready-made missiles or munitions from elsewhere, be it Iran or the Chinese if they want to get into that game. So I think that this will also become an increasingly important part of the Ukrainian and Western strategy against the Russians, especially

directed to their long-strike capabilities. And that has to be, of course, factored in in sanctions. That's why it has to keep coming back onto the table. The screw has to be turned even more in this area to make sure that the Russians aren't able to replenish at a rapid pace and to replace the munitions that they will be using as time goes by. So I think a lot will depend upon the health of the Russian inventory moving forward in this regard. And then I had one follow-up question on the Bastion strategies. How executable do you think that is in such a confined space as the Black Sea Sea of the Zogs? We've already seen strikes against port infrastructure there that would lead us to believe

that nothing that the Russians have there would appear to be safe, even when it's sitting in port, whether that was losing the amphibious vessel at Berdyansk. I think we've already seen some strikes in Sevastopol. And I think the latest unmanned surface vessel attack was on Novorossiysk, if I'm reading the reporting correctly. So it does not seem to me that there's sort of any respite for them in any of the three major port facilities that you would think about in that region, which would seem to be a prerequisite for executing a successful bashing strategy. So is that strategy even executable for the Russian Navy? Yeah, well, I think for the Russian Navy, it's the only choice that they have at the

moment. And the Ukrainians have already picked up on that. Hence the reason we have, I think, all of these attacks and the awareness to attack Russia in that way. So I think that from a strategic point of view, I also think that long term, we're yet to see how Russia is going to approach its security in that region. I think you were spot on when you said that it is geographically a very tight area, very congested area. I would imagine, I think, in the next few months, depending on how Russia's war more generally goes,

that the Kremlin will pay much more attention to that. I mean, also because the symbolic effect of Ukrainian handmade craft, you know, sailing close to Russian submarines is not a look that the to um so so i would imagine also that you know if we're if i'm right in the general thesis that that the russians will want to you know hem themselves in and secure themselves in this bastion within the black sea that that is one area that they'll want to want to focus on it is worth i think questioning and this is what your question does quite interestingly is really look at the counterfactual and say well if the russians don't do that what does that tell us about their overall approach? Have they given up? Because I mean, if you look at the Russian general outlook, I mean,

one of the reasons and motivations I wrote the article was, in fact, because the naval area was the one place apart from its nuclear arsenal that I thought that it had a relative advantage against Ukraine, and also, you know, Western states who are supporting them. Now, if the maritime naval dimension of that falls apart, then it does beg the question of, well, where will the Russians then have to rely upon. I think in the last few months, if you want to connect that kind of counterfactual to some of the nuclear sabre rattling that the Russians have, you know, put out in public, I think that may be one way to think of it. But I think the options that the Russians have at the moment are very few, getting also very, you know, much, much thinner for them.

And that, you know, may push the Russians into other desperate measures. But it is something that we have to keep our eye on. I think that if the Russians fail in their Bastion strategy, then coming back to the point I made earlier about the connection between land and sea, then they're in real difficulties, I think, real difficulties. And we know that the existing Black Sea fleet can't really go anywhere, it can't leave the Black Sea. So it's pretty much stuck there in a mine infested sea with Ukrainians trying to hunt them down rightfully. So, you know, it could look very, very bleak for the Russian Navy and for the Kremlin very, very quickly indeed if they don't succeed with their Bastion strategy. You're also arguing Ukraine needs to rebuild

its Navy. And how could it do that? And is that really going to be possible in the midst of this war? Yeah, I think within the midst of the war, probably not. I mean, but there are some things that we can do. I mean, I think I already said that in the article that we have to think a bit more ambitiously about delivering anti-ship missiles to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, especially the Harpoon. We've also seen, by the way, very recently, steps by European governments and European Union even as well, moving into the military training dimension. And I think that that will be very interesting to keep an eye on in terms of the naval dimension. So also being able to use, for example, you know, improvised or micro torpedoes, you know, all of these types

of strategies, I think, which could help the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and which Western militaries themselves may have something to say about, that will be really, really useful. So I think within the midst of the war, we have to keep up with the deliveries of anti-ship missiles and training. And I think that that's really important. However, I do think we need to think about the future a bit. If I take one lesson, at least from 2014, and the seizure of Crimea is that in the interregnum, if you want to call it that between the two Russian invasions, we really didn't do enough to help the Ukrainians build up their naval capacity. And so I would hope that however this war ends, and you know, however, kind of history prevails here that we don't waste

another opportunity to help the Ukrainians build up their naval fleet. The Ukrainians themselves have already started doing that. I mean, they have already placed an order with the Turks for two corvettes. It's very difficult to, of course, deliver them in the midst of a war, as you're completely correct to suggest. There is also, of course, steps, including by the US government to supply the Ukrainian Navy with coastal vessels, patrol vessels, again, not easy to deliver in the middle of a war, but still will be on the inventory moving forward. And then, of course, We see other European governments who have reached out to Ukraine as well. And in particular, the UK, Ukraine, I think, signed a deal at the beginning of this year

as well, looking at warships in the future and the development of warships as well. So what I would really hope is that Western governments follow through with that, to not just leave Ukraine kind of hanging afterwards. Because I think, you know, whatever happens in the future, if there's a resumption of war after, you know, some kind of settlement or whatever, or Ukrainian victory, we shouldn't assume that the Russians will just rest on their laurels and, you know, as I said, rush back with the tail between their legs, we will then have to substantially invest in Ukraine's military assets across the board, including the naval dimension and the back sea. And I think that's why we then

need to be quite ambitious, I think, and quite bold in making sure that Ukraine can replenish their navy, make sure that the conventional balance is, you know, swayed towards them. And also, let's think about long term as well. I mean, one of the most immediate issues that we will have to deal with in the future, however, the war settles itself is demining. In the Black Sea is, as I said, it's infested currently with mines. So we will also have to think a bit more about how we engage there. I mean, I'm sure NATO will have a role in that. It's already playing a role in that regard. But I think in the future, Ukraine will probably be knocking on our door as well in terms of helping them to develop that. So they will be ambitious. I think they'll have money behind it as well, for obvious reasons. And I just hope we don't replay the game after 2014, where we kind of took an eye off the situation and didn't help Ukraine develop the naval assets it needed. Well, unfortunately, that's all that we have time for today. I'd like to thank my guest, Dr. Daniel Fiat. Daniel, where can we find you online and what are you working on next? well you can always find me on the free university of brussels website but of course the best place the easiest place is on twitter so it's just my name um you can find me there and we currently have quite a big project actually on what we would call bridging allies so looking at how we can

bridge both the nato alliance so us europe and then also with the increasing alliances growing in the Indo-Pacific. So we're going to be looking at that issue very, very closely. And of course, myself, in a personal research capacity, I'm not going to be taking my eye off the Black Sea anytime soon. Well, thank you again for joining us. To the listeners, thanks for tuning in. We'll see you next time.

© BF-WATCH TV 2021 © transcript Emily Beynon